This article originally appeared in the Japan Times.
By Stephen Nagy, June 14, 2024
The recent European Union parliamentary elections have once again highlighted the dynamic and often turbulent nature of European politics. Leftist green parties were sidelined, far-right parties increased their representation and the center held, but just barely.
Inflation associated with the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, concerns over illegal and unregulated migration and anemic economies pushed voters to reject what they call globalist parties and their political agendas.
These results not only provide a snapshot of the current political landscape in Europe but also offer insights into broader global trends, including voter inclinations for the upcoming U.S. presidential election.
Both elections have implications for Japan. Tokyo prioritizes a relationship with the EU that is characterized by deep cooperation, a commitment to shared diplomacy vis-a-vis Japan’s pressing challenges such as with China, Russia and North Korea, and support for an international order based on the rule of law.
More importantly, Japan seeks a reliable U.S. partner that is deeply anchored in the region and can contribute to Japan’s security and autonomy. This partnership includes unwavering security commitments to Japan, the defense of South Korea, peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and coordinated efforts in diplomacy, defense and deterrence. These measures are crucial in response to what political analysts Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine describe as the “axis of upheaval” — an alliance between Russia, China, Iran and North Korea (including Hamas) aimed at reshaping international institutions to support illiberal, authoritarian regimes.
The rise of right-of-center and far-right parties in the European Parliament that focus on family policies, migration control and shy away from progressive cultural issues reflect the pre-existing consensus that exists in Japan in these areas. Of concern to Tokyo are the right-leaning parties that either reject the defense of Ukraine against Russia’s illegal invasion or advocate for a quick end of the conflict through a negotiated settlement that leaves one third of Ukrainian territory in the hands of Vladimir Putin’s Russia. This sends the signal to revisionist powers such as China that with the right mix of force, patience and resolve, they could unify with Taiwan by force or annex all the features found in the South China Sea.
Tokyo’s big concern is that a conflict over Taiwan or in the South China Sea would endanger Japan’s economic security. Such a conflict would disrupt the nation’s ability to maintain open sea lines of communication, stable supply chains and trading partnerships.
The current political dynamics in the United States mirror those in the EU. American voters are unsettled by persistent inflation and feel that President Joe Biden’s management of the economy and foreign policy has not benefited ordinary Americans. Unlike the Donald Trump administration, which did not engage in any wars or conflicts (that started during his presidency), the Biden administration is now involved in conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine.
The results of the EU parliamentary elections can be seen as a bellwether for broader political trends that may also influence the upcoming U.S. presidential election in November. Several key parallels and implications can be drawn:
First, polarization and political fragmentation are features of contemporary politics in Western societies.
Just as Europe is experiencing political polarization, the U.S. is likely to see a similar trend. The rise of hyperprogressive and far-right movements in Europe mirrors the growing influence of progressive Democrats and the continued strength of populist Republicans in the U.S. led by a now-convicted felon, Donald Trump.
His conviction has further polarized voters, with MAGA supporters now hyperenergized to demonstrate their support for the former president. Many of his supporters claim the trial politically driven, likening it to what happens in “Banana Republics.”
Second, environmental and social justice agendas may have reached a saturation point for many voters in both the EU and the U.S. Disaffected voters who voted against green parties in the EU and for political parties that reject migration, progressive cultural issues and an overly “Brusselized” EU have sent a clear signal to European politicians. They prioritize bread-and-butter issues in the short-term over environmental and social justice agendas.
Similar dynamics have emerged in the U.S., with many Trump supporters urging the president to prioritize border control, implement a strong and secure migration policy and focus on exploiting abundant U.S. resources over environmental regulation, while ending social justice agendas.
With so many in the EU rejecting environmental and social justice initiatives, which are seen as distinguishing features of European life from their U.S. counterpart, you wouldn’t need a Ph.D. to realize that if this trend were pronounced enough to tilt EU politics to the right, the U.S. trend might also shift significantly further in that direction.
And third, nationalism and populism are core components of the politics of the post-COVID-19 period. The resurgence of center- and far-right and nationalist parties in Europe reflects a broader global trend of rising nationalism and populism. In the U.S., this could translate into strong support for Trump and candidates who advocate for stricter immigration policies, protectionist trade measures and a focus on national sovereignty.
These trends have implications for Japan’s foreign policies as well.
First, Japan will need to work even harder to strengthen multilateral and minilateral cooperation with the EU, individual member states and the U.S. The weakening of internationalists, green and progressive parties in Europe, which often advocate for stronger multilateral cooperation, means Japan will need to forge new lines of cooperation with center- and far-right parties to ensure Tokyo’s foreign policy priorities are not sidelined. The country may find new opportunities to collaborate with the EU on global issues such as climate change, sustainable development and human rights if these issues align with the politics of the new right. Such collaboration will be essential to counterbalance the influence of China and Russia in the region.
The same will be true with the U.S. if Trump returns to the White House and pursues the policies laid out in the Heritage Foundation Project 2025 Comprehensive Policy Guide, “Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise,” which includes comprehensive policy proposals drawn from conservative leaders and scholars across various disciplines.
Second, Tokyo needs to adeptly navigate burgeoning nationalism in the EU and the U.S. The resurgence of nationalist parties and “America-firsters” poses a challenge for Japan as nationalist agendas often prioritize domestic interests and may lead to more protectionist and inward-looking policies. Japan, which relies heavily on global trade and international cooperation, may need to recalibrate its approach to ensure that its economic and strategic interests are safeguarded amid an increasingly nationalistic Europe and U.S.
Third, Japan will need to prioritize U.S., EU-wide and member-state-based economic partnerships. The decline of traditional centrist parties and the rise of more diverse political forces in Europe could lead to shifts in economic policy. Japan must be prepared to adapt to new trade and economic realities that may emerge from a more fragmented EU and protectionist U.S. Strengthening economic partnerships through bilateral and multilateral agreements will be crucial to maintaining stable trade relations.
Fourth, security cooperation will need to navigate the plurality of EU and American views about Russia. The polarized political environment in Europe may affect the EU’s collective security policies. The U.S.’s commitment to Ukraine’s defense will also come under question. This presents a challenge to Tokyo, which has been deepening its security cooperation with Brussels and Washington.
Stephen R. Nagy is a professor of politics and international studies at the International Christian University in Tokyo, a fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, a senior fellow at the MacDonald Laurier Institute, a senior fellow at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada and a visiting fellow with the Japan Institute for International Affairs.
