By Jonathan Berkshire Miller and Christopher Collins, January 30, 2026
Since the end of the Second World War, the “core Anglosphere” countries (the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) have had a formal agreement to share intelligence and coordinate on matters of national security. This security arrangement is informally known as the “Five Eyes.”
While Canada has a high-calibre signals intelligence agency, known as the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), it is the only Five Eyes member without a dedicated foreign human intelligence service. Unlike Canada, the other four members of the Five Eyes all have specialized human intelligence services that can build networks of agents outside the country. These human intelligence services can penetrate foreign governments, organizations, and terrorist groups; reach into enemy decision-making; and gather critical intelligence through human sources.
By contrast, for intelligence, Canada relies on a patchwork of sources. This includes security intelligence collection by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Canada’s principal domestic intelligence agency; the communications know-how of the CSE; military intelligence from the Canadian Armed Forces; and scattered diplomatic intelligence efforts by Global Affairs Canada (GAC) – the country’s foreign ministry. Other government departments and agencies also contribute to the broader intelligence community in targeted ways. The result of this patchwork is an architecture that has significant gaps, both for domestic decision-making and as an ally sharing intelligence with Five Eyes peers and other friendly countries.
These gaps, along with growing geopolitical uncertainty, have led many intelligence experts in Canada to argue for a reconsideration of our intelligence apparatus.
However, while Ottawa lacks a dedicated foreign intelligence service, it is not starting from zero. In fact, Canadian intelligence agencies do currently have foreign intelligence collection capabilities, but those activities are done in a more targeted manner. CSIS, for example, has a mandate to collect foreign intelligence domestically, and routinely works with foreign human intelligence agency partners. However, while it does have officers overseas, its current mandate restricts it to the collection of security intelligence, including that abroad, focused on protecting Canada’s national security. Likewise, CSE, GAC, and other agencies contribute to Canada’s foreign intelligence capabilities in constructive but limited ways.
In an age when adversaries can integrate cyber, economic, and military power in a uniform fashion to confront democracies, Canada’s lack of a dedicated foreign human intelligence service is no longer tenable. Possessing a service of this type would allow Ottawa to anticipate foreign threats before they arrive on Canadian soil, a crucial capability to maintain sovereignty and navigate a world of increasing geopolitical instability and great-power competition. Building a national human intelligence capability would also benefit Canada’s diplomatic standing in the world by strengthening ties with allies. The issue is no longer whether Canada can afford such a service but whether it can afford not to have one.
Confronting Transnational Threats
Today’s security threats do not respect borders. Terrorism, foreign political interference, cyber operations, and organized crime all begin outside the country before appearing in Canada. Yet Ottawa’s current attitude is more reactive, defining threats only after they have taken hold within the country. A foreign human intelligence service might reverse this model. By collecting human intelligence outside of Canada, Ottawa might be able to locate and disrupt nefarious operations before they make it to Canadian soil.
Consider cyber threats. The CSE eavesdrops on electronic communications and CSIS monitors these networks, but neither can adequately penetrate foreign hacker cells or state-run cyber units. Without this capability, Canada is blind and often must rely on its Five Eyes partners to ascertain the intentions of would-be attackers who could leave critical infrastructure in the dark, pilfer sensitive information, or compromise key services.
Beyond cyber threats, the use of “grey zone aggression,” where adversaries employ unconventional hybrid tactics that fall below the threshold of conventional warfare, is increasing. Consider the case of Western Europe, where Russia has been waging an escalating campaign of sabotage, vandalism, and covert action since 2022, including numerous attacks on critical infrastructure. Human intelligence networks are key to understanding and anticipating these operations by gathering information about adversaries’ intentions and capabilities outside of Canada.
The same applies to terrorism. In the future, Canada will continue to receive allied intelligence – to complement its own capabilities – on terrorist plots, but this coverage will always be second-hand or incomplete. A persistent Canadian intelligence presence in zones where extremist networks operate would provide Ottawa with earlier, first-hand warning of threats to Canadian citizens abroad or of terrorist plots at home. This more robust Canadian-sourced information could supplement the intelligence Canada receives from allies. It could also be shared with other Five Eyes members to improve collective security.
Hostile state actors and terrorists are not the only threats to Canada’s national security that a human intelligence service could address. Transnational organized criminal groups traffic drugs, guns, and people across Canada’s borders, launder money, and conduct cyber-enabled fraud aimed at Canadians. And, increasingly, “grey zone” operations by adversaries are combining these criminal elements with traditional espionage, making it difficult to distinguish between state and criminal activity. Unravelling these webs requires human sources overseas – something Canada cannot do systematically as of now.
Protecting Economic Security
Economic espionage is another arena where Canada is increasingly exposed. As great power competition and geopolitical instability rise, economic and technological rivalry between states is increasing. Against this backdrop, Chinese and Russian intelligence agencies regularly attack Canadian technology firms, research organizations, and energy companies to steal intellectual property and improve their national competitiveness.
Economic espionage has major consequences, both for Canadian business and national security. In a recent interview, the former head of the UK’s MI6, Sir Alex Younger, said “there is an erroneous assumption that the “economic” espionage [such as] stealing IP – is less dangerous than political espionage. But I think it is more damaging in the long term. If our knowledge edge is being removed systematically … that arguably poses the most significant long-term threat to us.” Nortel, one of Canada’s leading technology companies, provides a sobering case study of this threat. The company, which at one point accounted for over a third of the entire value of the Toronto Stock Exchange, collapsed in part due to a concerted Chinese effort to steal Nortel’s intellectual property.
A foreign human intelligence capability would allow Ottawa to remain one step ahead of such threats by collecting intelligence on foreign industrial intentions, state-sponsored cyber activity, and front company activity against Canadian firms. Such information could shape national policy, inform corporate defenses, and prevent costly breaches.
On the economic front, there are also offensive benefits from a human intelligence service. For example, Australia’s external intelligence agency, the ASIS, has supported trade and investment proposals by providing current analysis of economic trends and political risk in the Indo-Pacific. Canada could do the same, using intelligence to support its Indo-Pacific policy, its policy on diversifying trade, and its resource security policies. Access to information on the negotiating positions of other countries, information about weaknesses in supply chains, and early notification of hostile takeover attempts may all give Canada a competitive edge in preserving its economic sovereignty. This would provide Canada a useful tool for economic statecraft, which is becoming more important in an emerging geopolitical order that increasingly blends economic and national security issues.
Contributing to Alliances
Most importantly, establishing a Canadian foreign intelligence service would significantly bolster Ottawa’s standing among its allies.
For years, Canada’s Five Eyes partners have raised serious, legitimate concerns about Canada’s limited human intelligence assets. Ottawa is often seen as a “net consumer” of intelligence within the Five Eyes alliance, and framed as junior partner in the group that does not pull its weight. While these concerns are not new, they are becoming more urgent as global geopolitical instability increases. This was most starkly illustrated by the alleged calls, in early 2025, by some in the Trump administration to expel Canada from the alliance.
Being seen as a Five Eyes freeloader may not be an entirely accurate depiction, as many of Canada’s capabilities – especially in signals intelligence – are deeply respected by our allies. However, there are still gaps and this perception, while right or wrong, reduces Canada’s influence in shaping allied priorities and limits its access to the most sensitive material. A dedicated Canadian human intelligence service, able to add value to other members of the Five Eyes alliance and support the group’s collective security, could help to turn that around. By concentrating on niches of expertise – Arctic security, francophone Africa, or diaspora-related expertise – Canada could provide analysis that complements that generated by allies. Independent analysis would also be a very valuable counterweight to allied analysis, adding to the overall intelligence picture and supporting collective security.
Building Canada’s intelligence capabilities could also expand its friendships with other like-minded middle powers. Intelligence is a currency of confidence; by producing more of it, Canada could build deeper relationships with allies that have similar issues in Europe, Asia, and beyond. This will be increasingly important in an era of heightened geopolitical tension, where middle powers with shared interests will benefit from closer strategic ties.
Solving the Challenges
Critics of a Canadian overseas intelligence agency point to four main challenges (although there are others): redundancy, cost, duplication, and oversight. These concerns are valid but could be overcome with the right planning and sufficient political will.
Redundancy: One common argument often advanced against the creation of a dedicated foreign intelligence service is that it would be redundant, given that Canada already collects foreign intelligence across multiple departments and agencies, and that reforming existing structures would therefore be preferable to creating something new. This view, however, mischaracterizes the nature of Canada’s current capabilities. Canada’s foreign intelligence collection is not duplicative so much as it is narrow, episodic, and tied to specific institutional mandates. The Canadian Armed Forces collect intelligence primarily in support of operations; the Communications Security Establishment focuses on signals intelligence; Global Affairs Canada produces diplomatic and security reporting; and CSIS’s foreign intelligence role remains legally and operationally constrained. These activities do not amount to an integrated, strategic foreign intelligence function. Rather than redundancy, the prevailing condition is one of fragmentation, with gaps in collection, prioritization, and long-term analysis. As a result, reforming existing agencies, absent a dedicated mandate, authorities, and culture for foreign intelligence, risks reinforcing existing limitations rather than resolving them.
Cost and Complexity: Building a human intelligence capability involves spending on hiring, training, safe buildings, and operations tradecraft. But other middle powers have already succeeded in building these capabilities. For example, Australia’s Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), established in 1952, is relatively small but produces first-class intelligence. Canada does not have to replicate the CIA or MI6, with their deep capabilities and worldwide presence. Rather, it can start small, focusing on key priority zones, and gradually build up as needs dictate. The long-term economic and security dividend – avoiding costly breaches, protecting sovereignty, and shepherding trade – would be well worth the investment.
Duplicating Allies: Other critics say that a Canadian foreign intelligence service might end up duplicating allied activity. But there are precautions to prevent this. Ottawa can specialize in certain areas where Canada has a competitive advantage, such as the Arctic, the Indo-Pacific, or francophone nations where it has privileged access. There is historical precedence for this; during the Cold War, the Canadian CSE provided the Five Eyes alliance members with vital signals intelligence on Soviet activities in the Arctic. In this historical case, Canada focused on a specific task and was able to complement, rather than duplicate, allied coverage. There is no reason Canada cannot do the same thing with foreign human intelligence.
Oversight and Ethics: Perhaps the most valid concern is the potential for abuse and scandal. Recent Canadian history – such as the scandals around Cameron Ortis and Jeffrey Delisle – is testimony to the consequences of inadequate intelligence management. A robust oversight mechanism is therefore a requirement. The UK’s Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament is a model. Canada can bolster the mandate of its National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians to enable it for accountability, transparency, and subject to law. Explicitly excluding domestic operations and paramilitary activities from the agency’s mandate would further protect democratic principles. Another issue is workplace culture. CSIS, for example, has dealt with multiple scandals stemming from a toxic workplace culture. As CSIS’ Director, Daniel Rogers, said last year, these “disappointing and unacceptable” culture issues mean “our Service is not acting at its full potential.” A new foreign intelligence service would need to be built with the proper oversight and accountability mechanisms to prevent similar culture issues.
Building Institutional Capacity
One of the greatest challenges to building a foreign intelligence service in Canada is cultural.
For decades, arguably since the end of the Cold War, foreign policy has not been a priority for governments in Canada. As two leading experts on Canadian foreign relations recently wrote, it has “been quite a while since Canada had a foreign policy. Even before Trump’s return to the White House, Canada was struggling to adapt to a fundamentally reshaped global landscape.” And, prior to the foreign policy torpor of the past several decades, even when Canada did have a foreign policy, the country emphasized peacekeeping and diplomacy over the collection of intelligence.
Fortunately, there are positive signs that Canada is rising to meet the current geopolitical moment. As one retired senior diplomat wrote, the government of Prime Minister Mark Carney is “revitalizing Canada’s international relations, doubling down on economic security and making our defence posture more muscular.” Mr. Carney’s January 2026 speech at the World Economic Forum, where he emphasized Canada is “engaging” the world “broadly, strategically with open eyes,” is further evidence of this shift. To have open eyes, Canada will need intelligence capabilities, and a smart and motivated Middle Power like Canada can learn fast with the right allies.
Australia could provide a good model for Canada. When that country set up its foreign intelligence service, ASIS, it employed British training and support prior to developing its own tradecraft. Additionally, over the years, ASIS was able to overcome a culture clash with the Australian diplomatic service and secure a valuable role in Australia’s foreign policy and national security architecture. Canada could adopt the same approach, utilizing its Five Eyes relationships as avenues for training, mentorship, and technical expertise.
When it comes to staffing a human intelligence service, Canada’s multicultural population is a latent asset, offering language skills and cultural expertise priceless for effective human intelligence operations. Mobilization of capabilities from diaspora communities, universities, and the private sector would give rise to a deep and sophisticated talent pool. As is the case for other crucial government agencies, such as the Bank of Canada, recruitment would need to be focused on professionalism.
With effective planning, Canada can have a small but effective institution that fills critical gaps without over-straining resources.
A Choice Point for Canada
At its core, this debate is about Canada’s aspirations in a changing world order, and what capabilities these aspirations require.
A lean, professionally managed service would not duplicate allied work but instead contribute value in niche domains where Canada holds unique vantage points: monitoring Arctic sovereignty concerns, defending vital infrastructure from foreign incursions, and providing objective perspectives on Indo-Pacific security. These are not luxuries but necessities in a time when strategic autonomy and alliance credibility are both in question, and middle powers may increasingly need to work together.
The expense and intricacy of constructing such a service will not come cheap and will take time. However, the cost and danger of not doing so are far greater: constant dependence on allies whose interests can diverge, a diminished voice in Five Eyes, and vulnerability to threats that can be anticipated and interdicted abroad. Canada has the resources, the friends, and the strategic interest for victory. Political will alone remains as the key obstacle. Ottawa must decide whether to continue to feed on intelligence created elsewhere or finally emerge as a producer of intelligence to protect Canadians and forge alliances.
For Canada, the choice is stark. It can be on the fringes of the world of intelligence, or it can build up the capabilities that a G7 economy, Arctic state, and Indo-Pacific player should rightly possess. The establishment of a foreign intelligence service is not a matter of national security – it is a test of Canada’s seriousness as an independent global player in a rapidly contested world.
Jonathan Berkshire Miller is a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and principal of Pendulum Geopolitical Advisory.
Christopher Collins is a visiting scholar at Massey College at the University of Toronto.
