By Andrew Fox, January 27, 2026
Future conflicts involving Western militaries are increasingly likely to occur in dense cities, under constant surveillance, and amid intense political and information pressure. The 2023–25 Gaza War offered an early and sobering glimpse of what that reality looks like – and the demands it will place on modern armed forces.
Tactical Lessons from Gaza, written by the author for the Henry Jackson Society, offers a warning for Canada and other Western nations that may face high-intensity urban combat in future conflicts. Focusing on the Gaza War, the report offers lessons on command and control, logistics, combat engineering, drones, special forces integration, force health, civilian protection, and information warfare.
The report also emphasizes that not all Israeli military practices translate seamlessly. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and other Western militaries must distinguish between what can be transferred as-is and what must be adapted to NATO doctrine and the specific conditions of different conflicts.
This matters for Canada because its most likely expeditionary commitments align closely with the scenarios described in the report: potential flashpoints from the Baltic region to the Indo-Pacific, often involving major urban centres.
Canada currently leads NATO forces in Latvia and can deploy a combat-ready brigade. At the same time, Operation HORIZON positions CAF units across multiple domains in the Indo-Pacific, including annual Royal Canadian Navy warship deployments.
Tactical Lessons from Gaza offers several key insights and recommendations for Canada:
- Urban warfare as the norm. The report argues that “urban operations should no longer be viewed as a niche or last-resort scenario.” It calls for large-scale training in rubble-strewn terrain, degraded communications, tunnel or underground environments under real-time information warfare pressures. For the CAF, this means prioritizing brigade-level urban exercises that stress mission command, “comms-denied” drills, and pushing key enablers down to battalion or company headquarters.
- Legitimacy as a combat factor. The Gaza War shows that legitimacy is central to modern conflict. The report contends that civilian harm, intensified by a contested information environment, became a primary measure of how the war was evaluated. It underscores the importance of integrating legal advisors and collateral damage estimation tools near targeting decisions, potentially down to battalion level in urban operations. For Canada, these measures help sustain coalition unity and domestic support while preserving operational momentum in a politically sensitive conflict.
- A crowded sky. As in Ukraine, Gaza demonstrates the pervasive use of drones. The report recommends deploying small unmanned aerial systems (UAS) at the platoon or squad level, establishing counter-drone specialists within infantry battalions, and enhancing tactical air defence. While Canada is already investing in counter-UAS concepts through DND/CAF’s IDEaS programme, the report’s institutional message is clear: move from prototypes to deployable kits, dedicate training time, and develop habitual counter-UAS teams at the tactical edge.
- Combat engineering as decisive. Urban fighting – especially against tunnel networks and dense IED threats – places a premium on combat engineers. The report calls for armoured breachers, specialized subterranean units, and forward-positioned engineers to assist small-unit leaders in breaching and clearing obstacles swiftly. For the CAF, this reinforces the need for protected engineering mobility, robotics and remote control for high-risk tasks, and regular integrated training that brings engineers, infantry, armour, and special operations forces together to address “surface–subsurface” challenges.
The report also highlights endurance as an often-overlooked factor. It describes last-mile resupply in cities as effectively “an advance to contact,” highlights forward medical infrastructure and rapid evacuation, and warns that sanitation failures can weaken combat power. For a small, professional CAF operating at a distance, these enablers may determine whether forces can maintain tempo under drone threats and restricted urban movement.
The core lesson is organizational speed. The report details the IDF’s rapid lessons learned process and tight feedback loops, enabling innovation at a pace few Western militaries can currently match. It concludes that NATO allies must turn lessons learned into tangible capabilities. For Canada, Gaza’s lessons should serve as a force-development checklist – followed by the doctrine, procurement pathways, and training cycles needed to prepare its military for future urban conflicts.
Canada must adapt before the next war. The lessons from the IDF in Gaza are there for the taking.
Andrew Fox is a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and senior associate fellow at the Henry Jackson Society. He served for 16 years in the British Army (2005–21), leaving the Parachute Regiment with the rank of Major. His service included three tours in Afghanistan as well as deployments to Bosnia, Northern Ireland, and the Middle East.
