These remarks were delivered by Peter Copeland, deputy director of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute’s domestic policy program, at the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs on June 12, 2026. The transcript has been lightly edited for republication.
Bill C-16 – Protecting Victims Act Senate Testimony
Senators, and colleagues, thank you for having me. It’s my pleasure to share my thoughts with you on this comprehensive bill. I’ll confine my remarks to three subjects: coercive control, case timelines and minimum sentences.
Coercive control is a sustained pattern of controlling behaviour. It includes duration, controlling behaviour with harmful effect, and multiple acts of varying type. The definition that we have before us is not as tight. It puts forward a standalone offence that requires a pattern of acts, where the nature of the act, what constitutes a pattern, and when that threshold is met are too vague. Only the ‘any other conduct’ subsection 2 (c) of the definition has an explicit reasonable person standard built in, and it leaves open the possibility of charges for coercive control that could be better described as isolated instances of sexual or general assault, uttering threats, forcible confinement, or extortion – all existing offences.
The idea behind the offence should be that there is a sustained pattern. Other aspects of the definition lack the necessary clarity. When does financial management become controlling economic resources? When does disagreement about a child’s bedtime become controlling the manner in which the intimate partner cares for a child? Over what timeframe?
Experience from England and Wales, and Scotland provide case studies in contrast. Scotland’s model requires a pattern, demonstrable effect on the victim, and applies a reasonable person standard to the whole test. It also involved considerable officer training, resulting in conviction rates surpassing 90% whereas England’s were 13% in the first year.
The definition of coercive control in the bill could be improved by applying the reasonable person standard throughout the test, tightening the definition of various acts included in the definition, and possibly requiring two or more acts of a type over a defined period, ensuring the definition is in line with the underlying concept – a pattern, not a set of isolated acts.
We are pleased to see the inclusion of image takedown powers, introduced at the house committee stage. To ensure these tools are effective, the government should closely study the recently enacted US takedown act, which ensures the necessary staffing, and technological infrastructure is in place to properly operationalize the tool.
The amendments on delays are also welcome. Two recent SCC decisions in R v Vrbanic and R v Jacques give further clarity to the exceptional circumstances grounds for extending case timelines, which include disclosure, multiple witness, and other factors common in complex organized crime cases. However, I would still argue for clearer national security and organized crime grounds for case timeline extension, as they are complex, lengthy, and often more consequential than other cases.
On minimum sentencing, the government should be commended for going as far as it has in reinstating currently inoperative minimum penalties. That said, the proposed safety valve could still be refined.
It remains to be seen how courts will interpret and enact the provision, but recent experience suggests that some courts may be keen to use identity-based criteria to override sentencing provisions, by referencing the accused’s race, or migration status, for example.
This safety valve could be further refined to prevent this possibility, while also affording clear grounds for exceptions when the facts of an accused’s circumstances warrant it. The bill could be amended to provide a clear list of grounds – either inclusions or exclusions – pertaining to the exception to the minimum, and for specific offences. Things like, age or criminal history, commercial purpose, abuse of trust, or organized exploitation, which could be applied only for certain offences, such as drug possession, for example. This would further constrain the courts from searching for ideologically-driven justifications to lessen charges and ensure that they are better guided by the facts in play and the specific circumstances of the persons before them, rather than generalized assumptions about group membership.
In the main, and in spite of these comments, the government has put forward a sound bill in response to legitimate concerns from the public across broad swaths of the political spectrum, which I find refreshing and commendable.
