This article originally appeared in The Hub.
By Richard Shimooka, June 25, 2026
Last week, during a meeting with European Union Officials, Prime Minister Mark Carney declared that the “next world order will likely be built out of Europe.” This is not a surprising comment from him, as he has made similar statements before and reflects his seemingly Eurocentric vision of international relations.
This predilection, though, calls into question his earlier commitment to a “variable geometry” of Canadian foreign relations that would use multiple overlapping relationships to provide security, rather than rely too heavily on one single alignment with the United States.
But beyond the prime minister’s latest statement, there is plenty of evidence of the government putting this pivot to Europe into practice, including the selection of the Swedish GlobalEye airborne early warning aircraft over the American options and a focus on the Canada-EU SAFE Defence Agreement (despite its limited potential upside), as well as a preponderance of meetings with European leaders over those of other partners—the former Bank of England governor feels more at home in the halls of Westminster and Espace Léopold than in Tokyo or the Blue house in Seoul.
Yet a geopolitical bet on Europe is fraught with challenges, particularly in the realm of collective defence, some of which were on full display in the very week Carney made his speech.
The most dramatic event occurred in the United Kingdom, with the resignation of the minister of defence, John Healey and the armed forces minister, Al Carns, over the underfunding of the military as well as mismanagement within the department. Prime Minister Keir Starmer followed with his own resignation this week.
This reflects an underlying tension within the U.K., a country dealing with a sluggish, post-Brexit economy that is struggling to create growth. The lack of defence spending has imperilled one of the U.K.’s major defence programs: the global combat air program, or GCAP, a multinational sixth-generation fighter program that it leads with Japan and Italy. The underfunding concerns are so serious that Japan, facing acute threats from China, Russia, and North Korea and needing the timely introduction of the aircraft, is reconsidering its participation in the scheme.
Similar tensions and reluctance to prioritize defence are emerging within states across Europe. Earlier in the month, Giorgia Meloni’s government in Italy declined to use EU loans financing to increase defence spending, identifying domestic spending priorities as being more pressing. While it remains publicly committed to meeting NATO’s 5 percent target in 2035, and has increased its budget to past 2.5 percent this year, the long-term implications of this policy make it unlikely that it will reach the objective in a decade’s time.
Finally, there’s the collapse of the Franco-German-Spanish Future Combat Air System project, reportedly over corporate governance and workshare arrangements. While Germany has made substantial increases in defence spending, France’s fiscal situation is highly constrained, and it too has limited ability to increase its defence spending in the coming decade. Moreover, the program continues to illustrate how domestic industrial interests continue to play a dominant influence, even for a marquee European defence program.
These challenges are ones that Canada’s political leadership must be clear-eyed about. They suggest that Europe’s ability to play the role of a global military power is mixed at best, and Ottawa’s thinking must be much more agile in how it approaches its alliances. Putting all of its eggs in the European basket is a mistake.
Given the country’s diverse foreign policy interests, the variable geometry model, where Canada disperses its reliance and partnerships between Asian, European, and American allies, is the better, more secure, more logical path. Those relationships need to be equitable and have tangible effects—it does little good if the agreements fail to produce real-world outcomes, such as the delivery of military capabilities to the Canadian Armed Forces quickly and at reasonable cost to meet the emerging threat that threatens Canada and its interests.
No choice likely better represents this challenge than the upcoming decision for the Victoria class submarine program, which is reportedly to be made in the coming weeks.
The reality is that the South Korean submarine almost certainly remains a significant frontrunner to replace Canada’s ageing fleet. Despite recent eleventh-hour claims made in public by Germany, the South Korean bid likely has a significant edge in cost, delivery dates, and capability. Yet following Carney’s comments and his government’s recent decisions, the worry remains that the cabinet will ignore all of these considerations and base their decision on a deeply flawed miscalculation of Europe’s influence on the international system.
Buying European submarines when the most likely threat vector is in the Pacific with China or in the Arctic approaches through the Bering Strait would be a premier example of misevaluating Canada’s geopolitical position as well as that of its erstwhile allies.
Given the threats and challenges, as well as the country’s limited economic resources, it is absolutely essential that Ottawa correctly evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of each potential partner and ally and invests in each accordingly, whether it be Asia, Europe, or the United States. Failing to do so is a costly, costly mistake.
Richard Shimooka is a Hub contributing writer and a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute who writes on defence policy.
