By Nguyen Hung Son, March 2, 2023
Canada’s much awaited Indo-Pacific strategy was finally released in late 2022, following much consideration and after several of Canada’s western allies adopted similar policies. The strategy’s late arrival reflected Canada’s struggle to regain focus on the Indo-Pacific region in a year dominated by events in Europe. It may also indicate how carefully Canada calibrated its increasingly sophisticated relationship with the region, including with ASEAN.
In the comprehensive, visionary and pragmatic new policy, Canada recognized the central role of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and aimed to elevate the partnership to a strategic level, making Canada one of the last remaining dialogue partners of ASEAN to do so.
This is a significant development in ASEAN-Canada relationship. In the 45 years since the dialogue partnership was established, it had been best described as pragmatic and progressive, but not necessarily that strategic.
Canada’s primary interests with ASEAN had been development and trade, which was overshadowed by its other stronger regional trading relationships with partners such as China, Japan and South Korea. Canada-ASEAN relations suffered a blow after the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998, when ASEAN lost some of its appeal as a lucrative trading partner. Despite ASEAN being its fourth largest merchandise trading partner, Canada’s current trading bandwidth with Asia is still mostly absorbed by Northeast Asia.
Canada’s progressive values and agenda helped make it an important development partner of ASEAN. Indeed, Canada had assisted ASEAN member states address many of its developmental needs such as education, health, environment protection, and development gaps, among others. Differences in values between Canada and certain ASEAN member states, however, were hard to overcome at times. Such differences could even become politicized and further stagnate ties. Canada’s recent difficult relationships with the Duterte’s government of the Philippines and Thailand’s military government were demonstrative. Canada refusal to include ASEAN member states with a higher GDP per capita than Canada in its development cooperation also clashed with ASEAN’s consensus principle.
ASEAN often saw Canada as one of the most distant and disinterested dialogue partners, whose level of engagement with Southeast Asia fell far behind its potential. That partly explained ASEAN’s persistent lukewarm attitude to Canada becoming a member of the East Asia Summit and ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus.
However, the rapid developments in the Indo-Pacific and the global order at large invited both Canada and ASEAN to rethink their values and engagement.
ASEAN could no longer take its “centrality” for granted as power politics returned to its region after more than three decades since the end of the Cold War, challenging the normative foundation upon which the ASEAN project was built. ASEAN would need to prove its continued relevance, reach out, diversify and revitalize its partnerships. ASEAN’s geographical centrality in the Indo-Pacific and position as host of the most active regional diplomatic processes make it hard for any country to bypass ASEAN if they want to seriously engage the region.
For ASEAN, having another G7 country as its strategic partner would only further anchor the open and inclusive regional architecture, with itself at the centre, that was foreseen in the ASEAN Outlook for the Indo-Pacific. Canada’s formal participation in regional institutions might strengthen those institutions by ensuring diversification and balance.
Canada also saw the value of engaging the Indo-Pacific region more comprehensively and strategically after it realized that preserving the rules-based international order and navigating major powers competition were a real and urgent common interest.
Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy is ambitious, offering renewed optimism and enthusiasm in ASEAN-Canada relations. ASEAN would appreciate the long-term vision, detailed planning and resources committed in the strategy, which would build lasting connectivity between not only governments but also the grassroots. Canada’s expertise and investment in trade and sustainable green future resonate well with ASEAN member states’ priorities and should be welcomed.
ASEAN would also support Canada’s intention to play a more active security role in the region, first and foremost through strengthening Canada’s voice in upholding the United Nations Charter and international law, such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In addition, Canada’s intention to support capacity-building programs ranging from cyber to intelligence would be appreciated as well.
ASEAN, however, would be very cautious in how Canada pursues these security roles. While ASEAN may not dispute Canada’s claim that China’s power has become increasingly “disruptive,” certain ASEAN member states may feel alienated if such a statement was seen as the primary motivation for Canada’s security engagement with Southeast Asia.
Canada’s declared objective to “push back” against coercion and intimidation, while perfectly legitimate and aligning well with some ASEAN member states’ interests, is also somewhat distinct from ASEAN’s collective and long-term objective of not turning itself into an enemy of anyone. ASEAN’s primary interest is rather to strengthen its collective resiliency and autonomy, broadening its strategic choices to prevent itself from being “pushed around” rather than being seen as aligning with external parties in pushing back against anyone.
Finally, while Canada’s military engagement and assets deployed in the region would undoubtedly be a crucial part of Canada’s long-term commitment to regional security and cooperation, such engagements and assets should be complemented by other “soft security” measures. Enhancing Canada’s engagement in the vibrant think tanks network in the region, for example, would help inject Canada’s voice and the power of its ideas in shaping the regional diplomatic discourse.
Canada was once an active track-two player in the Asia-Pacific, for example in promoting disputes settlement through dialogues and cooperation in the South China Sea. Canada’s renowned and influential international experts might be well suited to lead the return of Canada to the Indo-Pacific. The Asia Pacific Foundation’s intention to establish its permanent presence in the region is welcome news in that direction.
Canada is the latest to join the global pivot towards the Indo-Pacific. Since other countries’ Indo-Pacific strategies refer to ASEAN as a significant partner in their engagement with the region, one of Canada’s first priorities might be to work with ASEAN to synergize and coordinate these strategies, through the ASEAN process, to minimize overlaps and maximize the efficiency of Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy’s implementation.
Nguyen Hung Son is Vice President of the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam.
