This article originally appeared in National Security Journal.
By Stephen Nagy, December 9, 2025
The Trump administration’s November 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) marks a watershed moment for American foreign policy and a potential crisis for Canada. Unlike previous iterations that championed a “rules-based international order,” this document explicitly embraces what it calls “flexible realism” and acknowledges that “the unipolar moment of American predominance is over.”
For Canada, the implications are profound and immediate.
The strategy’s treatment of the Western Hemisphere is revealing. The so-called “Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine” explicitly states Washington will “deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere.”
The document positions hemispheric nations as expected to align their economic policies with American interests while developing capabilities useful for “collective defense.”
The strategy emphasizes that hemispheric countries should build stronger domestic economies that become “increasingly attractive markets for American commerce and investment.” Nowhere does it treat Canada as the equal partner of conventional diplomatic rhetoric. Instead, Ottawa appears as one element within America’s sphere of influence, expected to support American priorities.
Some will argue that geographic proximity and NORAD make US-Canada rupture impossible. But proximity cuts both ways. It gives Washington leverage to demand compliance, knowing Canada has limited alternatives. The Trump NSS makes this explicit, stating that hemispheric nations must align with American strategic priorities.
Consider what this means practically. The Northwest Passage, which Canada claims as internal waters, has never been recognized as such by Washington. The Trump strategy’s emphasis on ensuring American “access to key strategic locations” and control over “transportation networks” in the hemisphere suggests the US may prioritize its own interests over Canadian sovereignty claims as climate change renders northern sea routes commercially viable.
The troubling part isn’t that America is wrong about multipolarity. As scholar Emma Ashford argues in Foreign Affairs, attempting to force the world into a bipolar US-China framework ignores reality. She contends that “with increasing economic interconnectedness; the rise of militarily capable regional powers such as Turkey, India, Japan and South Korea; and economic and technological power less concentrated in the hands of the United States and China, it seems more likely that a fragmented and complex multipolar world will follow the unipolar moment.”
The Trump NSS operationalizes this vision but in ways that position Canada less as a valued partner and more as a territory within America’s hemisphere requiring alignment with Washington’s priorities.
What makes this particularly concerning is how unprepared Canada is for this reality. For decades, Canadian security policy has rested on a simple proposition, invest minimally in defense because geography and the American alliance provide safety. Canada maintained defense spending around 1.3% of GDP — currently about $40 billion annually — well below NATO’s 2% target and laughably distant from the Trump administration’s new 5% “Hague Commitment” it expects from allies.
But this bargain assumed American willingness to underwrite Canadian security regardless of Canadian effort. That assumption is dying. The Trump NSS explicitly emphasizes “burden-sharing and burden-shifting” as core priorities, stating that “the days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over.”
The window for adaptation is narrow. China is investing heavily in Arctic capabilities and influence operations within Canada itself. Russia is militarizing its northern territories. Meanwhile, Canada lacks an adequate number of icebreakers, Arctic patrol vessels, or comprehensive northern surveillance that creates vulnerabilities that Washington increasingly views as American security problems.
This is the core issue. As long as Canada’ choices are seen as American vulnerabilities, Canada will be pressured by any US administration. The solution isn’t fantasies about diversifying away from the United States. With roughly 75% of Canadian exports flowing south, hundreds of thousands of cross-border interactions daily, and deeply integrated supply chains, institutions, and defense arrangements, significant economic diversification is unrealistic at best and self-destructive at worst.
The Canada-US relationship isn’t a problem to solve; it’s a reality to manage wisely. The question is whether Canada will make itself indispensable to American security and prosperity, or remain a potential liability.
Making Canada indispensable requires addressing the two areas where Canadian weakness most threatens American interests, the Arctic and Chinese influence operations.
First, the Arctic. Canada’s inability to patrol, monitor, and defend its northern territories doesn’t just compromise Canadian sovereignty, it creates a gap in continental defense that China and Russia are eager to exploit. When Chinese research vessels probe Canadian Arctic waters without adequate Canadian response, Washington sees a threat to North American security. When Russian activity near Canadian waters goes unmonitored, NORAD’s northern flank looks exposed.
Canada must achieve comprehensive Arctic domain awareness and patrol capability within the next five years. This means icebreakers, Arctic patrol vessels, northern infrastructure, satellite surveillance, and underwater monitoring systems. Defense spending must increase to at least 2.5% of GDP, an additional $25-30 billion annually. This is substantial but manageable for the world’s ninth-largest economy, particularly when compared to the cost of American pressure or loss of sovereignty.
Second, Chinese influence operations. Beijing’s systematic efforts to penetrate Canadian institutions, political systems, and critical infrastructure make Canada a vulnerability in the US-China competition. The Trump NSS explicitly warns against allowing adversaries to “own or control strategically vital assets” in the hemisphere. Every Chinese acquisition of Canadian critical mineral deposits, every influence operation targeting Canadian politicians, every espionage success against Canadian research institutions becomes an American security concern.
Canada needs laser-like focus on Chinese influence operations. This means comprehensive foreign influence transparency legislation, robust counterintelligence capabilities, stringent investment screening for critical sectors, and protection of research institutions. When Canada fails to address these threats, Washington sees a back door into North American security.
The Trump NSS states plainly, “It is natural and just that all nations put their interests first and guard their sovereignty.” Canada must take this principle seriously including when applied to our own country.
The paradox is that Canada’s best path to maintaining sovereignty within the North American partnership is making that partnership more valuable to Washington. By securing the Arctic and eliminating Chinese influence vulnerabilities, Canada transforms from a potential American liability into an indispensable strategic asset.
This isn’t subordination, it’s strategic realism. Canada and the United States share fundamental security interests. But a partnership requires both sides to pull their weight. Geography granted Canada a security discount that’s now expired. The question is whether we’ll invest in the capabilities needed to remain indispensable partners or discover too late that weakness was the most expensive option of all.
Stephen Nagy is Professor of Politics and International Studies at the International Christian University. He is a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and the Center for North American Prosperity and Security; a Visiting Fellow for the Hungarian Institute for International Affairs (HIIA) June 13th, -August 30th, 2025 and a Distinguished Fellow at the Corvinus Institute for Advanced Studies (CIAS), Corvinus University, Budapest July 2025. He is currently working on middle-power approaches to great-power competition in the Indo-Pacific.
