This article originally appeared in the National Post.
By Christopher Coates, July 15, 2026
The recent Walrus article “Why Canada Needs to Walk Away from NORAD” points to the Netflix thriller “A House of Dynamite” and suggests that among the very “realistic” aspects of the film is the absence of Canadians from the command centres involved in the response to a nuclear attack on the U.S. or North America. Like the film, that suggestion is a fiction.
The film the author comments on does just enough to be “believable,” but as a former deputy commander of NORAD, I can tell you it does not accurately represent the actions of the Canadians within NORAD in assessing and warning of an inbound missile attack on North America. Nor does it accurately portray the role of the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), NORAD’s sister command in Colorado, in the ballistic missile defence actions (e.g. the launching of the interceptor missiles). Neither of these command activities are represented in the film — they aren’t required to generate the cinematic tension the film relies on — but they are central to the defence of North America.
Citing an inaccurate film representation of Canada’s defence role to build a case for NORAD’s irrelevance in the real world is irresponsible and dangerous.
Notwithstanding the importance of either Richards-Gebaur Air Force Base (AFB) Kansas or Malmstrom AFB in Montana — to which the author cites a personal connection — and the NORAD roles that were accomplished there, they bear little connection to the role of today’s NORAD headquarters or NORTHCOM headquarters in Colorado or the United States Strategic Command or U.S. Space Command — all active players in today’s continental defence activities.
To diminish NORAD’s value to Canada’s defences, the article strangely asserts that “The NORAD conundrum is that what was once good for Canada’s interests, generated by a threat picture that prevailed for much of the Cold War, now threatens to erode both our sovereignty and security.”
But contrary to the author’s claims, NORAD’s “threat picture” has adjusted, and continues to adjust, to a range of modern threats, including the cruise missiles and drones that he mentions. If there are deficiencies in NORAD’s capabilities, especially those relative to protecting Canada, the party to hold responsible for that is Canada — not the United States and not NORAD. At the same time, it is entirely wrong to conclude that participation in NORAD somehow erodes Canada’s sovereignty and security.
NORAD was, and is, a response to short notice threats that require a quick response showing up in North American airspace, including Soviet bombers or Russian cruise missiles or terrorist-commandeered aircraft. For other threats, such as the hybrid threats identified by the Walrus article, Canada and its allies have other means and mechanisms to respond, including our current North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) relationships — although the will may be lacking.
The Walrus article maintains that “(e)ven if Canada were to … move beyond NORAD as the organizing principle of continental defence, the Canada–U.S. defence relationship would not disappear. Nor should it.” The author then says that “Instead, it would be grounded in a more balanced partnership, with Canada contributing more capabilities of its own.”
But the logic here is backwards. Yes, Canada is going to have to contribute more, but there’s no reason that doing so outside of NORAD would address the perceived imbalance better than doing so within the NORAD construct. In fact, it makes more sense to use that increased contribution to increase Canada’s influence in NORAD, reducing the perceived power imbalance, rather than believing that Canada would somehow have more influence over the U.S. from outside NORAD.
The article suggests Canada lean on NATO and Europe for Canada’s defences: “Rather than centering Canadian defence policy on NORAD alone, Canada should anchor itself more firmly within NATO’s emerging Arctic and Euro-Atlantic mission.” But Canada is already a full NATO participant — an organization whose plans and priorities are focused on the defence of Europe — not North America. There’s plenty we can and should be doing with NATO.
While forces can flow from Europe to North America under NATO’s Article 5 mutual defence clause, as occurred after 9/11, NATO’s defence plans and areas of responsibility end at the North American shoreline. With an aggressive Russia in their continent, it is beyond comprehension that somehow European NATO nations will find the capacity to contribute to the day-to-day aerospace defence of Canada.
The Walrus commentary reads as a poorly disguised attempt to stroke anti-Americanism; an attempt to poke the Trump administration for a perceived “attack” on Canada and comes from a myopic interpretation of U.S. intentions. NORAD continues to function well. Canada needs to double down, not walk away.
Canadian and American readers will realize that films like “Black Hawk Down” and “Top Gun: Maverick,” like “A House of Dynamite,” are meant to entertain. Decisions related to the defence of the nation, however, require deliberations based on fact not fiction.
LGen (ret.) Christopher Coates, former deputy commander of NORAD, is the director of foreign policy, national security, and national defence at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.
