By Michael Barutciski
January 13, 2026
Introduction
Canadians have been telling pollsters for more than a year that their country’s immigration system has been admitting more foreign migrants than it can screen and integrate into the existing infrastructure and economy. There is a general perception that even public services are affected in a way that is reducing living standards for the collectivity. How Canada’s distinctly pro-immigration consensus was so severely eroded in such a short time will be explored by analysts for years to come because it is possibly the country’s worst public policy failure this century.
Indeed, it is astonishing that politicians and bureaucrats implemented fundamental policy shifts on key issues without even bothering to explain these controversial changes. Decisionmakers appear to have been unaware of the extent to which their choices sharply contrasted with historical approaches to immigration.
Canada will have difficulty remaining a pro-immigration country if the federal government enacts major immigration changes in a non-transparent way that also ignore the lessons of past policy. This lack of transparency makes it difficult for the general public, opposition MPs, and migration policy specialists to hold the government to account: How can we avoid such a fiasco if the government is not upfront about the changes it is enacting?
To prevent this from recurring, legislators should work to strengthen parliamentary oversight – specifically, by expanding the immigration minister’s obligation to report to Parliament.
In accordance with s. 94 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the minister is obliged to submit a report to Parliament each year. The legislation requires the report to focus on details concerning permanent residents who are admitted to Canada. Section 94 does not require the minister to report on other categories, even though there has been an explosion in temporary residents and migrants without legal status.
This provision is clearly outdated: statistical trends reveal that permanent residents now represent only a minority of the migrants in Canada. This reporting gap made it easier for the government to use temporary migration to significantly increase Canada’s intake during the post-pandemic period, thereby implementing a major shift in the country’s immigration policy without ever informing Parliament or the public.
The details and data included in the annual report need to be expanded to reflect the recent shift in migration trends and to prevent such policy changes from being implemented without Parliamentary scrutiny. Parliamentarians should therefore amend the legislation so that Canadians can be properly informed not only about permanent residents, but also temporary residents and other migrants without legal status. This would result in Parliament and the media having easy access to more data that would allow better public debate. This, in turn, can influence government policy decisions, relations between the federal and provincial governments, as well as investments by various economic actors.
Yet, to fully grasp recent immigration policy problems, we must recognize that the government acted non-transparently when introducing its new temporary migration approach, and then mismanaged it so badly that the system’s integrity was questioned.
It is stunning that Canada, with all its immigration specialists and the general importance it attaches to this topic, could somehow be developing policy in an environment characterized by the lack of data highlighted below. Immigration is simply too important for Canada’s future to allow the type of policy derailment that happened in the post-pandemic period. While it may have taken time for the media to grasp the degree of mismanagement, there were clearly policy process failures from political and bureaucratic actors. The former reacted nonchalantly as they grudgingly conceded the system was “somewhat out of control,” while the latter were apparently unsuccessful in their key advisory and implementation roles.
As demonstrated by the awkward exchange following the new immigration minister’s first intervention in the House of Commons, it is difficult to have a serious discussion on immigration policy without extensive and accurate data. The proposed legislative amendments below will provide Parliament more information, thereby allowing the public to better scrutinize developments that directly affect how the country welcomes newcomers.
It is worth pointing out that we should always be careful with examining the data given the latest obfuscation efforts when the government presented the 2026–28 Immigration Levels Plan. The latter includes tables on permanent and temporary resident admissions and it was included in the recent budget published on November 4, 2025. The immigration minister waited until the following day to present her Annual Report with the same Levels Plan, which is an unusual way of reporting basic immigration data in the sense that the sequence did not respect the November 1 deadline specified in s. 94(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. (Although the legislation arguably allows a delay because the date fell on a Saturday.)
Moreover, the official announcement of cuts to permanent resident admissions is generally misleading. Aside from the fact that the 380,000 target for the next three years actually represents a slight increase from last year’s plan (which aimed for 365,000 in 2027), two new special “one-time initiatives” need to be added to these numbers.
These include 33,000 to overall numbers in 2026 and 2027 for “work permit holders” who will be granted permanent resident status, as well as “about 115,000” in 2026 and 2027 for protected persons who can also obtain permanent residency. The latter should normally have been able to transition to permanent status and they are part of another significant backlog in the system. This is not an amnesty and there is no apparent reason why these “one-time initiatives” are not included in the “Annexed Table for PR Admissions 2026–2028” (Budget p. 53). It is also misleading that the government’s website emphasizes there are 380,000 new permanent residents planned for 2026 which represents “4% fewer than last year’s target.”
Consequently, the actual forecast is a significant increase in permanent resident admissions for the next few years even though Canadians would have no idea because of government “marketing” of its Levels Plan.
This obviously poses a problem in that the annual levels are intended to help all stakeholders plan for the next few years. Just as worrisome, it also suggests the government is using the humanitarian card to justify bad planning on the economic front. While we do not control how many migrants will seek asylum, the government does have to warn Canadians about asylum numbers because many claimants will be staying permanently (i.e. the protected persons who are recognized as needing protection and therefore will be allowed to stay). To pretend this is a one-time situation is disingenuous given that we know we have had record numbers of claimants in the last few years. Where will these temporary residents be going as the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) deals with its historic backlog?
Identifying countries of origin
Although it has been long-standing practice for the annual report to indicate countries of origin for permanent residents, the reports submitted in 2024 and 2025 omitted this basic information. This omission aligns with a worldview in which a person’s cultural background is not seen as particularly relevant to immigrant integration. Canada’s welcoming multicultural fabric may leave the impression to many, particularly in the English-speaking part of the country, that integration is not a genuine issue. The potential problem is that this overconfident attitude encourages policymakers to ignore actual integration challenges, as well as diaspora difficulties.
Basic information on countries of origin should always be reported to Parliament for permanent residents, as well as other categories. Migrants arriving from a variety of source countries bring different cultures with them and Canadians should be encouraged to consider how this inevitably changes the multicultural fabric of their country. It is possible to be respectful of the world’s diverse cultures while not necessarily importing certain cultural traditions that clash with Canadian values.
By clarifying the countries of origin for Canada’s immigrants, we will gain better insight to address trends and problems relating to migration flows. For example, countries such as Canada cannot be expected to serve as a pressure valve for growing poverty or misery in certain regions of the world. To the extent that India is the leading source country for various migrant categories in Canada, it is important to consider the situation in the Punjab – a region of economic hardship with high unemployment, farming distress, and a looming drug crisis – and how many of its youth (along with significant numbers from Gujarat) have used recent lax controls to migrate to Canada and even transit to the US.
Identifying source countries can also help to clarify whether immigrants are coming from jurisdictions with inferior educational standards and from cultures that are not necessarily going to make it easy for them to succeed in Canada. This additional information can also contribute in advancing the long-standing debates about recognition of foreign credentials. These have tended to highlight the plight of overqualified immigrants occupying low-wage jobs, thereby emphasizing the problem of an ineffective selection process and personal frustrations experienced by immigrants. Yet there is another side to this problem that is not often discussed: it would be naive to believe that all jurisdictions have comparable standards. This delicate issue cannot be a taboo topic if Canada is to participate in the global competition to attract immigrants.
In other words, more information on source countries will also help to encourage more realistic discussions about the role of our professional and trade associations in accommodating the credentials of foreign-trained immigrants, as well as to maintain Canada’s traditionally high standards.
Recommendation: Section 94 of the IRPA should be amended to oblige the immigration minister to provide Parliament with data on countries of origin for all migrant categories.
Including temporary residents
Less than three years ago, the federal government was boasting about record immigration intakes that were driving a population growth that was far outpacing other G7 members. Yet the government did not explain that this development largely resulted from an explosion in temporary residents. To avoid this kind of obfuscation about an important change affecting all community planners and stakeholders, the immigration minister should be obliged to provide data for temporary residents in the Annual Report. As mentioned above, current legislation only requires reporting on permanent residents. A new reporting obligation regarding temporary residents should include future planning, as well as those actually admitted each year.
The commendable decision to include temporary residents in the last two Annual Reports should be standardized and turned into an obligation by legislative amendment. If such a requirement were already in effect, it could have helped avoid the unintended consequences of the recent explosion in this category.
Recommendation: Section 94 of the IRPA should be amended to also include detailed information on temporary residents.
Clarify data on the unprecedented temporary resident workforce
A genuine debate on how immigration affects Canada’s labour market requires accurate data concerning the unprecedented numbers of temporary residents who are working in the country. It is impossible to have an accurate picture of wage growth or unemployment rates without this information. Such data are particularly important because of recent analysis suggesting the record increase in temporary residents with work permits is contributing to rising youth unemployment rates.
The link between Canada’s workforce and the group that is now referred to as “international students” (previously called “foreign students”) deserves particular attention. Along with granting visas more leniently in recent years, the federal government had also expanded the conditions related to work permits for temporary residents who are legally studying in Canada, as well as dependent family members.
Recommendation: Section 94 of the IRPA should be amended to oblige the immigration minister to provide data on work permits issued to temporary residents.
Need for more data on study permit integrity
Foreign students in Canada have recently attracted considerable media controversy in relation to immigration control. Cash-strapped educational institutions have relied on these students who pay high tuition fees. The immigration minister has even likened some institutions to “puppy mills” in that they are providing foreigners a chance to obtain visas without actually obtaining a quality education. Recent reports have revealed that many foreign students simply never show up at the institutions where they were admitted to study. As a result of this abuse, the government has started to tighten the rules. Along with limits on foreign student numbers, educational institutions that do not produce immigration compliance reports can be suspended from accepting these students.
To show it is taking the issue seriously, the government could require foreign students to pay fees before coming to Canada. Likewise, it could clarify how many foreign students are “no shows” and how many educational institutions are not reporting the relevant information.
Recommendation: International students should be required to show to the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) upon arrival that they have pre-paid full tuition.
Recommendation: To encourage scrutiny of any discrepancies between issued visas and actual enrolment, the immigration minister should be obliged under section 94 of the IRPA to report on immigration compliance data from educational institutions.
The need to present data on the IMP
While there has been considerable debate about the Temporary Foreign Workers Program (TFWP), the federal government is in control of another category of foreign workers that has seen a huge increase in recent years: the International Mobility Program (IMP). This stream, which has been advertised as aiming to advance “Canada’s broad economic and cultural interests,” was once a small source of migration, but its objectives have become vague and the federal government has recently presented it as a way to hire a temporary worker “without a Labour Market Impact Assessment.” The vast majority of foreign workers come from this stream, yet the media has devoted little attention to this expansion.
Quebec has been pushing the federal government to reconsider its opaque approach. Given that the Legault government has indicated it wants to take over this stream of foreign worker, it is noteworthy that the Conservative Party of Canada made an electoral promise during the last election in 2025 to grant Quebec the authority to select temporary residents under the IMP.
This proposed new approach to the IMP should be extended to all provinces. By transferring control of the IMP to provinces, local decisionmakers will be better positioned to match intake with housing and health resources and to avoid distorting the program’s intended goal. The federal government’s role should essentially be limited to ensuring national intake numbers are reduced significantly from current levels.
Recommendation: The federal government should clarify the objectives of the IMP and provide data on who is being admitted under this stream, along with future planning.
Recommendation: The federal government should explore the feasibility of authorizing all provinces to select their own candidates for the IMP.
Apprehending uncontrolled migration
Uncontrolled migration can take various forms and they all have destabilizing effects on Canada’s demographic situation. For example, if significant numbers of migrants overstay their visas, it is more difficult for public officials and businesses to plan housing and infrastructure, along with services. It is also important to note that Statistics Canada does not provide data on migrants who are unlawfully present in Canada. While there is a general assumption that the majority are visa overstayers, the overall situation obviously affects public trust to the extent that the population risks becoming anxious about whether the government even controls the country’s territorial borders.
Indeed, Canadians may be astonished to learn that we do not know how many people actually live in the country. At the same time, the government cannot fully control how many migrants arrive at the border seeking to enter by claiming protection. These asylum seekers can also be considered a form of uncontrolled migration and they deserve particular attention because their numbers have exploded in recent years.
The government’s overly generous visa issuance and weak enforcement of recent years have not only contributed to more asylum claims. Almost two years ago, the immigration minister was acknowledging that there are now possibly over half a million migrants unlawfully present in Canada. Other estimates are significantly higher.
To grapple with this unprecedented situation, Parliament needs information on all these uncontrolled migrants, some of whom are unlawfully present in Canada. To understand the magnitude of the problem, we should note that Statistics Canada has been acknowledging there is a problem with “non-permanent residents” (NPRs, the distinct category measured by StatCan for its own demographic purposes) missed in its population estimates. It considers the missing rate at 38 per cent for the 2021 Census, which constitutes the last detailed enumeration of the Canadian population before the post-pandemic explosion in this category. It is likely that the missing numbers are now even higher. Not only does Parliament need more data, but it also needs the data to be reliable if it is to scrutinize the government’s attempts at reducing uncontrolled migration.
Need to measure border exits
Part of the problem is that Parliament is not being informed on how many migrants remain in Canada after they were legally supposed to depart.
As repeatedly pointed out by specialists, it is naive for Statistics Canada to assume in its estimates that NPRs leave Canada within 120 days of the expiry of their work or study visa. For a comparison that points to the seriousness of this methodological problem, it is reported that UK statistics suggest 50 per cent of foreign students overstay their visas. Put bluntly, we cannot reduce the share of temporary residents in the overall population if we do not even know how many are actually leaving Canada after their visas have expired.
If many are staying illegally, it poses serious questions regarding the rule of law. If others somehow manage to remain with a legal status that involves ministerial discretion, it also deserves attention to the extent that it puts into question the general assumption that visa validity corresponds directly to the lawfulness of a migrant’s presence. Both these possibilities pose a problem because the methodology used by Statistics Canada means they are not included in population estimates. This needs to be corrected.
In terms of signalling seriousness and countering abuse, it is astounding that the system currently encourages this kind of confusion by tolerating lengthy renewal processes of work or study permits even after visas have expired. In any case, Canada’s statistical office is doing the country a disservice if so many non-permanent residents are not included in population estimates because they are simply (and incorrectly) assumed to have left 120 days after visa expiry.
Recommendation: In accordance with the Statistics Act, the Chief Statistician should be directed to revise the assumption that non-permanent residents leave the country 120 days after visa expiry. The Chief Statistician should correspondingly adjust the way general statistics relating to immigration and emigration under s. 22 of the Act are collected and analyzed.
Following its pre-pandemic introduction of high-tech exit controls intended to curb abuse and violation of Canadian immigration law, CBSA has not made public the exit data it collects. These data need to be shared with Statistics Canada for its estimates on the number of non-permanent residents in the overall population. Otherwise, the federal government will leave the impression that it really does not know how many visa overstayers are present in Canada.
Recommendation: CBSA should be directed by the minister of public safety to provide Statistics Canada with its exit data. Data related to the relationship between expired visas and actual departures at the border should be presented in the report produced by the minister of immigration under section 94 of the IRPA.
If we are serious about limiting uncontrolled migration, the attempt to determine how many migrants are unlawfully present in Canada should be a multi-agency effort that also involves employers. For example, the immigration minister should be informed when the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) establishes that migrants unlawfully present in Canada are receiving tax slips from their employers and are having taxes deducted from their pay. An obligation to report this information to Parliament will allow the public to engage in the country’s efforts to reduce uncontrolled migration, while also encouraging more accurate population projections and effective planning. The responsibility of the employer and any penalties for non-compliance should also be explored.
Recommendation: The Canada Revenue Agency Act should be amended to oblige the CRA to provide Canada Border Services Agency and Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada with any data it holds regarding migrants unlawfully present in the country. These data should be presented in the report produced by the minister of immigration under section 94 of the IRPA.
More data on asylum seekers
Nobody should underestimate how the unprecedented levels of uncontrolled migration are affecting public confidence in the immigration system. As suggested above, the old way of reporting data to Parliament should be changed to help identify appropriate responses to this growing problem.
The migrants behind this phenomenon are essentially asylum seekers and others who are present unlawfully, particularly visa overstayers. The latter now constitute a new issue not only in quantitative terms, but also in a qualitative sense: Canada appears to be importing US-style politics that result in “undocumented” migrants and “sanctuary cities” being tolerated by a significant part of the educated urban constituency. While such civil disobedience may have a role in certain contexts characterized by unjust and undemocratic laws, it is unreasonable to imply that Canadian laws provide insufficient safeguards or protections for migrants. The need for reform is in the opposite direction: Canada’s openness to immigration is such that it has encouraged a borderless worldview that introduces a naive “global village” spirit into immigration policy.
While it is not illegal for migrants to try to claim asylum at the Canadian border, they do not automatically have a right to enter or to be eligible to claim asylum. The overall policy challenge relates to the fact that the government cannot plan the number of future asylum claims, so we need to understand the migration flow dynamics in order to respond appropriately. A useful starting point would be to inform Parliament about the source countries for these new asylum claims. Information on country of origin will allow better scrutiny of the government claim that Canada is simply experiencing the effects of global trends. Specifically, a legal requirement to report data on source countries would make it more difficult for the government to distract attention from its own visa policy decisions by misleadingly invoking external factors.
Contrary to the European Union or the United States, the influx of asylum seekers into Canada over the last three years was not essentially the result of unauthorized entry. Rather, foreigners were allowed to enter legally, after which they claimed asylum in the hope of staying permanently. While any country dependent on immigration must prevent xenophobia, we need to be careful not to automatically dismiss any criticism as evidence of bigotry.
Until early 2024, Mexico was the top source country for asylum claims in Canada, even though the federal government allowed Mexicans to enter the country without visas. The unusual situation, which continues despite last year’s imposition of visas on most Mexicans, is highlighted by recent reports on the high number of foreign students claiming asylum. Indeed, Canada has become a global outlier because it is receiving a high number of asylum seekers who also happen to come from countries that are not typical refugee-producers (e.g. India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya). It should not be surprising that Canada now finds itself amongst the world’s top destination countries for individuals presenting new asylum claims.
To provide Canadians a better picture of the asylum situation, parliamentarians also need information on the location where asylum claims are made in Canada, as well as the previous immigration status of claimants. Understanding how many claims are made at particular Ports of Entry or inland (in specific municipalities) will allow more serious reflection on appropriate responses and planning efforts. Likewise, it is important to know whether asylum seekers are arriving as tourists or whether they already held study or work permits in Canada.
Recommendation: Section 94 of the IRPA should be amended to oblige the minister of immigration to provide information about the country of origin of asylum seekers, the location where they presented their claim, along with their immigration status prior to the claim.
Another distinctive aspect of the Canadian asylum system is that claimants benefit from considerably higher recognition rates for refugee status and the granting of protection. Even for those claimants who are not formally recognized as needing protection, the federal government maintains deferrals and moratoria on removals that is more expansive than peer countries. For example, Germany and Sweden deport rejected asylum seekers to Afghanistan, while many countries in the Americas have deported Haitians in recent years. Canada, on the other hand, has for years not returned failed asylum seekers to countries such as these and it is unclear whether the federal government actually intends to adjust this long-standing and distinctive approach. The combined result of these two basic features of the Canadian system is that Canada has become even more of an outlier that attracts disproportionately more asylum seekers.
Unfortunately, data are hard to find and difficult to understand for those without specialized knowledge of the system, which is why they are routinely misinterpreted by reporters and politicians.
Recommendation: The immigration minister’s annual report under s. 94 of IRPA should specify the following information regarding asylum claims: it should include how many migrants claim asylum each year, how many proceed to a hearing before the IRB, how many are recognized as needing protection, how many remain in Canada despite not being granted formal protection, how many benefit from a deferral or moratorium regarding removal, as well as how many disappear altogether from the system. For a truly constructive debate, the immigration minister should be encouraged to present comparable data regarding our peers: the US, the UK, Germany, Australia, New Zealand, along with other EU member states such as Sweden and Denmark.
Need for data on removals and deportations
Given the unprecedented number of migrants who are unlawfully present in Canada, it is time for Parliament to require the annual report to include data on removals and deportations. This problem has now become an important challenge regarding the system’s integrity. By not addressing these issues, there is a risk that public trust will be further eroded.
These data will also help clarify whether the government is tolerating visa overstayers and indirectly choosing less-skilled migrants to settle permanently because it does not want to conduct mass removals or deportations. More data presented to Parliament will allow a better discussion on this politically contentious issue.
Recommendation: Section 94 of the IRPA should be amended so that the minister of immigration is required to provide data on removals and deportations.
Conclusion
The Canadian public has lost confidence in the immigration system because of recent problems that are striking. Parts of the system appear to have been mismanaged and abused, while other parts are simply uncontrolled. Even the Toronto Star’s senior immigration reporter acknowledges it is legitimate to ask whether Canada’s immigration system is broken. Given the importance of immigration to Canada’s future, it is clear the government needs to restore confidence by genuinely addressing these problems.
To the extent that public support depends on sensible control of borders and intake levels, it is difficult to treat migrants in a dignified and humane manner if the local population is not fully onboard with the country’s overall immigration policy. To regain public confidence in Canada’s immigration system, the first step is to encourage an honest and open public debate. This cannot happen if the government withholds basic information, obfuscates in its public dissemination, or simply does not have essential data. Parliament can address many of these shortcomings by amending the country’s legislation and requiring the minister of immigration to present an updated version of the annual report that is adapted to 21st-century realities.
About the author
Michael Barutciski is a professor at York University’s Glendon School of Public and International Affairs and a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.
