By Sergey Sukhankin, July 16, 2024
After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, a small portion of the country – Kaliningrad oblast, on the Baltic Sea – had a chance to become Russia’s “Baltic Hong Kong.”
Many in the West, as well as members of Russia’s liberal-reformist circles, hoped Kaliningrad would become a prosperous and democratic bridge between a growing European Union (EU) and a Russia throwing off seventy years of Communism and militarization.
Unfortunately, the dream turned out to be a mirage. Today, the oblast has largely returned to its Cold War stance, posing a growing threat to the West.
Located between Poland and Lithuania, Kaliningrad emerged at the end of the Second World War in 1945 as a secluded, militarized Soviet bastion on the Baltic, and remained a thorn in Europe’s side throughout the Cold War.
However, the era of Glasnost in the mid-1980s and the end of the Soviet Union convinced many that Kaliningrad could be a “testing ground” where economic, political, and cultural models and strategies of cooperation between Russia and the West would be put to practice.
The dreamers were forced to return to reality following Russia’s aggressive 2014 annexation of Crimea and its hybrid war against Ukraine in the Donbas Oblast. Between 2014 and 2022 the situation stagnated further, with Kaliningrad increasingly causing “headaches” for its regional neighbours, primarily, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland, as well as the EU and its allies in North America.. Today, Kaliningrad presents several threats to security and sustainable development in Europe.
Kaliningrad as a military threat.
Between 1945 and 1991, Kaliningrad was among the most heavily militarized spots in the world, and an integral part of the Soviet Baltic Military District, which also included Soviet-occupied Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The region de-militarized in the 1990s – largely due to Russia’s economic collapse and a desire by Russian leadership to be seen as reconciling with the West.
However, beginning in 1999, Kaliningrad began to revert to its pre-1991 form by hosting the “Zapad-99” large-scale strategic-operational exercise. Russia conducted several other exercises under the same code name Zapad (“West”) in 2009, 2013, 2017, and 2021.
After Russia’s split from the West in 2014, it escalated the re-militarization of Kaliningrad. The post-Crimea transformation reportedly included turning the oblast into a so-called Anti Access Area Denial (A2/AD) zone – a West-coined term that is neither a part of Russia’s military parlance nor a part of its military-strategic doctrines – that seeks to limit the ability of opposing forces to enter an operational area, and prevent the free movement of enemy air and naval forces.
Leaving aside the discussion about the concept (A2/AD) itself, it is important to acknowledge that between 2014 and 2022, Russia significantly bolstered Kaliningrad’s military capabilities. Specifically, Russia concentrated on three main domains: enhanced radio-electronic warfare (EW); integrated, deeply echeloned anti-aircraft/missile defense systems; and precision-strike capabilities that employ a mix of coastal missile complexes as well as short-range ballistic missile systems.
Prior to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, it reportedly had at least 12,000 troops stationed in Kaliningrad, along with around 100 100 T-72 tanks, a couple hundred BTR fighting vehicles, Msta-S howitzers and BM-27 and BM-30 rocket-launchers. Since then, Russia has also recruited an undetermined number of (para)military forces in the oblast.
Despite Russia’s military build up, its current assets in Kaliningrad would be no match for NATO forces in a conventional conflict in the Baltic region. NATO would almost certainly smash Russia in a direct fight. However, as demonstrated during Ukraine’s unsuccessful summer counter-offensive in 2023, Russia would still be able to exact heavy losses on NATO personnel and equipment due to the regime’s defence systems.
Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has hampered its ability to also maintain military strength in Kaliningrad. In addition to cancelling Zapad-2023 military exercises, Moscow has reportedly redeployed several of its S-400 missile systems from Kaliningrad to the Ukrainian frontline in light of heavy losses.
However, the military danger posed by Kaliningrad hasn’t completely disappeared. Despite the post-2022 developments – mobilization and alleged redeployment of personnel and military equipment to Ukraine – Kaliningrad still retains much of its defensive military potential. And, since Russia doesn’t expect any near-term NATO aggression against the oblast, Moscow likely sees no reason to further reinforce its Baltic outpost. Even if Russia hypothetically engaged in a conflict with NATO in the Baltic Sea region, Kaliningrad would likely be ascribed an auxiliary role, with the vast bulk of operations carried out from Russian territory proper or neighbouring Belarus.
Kaliningrad as a source of hybrid threats.
Russia’s so-called “special military operation’ in Ukraine, launched in February 2022, was supposed to be over in mere weeks, according to Russian President Vladimir Putin. More than two years later, the vicious and brutal war grinds on, hampering Russia’s ability to further fortify Kaliningrad.
However, the oblast is still a potential source of Russian “hybrid threats” against Western adversaries.
During the 1990s and 2000s, Kaliningrad was an epicentre of Russian anti-EU disinformation campaigns: pointing to the “dangers” EU expansion posed the oblast, Moscow warned that further “isolation” of Kaliningrad would damage the oblast’s economy. Over the years, Russia has routinely used disinformation to sow discontent in its Baltic neighbours. Undoubtedly, Kaliningrad – as well as Russian agents in the EU (individuals and groups) – will be further employed by Moscow to destabilize neighbouring Baltic states. Indeed, earlier this year, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs de-facto threatened Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and promised “not to forget Russian speakers […] living in Pribaltika [Russian derogatory term used in regard to the three Baltic states].”
Kaliningrad is also a base for Russian cyber warfare and radio-electronic sabotage. For instance, in late April 2024 two passenger jets (en route from Helsinki to Tartu) were forced to turn around mid-air after reported Russian GPS jamming close to Kaliningrad. Russia has been experimenting with GPS jamming in the Baltic for some time now; it’s a very dangerous game, threatening shipping in addition to air travel. Officials throughout the Baltic region, as well as with NATO member countries, have condemned the illegal and potentially deadly practice.
Russian GPS jamming needs to end before “it results in significant loss of life or escalates into armed conflict directly involving NATO,” warned Dana Goward, a member of the US Space-Based Positioning Navigation & Timing National advisory board.
Finally, Russia could also use Kaliningrad as a base to spark border crises with the EU by shuttling illegal migrants from the Middle East through the oblast and into neighbouring Baltic nations. As recently as 2023, Russia organized and executed a massive border crisis with Finland by sending waves of illegal migrants into that country, forcing Helsinki to close its border with Russia. Should Russia decide to escalate tensions in the Baltic region, it could easily use this tactic again as part of a wider de-stabilization effort.
Implications for Canada and policy recommendations.
The myriad threats posed by Kaliningrad oblast should also concern Canada. Following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Canada joined Operation Reassurance (OpRe), currently the country’s largest overseas mission involving the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). By 2026, Canada’s troop levels in Latvia are expected to double, increasing the number of permanently deployed military personnel in this country to 2,200 members. Canada’s commitment also includes $316 million to purchase new air-defence and counter-drone systems as well as anti-tank missiles for its troops in Latvia. Given Russia’s belligerence and willingness to engage in actual combat to achieve its strategic goals, a conflict with Canadian troops in Latvia is a real concern.
Specifically, Canadian troops stationed in Latvia could face two types of threats:
- A threat of direct military confrontation: Under this scenario, Kaliningrad (given its current military potential) would be used as a sort of “forward operating base” for Russian aggression against the Baltic States or Poland. In this scenario, if NATO honours its responsibilities, the result could be a nuclear conflict between NATO and Russia. In current conditions, this seems unrealistic.
- Indirect threats emanating from a wide range of factors, including Russia attempts to spark an illegal migrant crisis in Latvia: In this case, the threat would likely not come from Kaliningrad, due to the geographic distances between the oblast and Lativa. It’s more likely the migrants would be sent to Poland or Lithuania. In Latvia, Russian threats would likely emerge from Belarus, including GPS jamming and cyber attacks akin to those carried out by Russia against Estonia in 2007.
Furthermore, given the high number of Russian covert agents in the Latvia, it is a prime target for Russian destabilization. If Canadian troops are forced to (in)directly counter Russian threats, Moscow could use that as an excuse to “need” to respond with military force.
To deal with the dangers posed by Kaliningrad, the Canadian government should pursue the following lines.
First, it should apply political-economic pressure on Kaliningrad and Russia’s economic presence in the Balic Sea region. Canada has limited military capabilities but wields substantial “soft power” influence in part due to its role as aG7 nation. Canada should introduce sanctions – preferably in alliance with its regional strategic partners, primarily Denmark – against all outbound carriers of grain departing Kaliningrad-based ports destined for Latin American markets and especially Mexico. Profits from Russian grain exports are helping to fuel Putin’s war machine in Ukraine. Kaliningrad is one of Russia’s key grain exporting centres for the Latin America and Caribbean region, and its importance is only likely to grow – unless actions are taken to stifle it. Canada should also work with its Baltic Sea-based strategic partners to create and enact policies that close the Danish Straits to Russia’s hydrocarbons carriers. Barring Russian export activities in the Baltic Sea region will have a major economic impact on Kaliningrad.
Second, Canada can apply informational-psychological pressure against the Putin regime. As one of the world’s staunchest proponents of democracy and human rights, Ottawa should more actively support anti-Putin forums such as the Free Nations of PostRussia Forum, which champions democracy and independence for regions and territories illegally annexed or colonized by Moscow. These organizations help to turn the Russian populace against the Putin regime.
Finally, although Canada is not a military superpower, this doesn’t mean that Ottawa shouldn’t contribute to the military security of the Baltic region. For instance, Canadian troops deployed in Latvia could be sent on a rotating basis to Ukraine to act as military instructors. It’s not certain whether the Canadian public would welcome CAF “boots on the ground” in Ukraine. However, there are clear benefits that go beyond simply helping to train Ukrainian troops. Canadian forces could gain valuable insights (in practice) in Russia’s methods of warfare. Furthermore, if Canadian (para)military personnel became more actively engaged in missions and training in Lithuania and Poland, it would send a clear message to Moscow about Canada’s unwavering commitment to the security its strategic allies in the Baltic region.
Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a senior fellow at the Jamestown Foundation (Washington, DC) and a fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN).
