By Sergey Sukhankin, March 5, 2024
The year 2023 was marked by an ominous geopolitical trend: dithering by Western allies and like-minded nations as destructive forces and rogue states unleashed waves of chaos and violence that openly challenged global stability and rules-based order.
Russia’s dramatic and bloody war of aggression against Ukraine was supplemented by (yet another) wave of destabilization in the Middle East. In response to Hamas’s vicious terror attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023 – which included the murder, torture, rape, and kidnapping of everyday citizens – Israel launched an invasion of the Gaza Strip. In retaliation, the Iran-backed Houthis of Yemen began attacking international shipping in the Red Sea – effectively paralyzing the movement of goods via the world’s busiest transportation artery, the Suez Canal.
Across the Middle East, the conflict spread. Iran’s proxy militias launched attacks on US forces and military facilities deployed in Syria, Iraq, and Jordan, killing and injuring US military personnel. At the same time, dramatic deterioration of the security environment in the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and Indo-Pacific regions – with Venezuela and North Korea provoking regional crises – ensued.
All these seemingly disparate events have one common variable: the tacit, and in some cases, overt support of a powerful rogue state that has repeatedly violated the norms and principles of international law – the Russian Federation.
Given the substantial geographic distances between the above-mentioned theatres and Canada, one might wonder about the relevance of the growing global destabilization. However, Russia’s actions could have a direct negative impact on Canada, its national interests, and its relationships with strategic allies in Europe.
As one of the leaders of the free world, and an avid supporter of Ukraine`s sovereignty, Canada is wholeheartedly loathed by Russia’s regime; the Kremlin likely considers Canada among its top strategic adversaries.
Russia’s broader strategic goals – to split Western unity, destroy transatlantic partnerships, and distract the West from Ukraine – are perhaps best achievable through further destabilization of the Middle East. Chaos in that region threatens energy security and trade, and increases the likelihood of a humanitarian catastrophe that could force thousands of displaced people to seek refuge in European Union nations. This, in turn, could spark a surge of support for both anti-European and far-right forces extensively supported by Moscow.
As part of its strategic arsenal, the Russian state has been employing so-called quasi-Private Military Companies (PMCs) and mercenary formations – paramilitary groups that are directly subordinated to and financed by the Russian state. Their destructive potential has proven to be quite effective in serving the Kremlin’s goals and objectives abroad.
The history of Russia’s paramilitary presence in the Greater Middle East goes back to the Cold War era. Countries that were formerly dominated by Western nations found a willing and eager partner in the USSR as they sought to shed their colonial shackles. For Moscow, decolonization was seen as a perfect opportunity to challenge the US and its Western allies. The Soviet Union unleashed virtually unconditional support for anti-Western state- and non-state actors that embraced platforms of extremism, militarism, and revanchism – offering them direct economic injections, massive supplies of arms and munitions, and military training at Russian-operated camps both in and outside the USSR.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Moscow`s involvement in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa) decreased, albeit for a short spell. However, following the 1998 appointment of Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov – well-known for his anti-Semitism and anti-Western stance – Russia began to re-engage with countries in the Middle Eastern and Indo-Pacific regions and cut ties with the West.
Russia’s return to the Middle East was heavily premised on the intensification of paramilitary cooperation. Russia used both legal and illegal channels of engagement that, among others, included the use of mercenaries. The first quasi-PMC with a recorded “Russian footprint” operating in the MENA region was FDG Corp. (which emerged in Iraq in the 1990s), followed by several other groups that, for a variety of reasons, ultimately failed to achieve any visible success.
Undiscouraged, Russia continued to strategically employ mercenaries for two main objectives: geopolitical (the proliferation of Russia’s power) and geo-economic (the expansion of its economic presence). Combined with the advantage of plausible deniability, the use of quasi-PMCs became an essential tool of Russia’s foreign policymaking in the Middle East.
After the outbreak of the Syrian (2011) and the Libyan (2014) civil wars, Russian mercenary formations – chief among them, the Wagner Group – were discovered on the ground by Russian investigative journalists. Later, the Russian state openly admitted to using quasi-PMCs in conflicts and civil wars across the MENA region.
Being tightly embroiled in regional conflicts, Russian mercenaries assisted the murderous regime of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, collaborated with pro-Iranian militia and extremist formations and committed despicable atrocities against prisoners and the civilian population. Importantly, it was Wagner’s “Syrian adventure” that created the image of the group as a merciless and highly effective military tool that can be used against rebels and domestic opposition.
Soon, Wagner forces began to appear in several Sub-Saharan African nations – all thanks to secret deals between Russian and African political leaderships. Under the pretense of “stabilizing” security environments and uprooting signs of protest against incumbent regimes, Russian mercenaries performed murderous missions in Sudan, the Central African Republic, Burundi, Mozambique, and countries of the Sahel G5 region, to name a few.
Subsequently, the Wagner Group was recruited to fight in the bloodiest battles of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including at Soledar and Bakhmut. In essence, the Middle East – primarily, Syria and Libya – was the “murder laboratory” where Wagner honed its savagely effective fighting skills for Ukraine.
So, how does the use of Wagner and other quasi-PMCs impact Canada?
First, via economic-related consequences and repercussions. Consider the Red Sea crisis. Moscow has been courting the Houthis since the Soviet era and has ramped up its support of the Yemeni terror group amid its attacks on international shipping.
This, in turn, is hurting Canadian shippers, who are reporting difficulties with delivering cargoes (mainly frozen food and clothing imports) on the East Coast. Their concern is supported by data from the Port of Halifax (the second-largest port in Eastern Canada), where cargo delivery has behind schedule for more than two weeks. Continuation of the crisis in the Red Sea is Russia’s golden opportunity to advertise its Northern Sea Route – Russia has de-facto prohibited so-called “unfriendly nations” to use this route – as an alternative transportation artery between East and West.
Russian aggression also has geopolitical ramifications for Canada: its destructive agendas in the Middle East could directly undermine or impede Ottawa’s foreign policy and security commitments in Europe (and specifically in Latvia, where around 1,000 Canadian troops are currently deployed as part of a NATO mission).
Further destabilization in the Middle East will likely result in a growing number of illegal migrants from the macro-region, many of whom are deliberately transported by the Russian side with the help of Belarus. So far, the most notorious cases occurred in Poland and Finland, where massive Russia-supported illegal migration provoked local crises.
Given Latvia’s strategic proximity to both Russia and Belarus, as well as Russia’s threatening rhetoric towards Riga, Moscow could try to organize a migration crisis against this country as well. In addition, Russia might choose to use Latvia’s large Russophone population as an excuse to send mercenaries or other irregulars into the country, with a goal of provoking locally deployed NATO forces.
In both of these scenarios, foreign forces, including Canadian troops, could find themselves the subject of provocations that could lead to an international crisis.
There are yet more domestic implications for Canada.
As one of the most ethnically diverse and welcoming nations, Canada’s strategic commitment to diversity and inclusion could be weaponized by Russia. As refugees and displaced peoples flee war zones in the Middle East and elsewhere, many might seek refuge in Canada. There is a chance, however slight, that Russia- and Iran-trained militants and radicals could use the turmoil and instability to slip into Canada for the purpose of establishing terror networks on its territory.
It is worth remembering that Russian President Vladimir Putin is actively using the playbook of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, who in the early 2010s threatened to destabilize Europe by sending waves of refugees from the Mediterranean to the West. Indeed, Putin directly referenced the Libyan dictator back in 2019, when, for the first time ever, existence of the Wagner Group was openly admitted by Russian political leadership.
Resilience in supporting Ukraine, and confronting Russia economically and diplomatically, are the only ways Canada can avoid (or drastically diminish) threats to its national security coming from Putin’s murderous regime.
Dr. Sergey Sukhankin is a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation (Washington, DC) and a Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN). His project discussing the activities of Russian PMCs, “War by Other Means,” informed the United Nations General Assembly report entitled “Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination.”
