This article originally appeared in Montreal Institute for Global Security.
By Richard Shimooka and Jonathan Berkshire Miller, September 2, 2025
Canada’s defence and foreign policy is undergoing a dramatic shift. Years of ambivalence, marked by poor defence spending and meandering policy goals, have resulted in a greater focus on the diplomatic aspects of defence.
Much of the focus on this transformation has been aimed at reinforcing the existing transatlantic relationship, not only within NATO but also through European Union (EU) structures. The announcement of Canada’s entry as a security partner in the SAFE Europe program is likely the most concrete signal, but there have been strong bilateral meetings with European states to cultivate potential defence relationships.
Certainly there is some logic behind this – NATO has been Canada’s preeminent multilateral security relationship and had a significant impact on shaping defence policies and force structure for the past 75 years. There also could be some significant benefits for Canada. However, aligning too closely with EU frameworks—which remain uneven in terms of defence integration and operational capacity—risks duplicating efforts already robustly covered by NATO. A more balanced approach would recognize the limits of EU defence coherence while leveraging bilateral defence-industrial ties where strategic returns are clearer.
Yet the heavy focus paid to Europe as the focus on Canada’s diversification should be questioned, given the international environment and distribution of defence industries. There are compelling reasons to suggest that Canada should reconsider this balance and devote more resources towards the Indo-Pacific to shore up its interests in the region.
Canada’s geo-strategic situation is complex and multifaceted, with three oceans and rivals that no longer seem content to keep their posture confined. On the one hand, the primary threats faced by the country, China and Russia, primarily project their interests and military capabilities from different axis: The Western and South pacific for the former, and the Atlantic and Arctic for the latter. This offers more flexibility for Ottawa to craft its policy. Thats not the case for most Canadian allies and partners (save for the United States): they are forced to prioritize one or the other. For example, for United Kingdom or Japan, their proximity to their primary adversary serves as a strong focusing mechanism for their defence and security debate. Moreover, the majority of the country’s non-United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement trade are roughly comparable between Asia and Europe, though the former is set to eclipse the latter due to the growth of the LNG sector.
Thus, they should at the very least merit equal consideration and focus, particularly in the past several decades with the economic rise of China. Spending Canada’s scarce capital, whether it be policymakers and diplomats’ time, financial or military resources, will almost certainly go much further if dedicated with greater focus towards the Indo-Pacific.
First, while the threat posed by Russia towards Europe is considerable, it is manageable by Canada’s allies in the region. Moscow’s ruinous war with Ukraine will diminish its national power for a generation or more. Furthermore, the transatlantic security architecture is far more developed, both institutionally and politically, than any Western-leaning one in Asia. While it is true that Canada’s practical contributions to European security may be modest in scale, the act of reaffirming its commitment to deterrence in Europe remains essential. Sustained engagement—whether through material support, policy alignment, or symbolic gestures—serves not only to reinforce collective resolve in the face of Russian aggression but also ensures that Canada remains a credible partner within allied circles. Limited support can have outsized significance by bolstering deterrence and demonstrating that European security continues to be a strategic priority for Ottawa.
This support for our European friends – however – should not come at the expense of us engaging in the Indo-Pacific. China holds a preponderant military and economic position in Asia, while other Asian countries allied with the West do not possess any political framework even approaching NATO’s stature. Historically, bilateral ties with Washington provided the security glue that held together like-minded states. However, President Donald Trump’s recent comments questioning America’s commitment to existing arrangements, as well as broad-based tariffs, has severely undermined confidence in these relationships. This is even the case with the United States’ closest allies, the Republic of Korea and Japan, which have both been a target of the Administration’s ire over the past six months.
Canada can certainly step in and play a small, but important role in stabilizing these relationships during this era of uncertainty. Politically, the Carney Government must become more politically astute than its predecessor in managing relations with countries in the region. For example, the Trudeau government’s missteps surrounding the 2017 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTTP) negotiations seriously damaged its standing with the Abe government, as did rebuffing subsequent efforts to engender greater energy trade with Japan. Moreover, recent new Canadian tariff measures on steel have also hit legitimate Japanese exports, much to their consternations. Yet improving trade and political relations will only go so far to help in this approach, given the primary threat these states face is security-based in nature.
In the military sphere, Canada has limited resources it can commit to improve its diplomatic and defence presence in the region. What few spare capabilities it has, are already devoted towards the Indo-Pacific. The Royal Canadian Navy committed to deploying three frigates to the region on a yearly basis, which forms an important part of its foreign diplomacy. Furthermore, the Royal Canadian Air Forces’s continual rotation of CP-140 Aurora maritime patrol aircraft to Japan in support of UN Security council resolutions 1718 and 2397 on North Korean smuggling represent its largest foreign commitment of capabilities over the past five years. Yet in sum, Canada’s military footprint in the region is extremely limited, and is a major impediment for it having any defence profile in the region. This severe capability deficit will take quite some time to remedy, given the long gestation of major defence projects and the difficulty resolving personnel shortfalls. Many key modernization programs, such as the P-8 Poseidon Multi-mission Aircraft, Canadian Patrol Submarine Program and the River Class Destroyers will eventually enhance Canada’s ability to project power into the region.
In lieu of its present weakness in defence capabilities, Ottawa could leverage its military’s future to build better security relationships with the Asia pacific. If the government meets its twin NATO commitment of spending 3.5% of GDP by 2035 and invests 20% of that budget on procurement of equipment, Canada will likely spend more than $100B on the procurement of defence capabilities. Many of these projects can be leveraged to improve relations with allies and partners in Asia, and elsewhere.
Acquiring a foreign states’ defence products can build strong bilateral relationships at the political level and can unlock other avenues of cooperation. However, procuring capabilities in the region can also provide significant operational and tactical military benefits. The ability to create interoperability and interchangeability with a potential ally is a significant advantage. The added mass can add to the deterrent value of a capability before a conflict or its effectiveness during one. Relatedly, this can vastly improve the logistical requirements for the Canadian Armed Forces, by providing a regional source of spares and relevant consumables. For example, if Canada purchased a European submarine to operate in the Western Pacific, its logistics tail would need to extend essentially halfway across globe back to the state of origin – a potentially fraught proposition during a conflict.
Finally, the region could be ripe for domestic Canadian industrial involvement, if pursued effectively. Canada’s extremely close bilateral defence relationship with the United States is a major advantage for domestic industries exporting outside of North America. Many of its defence firms operate on the cutting edge of military capability and can be integrated with American systems and doctrinal concepts. This provides Canadian firms a major competitive advantage in foreign markets, which many have exploited by developing non-export-controlled amalgams they can sell to foreign clients without American approval. An example of this is CMS330 – a Canadian-developed combat management system for warships that is in use with the Royal New Zealand and Chilean navies, in addition to its own Halifax Class Frigates. In areas like Cyber warfare, or drone technology, many south Asian states are well behind developments in western states, and a proactive strategy to use defence sales could help meet broader foreign policy objectives.
However, several institutional impediments exist for Canada to fully realize the diplomatic potential of its defence cooperation. One area sorely need of reform is how defence procurement deals with questions surrounding strategic imperatives. At present, the government is hamstrung in its ability to use the acquisition to build strategic relationship with like-minded countries. The overarching approach has increasingly focused on creating “fair” competitions that provided best value for the Canadian State – yet such formulation was on an extremely narrow criteria of value. There was no formal mechanism to assess the benefits for these impacts, and debate on these issues might only appear informally during a final cabinet decision on a major program.
Nevertheless, leveraging Canada’s increased defence spending could be a critical tool for building relations with states in the Indo-Pacific and ensuring the overall stability in the region, but it requires a major shift in how Ottawa perceives its interests and making significant changes in several policy areas. It starts with the government correctly identifying the greater risks apparent in China’s rise in the region and devoting a greater proportion of its defence resources towards the region. Ottawa however must appreciate the diplomatic and strategic potential its defence diplomacy and the corresponding benefit that could be extracted from concrete defence investments tied to the region. Considering the Canada’s deep underlying interests in the region, it is a shift that is sorely needed.
Richard Shimooka is a senior fellow with Macdonald-Laurier Institute and contributing writer to theHub.ca.
Jonathan Berkshire Miller is co-founder and principal of Pendulum Geopolitical Advisory in Ottawa and a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.
