By Alexander Dalziel
March 18, 2025
“In Canada, I often use the word ajuinnata. It’s a word in Inuktitut that has great meaning for Inuit. It is persevering in the face of obstacles. It means to never give up.”
– Governor General Mary Simon, 2022
Her Excellency Mary Simon is Canada’s first governor general from the Inuit community (Governor General of Canada 2025). Her appointment reflects the growing awareness that Canada must be an Arctic leader. Her words encapsulate the distinctiveness of Canadian conceptions of the Arctic and its peoples in shaping them in a time of deteriorating international security. The Arctic is, as she goes on to say in these remarks to the Arctic Circle Assembly in 2022, a matter of “global importance” (Governor General of Canada 2022).
Canada is indeed making progress in the Arctic – but too slowly. Canadian thinking is becoming more sensitive to the tense international situation, flagging the challenges to the Arctic from geopolitical rivalry with Russia and starting to put forward the plans for a credible presence, which includes a properly equipped military and coast guard and strong governance and infrastructure for communities region-wide. Some of that thinking is lateral – about how to draw in Nordic, NATO, and north Pacific partners. Some of that thinking is local – working with Canada’s Indigenous communities, looking more closely at Alaska and Greenland. And Canada is starting to call out the main threats to the country’s North – whether that be Russia’s disregard for the United Nation’s Charter by invading Ukraine, China’s efforts to become a polar power, or the diverse range of factors like disinformation and economic security.
It’s urgent not so much because of an imminent attack. It is urgent because, to keep it stable and peaceful, status quo actions no longer are enough. To maintain the status quo of security, defence and allied co-operation need to be upgraded. Moreover, the world, along with Canadians, looks to Canada for leadership in the Arctic. Ignoring the region makes it more likely that Canada’s adversaries will attempt destabilizing actions there. Moreover, the threat picture in the European Arctic and Bering Strait is dynamic – and Canada can play a role in emphasizing unity of purpose. Readiness is imperative.
Therefore, Canadian leaders need to “think Arctic” when they think foreign affairs and defence. It should become a policy reflex. That way of thinking is a “must have,” not a “nice to have” in a world riven by geopolitical rivalry, because the Arctic is one of the issues that will define Canada’s roles in the years ahead. A Canada with a strong Arctic presence is not just good for Canadians, but for the world as well.
A strong presence requires smart strategy, but it also requires capabilities to back it up: military and civilian ships, planes, infrastructure, and so on. These are the tools of smart power. Here is where Canada needs to concentrate its effort. Here is where Canada is investing in new tools – diplomatic, military, and civilian. Accelerating the acquisition of new military hardware, the building of new bases and supply points, the expansion of diplomatic networks, improving Arctic knowledge and skills among the intelligence community, and the launching of icebreakers – these are the next steps in what will make Canada an unquestioned leader in the Arctic. Most are on the books – it is time to throw political will behind them.
This paper will look at Canada’s four documents that express important attributes of the emerging Canadian Arctic grand strategy. Three are from 2024: the Canadian Arctic Foreign Policy (CAFP), the defence strategy, Our North, Strong and Free (ONSF); and the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) Arctic Strategy. The other is the Inuit Nunangat Policy, signed in 2022, which illustrates the domestic factors behind what will make Canada successful in the Arctic and in its wider foreign policy, as it attempts to gather its resources – human and natural – to meet the challenges of the sharp competition among the world’s countries (Government of Canada 2022). Canada will be less smart, slower, and less effective in the region if it fails to respect constitutional Indigenous treaty rights. Democracy and the rule of law will get Canada to pole position, by building cross-Canada support, unleashing the business sector’s entrepreneurship, and availing of civil society’s creativity.
Canadian Arctic basics
In Canada, the Arctic is not just what is above the Arctic Circle. It is a geophysical, climatic, and cultural area (see Figure 1). Its population is small and widely dispersed; some 150,000 people live there. Indigenous peoples make up a large percentage of the population. Their homelands cross political borders: the Inuit people extend from Greenland through Canada and Alaska to far eastern Russia, calling their lands Inuit Nunaat, with the Canadian portion called Inuit Nunangat (Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami 2019). The Dene and Gwich’in First Nations live on both sides of the Yukon-Alaska border.
Starting Point
The tone and content of Canadian Arctic strategy has changed significantly. Canada’s 2019 Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, for instance, relegated foreign policy, defence, and national security to its final chapters (Government of Canada 2019). It spoke about defence in terms of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD 2025), not NATO. It put an onus on science and other forms of civilian international cooperation international cooperation, for instance at world-class venues like Polar Knowledge Canada’s High Arctic Research Station in Cambridge Bay, Nunavut (Government of Canada 2025). At the time, analysts viewed the Arctic as a peaceful, low-tension region, cordoned off from the repercussions from Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine. Russia has since squandered that what was effectively a free pass given to them after their initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 to continue a constructive, mutually respective dialogue.
By 2024, the government’s update on Arctic policy had transformed into an Arctic foreign policy. Now, Canada would require hard military investments and invigorated diplomacy to keep the Arctic peaceful. The 2017 defence policy, Strong Secure and Engaged, first mentioned China and Russia on page 50; they garnered a total of 6 references collectively; the Arctic got 79 (Department of National Defence 2017). By 2024, the ONSF mentioned Russia 27 times, China 17, and the Arctic 90 in its total 45 pages.
Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy
Canada’s 2024 Arctic foreign policy document reflects an advance in Canadian grand strategic thinking (Government of Canada 2024). It offers a comprehensive view of how diplomacy works together with the military, coast guard, the public, and civil society. It also explains the strategic factors that influence how Canada makes decisions. Strategically, the CAFP pivots on the concepts of the “primacy” of the Arctic states and their Indigenous populations in the region, Canada’s Arctic as part of a NATO “northern flank,” and the integration of local communities into foreign policy and security policy and implementation.
Arctic primacy is an enduring element of Canadian foreign policy. It is the idea that circumpolar states and peoples lead governance and decision-making in the Arctic. The Arctic Council (AC) is the emblematic institution of Arctic primacy, and the CAFP reiterates Canada’s commitment to it, including through additional funding. This can be seen as something of a strategic bet that in the future, when Russia has returned to ranks of international-law abiding countries, the AC’s infrastructure will be intact.
But because Russian aggression has hindered the Arctic Council and China is seeking to gain influence in the region, Arctic primacy today turns on the idea that Canada, the United States, and the Nordic countries need to work together to lead in the region. As the CAFP explains, “non-Arctic states and actors increasingly expressing foreign policy or security aspirations… pushing for greater roles in Arctic affairs.” One essential point in Arctic primacy is the position of all these states that the existing international institutions and laws, like the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, are sufficient to cover the Arctic – special treaties are not needed.
New partnerships, however, are part of preserving Arctic primacy. The CAFP broke new ground in loosening the constraints on who Canada is willing to work with in North American Arctic. Historically, defence and security in the region was heavily binational and NORAD-focused. The document does not exclude extra-regional players from the Arctic defence-and-security table – a very large change for a Canada. Historically, Canada has portrayed the Arctic as a region of peace and stability, and sought to avoid setting precedents that could potentially hurt its position in its disagreement with the US that the Northwest Passage is an internal waterway, not an international one as Washington insists.
By adopting the concept of a northern flank, Canada aims to structure this new line of effort. This broadens the opportunities for Canada’s allies and partners to participate in the defence and security in the Canadian North. It is a significant milestone in Canadian strategy.
The CAFP does retain a North America-centric conception, acknowledging the centrality of the US as “essential” to Canada’s Arctic strategy. Here, the horizons are expanding as well. For instance, the CAFP promises Canadian diplomatic missions in Anchorage, Alaska, and Nuuk, Greenland. A close reading of the CAFP indicates a North American primacy for Canada: it carefully distinguishes between NORAD, NATO, the North American Arctic and the “European High North” (as the CAFP refers to the Nordic countries). That will still place limits on the sorts of partnerships Canada will enter into when it comes to its north, and will be something that non-Arctic partners will need to be cognizant of in their approaches to Canada on co-operation there.
But NATO’s rules around the collective security of its members are also influencing Canada’s approach. Article 5, which states that an attack on one or more alliance members is considered an attack on all NATO members, covers the Canada’s North just as it does the rest of the country. More on this will follow in the section on defence policy.
Again, flowing from the idea of Arctic primary, the CAFP enhances the role of the Nordic countries (Finland, Iceland, Kingdom of Denmark, Norway, Sweden – the Nordic Five or “N5”) in Canadian strategy. One of the innovative proposals to build out the northern flank is the discussion about establishing a security dialogue among the democratic Arctic countries. That is itself a sign of changing times.
At a meeting in Iqaluit in September 2024, Canadian Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly and her Nordic counterparts agreed to “explore means through which to deepen security dialogue amongst all like-minded states in the Arctic” (Global Affairs Canada 2024). The CAFP fleshes out this “Arctic security dialogue,” citing the importance of that relationship and adding that the “European High North” is of “critical importance” to Canada. For example, Canada was the first country to ratify Finland’s and Sweden’s applications to join NATO.
The format is still taking shape. It has the potential to be an effective “minilateral” body for coordinating strategy and positions among the Arctic democracies (Berkshire Miller 2025). Ideally, the US would take part, but American interest in it at this time is debatable, given the positions of the current US presidential administration on issues like the status of Greenland and cooperation with European allies. Nonetheless, the Nordic countries and Canada (what diplomats might call a N5+1C meeting) could use such meetings to organize a strong unified voice to lobby President Donald Trump’s administration about the benefits of co-operating with the liberal democracies to strengthen the US’s Arctic presence and national security. While much depends on the result of Canada’s looming federal election, the momentum and rationale for the minilateral body is solid. At a minimum, it’s likely that Canada-N5 meetings with a broad security agenda will occur regularly at the foreign minister level. Key discussion topics could include critical infrastructure protection and economic security. It could also be a way to preserve Arctic primacy while undertaking outreach to other partners, like Germany.
The Pacific Ocean is also an element, but one that will require more elaboration. In Canada’s 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy, the North Pacific is alluded to as “one of the approaches to the Canadian Arctic” (Global Affairs Canada 2022). As the Aleutian Islands and Bering Strait become a focal point for US-China-Russia interaction, whether that be Chinese icebreaker voyages or joint China-Russia air force exercises, Canada, Japan, and South Korea will have more opportunity to think collectively about what the Arctic means as a transition zone between regions, and how they can work with the US to ensure the balance of power there.
The northern flank strategy reflects Ottawa’s adopting a broader Arctic security lens. As climate change transforms the Arctic region, the CAFP argues that Canada will need to increasingly consider geopolitical challenges such as economic and research security, and “hybrid” threats like foreign interference, disinformation, espionage and cyber attacks. The CAFP talks about expanding information sharing among Arctic partners to bridge “intelligence gaps” – a shift towards the North to supplement Canada’s role in the Five Eyes community (with the US, UK, Australia, and New Zealand).
In that view, Russia is the primary threat in the Arctic. It is a “generational geopolitical challenge,” in the CAFP’s words, that Canada will “hold accountable” for its actions in Ukraine; Russia bears the responsibility to “create the conditions” for the resumption of a more productive bilateral relation. The CAFP describes China as working alongside Russia to advance its ambition to be a polar power, create a more “permissive environment” for itself internationally, and have a “say” in Arctic governance. Canada frames this as corrosive to Arctic primary.
The CAFP is grounded on the idea of locally based security feeding into geostrategy. It argues that the federal government will need to obtain social and political buy-in from Indigenous treaty-rights holders and the governments of Yukon, Nunavut, and the Northwest Territories, as well as the provinces of Quebec and Newfoundland and Labrador that extent into the far north. The CAFP also discusses Alaska, Greenland, and the Kingdom of Denmark, demonstrating that smart Arctic policy will not be made just by talking to national capitals but to all levels of government and society. In Canadian diplomacy, co-development of policy will be an enduring feature of Arctic policy – a “think local, act global” approach that will be crucial to its legitimacy and long-term sustainability.
Canada’s Defence Policy
The Arctic is the military’s strategic centrepiece in the 2024 defence strategy, Our North, Strong and Free (ONSF) (Department of National Defence 2024). “The most urgent and important task we face is asserting Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic and northern regions,” it announced. It is a long overdue development, and a coherent recognition that the Arctic needs to be embedded in a 360° defence concept that looks north, south, east and west, given Canada’s geography and links to the wider world – an awareness that has not always been there in Canadian government circles or among leaders over successive governments. The document is forward leaning in expanding the language of Canadian defence strategy, as the ONSF points out that Canada and the US protect NATO’s western and northern flanks – a move away from talking about NATO only as relevant to the Atlantic Ocean and Europe.
Like the CAFP, the ONSF adopts a Canadian interpretation of the “northern flank.” It is again North America-centric, with NORAD at its core. The main aim, building on the recommendations of reports from the Parliamentary and Senate committees in 2023, is improving “situational awareness,” in other words the ability to monitor and patrol the Arctic, whether that be through specialized sensors or ships and planes, but with more defensive “striking” power like submarines and missiles to deter potential aggressors (House of Commons 2023; Senate of Canada 2023). Alongside the North America orientation, the ONSF recruits NATO language to describe its Arctic and who can be involved in defending it. Again, like the CAFP, there is a tension here, as it will likely be “Arctic allies” that defend NATO’s northern flank – not necessarily the whole Alliance.
It also expands the threat picture. “Emerging and existing threats” are one area, including the category of military threats like hypersonic and cruise missiles. Natural disasters and accidents are another, speaking to the demands placed on the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to participate in emergency preparedness and disaster response. The vision is still very much about defence and response, not offence.
The ONSF describes Russia and China as the primary threats. In fact, it mentions Russia more frequently than China, noting that “Russia continues to modernize and build up its military presence in their Arctic, investing in new bases and infrastructure… is highly capable of projecting air, naval, and missile forces both in and through the broader Arctic region” and “possesses a robust Arctic naval presence,” with the Russian Northern Fleet’s cohort of submarines and surface ships and the civilian fleet of icebreakers at its disposal. Russia, it added, is a threat to North America, being “highly capable of projecting air, naval, and missile forces… to and through the Arctic to threaten North America.”
Whereas Russia is portrayed as an active threat in the Arctic, China in the ONSF is seen as an emerging threat. The document notes the “steady growth” of the People Liberation Army’s Navy (PLA-N) and its ambitions to be a “great polar power” are based on building a conventional and nuclear-powered submarine fleet. Economic and scientific ventures are also part of China’s growing Arctic plans and capabilities. The ONSF is infused with a liberal geopolitics, a concept that accepts that it is a competitive and dangerous world and that reaffirms Canada’s commitment to democracy and the rule of law in staking its position in it. As the ONSF states, ““Canadian and North American security reduces the ability of authoritarian powers to dictate the terms of our foreign and defence policies.” An example of Canadian action and regional burden-sharing was the Royal Canadian Navy’s shadowing in international waters of a Chinese icebreaker transiting the Bering Strait in 2024 (Brewster 2024).
The ONSF envisions a stronger Arctic presence. The ONSF’s plan is for “capabilities… focused first and foremost on ensuring that Canada has the ability to protect its Arctic and North,” enabled by a more “persistent presence,” through “bases, surveillance aircraft, surface and subsea sensors, helicopters and satellite ground stations.” The capabilities that Canada’s military is looking for “prioritize detecting and understanding threats across all military domains” and establishing “a broader footprint” in the Arctic. They include operational hubs, prepositioned supplies, better situational awareness – including through space satellites and subsea sensors – striking power in the form of surface-to surface missiles to deter threats far from our shores, and the ability to get to and deal with incidents faster.
Elsewhere, senior Canadian military leaders have spoken of a rough division of labour for the CAF, that sees Canada’s navy concentrating on the Indo-Pacific, the air force on the Arctic, and the army on Baltic Europe (CSIS 2023). Air assets will indeed be crucial to Canada’s presence in the Arctic, but the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) will need to play a growing role, in concert with Canadian civilian government departments, the Canadian private sector, and Canadian society. The ONSF gives a sense of the direction.
Some key commitments are slowly improving Canada’s Arctic capabilities, but these must be seen against a backdrop of the neglect of the CAF as a whole since the end of the Cold War – something that has become more acute in recent years (Shimooka 2025). The CAF is acquiring or considering acquiring a range of military hardware, systems, and infrastructure – but the government’s urgency has been lacking.
The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) is focused on NORAD modernization and obtaining high-end weapons systems. In March 2023, US President Joe Biden and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau reaffirmed the value of NORAD and Canada promised investments to modernize the institution, which has always had a northwards gaze (Prime Minister of Canada 2023). Their joint statement was a repackaging of Canada’s June 2022 announcement of a C$38.6 billion investment in NORAD modernization. The headline commitments were two new over-the-horizon radars, as well as network of sensors in the Arctic. In addition, the government would put C$7.3 billion towards establishing four “Forward Operating Locations,” primarily airstrips for handling F-35As and other aircraft, in Inuvik and Yellowknife in the Northwest Territories, Iqaluit, Nunavut, and Goose Bay, Newfoundland and Labrador.
Timelines for these investments, however, do not show that the Trudeau government understood the urgency of investment in a stronger northern military. The Arctic over-the-horizon radar is to come online 2028, and the polar radar in 2032. The federal government slated the forward bases to be fully operational by 2039. There has been more progress on some systems. Canada’s announcement of the purchase of 88 F-35As – up from previous plans to acquire 65 of them– as well as 11 MQ-9B UAVS and up to 16 P-8A patrol aircraft procurements are all underway, but again the timelines are not in step in the current threats Canada faces. The CAF says the F-35As, MQ-9Bs and the P-8As will be fully operational only between 2032 and 2034. The RCAF is also acquiring eight CC-330 mid-air refuellers from Airbus, with the full fleet received by 2027. These will augment Canadian Arctic defence, but not for years (Department of National Defence 2023a; 2023b; 2024b; 2025a).
The Royal Canadian Navy reflects the slow addition. Most notable of the Arctic capabilities are the six ice-class (Polar Class 5) Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships, all of which are now in service or sea trials (Department of National Defence 2025b). Although criticized for their light armament (one forward canon) and having had multiple teething problems in seaworthiness, the RCN can now operate in light ice conditions much of the year throughout Canada’s northern waters, a capability it previously lacked (Canadian Naval Review 2015).
The next most significant naval procurement is to replace Canada’s aging and trouble-plagued Victoria class submarines. The plan is to buy up to 12 conventionally powered vessels, which would triple the size of the fleet (Public Services and Procurement Canada 2024a). These will have some under-ice capability – able to patrol underwater for at least three weeks – although they will not be able to surface through the ice (Vanderklippe 2025). Regardless, their ability to stay submerged for longer periods of time will extend their range to many of the approaches to Canadian Arctic waters. The federal government says the first vessel will be available by 2035. These will be bought from a foreign shipyard. As of the time of writing, South Korean, German, Swedish, and Spanish suppliers had expressed initial interest.
Emblematic of the Canadian government’s slowness turning words into reality in the Arctic is the RCN’s refuelling station in Nanisivik, on the Northwest Passage. Originally announced in 2007, it is still not fully operational as of the time of writing. Establishing Northern bases is particularly challenging because of costs and logistics. Most of Canada’s Arctic assets – for example, the fleet of CH-149 Cormorant search and rescue (SAR) helicopters – come from the country’s south.
The Canadian Rangers are the Canadian Army’s most distinctive contribution in the Arctic (CAF/DND 2023). According to the ONSF, they are part of Canada’s “best insurance against global uncertainty,” alongside the regular and reserve forces. All five Ranger Patrol Groups contribute to northern and Arctic security, three with far northern territory, and the other two bordering on Hudson Bay. Rangers are community members who work about two weeks a year or more. They number about 5,000. They are an exemplar of the CAF working with local communities to extend its reach and awareness. But given their daily civilian lives, they alone cannot solve all the CAF’s needs for more presence in the Arctic. The ONSF commits to a “people first” approach and an expansion of its work with “Arctic stakeholders.”
Otherwise, the Army has important facilities like the Arctic Training Centre in Resolute Bay, Nunavut, its main cold-weather training base that has been operational since 2013 (Canadian Armed Forces 2022). As part of ONSF, the Army will get long-range missiles as part of its North American defence mission, a system that might have applicability to the Arctic. It also mentions plans for procuring new vehicles for “ice, snow and tundra” conditions. But the sky and the sea, not the land, are where Canada assesses threats will mostly appear in the Arctic.
Canada’s Coast Guard
The Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) is one of the most experienced federal agencies in the Arctic. With the creation of an Arctic region in 2018 and the publication of a regional strategy in 2024, it is expanding its active presence across the region year-round. That will be a crucial element of Canada’s Arctic credibility and presence – not just in northern waters, but at negotiating tables on both sides of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.
The CCG Arctic Strategy acknowledges the “shifting landscape of global affairs,” an “evolving” picture to which it will adjust over the next decade (Canadian Coast Guard 2024). The CCG sees itself as part of Canada’s effort to “mitigate the risks” of the global security context and the effects of climate change. The strategy invokes the concept of maritime security, which encompasses handling a variety of illegal and hostile activities like sabotage and illegal fishing, as well as Canada’s sovereignty. The strategy frames the CCG as a tool for stability and “predictability” in the Arctic, highlighting its commitment and networks to promote peace and security.
To do so, the strategy emphasizes the CCG’s multi-mission mandate, supporting civilian and military functions and agencies in the Arctic. It describes its role as contributing to maintaining awareness of what is going on in the Arctic, through data collection, assessment, and sharing; Indigenous and northern communities are key elements in exchanging information with the CCG, for instance through expanding region-wide initiatives like the volunteer CCG Auxiliary.
Icebreakers are the CCG’s hallmark. It is in the midst of a full rebuild of the fleet. The National Shipbuilding Strategy has projects for two Polar Icebreakers (able to handle year-round ice conditions) and six Program Icebreakers (heavy and medium icebreaking) (Public Services and Procurement Canada 2024b; 2024c). These have been contracted to shipyards in Vancouver and near Québec City. Their construction has faced numerous delays. Most are still in the design phase and it will be the end of this decade before any fully enter service.
A key aspect of their design is modularity in icebreaker design. The CCG strategy talks of a multi-mission role for the organization, with its ships fulfilling core CCG responsibilities like icebreaking, community resupply and maritime search and rescue (SAR). In addition, the CCG needs to be ready to assist other government departments in the Arctic, in the area of maritime security, which could involve the military or law enforcement. To carry out a variety of roles, its ships need to be able to carry different suites of equipment onboard– or modules, like plug-and.-play systems, which can be mounted onboard or removed, depending on the tasks set to the CCG crew, in order -to conduct different activities. Modularity is a strategic necessity in the contemporary North, where the CCG will be one of the most present government agencies, and therefore their ships will be among the first go-tos in a variety of situations. One ship cannot do everything at the same time, but it certainly can be designed to do a lot of things at different times. That expresses one imperative of Canadian activity in the Arctic – do as much as you can with as much as you can get.
The CCG’s needs have transatlantic and transpacific dimensions. Icebreaker construction can tie allies tighter together and offer avenues to new partnerships. The Canada-Finland-USA ICE Pact is the best example so far (Prime Minister of Canada 2024). Less commonly noted is that it integrates European capabilities in North American Arctic security. The comparative advantages of Finland, and increasingly Canada, in the construction of icebreakers and ice-class vessels is one that can be an advantage to the US and other allies, including Germany.
Geoeconomic Competitiveness and Indigenous Reconciliation
Canada’s geoeconomic future turns on Indigenous partnership. Canada is often viewed as a natural resources power. While Canada has a broad industrial and innovation economy, there is little doubt that its energy, minerals, and food are crucial to the supply chain resilience of its allies and partners. To unlock those resources, Indigenous communities must be partners in the design, development, and operation of any ventures, not just agree to them. It is a vision of Arctic governance and development distinct to Canada.
Right now, Canada’s Arctic economy is a small part of Canada’s GDP. One should treat with caution the view that there will be any sort of rush to extract mineral wealth or develop transoceanic shipping through the region. High extraction costs and harsh environmental conditions make mining, for instance, daunting, and the forecast for the Northwest Passage as a major commercial sea lane is poor, as melting sea ice is actually making navigation more unpredictable.
But future endeavours will depend on co-development and co-ownership with northern Indigenous and Metis peoples. The Inuit Nunangat Policy (INP) is one northern example (CIRNAC 2025). In the INP, the Canadian government “recognizes Inuit Nunangat as a distinct geographic, cultural (including with its own distinct language), and political region.” All areas of policy, including resource development, is contingent on “Engaging Inuit in the early stages of program renewal or design… to maximize the impact of an initiative.”
This will extend to infrastructure. Infrastructure deficits are pronounced in Canada’s North, whether those be roads, digital connectivity, ports, medical services and so on. All levels of government and treaty-rights holders have driven improvements over the last decade, like road networks in the Yukon, a deep-water port in Nunavut and fibre optic cables in Hudson Bay, but much work remains to be done.
Here defence and reconciliation can come together by creating “dual-use” military infrastructure that kickstarts investment and shares costs, reducing the infrastructure gaps facing Inuit communities. Civilian infrastructure investments can also strengthen Canadian security. For instance, subsea fibre-optic cables can be used to detect changes in their surrounding environment, and civilian vessels can contribute to real time data, as the CCGS discusses. In fact, dual use does not capture the full picture: it is really about “multiuse,” as the ONSF describes it, and how investments in the North can serve security, society, and the economy, as well as the environment, public health, culture, and education. The implications of investment and its potential dual-use applications are subject to healthy debate in the Inuit community and Canadian society at large.
Summary: An Emerging Arctic Strategy
From these documents emerges a Canadian Arctic grand strategy. The key themes are:
• While still focused on the US and NORAD, a more nuanced North America-centric view, drawing in neighbouring regions like Alaska and Greenland, and involving Indigenous peoples, knowledge, and concepts in policy-making and implementation, to improve social buy-in and legitimacy.
• More openness to cooperation with other allies, especially the Nordic countries, but also NATO and North Pacific partners, in the Canadian Arctic.
• Similarly, more willingness to frame challenges in other parts of the Arctic as matters of defence and security, shifting away from the low tension view of the past.
• More use of the Arctic as a pillar of Canadian FP and defence, with more attention to the strategic roles of civilian agencies like the Canadian Coast Guard, businesses and civil society
• A more comprehensive sense of the range of threats, from overt military to covert operations, from climate change to supply chain security, in the Canadian Arctic; and more direct attention to the challenges to the region posed by China and Russia.
This list is not exhaustive, presents some of the main factors shaping Canada’s policies and diplomacy when it comes to the Arctic.
Conclusions: Arctic Leadership in Hard Times
Canada is adjusting Arctic strategies for a geopolitical and geoeconomic world. In a geopolitical world, authoritarian countries use all their national resources to achieve their goals; in a geoeconomic world, countries bring to bear their economies to effect outcomes, by strengthening their resilience to supply chain disruptions and coercive economic strategies. That entails coming to see the North American Arctic in an integrated picture of traditional (military) and emerging threats (sabotage, climate change, economic security) and drawing in allies like Nordic and NATO allies to achieve Canadian interests, on the continent and in the world. The Arctic and its peoples are assets to Canada internationally. Canada will be more valuable to its closest allies and partners when it is ready to defend and develop its Arctic.
To take the next steps, Canada needs to add urgency and ambition. The urgency is in procuring the tools necessary to main a secure, stable Arctic. More ships, planes, sensors, radars, and facilities are becoming operational, under construction, or are planned. But these improvements are from an exceptionally low baseline and against a backdrop of general neglect in the defence and icebreaker realms. For most of its tenure, the Trudeau government lacked an understanding of the fraught world taking shape around Canada. It was only after February 2022 that the purchase of military hardware and the outlines of a diplomatic strategy began to emerge. Only during its very last days did it sign contracts for polar icebreakers. The next federal government needs to make it a top priority – for instance, by appointing shipbuilding and military procurement “czars” that report directly to the prime minister to see through military and ship procurements.
Canada must ingrain in its policy-making the reflex to “think Arctic.” It needs to consider how it can contribute more to Alaskan and Greenlandic defence, which in turn strengthens Canada’s own. Canada can work more closely with the Nordic countries, ensuring that the NATO mission it leads in Latvia is used for an opportunity to exercise together with Nordic – that is Arctic – partners. Canada should work with an open attitude with NATO and NATO allies, as well as North Pacific countries like Japan and South Korea, in order to bring the dynamism and capabilities to bear in strengthening Canada’s northern defence. And Canada’s “think Arctic” reflex must include a stronger maritime dimension in NORAD, developed in light of contemporary “hybrid threats.”
Countries like Germany should encourage these lines of thinking by proposing their own ideas for collaboration with Canada. Canadian strategy in recent years has opened more opportunities for Arctic partnership. Canada is finally waking up to the importance of the Arctic in the world. It needs international partners to ensure that its northern territories remain secure.
About the author
Alex Dalziel has been a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute since 2023. Before that, he spent over 20 years in Canada’s national security community, advising senior decision-makers across government and Canada’s allies while holding positions at the Privy Council Office, Department of National Defence, and Canada Border Services Agency. He writes on geopolitics and geoeconomics, concentrating on the Arctic, and has published in the Globe and Mail, National Post, iPolitics, and Policy Options. His views have been showcased on Finland’s national broadcaster Yle Uutiset and Canada’s CTV network and at lectures across North America and Europe.
References
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Endnote
Figure 1 additional source information: High and low Arctic terrestrial boundaries defined by the Circumpolar Arctic Vegetation Mapping Project – Bioclimatic subzones. Subarctic boundary defined by the Arctic Biodiversity Assessment (ABA). Border data: Runfola, D. et al. (2020) geoBoundaries: A global database of political administrative boundaries. PLoS ONE 15(4): e0231866.
