This article originally appeared in National Newswatch.
By Tobias T. Gibson and Patrick James, June 29, 2026
The Arctic, to cite perhaps the most obvious matter of concern, is no longer a distant frontier. It is an emerging theatre of competition where intelligence – on rivals’ capabilities, intentions, and movements – will shape outcomes.
Canada’s chief rivals in the Arctic, Russia and China, are moving aggressively in the region. Ottawa has responded by ramping up Arctic spending – expanding infrastructure, adding icebreakers, and strengthening the Canadian Armed Forces’ presence and capabilities in the North.
Ottawa now acknowledges the need to “[bridge] the intelligence gap” and has begun adding capacity, including the ThothX radio telescope. But sensors are not a strategy. Protecting Canadian interests – and “strengthen[ing] Canadian national resilience to counter malign influence and activities of foreign powers” – requires what Canada still lacks: a capable IFIS.
As we argue in our recent academic paper (currently under review), an independent foreign intelligence service would enhance the defensive and economic efforts already underway. Among these advantages, intelligence collected by such an agency would benefit several areas of Canadian society, including economic sectors and political interests. There are several recent examples of incursions into Canadian private sector interests, including the recent revelation that the Chinese Salt Typhoon group probably targeted Canadian telecommunications. All members of the Five Eyes jointly suggested that China’s effort to access Western intellectual property “goes well beyond traditional espionage.” The CSE warned that China is “the most comprehensive cyber security threat facing Canada today.” Protecting Canadian economic interests would safeguard manufacturing and tourism, among others, which are key to Canada’s economic future. In an effort to protect homegrown IP and manufacturing, an IFIS “would provide Ottawa with earlier, first-hand warning of threats to Canadian citizens abroad or of terrorist plots at home” and “remain one step ahead of such threats by collecting intelligence on foreign industrial intentions, state-sponsored cyber activity, and front company activity against Canadian firms. Such information could shape national policy, inform corporate defences, and prevent costly breaches.”
An IFIS would also have global political benefits and may help inform Canada’s future relations with the UN, EU, NATO, the Arctic Council, and other international bodies – as well as negotiations with individual partners. Creating an IFIS could have offensive benefits. Canada, like Australia, “could use intelligence to support its Indo-Pacific policy, its policy on diversifying trade, and its resource security policies.” Some commentators have suggested that Canada’s decision to create a foreign intelligence service may impact its place globally. “For Canada, the choice is stark. It can be on the fringes of the world of intelligence, or it can build up the capabilities that a G7 economy, Arctic state, and Indo-Pacific player should rightly possess.” We agree.
The need for an IFIS is glaring. As the federal government notes in its recent Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, “[a]dversaries and competitors also employ disinformation and influence campaigns, malicious cyber operations, and espionage and foreign interference activities to target Canadians, including northerners.” Competitors are increasingly active in the region, often in ways of genuine concern for Canadian economic and defence interests. For example, “we are seeing greater Russian activity in our air approaches, and a growing number of Chinese vessels and surveillance platforms are mapping and collecting data about the region.” Over time, these efforts could pose a real threat to Canadian sovereignty.
As the Arctic grows hotter – both literally and metaphorically – an IFIS would provide the information needed to navigate future negotiations and potential conflict. The region is drawing sustained attention not only from major powers, but from fellow middle powers as well. Without an IFIS, Canada simply won’t be a leader in a region it calls vital.
Some criticsclaim an IFIS would be too expensive. Certainly, creating an effective IFIS will take time and money. However, the same can also be said about other ongoing efforts to buttress Canadian defence. Since it will take time, beginning now is the best option. And, although it will be expensive, supporting an IFIS is a cost-effective use of state power. If Prime Minister Mark Carney is right, and the global order is ruptured, then having a Canadian IFIS, designed to support its independence, is an imperative, not a luxury.
A new independent foreign intelligence service should be firmly rooted in Canadian values, including a distinct national identity, economic and civic freedom, and a commitment to acting as an “honest broker” abroad. There are models to follow, including the democratic norm of creating a bifurcated intelligence community, with one domestic intelligence agency and one dedicated to foreign intelligence. Examples are found in the United Kingdom, Australia, Israel, Austria, Estonia, France, India, and Romania.
Importantly, we remain optimistic that the “rupture” in the global order can be repaired. Perhaps, like a broken bone, the rupture site can even be rebuilt more strongly than before the schism. If, in this best-case scenario, the Canadian-US alliance can return to a path forward, then the creation of a Canadian IFIS can support all of the “Five Eyes” intelligence sharing pact.
Tobias T. Gibson is a professor of Political Science and Security Studies at Westminster College, located in Fulton, Missouri.
Patrick James is the Dornsife Dean’s Professor Emeritus of International Relations at the University of Southern California and a visiting professor at the University of Georgia.
