This article originally appeared in the National Post.
By Alexander Lanoszka, Richard Shimooka and Balkan Devlen, June 11, 2025
The proverbial canary in the mine of U.S.-Canada defence co-operation is grey, flies as fast as Mach 1.6, and has a very low radar signature.
Canada has named the F-35 — Lockheed Martin’s fifth-generation multipurpose fighter jet — not once, not twice, but thrice as the CF-18s’ intended replacement. Alas, the stealth fighter’s procurement has come under scrutiny again in view of U.S. President Donald Trump’s repeated wish to see Canada become the 51st state.
Hence, in his first days on the job, Prime Minister Mark Carney ordered yet another review. However, there was a ray of hope on June 10, when David McGuinty, Carney’s new defence minister, issued a statement that made no mention of reviewing the contract. Instead, he said, “this project will provide Canada with an invaluable air defence capability … well into the future.”
Let’s hope the government sticks with that plan. Given the history of this procurement, it continues to merit close scrutiny.
Politicians and international security analysts from across the political spectrum have supported Carney’s temporizing. From their perspective, the U.S. now represents at best an unreliable ally and at worst a territorial menace. Canada would thus be better off acquiring other aircraft made by purportedly more trustworthy European allies. Recognizing that it may be too late to cancel, some propose Canada should acquire a mixed fleet — with either French-made Rafales or Swedish-made Gripens — so as not to rely exclusively on the U.S.-produced aircraft.
As Ottawa considers the implications of the June 10 auditor general’s report, which found the estimated cost of replacing the F-18s has ballooned to $27.7 billion, it should note that a mixed fleet of fighter jets remains a terrible idea. Much of the costs are exogenous to the F-35 (like rebuilding dilapidated infrastructure), and would be borne by any fighter selected. It further underestimates the complex technologies involved, and takes too optimistic a view of what European defence contractors can provide. Tens of billions of public money could be wasted if Canada chooses a mixed fleet.
The idea may sound reasonable. By many attributes — speed, payload, range — the Rafale and Gripen seem comparable to the F-35, thereby making them appear interchangeable. Moreover, diversity in suppliers makes sense to provide resilience over matters related to sovereignty.
Yet this logic is flawed for three reasons.
First, despite overlapping capabilities, these aircraft have become so technologically complex that they have little interchangeability. Each aircraft has its own training program: F-35 pilots and support personnel cannot simply operate Gripens. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) would have to offer two distinct training pipelines. Considering it already suffers from a severe pilot shortfall, a bifurcated training regime would further strain personnel capacity. Similarly, each aircraft requires its own logistical supply chain. Aircraft inevitably suffer from wear and tear, even in benign conditions, and their components are not interchangeable between fleets.
Indeed, inefficient supply chains in Europe plague European aircraft consumers with long delivery times and shortfalls in spare parts. Australia had to prematurely retire its European-made MRH90 and Tiger helicopter fleet because of reliability problems. Inadequate spares kept Royal Air Force Typhoon fighters grounded in the early 2010s.
The second problem with the mixed-fleet proposal is its misunderstanding of how situational awareness matters for the modern battlefield. The F-35 aggregates extensive data through sensors and datalinks to detect, identify and monitor targets. Its efficacy is enhanced by Norad, through which the RCAF has sole access to vast quantities of highly sensitive operationalized intelligence.
This asset has tremendous value in the Canadian North, where four F-35s can cover the same territory as several dozen fourth-generation fighters like the Gripen or Rafale. Retrofitting older aircraft to integrate into these networks is too difficult. Dassault and Airbus withdrew their respective aircraft from the competition to replace the CF-18 because fulfilling this essential requirement was too demanding for them to achieve at a reasonable cost.
The third problem concerns the entire strategic rationale for a mixed fleet. Those who assert that the Trump administration might shut down U.S.-made aircraft abroad must consider why other allies do not share such worries. Those states include Finland, Japan and South Korea, all of which face more acute threats to their security than Canada. Last week the U.K. government suggested it will buy more F-35s to strengthen its nuclear deterrent: a mission that requires utmost trust in Washington’s commitment to its security. Moreover the RCAF is an integral part of the U.S. continental defence, providing between one quarter to one half of the aircraft on alert for defending the northern approaches. Washington would be amputating its own security even if it could disable Canada’s F-35 fleet.
Years of chronic underfunding have created such capability gaps in the CAF that even spending as much as two per cent of gross domestic product — which Prime Minister Mark Carney has pledged to do — will not fill them. Given the sheer expenses and complexity it would involve, a mixed fighter fleet will only further undermine the CAF and Canada’s national security.
Alexander Lanoszka, Richard Shimooka and Balkan Devlen are senior fellows at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.
