By Isabelle Terranova
July 6, 2026
[Note: This commentary draws from our longer report, Material Breach: The Legal Case for Suspending Türkiye from NATO, published by Secure Canada.]
For more than 75 years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has existed to do one thing: keep its members secure while anchoring them in democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law (The North Atlantic Treaty 1949, preamble). Canada, as a founding member, plays a critical role in promoting these principles. The Canadian government frames its objective as ensuring NATO remains “modern, flexible, agile and able to face current and future threats” (Government of Canada n.d.a). But that ambition only holds if the alliance is willing to confront a harder question: what happens when a member state no longer acts in line with the values it signed up to defend?
For far too long, Türkiye, under the leadership of President Erdoğan, has engaged in systematic human rights violations, provided support to terrorist organizations, and aligned itself with authoritarian regimes in clear opposition to the object and purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty. The failure of NATO members, including Canada, to collectively address these breaches calls into question the credibility of the alliance’s commitment to its own founding values. Although the North Atlantic Treaty contains no explicit mechanism for suspension, such reprimand is both legally feasible and politically advisable to preserve the integrity of the alliance.
Türkiye’s departure from the object and purpose of North Atlantic Treaty
Türkiye’s internal repression and external conduct have become increasingly inconsistent with NATO’s foundational values since the election of President Erdoğan in 2014, and in particular since the failed coup in July 2016, as the decade has been defined by widespread human rights abuses, sponsorship of terrorist organizations, and association with authoritarian states. These actions violate the principles of democracy, liberty, and the rule of law, and jeopardize the defense of other NATO States in clear contravention of the preamble and Article 2, provisions essential for the accomplishment of the object and purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Erosion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
While the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims that “[s]ince the early 2000s, comprehensive reforms have been implemented in Türkiye to strengthen democracy and the rule of law, as well as to ensure full respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, with the aim of protecting and promoting human rights” (Republic of Türkiye, Ministry of Foreign Affairs n.d.), civil society organizations and state institutions have documented escalating human rights violations at the hands of the government.
These violations include restrictions on freedom of expression and association, such as:
- Blanket protest bans imposed in various cities in response to peaceful demonstrations against the politically motivated imprisonment of Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu.
- Reduction of internet bandwidth and restricted access to social media and news sites.
- Use of force against peaceful protestors, including pepper spray, tear gas, water cannons, plastic bullets, and batons (Amnesty International 2025).
Accordingly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) unanimously ruled in 2025 that Türkiye had violated the right to freedom of expression in 58 cases where individuals were “charged and sentenced to imprisonment for carrying banners or chanting slogans during demonstrations or funerals which they had attended, or for certain social media posts” (Parlas and Others v. Türkiye, Applications nos. 9413/22 and 57 others).
On the same day, the ECtHR unanimously held that Türkiye had violated the right to liberty and security “on account of the absence of sufficient grounds for ordering and keeping the applicants in pre-trial detention” in relation to the arrest and pre‑trial detention of 137 individuals “in the aftermath of the coup attempt of July 15, 2016, primarily on suspicion of their membership of an organization described by the Turkish authorities as the ‘Fetullahist Terror Organization/Parallel State Structure’” (Çetin and Others v. Türkiye, Applications nos. 30185/17 and 136 others). This pattern of arbitrary arrest and detention has also targeted Syrian refugees (Human Rights Watch 2022), lawyers (International Federation for Human Rights 2024), and human rights activists (International Federation for Human Rights 2022).
Likewise, credible reports found that Turkish officials in removal centres beat Syrian refugees (Human Rights Watch 2022) and law enforcement authorities subjected children allegedly affiliated with the Gülen movement to threats and physical torture (United States Department of State n.d.), demonstrating the ubiquity of torture and ill-treatment in police and military custody and prison in Türkiye (Human Rights Watch n.d.). The Stockholm Center for Freedom reported in February 2026 that “[Türkiye’s] record on torture and ill-treatment continued to deteriorate in 2025,” based on reports of widespread abuses by security forces and prison officials, including severe beatings, as well as medical neglect, overcrowding, and unhygienic conditions in detention (Stockholm Center for Freedom 2026). Supporting this report of deteriorating standards, the World Organisation Against Torture’s Global Torture Index 2025 ranked Türkiye as “high risk” for torture, noting that “[t]here is a worryingly high number of cases of torture and ill-treatment” (World Organisation Against Torture n.d.).
Sources also raised concern regarding enforced disappearances (Human Rights Watch 2020; OMCT 2022) and extrajudicial killings (Committee against Torture 2016). Significantly, the European Commission expressed concern that “[n]o adequate investigations have been carried out regarding the alleged cases of abductions and enforced disappearances by the security services that have been reported since the 2016 attempted coup” (European Commission 2023, page 31).
Persistent “threats, physical harassment, arrest, prosecution, torture and ill-treatment” against human rights defenders and journalists for merely exercising their fundamental rights (Committee against Torture 2024) clearly undermine the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law outlined in the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty. As compliance with these core values is considered “essential for the accomplishment of the object and purpose of the treaty” (Sari 2019), the widespread commission of human rights violations by Turkish police, prison authorities, and military and intelligence units under the stewardship of President Erdoğan constitutes a material breach of the North Atlantic Treaty such that suspension or termination would be permissible.
Furthermore, Türkiye not only fails to “promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area” but actively undermines it by associating with and supporting terrorist organizations that contribute to regional and global instability. For example, Türkiye has long demonstrated support for Hamas (Schanzer et al. 2025; Ciddi 2024), with President Erdoğan maintaining that “Hamas is not a terrorist organisation, it is a liberation group” (Gumrukcu and Hayatsever 2023) even after the October 7, 2023 attacks. Beyond this, it has played host to numerous Hamas officials over the years (Schanzer and Argosh 2014; Turkish Minute 2025) and provided them with financial and material support (Schanzer et al. 2025; Reuters 2023).
Türkiye has provided similar assistance to ISIS, Hizbullah, Hezbollah, and al-Qaeda (Tax 2022; Phillips n.d; Bozkurt 2025; Taghvaee 2025; Iran International 2025; Shahbazov 2024; Ciddi and Epley 2025). Providing such aid is antithetical to Türkiye’s commitments to “collective defence” and “the preservation of peace and security”, which are essential for the accomplishment of the object and purpose of the treaty. Thus, the support of terrorist organizations is a material breach of the treaty.
Alignment with authoritarian powers
Likewise, Türkiye’s collaboration with authoritarian regimes that seek to replace the NATO-led world order, such as Russia and China, including through participation in intergovernmental organizations under their stewardship, namely BRICS and the Shanghai Co-operation Organization, is also a material breach.
Türkiye’s partnership with Russia includes security and economic dimensions. For example, in 2019 Türkiye purchased the Russian S-400 air and missile defence system despite concerns from NATO allies that the system is a security risk for the alliance (Hayatsever and Spicer 2024); the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace regarded that the arrangement was portrayed “by both sides as the beginning of expanded military-industrial bilateral co-operation” (Coşkun et al. 2024). Economic co-operation also increased in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as Türkiye refused to join NATO allies in levying sanctions against Russia, instead becoming its second-biggest trading partner after China (Coşkun at al. 2024).
Türkiye’s partnership with China has also grown, particularly through its participation in the Belt and Road Initiative, which serves as both an economic expansion project and a “security belt” between the two countries (Eşref Yalinkiliçli 2017; Avdaliani 2024).
Additionally, Türkiye has played a significant role in spreading authoritarianism to smaller regimes, particularly in Africa, by “present[ing] itself as an alternative to the Western model of liberal democracy and secularism” (Nogueira Pinto 2021).
As authoritarianism inherently conflicts with the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law and the promotion of such regimes deteriorates stability and well-being in the North-Atlantic area, Türkiye’s pursuit of authoritarian partnerships violates provisions essential for the accomplishment of the object and purpose of the NATO alliance. Accordingly, the other parties could suspend it from the organization by unanimous agreement.
Legality of suspending Türkiye from NATO
Unlike the founding documents of many intergovernmental organizations (See United Nations Charter, at Articles 5–6; Consolidated Version of The Treaty on European Union, at Article 7; Statute of the Council of Europe, at Article 8; Constitutive Act of the African Union, at Article 30; Charter of the Organization of American States, at Article 9), the North Atlantic Treaty includes no clause providing for the suspension or expulsion of member states. Nonetheless, both options are legally feasible. In fact, the treaty drafters omitted such a clause in part because they regarded the inclusion of a formal provision as unnecessary (Sari 2019). For example, the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations’ report on the North Atlantic Treaty provided:
The treaty has been criticized in some quarters because it contains no provision for expulsion or the suspension of rights of a recalcitrant member which might fail to carry out its obligations… Given the nature of the pact and the close community of interests of the signatory states, the committee believes that such a provision would be both unnecessary and inappropriate” [emphasis added]. (Sari 2019)
Similarly, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson explained before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that the preamble described the alliance’s shared objectives in part to lay the basis for “separation” if a member state fails to act in pursuance of those objectives (Sari 2019).
These arguments are based in the universally recognized principle of international law that suspension or termination of a treaty is possible in the face of a material breach, as reflected in Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties (VCLT). Article 60(2) provides that “[a] material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles: (a) the other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend the operation of the treaty in whole or in part or to terminate it either: (i) in the relations between themselves and the defaulting State; or (ii) as between all the parties.” Under Article 60 (3), both “a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention” and “the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty” constitute a material breach of a multilateral treaty.
However, the breach must be “so extensive in scope, so severe and so persistent as to effectively ‘disavow’ or repudiate the treaty” (Sari 2019), or at a minimum be essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty (European Parliamentary Research Service 2023).
Three-quarters of NATO’s founding members are states parties to the VCLT,[1] and of the current membership, all but four countries are states parties to the VCLT.[2] Regardless, to the extent that the principles enshrined in the VCLT codify customary international law, they are binding on all states – not just states parties.
Indeed, various credible sources, including the International Court of Justice (Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion) and the European Commission (European Parliament 2017), have expressed that VCLT Article 60, codifying the principle that the breach of a provision essential for the accomplishment of the object or purpose of a treaty can justify its suspension or termination, reflects customary international law.
It follows that an agreement establishing an intergovernmental organization, such as the North Atlantic Treaty, can be suspended or terminated under customary international law if a material breach has occurred (European Parliamentary Research Service 2023, page 1). Therefore, the legal pathway to suspend or revoke Türkiye’s membership in the NATO alliance exists, so long as it has committed a material breach.
So what, exactly, is a material breach of the North Atlantic Treaty? According to Dr. Aurel Sari, “there can be little doubt that continued compliance with the values set out in the preamble and Article 2 is essential for the accomplishment of the object and purpose of the treaty” (Sari 2019). The preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty provides:
The Parties to this Treaty … are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law…. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. (The North Atlantic Treaty 1949, preamble)
Article 2 further states:
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. (The North Atlantic Treaty 1949, at Article 2)
Therefore, if one party acts in a way that threatens the security of the alliance or severely undermines the values of democracy, individual liberty, or the rule of law, “the other parties may, by unanimous agreement, suspend the operation of the treaty in whole or in part, or terminate it either in the relations between themselves and the defaulting state, or between all the parties to the [NATO] treaty” (European Parliamentary Research Service 2023, page 1). As highlighted in detail above, Türkiye has acted in such a way under the leadership of President Erdoğan.
Policy Considerations
A decision to suspend Türkiye from NATO is not only legally feasible but also commensurate with the purpose of the alliance. First and foremost, decisive action against those members who seek to undermine NATO’s best interests is necessary to preserve the integrity of the organization. As stated by former French ambassador to Syria Michel Duclos, the operation of the alliance requires an “atmosphere of trust” (Jacinto 2024). Türkiye has undermined this trust. The European Parliament has described how failing to address such a breach erodes an organizational partnership, stating “if a state is allowed to breach the organisation’s rules, this can negatively impact the organization’s prestige” (European Parliamentary Research Service 2023, page 1).
At the same time, the European Parliament has expressed that expulsion, as opposed to suspension, would be imprudent under some circumstances. The briefing entitled “Suspension and expulsion of states from international organizations” explains that “expulsions are extremely rare” partly because it is beneficial to keep a state within the organization so it can be monitored. (European Parliamentary Research Service 2023, page 2).
Nonetheless, some consequences are certainly needed, both to persuade President Erdoğan and his regime to change their behaviour and to deter other NATO members from following a similar path. Suspending Türkiye from NATO would strike the proper balance – putting other states on notice regarding the consequences of violating the core principles of the alliance, while still maintaining strategic relations with Türkiye pending reinstatement of full membership upon remedy of these breaches.
Canada’s role
As one of NATO’s founding members, Canada is well-placed to raise the issue of Türkiye’s suspension. Such action would not only be in line with Canada’s above-mentioned priority of ensuring the Alliance remains adaptable to emerging threats (Government of Canada n.d.a), but also its broader interests in protecting and promoting human rights, countering terrorism, and combatting authoritarianism.
Ever since Canada played a key role in drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1947, it has espoused the “promotion and protection of human rights” as “an integral part of Canadian efforts abroad” (Government of Canada. n.d.b). In the decades since, it has embodied this priority through decisive action, including the ascension to almost all the core human rights treaties and the passage of domestic legislation enabling the Government of Canada to implement targeted sanctions on foreign officials responsible for gross violations of internationally recognized human rights (Government of Canada. n.d.c).
Canada has also made public statements on matters of concern, issued Universal Periodic Review recommendations, and imposed targeted sanctions in efforts to hold other countries to similar standards. A failure to maintain these standards equally among international partners, especially those that committed to respecting individual liberty by ratifying the North Atlantic Treaty, such as Türkiye, undermines these global efforts.
Regarding counterterrorism, Canada has declared that “the threat of terrorism is of the utmost importance to the Government of Canada” (Public Safety Canada. n.d.a) and has accordingly worked to address this threat by passing the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act, regularly listing entities associated with terrorism – several of which have been supported by the Turkish state (Public Safety Canada. n.d.b) – and developing the Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing Regime Strategy (Department of Finance Canada n.d). While this strategy emphasizes that “[n]o single country can combat money laundering and terrorist financing risks effectively on its own” (Department of Finance Canada n.d), any country that fails to address the activities in its territory, or worse, actively contributes to these crimes, undermines this collective effort. Canada’s counterterrorism regime is thus eroded by its failure to address state financing of terrorism, especially by a NATO member committed to promoting peace and security such as Türkiye.
In relation to combatting authoritarianism, Canada pledged in December 2021 to “enhance like-minded collaboration to identify and respond to foreign threats to our democratic values, processes and institutions in the context of our leadership of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (G7 RRM)” as one it its commitments related to the Summit for Democracy’s theme of “Advancing Democracy and Defending Against Authoritarianism” (Government of Canada n.d.d). In pursuit of this goal, Canada highlighted that under its leadership the G7 RRM published its annual report in 2023, which “called out China, Russia and Iran for malign activities” (Government of Canada n.d.d; G7 Rapid Response Mechanism 2022). However, the report omits Türkiye’s role in helping Russia circumvent sanctions, promoting anti-West narratives, and building dependencies with developing countries in Africa (Nogueira Pinto 2021), all of which were parallel concerns raised about Russia, China, and Iran.
By failing to address these issues, Canada undermines its own policy objectives in relation to human rights, counterterrorism, and anti-authoritarianism. Furthermore, continued inaction by Canada and other NATO allies signals tolerance for Türkiye’s past and ongoing breaches and establishes a precedent that future violators of provisions essential for the accomplishment of the object and purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty can act with impunity. Despite what the record may suggest, complacency is not the only option. By suspending Türkiye from NATO, the alliance could closely monitor its compliance with the North Atlantic Treaty, with the aim of reinstating full membership when it has demonstrated a commitment to protecting the security and freedom of all members. Canada has the opportunity to preserve and strengthen NATO by raising the issue of Türkiye’s suspension. At a time where NATO is receiving ever-growing criticism, both from observers and from within, leadership from a country committed to the values that the alliance is built on is more critical than ever.
About the author
Isabelle Terranova is a lawyer licensed in the District of Columbia, focusing on international criminal and human rights law. She holds a Juris Doctor and a Certificate in Refugees and Humanitarian Emergencies from Georgetown University Law Center. Her writing has appeared in publications including the Georgetown Journal of International Law and the Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law at the University of Pennsylvania.
The author of this document has worked independently and is solely responsible for the views presented here. The opinions do not necessarily represent the views of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, its directors, or supporters.
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[1] Of the 12 founding members, France, Norway, and the United States are not states parties to the VCLT.
[2] Of the 32 current members, France, Norway, Romania, Türkiye, and the United States are not states parties to the VCLT.
