This article originally appeared in the Globe and Mail.
By Aurel Braun, August 14, 2025
Nothing is ever truly predictable with Donald Trump. His upcoming Alaska summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin, viewed with such dread by Ukraine and its allies, is a case in point.
Much of the media and policy focus has been on Mr. Trump’s earlier position that there may have to be territorial compromises to end this terrible war (though he assured EU allies he wouldn’t discuss the matter without Ukraine present), and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s declaration that Kyiv will not accept such a derogation of national sovereignty. Indeed, territorial concessions by Ukraine would be traumatic, unfair and dangerous. Yet, there may be even greater problems that enormously diminish the possibility of a successful outcome.
In negotiations, often the devil resides in the details, and at this summit, which may well decide the future of Ukraine and peace and stability in Europe, there may be grave quandaries – territorial disputes, the format of the discussion, who actually participates, etc. The most bedeviling problem, however, is likely to be the absence of a clear and sustainable American grand strategy that addresses the fundamental principles of any successful settlement. The intention to stop the killing is noble, but it is missing the first principle of a good and lasting outcome: namely, that at the end of any agreement, unless Ukraine, regardless of territorial compromise, emerges as a more secure, stable, independent country that can rebuild in peace and thrive, there will be potentially a continuing mortal danger to Ukraine and a grave threat to democracy.
The American approach thus far, however, has been all transactional, and in the absence of a grand strategy and first principle, all the usual overwhelming American advantages are dissipated. This lacuna alone may prevent success.
By contrast, Mr. Putin has a grand strategy, which has been consistent throughout the conflict. Rejecting the unconditional, in-place ceasefire that Mr. Trump had originally demanded, Mr. Putin has responded with a cynical, manipulative demand to address the “root causes” of the conflict that he, in fact, precipitated. As resolution, he has invariably insisted on “demilitarization,” “denazification,” and “alliance neutrality” – in short, a Ukraine that is prohibited from joining NATO, with very limited armed forces and a subservient, or at least pliable, government in Kyiv. At the end of any “negotiations,” he wants to see a Ukraine that is effectively helpless. For him, the summit is not just a personal legitimation, but also a means to dictate Ukraine’s surrender.
Second, to use Mr. Trump’s metaphor of a card game, he is wasting a powerful hand, while Mr. Putin, a KGB-trained manipulator backed by a seasoned negotiating team (though playing with a weak deck in leading only a remnant of a superpower, suffering mammoth battlefield losses for minuscule tactical gains, and dealing with a stagnant economy and increasingly vassal status vis-a-vis China), is using his cards brilliantly. All the overwhelming American advantages – being the greatest superpower, with rapidly revitalizing NATO allies – are squandered by Mr. Trump’s eagerness to reach an agreement in his obsessive quest for a Nobel Prize.
Third, credibility in negotiations is a pivotal asset and here Mr. Trump has largely forfeited. His deadlines, red lines and threats of secondary sanctions have all been ephemeral, and his determination to confront the Russian dictator melts even during phone calls. Mr. Trump’s contemptuous dismissal of Mr. Zelensky, posturing that his presence at the summit would not affect the outcome, further encourages Russia.
Yet it might still be possible to make the best of a bad situation, assuming that Mr. Trump will not just walk away from the summit and finally turn on an irredeemable Russian regime. Though there are shades of Munich in 1938, Ukraine and modern Europe are different. Given enough time, the Europeans will be ready to stand up and a fatigued Ukraine is still prepared to continue the fight. The U.S., however, needs to provide the “bridging” to the time when the Europeans, and particularly Germany, can match their willingness to help defend Ukraine with commensurate military capacity. Success would ensure that even a neutralized Ukraine that concedes or exchanges some territory emerges as a large, heavily-armed Switzerland, a kind of “military hedgehog” that can fight off or deter future Putinite aggression as it evolves into a modern, advanced democracy.
On the other hand, if Mr. Trump bullies Kyiv into submitting to Moscow’s strategic goals and the Europeans’ resolve evaporates, Ukraine could become Russia’s protectorate. Far from peace, this would just whet Mr. Putin’s appetite for more gains and embolden Chinese aggressiveness in the East. For Mr. Trump, this betrayal would become the poisonous tree of his legacy. Anything else he might do subsequently would be deemed the fruits of that tree.
Aurel Braun is a professor of political science and international relations at the University of Toronto, an associate at Harvard University’s Davis Center, and Advisory Council member at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.
