By Juzel Lloyd
February 6, 2025
The global enrichment supply chain is undergoing a reckoning that will ripple through the nuclear industry for decades to come. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine sent shockwaves through global energy markets, forcing nations to turn away from its enriched uranium – a vital ingredient that powers the reactors electrifying much of global society. Enrichment is the process of increasing the concentration of uranium-235 needed to sustain the chain of nuclear reactions that produce the energy in a nuclear power plant. It is central to creating fuel for reactors and is a cornerstone for the nuclear fuel cycle. Russia’s dominance in global enrichment services make the transition particularly challenging, as countries scramble to find alternative vendors while expanding their domestic capacities.
The United States is taking steps to overcome decades of independence for uranium enrichment by expanding the capacity of its sole operational enrichment plant and allocating US$8 million to support the production of advanced nuclear fuel. Similarly, the UK government awarded over US$240 million to Urenco for the construction of a new enrichment facility, capable of producing fuel by 2031. France is also advancing its capabilities, with ongoing efforts to expand the capacity of the Georges Besse II centrifuge enrichment facility. A culmination of these individual efforts is the Sapporo 5 – a multinational partnership consisting of Japan, the United States, Britain, France, and Canada – that is committed to securing the nuclear fuel supply for civil nuclear power plants. These nations collectively account for 50 per cent of the world’s enrichment capacity, making their efforts crucial to diversify away from Russian fuel dependence. The alliance’s broader goals focus on creating a more resilient fuel supply as the global nuclear energy capacity increases with the declaration to triple global nuclear energy capacity by 2050. While these efforts are vital for the long-term stability of the supply chain, one crucial aspect is being overlooked: Canada’s uranium enrichment potential. As a top global uranium producer, Canada is uniquely positioned to fill the gap created by efforts to reduce dependence on Russian fuel. This need is further exacerbated by the increasing demand for high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU), required to power advanced reactors, as well as the growing number of developing countries turning to nuclear energy.
It’s time for Canada to leverage its strengths to redefine the global nuclear supply chain and establish a more secure, reliable future for the nuclear industry.
Canada already plays a crucial role in the global nuclear fuel security as a leading uranium producer. The nation possesses some of the world’s largest and highest-quality uranium reserves. Nuclear energy contributes approximately 15 per cent of Canada’s electricity, underscoring its importance to the country’s energy security. Canada has maintained a strong commitment to nonproliferation safeguards, exemplified by its heavy-water CANDU reactors, which are designed to operate without enriched fuel. However, recent global events demand that the Canadian government re-evaluate its position on uranium enrichment and its capacity to deliver these services. Russia’s stronghold on the global enrichment services poses a significant risk to the stability of the nuclear industry, a risk that Canada is well-positioned to mitigate.
By initiating enrichment services, Canada can diversify the global nuclear supply chain, reduce reliance on Russian fuel, and ensure the energy security of both established and emerging nuclear-powered states. Legislative action to establish enrichment capabilities would enable Canada to transform the nuclear fuel supply chain, becoming a key player in meeting the needs of allied nations and securing a reliable future for the global nuclear industry.
Russia’s grip on uranium enrichment
With its current dominance on uranium enrichment, Russia holds the global nuclear industry in a geopolitical chokehold. The nation occupies about 44 per cent of the global enrichment services. This substantial share of the uranium enrichment market is attributed to its extensive capacity, expanded over time as it downblended weapons-grade uranium under the Megatons to Megawatts agreement with the United States. The high costs associated with constructing new enrichment facilities have deterred other nations from prioritizing their domestic capacities, leading to reliance on external suppliers. Canada is capable of meeting its domestic demand through its own production, unlike many of its allies. In 2023, the EU imported 23 per cent of its uranium supply from Russia. In the same year, Russia accounted for 12 per cent of imported uranium for the U.S.
The risks of this dependence are already coming to fruition as regions scramble to reorient their nuclear fuel supplies to accommodate for the move away from Moscow’s supply. Although this reorientation will take time, there are near-term consequences that garner concern. The most prominent example is Putin’s recently enforced limit on its US uranium exports in response to nuclear fuel sanctions. Moscow’s grasp on the global nuclear fuel production spells more than the economic benefits. It increases the regime’s political and economic influence on global affairs. The dominating influence compromises the energy security of current and future nuclear powers. As both developed and developing nations increase global nuclear capacity, these risks are magnified.
At the same time, emerging nuclear powers present another market opportunity by expanding the customer base and increasing Moscow’s economic opportunities. This is already occurring as developing nations operate their nuclear power plants on Russian fuel, many of which were also constructed by Rosatom based on its integrated supply chain. For instance, Bangladesh received Russian uranium fuel after Rosatom completed the construction of its first nuclear power plant. This also occurred for Turkey’s Rosatom-constructed Akkuyu nuclear power plant. Egypt’s current agreement with Russia to construct the El Dabaa nuclear power plant includes nuclear fuel services. The uranium fuel supply is crucial to cementing Moscow’s economic dominance within nuclear construction, and breaking up this stronghold would loosen Moscow’s grip on the fuel supply as well as other parts of the industry.
The advent of advanced reactors further exacerbates this issue with the emerging need of HALEU. Compared to conventional fuel for light water reactors, enriched at a maximum of 5 per cent, HALEU is enriched between 5 per cent and 20 per cent. Estimates for regional requirements vary based on the projected advanced reactor deployment rates and will likely occur at the upper bounds of these ranges. The US Department of Energy (DOE) expects it will need over 40,000 kilograms of HALEU by 2030. The Euratom Supply Agency estimates the EU will require between 700 to 1,000 kilograms of HALEU each year by 2035. The Canadian government is also interested in HALEU as it explores other nuclear fuels for its advanced reactor fleet. Globally, the IAEA anticipates small modular reactors could occupy up to 24 per cent (140 GW) of new nuclear capacity by 2050. The need for fuel supply security will increase with mounting HALEU needs, requiring a more united and diversified nuclear fuel supply chain to meet them. Building such a global fuel supply chain requires expanding enrichment capacity in ally nations and strengthening their capabilities to ensure the security of the future nuclear fuel production. Canada is a key player in this future and must begin preparing itself for the crucial role it holds in fortifying global enrichment services.
Diversifying the nuclear fuel supply chain away from Russian dependence requires the West to harness every advantage available to it and its allies. Canada has an opportunity to reorient global enrichment capacity.
Canada’s moment: developing enrichment capabilities
Canada has long been the backbone of the global uranium market, but today’s shifting geopolitical landscape offers an unprecedented chance to expand its role and reshape the future of global nuclear energy. The nation holds high-grade deposits and extensive resources projected to last for more than 50 years, underscoring its long-term reliability. Operations in northern Saskatchewan, including the Cigar Lake and McArthur River mines, already supply 20 per cent of the world’s uranium. Adding domestic enrichment capabilities would not only expand Canada’s supply chain but also strengthen its role in the global nuclear industry.
Canada’s enrichment potential primarily lies with its leading uranium producer: Cameco. Cameco’s Blind River uranium refinery is the world’s largest and its Port Hope conversion facility contains 21 per cent of the global UF6 conversion capacity. Both facilities are located in Ontario, alongside the manufacturing plants that fabricate the fuel rods for CANDU reactors. Furthermore, Cameco’s increasingly unified efforts with Westinghouse create a formidable powerhouse to rival Rosatom. In 2023, Cameco acquired a 49 per cent stake in Westinghouse. By combining Cameco’s expertise in uranium production with Westinghouse’s proficiency in nuclear energy technology, this partnership strengthens Western enrichment capabilities and bolsters international nuclear fuel security. Adding to this momentum, Cameco recently signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with SaskPower and Westinghouse to explore nuclear technologies and fuel supply chain needs for Saskatchewan, where Cameco is headquartered. Furthermore, the company’s co-ownership of the Global Laser Enrichment (GLE) project with Silex, in North Carolina, demonstrates its pioneering role in developing new fuel technologies such as repurposing uranium tailings and producing HALEU for advanced reactors.
While Canada’s historical decision to abstain from uranium enrichment reflects its commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear technology, shifting global conditions now make enriched uranium a more valuable asset for peaceful uses of the technology. The nation has a responsibility to acknowledge this and address this global nuclear fuel insecurity. The West must gain a stronger grip on the global nuclear industry, and Canada’s enrichment potential is crucial to accomplishing it. The striking irony of Canada providing enriched fuel it has no use for, is the very characteristic reinforcing its strong suitability to guarantee nonproliferation commitments while advancing enrichment. Moreover, the nation’s current enrichment-free nuclear industry will not last as it aims to build light water reactors and SMRs. Construction such as the Darlington New Nuclear Project will require enriched uranium within this decade. Furthermore, Canada is already playing a key role in securing nuclear fuel supplies internationally. For instance, Cameco is partnering with Ukraine’s state-owned utility to meet the country’s uranium needs through 2035. In 2023 the European Union (EU) increased its Canadian imports of natural uranium following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, accounting for approximately 33 per cent of total deliveries, over an 86 per cent increase relative to 2022. This type of support may become more necessary as more nations work to reduce their reliance on Russian fuel.
Canada’s decision to initiate enrichment services would mark a strategic shift for the energy security of Western allies. The need for this shift is even amplified when understood in the context of Moscow’s growing control as the top global exporter of nuclear technologies, where it currently leads with 60 per cent of global reactor sales. By undermining Russia’s leverage in the uranium fuel supply chain – and therefore its control on critical nuclear power assets – Canada can help stabilize the balance of global powers and foster energy independence for nations transitioning to nuclear power.
Developing countries such as India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan are constructing nuclear power plants to improve their energy security and provide reliable electricity for growing populations. This highlights nuclear energy’s role in addressing energy security. At the same time, there is an urgent need to decarbonize both developed and developing countries. The goal to triple global nuclear energy capacity by 2050 is representative of how essential the technology is to meeting emissions mitigation targets. Thus far, 31 countries are signatories to the agreement and more will likely join. Many of these nations will want to diversify away from Russian fuel supply dependence. Ensuring that developing nations can access enriched fuel for the first time will require presenting them with a competitive alternative. The expanding global nuclear capacity adds to the urgency of diversifying the fuel supply chain to support this growth. Canada’s enrichment capabilities would solidify these efforts, ensuring the stability and expansion of the global nuclear industry while simultaneously reinforcing the West’s leadership in the nuclear energy sector.
Overcoming challenges to Canada’s enrichment goal
Canada faces several challenges to entering the uranium enrichment market, with international legal hurdles being the most significant. Satisfying the necessary amendments and completing the required negotiations to formally adjust Canada’s non-enrichment commitment is likely to be a protracted and complex journey. The government must formally notify the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and work closely with the agency to establish transparency in the decision-making and ensure continued compliance with the Additional Protocol – the instrument through which the IAEA gains enhanced access to nuclear sites in ensuring the peaceful use of the technology. Enrichment facility construction must accommodate IAEA inspections to verify adherence to its nonproliferation safeguards. The government will also need to converse with fellow members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in building diplomatic support for its enrichment program. Despite the urgency of reducing dependence on Moscow’s fuel, global protectionism and high nonproliferation standards may still hinder these efforts.
Allies need the energy security Canada can provide, but acquiring uranium enrichment technology presents significant challenges. Countries enforce strict control to monitor its operations, and regulations severely limit export and technology transfers. Even with a close ally like the United States, obtaining sensitive nuclear energy technology is difficult. The US enforces strict nuclear energy technology export laws designed to maintain control over proprietary technologies. Partnering with the US would require renegotiating Canada’s 123 Agreement – the legal agreement stating the terms of nuclear technology co-operation between the US and other nations – to include enrichment capacity, a lengthy and heavily scrutinized process involving both the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Even without technical assistance, Cameco is well positioned to pursue enrichment technology given how adept it is at the other steps of the nuclear fuel cycle including refining, conversion, and fabrication. It is also actively pursuing next generation enrichment technologies as shown by its joint laser enrichment project with Silex. Cameco’s established reputation as a trusted uranium supplier to major nuclear energy markets worldwide speaks to its ability to successfully integrate enrichment capabilities into its current operations. The key is to better support these initiatives and leverage whatever additional assistance possible. Another need involves developing domestic expertise and training a skilled workforce to support its enrichment target. Once again, existing partnerships such as the recent nuclear workforce development agreement with France will be most advantageous for quickly accessing the resources to build upon domestic knowledge. Ensuring all of these processes are as transparent as possible may ease the institutional burden of acquiring and developing the resources necessary for Canada’s enrichment industry.
Acquiring the public’s peace of mind will be just as critical as building the centrifuges, with social acceptance serving as the foundation for any successful expansion of the nuclear energy industry. Ontario, the likely site for enrichment facilities, is also home to Indigenous people as well as other communities who have an ongoing relationship with the nuclear energy industry. This includes agreements that focus on furthering community knowledge and well-being while advancing the industry. One example includes the government’s partnership with Bruce Power and the Saugeen Ojibway Nation (SON) to support the development of medical isotopes for cancer research.
Reaching similar agreements for uranium enrichment may prove equally challenging and time-intensive, given the heightened sensitivities surrounding the enrichment process. However, if approached strategically, this process could strengthen public trust in nuclear energy. By engaging communities early in the process, actively listening to their concerns, and co-developing solutions that respect their rights and priorities, the government and industry can earn the social licence necessary for success. Empowering Indigenous communities as stakeholders, valuing their perspectives, and providing economic benefits will be critical to securing their engagement and trust.
Canada’s roadmap to uranium enrichment infrastructure
Legislative and Regulatory Changes for Enrichment Services
The Canadian government must implement legislative and regulatory reform to establish a foundation for uranium enrichment services. The first step is to amend the Nuclear Safety and Control Act (NSCA) to include provisions that provide clearer pathways for licencing and operating enrichment facilities. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) should begin developing a regulatory framework addressing the licensing, operation, and eventual decommissioning of these facilities. Additional export control measures tailored to enriched uranium will also be essential to meet international standards. Expanding into this new stage of the nuclear fuel supply chain requires enhanced safeguards from the IAEA, including robust monitoring, inspections, and material accountability throughout the enrichment process.
Gaining social licence will be critical to advancing these operations, especially among local communities and Indigenous groups directly affected by the facilities. Proactively empowering these communities and addressing their concerns will build trust and foster collaboration. Indigenous communities already play an important role in Canada’s nuclear energy sector, a role that will expand further with advanced reactor development. In 2021, for example, X-Energy Canada signed an MoU with the First Nations Power Authority (FNPA) to enhance Indigenous participation and understanding of emerging nuclear energy opportunities, including employment and other economic benefits. Similarly, the Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) successfully engaged host communities to select a site select a site for Canada’s deep geological repository for spent fuel. These examples underscore the importance of transparent, meaningful engagement, and fair compensation in building trust. By applying and refining these people-centered approaches, the government can achieve similar public acceptance for enrichment expansion.
Leveraging multinational partnerships
Multinational alliances are key to accelerating Canada’s enrichment program. Collaborating with allies, particularly the United States, can provide enrichment technologies like gas centrifuges and advanced training programs. Such partnerships would help Canada’s workforce quickly gain the technical skills required to operate enrichment facilities and minimize errors during the industry’s early stages. The Sapporo 5 alliance provides an immediate opportunity for support, having successfully mobilized US$5.6 billion in public and private funds to enhance enrichment capacities. Canada’s Department of Natural Resources and the US DOE signed an MoU to strengthen the resilience of the global nuclear fuel supply chain, focusing on developing low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and HALEU. The Canadian government can leverage these collaborations by initiating discussions to secure funding and expedite the development of its domestic enrichment infrastructure.
Canada can also capitalize on advanced technologies, such as laser enrichment, through international cooperation. For instance, Silex delivered its second laser enrichment unit to the US in 2023 for further development, and Cameco is actively involved in advancing this technology. By leveraging these pre-existing partnerships, Canada can fast-track its enrichment capabilities and position itself as a leader in the next generation of nuclear fuel technology.
Constructing enrichment capacity
The government must treat the development of enrichment capacity as a geopolitical priority. A suitable timeline would include initiating construction of an enrichment facility within the next 5 to 7 years to meet emerging domestic and international needs. This means investing in its development as soon as possible by providing funding and targeted incentives to facilitate enrichment development. Enrichment capacity is an ideal candidate for federal funding through programs such as the Strategic Investment Fund (SIF) which is designed to support these types of national interests. Allies such as the US and the UK are already mobilizing specialized funding to ensure rapid enrichment capacity development and the Canadian government should consider doing the same. Such measures would better prepare the nation for the significant investment required to construct an enrichment facility. The estimated cost of building the U.S. enrichment capacity needed for HALEU production ranges between US$4-5 billion. A previously planned US uranium enrichment plant had an estimated construction cost of US$3.5 billion. While these figures are specific to the United States, they provide a useful benchmark for estimating the potential costs of constructing a Canadian enrichment facility. Strategic site selection will play a crucial role in reducing operational costs. Locating facilities near existing fuel processing operations in Ontario, for instance, would simplify logistics and integrate the supply chain more effectively. Timely construction is essential to ensure Canada’s enriched uranium can meet the needs of allies seeking to divest from Russian fuel dependence.
Conclusion
Finally, the world cannot achieve a secure clean energy future without decisive action to diversify the global nuclear fuel supply chain. At this critical junction, it is clear Canada is key to moving forward. Developing enrichment capabilities is the next logical step to not only deter Russia’s stranglehold on enrichment services but to also secure a reliable fuel supply for both established and emerging nuclear-powered states. The alternative is risking a further decline in Western nuclear energy security with profound effects on energy independence.
Canada’s enrichment potential is not only a crucial asset for its allies but also a strategic move for ensuring the security and resilience of its own nuclear power fleet. As the nation advances its plans for SMRs, the demand for enriched fuel will inevitably grow. A lack of forward-thinking strategies at this moment risks creating vulnerabilities in its nuclear fuel cycle by developing an import dependence or a lagged domestic capacity to meet growing enriched fuel demand. Investing in enrichment infrastructure now will enable Canada to better safeguard its capabilities to meet its evolving energy needs.
The Canadian government must implement the necessary legislative reforms, foster international collaboration, and strategically invest in infrastructure to prepare the industry for this vital role. This endeavor will require early communication and transparency with stakeholders and communities to build momentum and necessary trust for its success. By asserting its leadership within the global enrichment capacity, Canada can strengthen the resilience of the global nuclear industry, ensure the pathway to a decarbonized world, and reaffirm its position as a global energy powerhouse. The risks of inaction are rising, and the opportunity to act is now. Canada must act decisively to meet this moment.
Juzel Lloyd is a climate and energy analyst at the Breakthrough Institute. She is a 2024 Atlantic Council Global Energy Center Women Leaders in Energy and Climate fellow and a 2024 Women in Energy fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy.
