By Jonathan Berkshire Miller, March 4, 2026
Prime Minister Mark Carney’s arrival in Tokyo at the end of his Indo-Pacific tour (following visits to New Delhi and Canberra) presents a relatively rare and significant chance to do something more meaningful than just signing a communiqué or posing for a photo. He can signal that Canada is serious about engaging in the world’s most influential region, building its role on a solid foundation.
That message is especially important given recent trends in Carney’s government on the Indo-Pacific. The Prime Minister’s trip to Beijing earlier this year, framed as “stabilizing” and “reengaging” but omitting larger Indo-Pacific strategy, drew criticism from many observers. Once again, Canada seemed to default to a narrow, transactional perspective on Asia, centred almost exclusively on Beijing.
While Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy – years in the making and designed to prevent this type of thinking – is fading from Canada’s official lexicon, the Prime Minister showed signs of course-correction in New Delhi. His remarks on the differences between Canada’s relationships with India and China were both welcome and necessary.
There is a reason for this distinction; democratic Indo-Pacific partners are closely watching Ottawa’s actions. India is a complex partner with ongoing challenges, but as a democracy, it shares Canada’s interest in a stable, rule-of-law order. The difference between engaging with democracies and transacting with authoritarian states is not a matter of rhetoric – it is strategic.
This is reinforced by Australia’s experiences in developing a comprehensive Indo-Pacific posture built around AUKUS, the Quad, and investments in regional security architecture. Australia has clearly shown the risks of being too heavily exposed to China economically and the benefits of pushing back against those risks with determination. Canada can learn from that example and contribute significantly in return, particularly in terms of critical minerals, Arctic governance, and managing the competition between great powers.
However, the Japan leg of Carney’s trip holds the greatest strategic weight. It should not be viewed merely as a courtesy call.
While Japan is a major trading partner, it is also a key Indo-Pacific democracy that recently strengthened its defence, alliances, and role in regional security. Tokyo clearly understands the stakes in the contest between open and closed systems and has taken a leadership position in supply chain resilience, semiconductor security, economic statecraft, and technology standards that reflect democratic values.
Canada and Japan share several less-discussed characteristics, such as advanced economies, technological sophistication, democratic institutions, similar exposure to coercive trade practices, and a common interest in preserving the rules-based international order. Their relationship has long been productive, though low profile, and has never approached the strategic potential it holds today.
This visit is an opportunity to elevate the relationship to that level.
So, what would a serious commitment to Japan look like? It would move beyond trade ministerial discussions to engage in substantive strategic talks regarding Indo-Pacific security issues. It would coordinate Canadian and Japanese approaches to critical minerals and supply chain diversification – areas in which both countries bring complementary advantages. It would feature technology co-operation and investment screening that reflect a shared understanding of the economic security threats faced by both countries. And it would see Canada approach Japan as a long-term strategic partner, not simply as a bilateral relationship that is separate from the broader regional architecture of which Tokyo is a leading voice.
Collectively, India, Japan, and Australia represent something important. They are not fringe actors trying to hedge their bets between great powers. Rather, they are the central architects of the Indo-Pacific’s economic and security order. By showing a sustained, structured, and strategic commitment to these democracies, Canada can send a clear signal that its Indo-Pacific Strategy is more than just shelfware, symbolism, or worse, a pragmatic approach to China.
At a time when “pragmatism” towards China is again trending in some corners of the Ottawa establishment, working with other democracies in the Indo-Pacific is not idealism, it is strategic insurance. Stronger partnerships with trusted, like-minded partners enhance Canada’s economic stability, reduce dependence on China, and provide the opportunity to play a key role in the region that will shape the 21st century.
Carney has all the pieces, but will his government use this visit to launch a new era of Indo-Pacific engagement – integrated into Canada’s foreign and economic policy – or let it be another missed opportunity disguised as diplomacy.
Tokyo is the destination; it should not be the afterthought.
Jonathan Berkshire Miller is a senior fellow with the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and principal of Pendulum Geopolitical Advisory in Ottawa.
