This article originally appeared in iPolitics.
By Alex Dalziel, October 21, 2025
Greenland’s future has made headlines since Donald Trump returned to the White House. Since Canada claims it’s taking the Arctic more seriously, greater cooperation with Greenland would put action behind its words.
Greenland is part of the Kingdom of Denmark. Nuuk, its capital, handles domestic affairs, while Copenhagen leads defence and foreign policy. One day, Greenland may be independent. Today, co-operation means working with Nuuk and Copenhagen.
Canada mentions Greenland 21 times in its 2024 Arctic Foreign Policy and plans to open a Nuuk consulate. Sharing the world’s longest maritime boundary, Canada and Greenland have mutual interests in the environment, fisheries, shipping, mining, and supply chains. They share aerospace and maritime security concerns which will grow as Arctic infrastructure develops.
Security dynamics are changing, but not the way the Trump administration frames it. Greenland is not encircled by Russian and Chinese ships. Invasion is not imminent.
But there are real threats. Russia is building advanced missile technologies, and its submarines can operate under ice. Russia’s and China’s “hybrid warfare” presents new challenges, such as snipped data cables and jammed GPS frequencies. This demands Canada and Greenland be ready should these threats come to their coasts.
But the most realistic threat is to economic security. China might exploit vulnerabilities in Greenland’s export dependent economy, centred on fisheries and mining. Such moves hit small, rural economies hard. If relations with China worsen, Greenland’s economic resilience will be tested.
These vulnerabilities are common across North America’s Arctic. That’s why Canada should initiate a new comprehensive security co-operation with Greenland.
It’s an obvious partnership. The agenda would centre on military and economic security, with lots of space for the U.S. to join.
First, Prime Minister Mark Carney should cut the ribbon at the promised Nuuk consulate. Once there, joined by Danish and Greenlandic counterparts, he should announce the partnership.
It should have long-term ambition: to better integrate Greenland and Denmark (which controls the Kingdom’s military) into NORAD, improving its maritime capabilities. Canada, Greenland, and Denmark could clearly define that vision, launching a working group on Arctic and North Atlantic aerospace and maritime security gaps.
But it should be short-term actionable. The partners could develop Arctic sensor networks and advance data integration. Canada could offer to station military, coast guard, and search-and-rescue equipment at Greenlandic air and seaports. A bold invitation from Carney for Danish military members to join crews on Canada’s future submarines and P8 patrol aircraft would set the tone. This would tackle CAF retention and recruitment challenges, and position Denmark to acquire similar capabilities.
The centrepiece would be strengthened economic resilience. Both countries want healthy economies with reliable export markets and coercion-free supply chains. Enhanced economic security and prosperity working groups on fisheries and mining would be a step forward. In this “nation-building” moment, joint infrastructure projects — shipping, data centres, telecommunications, energy diversification, and mineral stockpiling—would accelerate region-wide security and development.
Such a model must emphasize self-determination. Canada’s and Greenland’s comparative advantage is capacity for Indigenous co-development and co-leadership. Greenland has called for strengthened north-north ties, in line with statements from Nunavut. Such tailored co-operation demands local knowledge and implementation, which Inuit involvement on both sides of Baffin Bay would provide.
This initiative should be unapologetically bilateral. Canada needs to get North American co-operation back on track. Ottawa can reinforce to Washington that Canadian, Greenlandic, and Danish initiative makes North America stronger.
These are not zero-sum games. Ottawa should communicate its plans to Washington for deepening Greenland relations, explaining how these coincide with American interests like NORAD modernization. This should be accompanied by burden-shifting offers, like more Canadian permanent presence in Pituffik, the United States’ northern Greenland space base.
Canada is part of a North American neighbourhood. Stepped-up co-operation with Greenland would signal to all of its neighbours that it’s serious about its role.
Alexander Dalziel is a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. His latest paper is Exposure Risks: Greenland, China, and economic security in the North American Arctic
