This article originally appeared in National Security Journal.
By Rob Huebert and Jamie Tronnes, December 8, 2025
Canada is still failing to take its defense seriously. The Government is contemplating continuing the worst Canadian political tradition of recent years — refusing to get the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) the modern fighter it needs to replace its aging CF-18s. After selecting the F-35 three separate times (in 2010, 2014, and 2023), the government is considering curtailing its purchase of 88 jets and acquiring the Saab JAS 39 Gripen E to create a mixed fleet.
Unfortunately, the absurd political theatre of the Trump Administration has caused many Canadians to cut their noses to spite their face. Rhetoric about becoming the 51st state and the unfair, if not illegal, imposition of tariffs has inflamed anti-American sentiment. But Canada is far from blameless for this situation.
Successive governments have convinced Canadians that they were safe from threats from abroad and that, therefore, our threadbare defense spending was commensurate with the challenges the country faced. This was an increasingly egregious falsehood to tell Canadians; we need serious investment in our defense to make up for decades of neglect. Failing to move forward with the F-35 acquisition would be a shameful act of placing the defense of the country (and continent) second to both global and domestic political concerns.
The F-35 is by far a more modern, capable fighter than the Gripen. Make no mistake: the F-35 is critical to the integrated defense of the North American continent. Specifically, it provides connectivity to enable the surveillance and interception of the new generation of cruise and hypersonic missiles.
The very Russian and Chinese aircraft and missiles that the Canadian Government (belatedly) identified as a core threat to the continent require a defensive response that is system-based on several integrated layers capable of detecting and responding to modern threats. The core principle behind the various multi-domain concepts that guide Western defense doctrines today is seamless data interoperability, which the F-35’s communication and sensor fusion capabilities embody. The data and programming that is loaded into an aircraft can have an immense consequence on its capability. Indeed, the acquisition of the F-35 was viewed by the RCAF as an opportunity to revolutionize all facets of its operations and to build in this broader need for data interoperability.
During the last competition, which ultimately (re)selected the F-35 in 2023, the government outlined a requirement for Five Eyes and “Two Eyes” interoperability. Five Eyes, the intelligence-sharing arrangement among Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, is well-known, but “two-eyes” is likely unfamiliar. “Two-eyes” refers to adopting U.S. intelligence and data security standards, if not interchangeability, in the continental defense mission.
In fact, Canada was one of only three states that originally granted allies the enhanced ability to modify their own mission data files, which are critical for operational planning, through the AustCanUK Reprogramming Laboratory (ACURL). Canada’s ability to access operationalized American intelligence products through NORAD and NORTHCOM means that Canadian F-35s would be undeniably among the most capable alongside their American counterparts.
Canada, as the second foreign participant in America’s Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, helped shape the program’s requirements for the aircraft of choice, including cold-weather operation, which complemented its other characteristics, such as long range.
All our northern allies, including Finland, Denmark, and Norway (not the Swedes, for obvious reasons), know this and are in the process of buying and operating the F-35. The fact that these northern allies are, or will be, operating F-35s in the high north should be the only response needed to critics who suggest that the F-35 is not suitable for the north.
The Gripen, in contrast, was originally a short-range point-defense fighter that has been upgraded to provide multi-role capability, but many of its limitations remain (such as its relatively short range and sensor capabilities).
Indeed, many Gripen sales pitches involve the sale of the Globaleye AEW aircraft, in part to address these shortcomings.
Ironically, the F-35’s tactical and operational strengths have become its greatest political vulnerability in Canada. If you’ve heard rumors of a so-called F-35 “kill switch,” you’re not alone. Canadians are so mad at Americans that this widely debunked and completely untrue rumor (that buying the F-35s gives them the power to turn off our aircraft) is still gaining traction. Yes, to the benefit of all parties, the F-35 has data interoperability with the US; no, it doesn’t therefore have a “kill switch”. (Buying into the dangerous “kill switch” rumor also requires one to assume the fantastic scenario where the United States would intentionally remove three squadrons of aircraft from defending the North American continent).
Tactical capabilities aside, the most egregious rationale for the JAS 39 Gripen has been provided by the Canadian Industry Minister Melanie Joly, who claimed that Saab could bring 10,000 jobs to Canada. Saab only employs 24,000 people globally and just 8,000 in their aerospace division. Even in the US, where they make parts for one of the world’s most formidable defense spenders, they employ only just over 1,000 people.
Minister Joly’s numbers may rely on a new order from Ukraine to make up the difference, but this order is unlikely to materialize. Ukraine has signed a non-binding “memorandum of intent” to buy some 100-150 aircraft from Saab. Moreover, on Monday, Ukraine signed a similar agreement with France for 100 Rafale fighter jets. Yet Ukraine’s economic situation will be extremely poor for quite some time, and any purchase of fighters will require significant financing, likely from the EU or Sweden. In either case, it is highly unlikely that Canada will ever build any of those fighters.
Canada already has skin in the F-35 industry game. It was a level 3 partner on the Joint Strike Fighter development program, and has thus far received over $3.1 billion in contracts to sustain or build components for the F-35, before the RCAF ever received one.
By some measures, a large share of the 2,500 existing jobs that support the JSF program are already at risk amid speculation that Canada would back out of its commitment to the F-35s.
Regardless of jobs, the Gripen is still the wrong choice. Preventing conflict comes from deterrence, and Canada should choose the option that convinces an enemy not to engage. An air force consisting of just 16 F-35s (fewer than Saudi Arabia), combined with an unknown number of Gripens, simply cannot compare with the deterrence that is provided by fulfilling the order sheet for 88 stealth-capable F-35s.
Americans should help Canadians remember the key things: First, there is no strategic autonomy or true independence from the United States that would come with a Gripen order. Second, the decision to buy a replacement for the 1980-vintage CF-18 must be based on strategic considerations rather than economic payback.
Canada needs defensive systems that meet the new threats it faces, not more political games.
Rob Huebert is a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and a professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Calgary.
Jamie Tronnes is the executive director of the Center for North American Prosperity and Security (CNAPS).
