By Jonathan Berkshire Miller, June 27, 2025
The Indo-Pacific has emerged as the most consequential geopolitical arena region, with a range of security challenges amidst a surge in economic growth over the past two decades. There, the intersection of economic vitality with seething security tensions and copious power shifts makes for an exceptionally interesting –and at times, dangerous – cocktail. For Canada and South Korea, the Indo-Pacific offers both enormous upside and notable downside. Despite being separated by the Pacific Ocean, we share strategic problem sets and confront many of the same threats.
The Canada-Korea partnership is compelling not only because the two countries share similar challenges but also because they are complemented by each other’s strengths. In an ideal world, Canada contributes significant natural resources, Arctic know-how, and reach across a wide range of diplomacy. Korea, on the other hand, brings leading-edge technology, capabilities in defence that have been tried and truly tested, and a set of deep regional integrations that span northeast Asia. However, despite these natural synergies, the partnership remains seemingly stuck in medium gear, with its co-operative engine long overdue for some serious tune-ups.
This analysis, based on discussions the Macdonald-Laurier Institute held over the past two years through a partnership with the Korea Foundation, looks at Canada and Korea and their current pattern of co-operation. It suggests ways the two countries can intensify relations and forge a strategic partnership that is both ambitious and effective. The hoped-for outcome of this intensified partnership is not merely a closer bilateral relationship but something that both Ottawa and Seoul can deploy as a model of middle-power co-operation: a partnership that can justifiably and meaningfully make waves in the Indo-Pacific.
The North Korean catalyst: A shared threat requiring coordinated response
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs are possibly the clearest instance of how regional threats have morphed into global concerns. Pyongyang’s development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, capable of reaching North America, has turned the Korean Peninsula crisis into a direct security threat to Canada. That evolution alone should energize much deeper Canada-Korea security co-operation.
Decades of experience allow Korea to manage the threats from North Korea effectively, while not perfectly. This experience translates into possessing exceptional intelligence capabilities. It also means Korea utilizes a variety of means, ranging from proven crisis management protocols to sophisticated missile defence systems, to maintain and ensure national security. Canada and Korea enjoy a long-standing relationship that offers an institutional basis for effective co-operation. Yet, most of the time, we don’t really take advantage of this relationship.
A more strategic approach would involve in-depth sharing of intelligence on North Korean capabilities and intentions, collaborative development of defence technologies, and coordinated countermeasures when the North does what the North tends to do – fires up its missiles, for example.
Yet this is the first time in over a decade that Canada has been involved in the kind of defence planning necessary to build those kinds of expertise and efficiencies.
The challenge is getting both countries to shift from the current pattern of episodic co-operation during crises to sustained strategic coordination. To do this, the two must see North Korea not as principally a problem for Asia that just involves Canada on the fringe, but as a threat that both have an interest in countering, with responses that use the special capabilities of each. Why does this matter?
Maritime security: Protecting the global commons
The maritime domain is the most natural area for expanded Canada-Korea co-operation, owing to both countries’ heavy reliance on sea-based trade. The South China Sea’s increasing militarization, the proliferation of piracy in the waters of Southeast Asia, and the weaponization of economic coercion increasingly threaten the economic interests and strategic autonomy of both countries.
Canada’s experience in operating under demanding maritime conditions, especially in the Arctic, complements Korea’s sophisticated shipbuilding industry and advanced naval technologies. The international operations of the Royal Canadian Navy and the proven regional capabilities of the Republic of Korea Navy create opportunities for meaningful coordination and sharing of naval capabilities.
Today, the two countries primarily have several valuable and important relationship-building activities between their navies: port visits and the occasional exercise. However, these somewhat infrequent at-sea activities do little to significantly increase the capability of either navy to handle maritime security challenges at a moment’s notice.
An increase in naval co-operation could take several forms, none of which carry any significant risk of confrontation with the Chinese Navy.
This technological aspect explores a well-placed opportunity offering vast potential. Korea’s satellite abilities, combined with their superior sensor systems, could be integrated with Canada’s space-based surveillance to perform a Herculean task – monitoring the “critical sea lanes” that make up about a quarter of the Earth’s surface. But why stop there? Such bilateral technological co-operation could set up a system that would not only enhance the two countries’ capabilities enroute to a comprehensive pan-Canadian approach to sea lane surveillance but also provide significant (and somewhat unprecedented) regional intelligence to partners and allies.
Defence industrial co-operation: Building resilient capabilities
The COVID-19 pandemic clearly exposed the fragility of global supply chains and highlighted the critical need to maintain strong and flexible defence industrial bases. The two countries rely heavily on imports for the manufacture of defence goods and services. So, in the interests of both parties, it makes sense to enhance the bilateral co-operation that could allow them to mitigate these vulnerabilities.
Canada’s aerospace, artificial intelligence, and materials science strengths align well with Korea’s global-leading capabilities in semiconductors, advanced electronics, and precision manufacturing. Both nations could achieve significant cost savings and efficiency gains if their defence industrial bases specialized in the respective capabilities that each country performs best.
Complementary abilities in unmanned systems, electronic warfare, and space technologies might be used in joint development programs. The beneficial effect is shared research and development costs. Serious, protective measures are necessary in several areas including: intellectual property, technology transfer; and industrial security. The effort is worth it for the payoff.
The strategic rationale is clear. Enhanced defence industrial co-operation would enable both countries to significantly reduce their dependence on potentially unreliable suppliers. Better yet, working together to design and develop high-tech, advanced defence systems could serve as a model for partnerships with other democracies – networks of co-operation that would strengthen resilience across the collective.
Pathways to enhanced partnership
To go beyond the present constraints requires both nations to take on a great deal more ambition if they are to achieve strategic co-operation. This is about accepting higher levels of risk when it comes to sharing sensitive information. It is also about making substantial, and in some cases, very large investments in developing the types of capabilities that we can use together in a conflict – that’s joint capability development. Finally, it is critical to maintain a clear and consistent political commitment to co-operating in ways that are sensible over the long haul, even when some very immediate short-term pressures might make either of us inclined to do something that looks more co-operative at first glance.
Both countries should set up strategic high-level institutional dialogues. These should meet regularly and have the authority to make binding commitments on behalf of their governments. They should be comprehensive and go beyond foreign affairs, defence, and trade. They should be all-seeing and all-hearing in persuading the relevant agencies across both countries to act in parallel on all relevant policy fronts.
In terms of operations, the two countries must markedly broaden their diplomatic and military presence in the Indo-Pacific. This means not just the old-style diplomatic posts but also intensified participation in the regional institutions that matter, a lot more military exercises and operations that cut across the various services, and, as a corollary to that, a presence that is much more visible and audible in terms of engaging with regional partners and allies.
From a technological perspective, both countries should strive for joint research and development programs. This is necessary in order to harness their complementary capabilities – much as the United States and Canada do, for instance – and to erect shared technological foundations on which they can cooperate in the
The strategic rationale for enhanced Canada-Korea partnership in the Indo-Pacific is compelling, but realizing this potential requires both countries to move beyond their current pattern of cautious co-operation. The challenges they face – from North Korean aggression to cyber threats – demand responses that leverage their complementary capabilities and shared interests.
Success will require sustained political commitment, substantial resource investment, and willingness to accept the risks that come with deeper strategic co-operation. However, the alternative – continuing with current approaches while hoping that somehow the security environment becomes more manageable – offers little prospect for effectively addressing the challenges both countries face.
The opportunity exists for Canada and Korea to develop a model of middle-power strategic co-operation that enhances both nations’ security and prosperity while contributing to broader Indo-Pacific stability. Whether they seize this opportunity will depend on their willingness to think beyond traditional approaches and commit to the sustained effort required to build truly effective strategic partnership.
Jonathan Berkshire Miller is a senior fellow with the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.
The Macdonald-Laurier Institute gratefully acknowledges the support of the Korea Foundation.
