By Katherine Leung, May 29, 2024
Bill C-70, the long-awaited bill to counter foreign interference in Canada, was introduced on May 6, a week after the Hogue inquiry published its interim report. The report confirms alarms that diaspora communities have been raising for decades about meddling and intimidation by foreign powers.
The bill is a step in the right direction, it gives the federal government more tools, including a new foreign agent registry, new offences related to foreign interference, and the capacity for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to share information with partners outside the government. The latter two provisions in particular begin to address the transnational repression of Hong Kongers, but the foreign agent registry (or officially, the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act) suffers from a limited scope and would be improved by widening the criteria for activities that trigger registration.
In Hong Kong Watch’s recent briefing on transnational repression, one case study outlines the experience of a Hong Konger in Canada who was evicted by their landlord after participating in a pro-democracy protest. Then they found out that the landlord is a member of the United Front Work Department, an agency of the Communist Party of China.
In cases like these, it is often difficult to establish a prosecutable criminal offence and as Bill C-70 is written, this landlord’s activities would not trigger a requirement to register as a foreign agent. Only influence activities related to political or governmental processes would make registration obligatory for someone acting on behalf of a foreign state, including “development of policy, program or legislative proposal; proceeding of a legislative body; decision-making by public office holder; nomination of a political candidate; or holding of an election or referendum.”
These activities must be considered, but much of foreign interference takes place not at the government level but at the community level.
The federal government’s attitude towards foreign interference, particularly by the People’s Republic of China, has changed drastically in the last few years. Allegations of foreign interference, for the most part, have shifted from diaspora groups raising the issue and getting no response, to the government establishing a public inquiry and tabling a bill to combat the issue.
Diaspora communities in Canada have long advocated for a foreign agent registry to be established to protect them against foreign governments that seek to silence voices of dissent abroad. In Bill C-70 Canada will get more tools to tackle a problem that has long permeated this country, but not enough to protect our diaspora communities from surveillance, harassment or coercion for exercising their Charter-protected freedoms to protest human rights violations abroad.
The federal government, if it is serious about combating foreign interference, must ensure that all Canadians, no matter their country of origin, are protected from transnational repression and to achieve that, the foreign agent’s registry (the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act), must be amended to encompass activities outside of political or governmental processes.
In many cases of transnational repression arising from the Hong Kong community, there is intimidation to discourage pro-democracy advocacy and the direct threat of facing frightening consequences, such as a threat against family members or one’s physical safety.
However, transnational repression can also be something that seems more benign, such as an anonymous message “reminding” someone that the vehicle they have parked outside their home but do not use is due for a licence renewal. This is not a criminal act by itself but indicates the sender knows their home address, their licence number and, perhaps most chillingly, also has access to registration information that is not available to the public.
It is exactly these acts that are in the grey area of what is legal that transnational repression largely takes place.
Those acting on behalf of malign foreign states want the most impact with the least possible consequences. For example, anonymous messages telling a Hong Kong Canadian pro-democracy advocate to “take care” of her young daughter on a planned vacation, especially when they have not shared their personal travel plans publicly, sends the message that not only are they being watched, but their family is as well, and the sender has access to private details.
Foreign states employ transnational repression to discourage dissent from diaspora communities by suppressing public discourse on matters important to Canadians, and thereby exert influence on political or governmental processes in the long run.
If individuals at the grassroots level are dissuaded from calling on their government for action, can elected officials truly represent their constituents and suggest policy initiatives on their behalf? By limiting Canadians capacity to speak out against foreign states, as guaranteed by their Charter rights, transnational repression ultimately undermines their ability to participate fully in our democratic processes. The foreign agents registry could do more to address this dire threat.
Katherine Leung is a policy advisor at Hong Kong Watch.
