This article originally appeared in The Globe and Mail.
By Jonathan Berkshire Miller, June 15, 2026
Late last month, at the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore, Chinese military officials called out Japan for embarking on “new militarism.” Japan’s Defence Minister Koizumi Shinjiro shot back at his counterparts indicating that it was China, not Japan, that was rapidly and non-transparently boosting its military spending and coercing neighbours.
For eight decades, Japan has taken its postwar obligations seriously. Its pacifist constitution, its self-imposed arms export restrictions, and its long reliance on the American security umbrella were never just legal arrangements. They reflected a genuine national reckoning with history and a deliberate choice about what kind of country Japan wanted to be. That context matters when evaluating how the debate is shifting in Japan. When Japan’s cabinet formally lifted its long-standing prohibition on exporting lethal defence equipment, China wasted little time in declaring that Beijing would “firmly resist Japan’s reckless new-style militarization.” It is a striking charge. It is also not a fair one, and it deserves a closer look.
Understanding Japan’s regulatory changes in a proper context is critical because recent actions taken by Tokyo are being portrayed by some as indicative of a growing “militaristic” Japan. However, the actual action taken is much less alarming than Beijing claims. The approval by the Japanese cabinet of modifications to Japan’s Three Principles on the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology represents nothing more than a gradual expansion of Japan’s willingness to co-operate with other countries on defence.
Prior to these changes, Japan could only export most military-related items in five non-lethal categories: rescue, transport, alert, surveillance and minesweeping. Going forward, all categories of defence equipment, including lethal systems such as warships, missiles and fighter jets, may in principle be exported. But the fine print matters enormously. Exports will be limited, for now, to the 17 countries that have signed formal defence equipment and technology transfer agreements with Japan. Each proposed sale must be reviewed and approved by Japan’s National Security Council. Moreover, recipients must commit to using equipment in accordance with the UN Charter. And crucially, Japan retains its prohibition on exporting to countries actively engaged in conflict.
Canada is among the countries on that trusted-partner list, but still needs a recent technology transfer agreement with Japan to be put into force.
So are Australia, Britain, the United States, France, Germany, and other democracies with which Japan has built deep strategic relationships. This is not a rogue state opening a bazaar. Rather it is a G7 democracy and a reliable ally carefully expanding its ability to work with friends.
For Canada, this announcement is neither surprising nor unexpected. Instead, it is merely a culmination of ongoing co-operative efforts between Canada and Japan, including agreements on equipment and technology transfer and intelligence sharing. As Canada looks to diversify its partnerships, this step will help Ottawa and Tokyo to collaborate on joint development projects in the defence realm.
It is also critical to note that this latest legislative development is not a new trend. Prior to making these recent changes, Japan had begun to loosen some of its more restrictive aspects of its regulation concerning the export of military-related items during the term of the late prime minister Shinzo Abe. At that time, he initiated reforms allowing for limited defence co-operation through a reinterpretation of certain provisions in Japan’s constitutional provision regarding collective self-defence. These reforms have continued and additional reforms have occurred since his departure from office.
Lastly, China’s objections should be taken with a grain of salt. Over the last two decades, China has dramatically expanded its military spending and modernized its military. Additionally, China has extended its naval presence across its periphery and consistently displayed aggressive behaviour to neighbours – including Japan – throughout the South and East China Seas; China has constructed the world’s largest navy based on hull count. And of course, Beijing continues to exert significant military pressure on Taiwan.
Consequently, given these realities, along with regional threats – including North Korea and a revanchist Russia – Japan’s decision to gradually enhance defence co-operation with democratic allies is largely a reaction to those very same realities.
However, if we characterize Japan’s policy reform as “reckless militarization,” while China engages in a peacetime military build-up that’s unprecedented in modern times, we see a disconcertingly disproportionate perspective on relative militancy.
In sum, Japan is not rearming in any way like how some have characterized its recent activities. Instead, Tokyo is evolving into a type of security partner that a truly multipolar world consisting of democracies requires.
Jonathan Berkshire Miller is a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and co-founder of Pendulum Geopolitical Advisory.
