This article originally appeared in the National Post.
By Heather Exner-Pirot and Christopher Coates, January 12, 2026
It may have started out as a joke: U.S. President Donald Trump, the former real estate magnate, tried to make an offer to buy Greenland back in 2019. The joke got fewer laughs in the early days of his second term, with the threat of annexation. Trump said in his state of the union address last March that, “We’re gonna get it — one way or the other,” and refused to rule out military force in several interviews.
Following the capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, the “Donroe Doctrine” for Western hemispheric dominance and control over other countries’ natural resources must be taken seriously. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio told legislators this week that the administration will begin negotiating to buy Greenland, while the White House reaffirmed that the “range of options” being explored includes the military.
The United States is actively threatening a staunch NATO ally, the Kingdom of Denmark. For its part, Denmark classified the U.S. as a potential security threat last month, even before the latest round of provocations, and has been investing billions in defence equipment over the past year.
What’s driving Trump’s desire for Greenland? For the realtor inside him, it’s location, location, location. Yet the island has been of interest to some American expansionists since at least the time of Canadian Confederation.
This was first formally described in an 1868 U.S. State Department document, “A Report on the Resources of Iceland and Greenland,” which noted Greenland’s acquisition, in the wake of the 1867 Alaska Purchase, would “flank British America for thousands of miles … and greatly increase her inducements, peacefully and cheerfully, to become a part of the American union.”
American interest in Greenland was expressed again in 1910, but a 1916 agreement whereby the U.S. purchased the Danish West Indies saw America recognize full Danish sovereignty over Greenland. Following the Second World War, America made another attempt to acquire the island for $100 million in 1946.
The advent of nuclear weapons — and the fact that passing over the Arctic Circle is the quickest route for intercontinental ballistic missiles to travel from the Soviet Union to North America — led to efforts to detect and deter such attacks. This prompted investments like the Distant Early Warning Line, a string of radar stations stretching from Alaska through Canada to Greenland and Iceland.
In addition, the United States and Denmark signed the 1951 Greenland defence agreement, two years after forming NATO, which allowed the U.S. to host military bases in Greenland. The agreement has evolved over time, but that fundamental aspect remains.
The Pituffik Space Base, formerly Thule Air Base, hosts about 150 American personnel today. Under the current arrangement, nothing prevents the U.S. from bolstering its numbers or assets at Pituffik, and Denmark has denied no such requests.
Similarly, while controlling Arctic shipping has been identified as an objective for owning Greenland, there are no choke-points or routes that pass through Greenlandic waters. The Kingdom of Denmark controls its 12 nautical mile territorial waters around the island, as the law of the sea allows for all states. Everything beyond is international waters. U.S. ownership would not change who can sail beside Greenland, or the ability of American ships to operate in those waters.
Greenland provides significant support in detecting and controlling Russian submarine entry into the Atlantic. From supporting NATO submarine-hunting aircraft to seabed submarine detection, these activities have been well managed within existing systems.
Today’s satellite-tracking and missile-defence systems at Pituffik are critical for the detection and deterrence of ballistic missiles, and the 1951 defence agreement and its successor deals permit the U.S. to adjust these capabilities as necessary.
The Trump administration also sees control over energy and resources as a priority, and has highlighted Greenland’s mineral wealth, especially rare earth minerals, as a reason to buy the island.
Greenland’s deposits are decent but difficult to access, and they remain undeveloped. Rare earths have received attention due to China’s production monopoly. But the issue is a processing bottleneck, not deposit availability, and Greenland has no processing capacity.
Greenland is not presently an important resource investment destination, due to its high costs, harsh climate, lack of infrastructure and distance from market. It currently has no oil or gas production, and only two small mining operations.
Greenlanders have gone through a half century of efforts to incrementally assume more control over their affairs. This has happened peacefully and consensually — from home rule in 1979, to self rule in 2009. Many Greenlanders aspire to eventually become an independent country, but have not yet held a referendum.
Justifications for U.S. ownership of Greenland are strategically and logistically weak. America can already expand its commercial and military presence, and patrol surrounding waters. It’s obvious that Trump’s provocation is grounded in the outdated thinking that people — particularly Indigenous people — have no agency and can be bought and sold by bigger powers. It is indecent, and destabilizing.
Canada — the next-largest Arctic power after Russia and the United States — has a role to play in offering moral and other support to the Kingdom of Denmark. Expanding our own Arctic presence and capabilities may further assuage American concerns about the region’s vulnerability to Russian and Chinese intervention.
But we must not kid ourselves by thinking that there are logical arguments that would dissuade Trump in his desire to acquire Greenland. Any arguments or solutions — such as highlighting the valuable defence co-operation among NATO allies — must be directed at Americans themselves.
Heather Exner-Pirot is director of energy, natural resources and environment, and Christopher Coates is director of foreign policy, national defence and national security at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. Coates served as deputy commander of NORAD from 2018-2020.
