By Kaush Arha, Christopher Coates, and Peter Harrell
April 10, 2026
Canada occupies a pivotal position as like-minded nations converge around shared Arctic interests.
The Arctic Ocean’s growing accessibility is linking northern waters with the Baltic and the Sea of Japan. A resolute NATO “blue wall” now stretches from Finland to Alaska, with close partner Japan at the far end. Together, these circumpolar democracies form the “Free North,” extending the principles of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific to the warming Arctic’s emerging waterways.
With shipping routes opening and resources becoming more accessible, Canada can translate its geographic advantage and diplomatic credibility into real influence – leveraging NORAD modernization and major defence investments while strengthening alliances across the Free North.
Prime Minister Mark Carney is setting ambitious objectives on two fronts. One, to invest in Canada’s long-neglected military preparedness, and two, to advance “middle power” alliances and diplomacy. The Carney government released a forward-looking plan to rebuild, rearm, and reinvest in the Canadian Armed Forces. In March 2026, Canada met the earlier NATO target of 2 per cent of GDP for defence investment – half a decade ahead of former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s schedule. Additionally, the Carney government proposes to invest over a trillion dollars in national security in the coming decade, including in submarines, aircraft, drones, sensors, radar systems, etc., to meet the new NATO obligation of 5 per cent by 2035. Concurrently, Carney has been on a breakneck barnstorming “middle power” tour of Europe, India, Australia, and Nordic nations to have the like-minded coalesce around shared interests and values. Carney’s announcements on Canadian defence are welcome after generational neglect but proof lies in the proverbial pudding in demonstrable results.
Carney calls for Canadian leadership to be “defined not just by the strength of our values, but also by the value of our strength.” Nowhere is the value of Canadian strength greater than in the Arctic. Canada is the largest democratic Arctic nation boasting the longest Arctic coastline. It is not amiss to equate the strength of Canadian values to the value of Canadian strength in the North.
Canada has long placed the Arctic at the centre of its defence policy with little to show for it. Carney has aptly noted “past (Canadian) efforts lacked the scale of ambition and the depth of strategy worthy of this vast region and its peoples.” In early March, Carney visited the Northwest Territories to announce more than $30 billion in investments to shore up Canada’s Arctic security posture, including the creation of three new military bases with associated operational nodes, and improvements to an existing base in Labrador. The investment is to convey towards Canadian commitment of more than $40 billion to modernize its contributions to NORAD (the North American Aerospace Defense Command). Carney also indicated support of Canada’s Arctic Economic and Security Corridor by allocating funds for an all-weather road network reaching Yellowknife, NWT, for greater military mobility and mining exploration and development. Carney’s timely attention to the region is welcome. However, much more is to be done.
Canada’s recent Arctic Foreign Policy prioritizes “strengthening regional defence and security architectures,” and expresses the need to “explore and foster new partnerships.” Similarly, scholars are also calling on the European Union to pursue strategic partnerships in the North Atlantic to create a unified space of common interests.
However, a glaring gap remains. As the Arctic opens and links more closely to the Baltic and Sea of Japan, existing institutions are ill-equipped to manage this emerging strategic geography. The Arctic Council is too parochial in scope to address expanding security and economic challenges. NORAD focuses solely on North America, while NATO’s attention remains largely on its European land border with Russia. Most European nations face the daunting task of strengthening conventional deterrence and have few resources left to engage meaningfully in the North American Arctic. This new northern geography calls for a framework that strengthens and complements existing institutions.
The Free North framework
When confronted with a similarly expanding geography of converging interests, former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe advanced the concept of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific, linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans. He set out a vision grounded in open societies, open markets, and adherence to shared rules and standards. The United States and its allies then reinvigorated the Quad – bringing together Australia, India, Japan, and US – as guardians of that vision.
The Quad remains an informal grouping, without a treaty or secretariat, yet it has become an effective forum for coordinating the interests of leading regional democracies across the Indo-Pacific. Its relevance is clear: US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s first major diplomatic outreach – on his first day on the job – was a call with his Quad counterparts.
The new Arctic–Baltic–Japan Seas geography calls for a similarly strong, interests-driven informal grouping modelled after the Free and Open Indo-Pacific and the Quad. A Free North framework could facilitate coordination across shared and converging national interests from the Gulf of Finland to the Gulf of Alaska, while also accounting for Japanese and Korean interests and capabilities in the region. A broad Free North constellation would comprise Canada, the US, the Nordic-Baltic eight (including Iceland), Poland, Germany, Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Korea. These sixteen nations represent highly advanced economies, militaries, technologies, and workforces. They are all committed to free societies, with an ingrained predisposition to adhering to agreed-upon rules and standards that guide relations between nations.
Canada and Alaska would be the fulcrums of a Free North zone that encompasses three priority theatres in the new US National Security Strategy – the Western Hemisphere, the Indo-Pacific, and Europe. Canada could help to catalyze the Free North framework and even be its leading convenor.
A Free North framework will be instrumental in achieving a more uniform spread of allied preparedness. At present allied capabilities and force posture under NATO are justifiably concentrated in the European Arctic–Baltic theatre. This includes the Combined Air Operations Centre in Bodø, Norway; the Joint Logistics Support Group Headquarters in Enköping, Sweden; and the Multi-Corps Land Component Command Northwest in Mikkeli, Finland. As Finland and Sweden integrate fully into NATO, and as Canada and the US augment their capabilities and force posture for a greater allied joint-forces presence, capability and interoperability will become an integral part of the Free North. A revamped Joint Force Command Norfolk that includes all Nordic nations will further facilitate this trend.
An informal, interest-driven Free North grouping is likely to foster deeper mini-lateral coordination with cross-geography lessons and applications making the whole more resilient. Efforts underway include:
- Norway–UK–US coordination in monitoring Bear and GIUK Gap (Cold War-era strategic maritime and air passages between Greenland, Iceland, and the UK).
- The Canada–Finland–US Icebreakers Collaboration Effort (ICE) Pact.
- Norway–Sweden–Finland, the first line of defence for NATO’s High North strategy.
- NATO’s Baltic Sentry program to protect critical infrastructure.
- NATO’s UK-led High North Joint-Expeditionary Force.
- The Norway–UK Lunna House Agreement aimed at fleets of interoperable frigates in their respective navies.
- Norway–Germany coordination towards interoperable national submarine fleets.
Modernized NORAD capabilities, including US President Donald Trump’s “Golden Dome” missile defence, are likely to encompass a larger share of the Free North geography than they do today, to the benefit of all.
A broad Free North framework will add ballast to the present suite of regional allied military exercises. Experts predict that NATO’s Arctic Challenge, Arctic Light, and Cold Response exercises are likely to grow in the coming decade in scope, frequency, and participation. Russia’s biannual Zapad exercises are expected to follow a similar pattern with added trials of ballistic and hypersonic missiles. Most likely, Russia will continue on the present trajectory of ever closer military drills in the Arctic with China.
Enhanced coordination among Free North nations through regular exercises will strengthen force readiness and posture, creating credible deterrence that helps maintain peace across the new Arctic–Baltic–Japan Seas geography.
Greenland constitutes a key bastion of Free North
As the largest North American island within a Free North zone, Greenland is critical to regional security. Both Greenland and Alaska would be indispensable security sentries for North America. A Free North framework would acknowledge Greenland’s key security role while also respecting its sovereignty.
At about 2.17 million square kilometres, Greenland is nearly twice the size of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden combined, while hosting little more than 50,000 inhabitants. The autonomous island, with ambitions for eventual independence from its Danish sovereign, currently lacks indigenous capabilities for its security and economic development. Greenland is as critical to American security as Svalbard is to Norway and European security. However, Europe simply does not have the capacity to contribute to the security of Greenland and North America. It faces a decades-long endeavour just to build up its own continental forces to a reasonable standard. Canada faces a similarly long road in fortifying its own High North islands.
For now, only the US has the will (national interest) and capacity to fortify Greenland’s security infrastructure and support its economic development. But a charged political climate and unhelpful rhetoric are getting in the way of clear judgment and mutually respectful outcomes.
A Free North framework – grounded in clear-eyed security assessments and close, respectful coordination among trusted allies – offers a timely way to define Greenland’s security role and the investments it requires. Assessing these needs through a Free North lens would help bridge the legitimate interests between North America and Europe.
Free North priority actions
The Free North nations’ shared security and economic interests suggest several priority actions. A logical first step is a joint, inclusive threat assessment covering the emerging northern geography.
Shared threat assessment
The Arctic Ocean’s growing accessibility, combined with Russia’s increasing economic and military dependence on China, has contributed to heightened activity by both powers in the polar region.
While China has not yet conducted independent military operations in the Arctic, it has participated in a growing number of joint exercises with Russia, including joint aerial patrols and naval maneuvers near Alaska.
In light of greater Chinese-Russian activities in the Bering Strait, Alaskan Senator Dan Sullivan has called for the reopening of the US naval base on Adak Island in the Aleutians. Meanwhile, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys recently expressed Baltic–Nordic concerns over Russia’s increased military posture, calling it a threat to freedom of navigation. Budrys also warned of Russian hybrid warfare near the Northern Sea Route.
Taken together, these specific threats reflect broader American and European security concerns in the High North. The Baltic-Nordic nations are understandably more worried about Russian military activities emanating from Murmansk and greater Arctic Russian facilities, while the US and Japan are more animated by China’s desire to expand its activities beyond the North Pacific into the Arctic.
European experts often downplay the Chinese threat in the High North, citing China’s structural constraints combined with Russia’s historic mistrust of an expanded Chinese role. Yet, China’s impressive global civil-military growth over the past decades demonstrates its ability to overcome such constraints and skepticism.
The increased presence of Chinese flotillas in the Arctic, operating with advanced surveillance capabilities, mirrors China’s modus operandi of deploying fishing fleets, research vessels, mineral exploration, and naval infrastructure in other regions prior to establishing a physical or operational military presence. The China-Russia “no-limits” partnership and Russia’s growing reliance on China could open the door to joint operations on Russian Arctic assets.
A circumpolar Free North framework allows allies to evaluate threats comprehensively and coordinate their security responses.
Shared information and intelligence protocols
Enhanced intelligence gathering and sharing across Free North nations would enable a common and up-to-date threat picture. For instance, advanced information about the Arctic seabed and weather is vital for military and resource exploration and development purposes.
It is crucial that Free North nations maintain a substantial collective advantage over their adversaries in space, meteorological, and sub-sea sensors across the High North. Enhanced NORAD and “Golden Dome” capabilities to track Chinese and Russian hypersonic missiles will require a significant expansion of the sensor network. Upgraded meteorological sensors are critical for both civil and military operations along emerging Arctic trade routes. Similarly, detailed seabed mapping is vital for identifying promising energy and mineral resources in the region.
Free North nations can leverage Five Eyes and NATO intelligence-sharing systems to coordinate Arctic intelligence – an effort that will become increasingly vital as the region’s infrastructure grows.
Expand and enhance infrastructure installations
An accessible Arctic beckons a race for smart infrastructure installations to secure advantageous real estate across the High North. The region is more critical to Russia’s economy and security than it is to any single Free North nation. It accounts for about 11 per cent of Russian GDP, 20 per cent of its tax revenues, 83 per cent of its gas production, and at present nearly 84 per cent of its oil exports through the infamous “shadow fleet.” Consequently, the Russian Arctic has a commensurately larger infrastructure imprint compared to Free North nations. Understandably, Russia views China as a global force in infrastructure development, and a useful ally in executing Russia’s Arctic Policy 2035, which promotes a future Russian-controlled northern Asia-Europe sea route as an alternative to the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal. In return, Beijing frequently refers to the Northern Sea Route as its “polar silk road,” and persistently positions itself as a “near-Arctic state.”
NATO (primarily US) and Russia have long operated nuclear-powered submarines beneath the Arctic ice. As the ice thins, there is a growing need to bolster critical surface security installations as well. Fortifying strategic shorelines and islands across the Free North will become increasingly important with a warming climate. Recent moves – Sullivan’s call to fortify Adak Island, the deployment of US 11th Airborne Division in Alaska, and Carney’s announcement of three new northern bases – reflect this trend. Building and maintaining all-weather roads and rail where feasible will also be essential.
Free North naval strategy
Expanding open water in the Arctic calls for a commensurate balance in submarine and surface boats in the national navies across the Free North region. Under earlier icy climatic conditions, the US and NATO relied on a submarine fleet able to function under the polar ice. Unfortunately, their collective efforts to field a formidable surface naval fleet have not kept pace with the rapidly changing climate in the High North. This needs to be immediately addressed.
A Free North naval strategy, grounded in Arctic accessibility and a shared threat assessment, is essential for all member nations. It should focus on two principles:
- Complementary fleet operations: Naval and coast guard forces must coordinate to secure both military and economic security interests across the region.
- Fleet composition: Balance manned and unmanned surface and sub-surface fleets to operate safely and effectively in the High North’s harsh conditions.
A conservative estimate would call for a threefold increase in the surface naval and coast guard fleets of the US, Canada, and NATO members in the region. Coast guards are likely to be on the front line of several growing challenges in the Free North, including protecting critical infrastructure, securing sea lanes, combating illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, undertaking search and rescue and incident response, ensuring responsible minerals and energy development, and patrolling and surveillance across respective Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ).
Collective defence industrial base
The two largest Free North nations – the US and Canada – lack requisite civil-military shipbuilding industries and associated ecosystems to quickly ramp up their northern naval and coast guard fleets. Japanese, Korean, Dutch, and Finnish shipbuilding industries and ice-breaker expertise can be of immense value in constituting a coordinated collective naval manufacturing industrial base among the Free North nations.
Several on-going mini-lateral partnerships among Free North nations offer valuable lessons for broader collaboration in naval manufacturing and procurement. Examples include:
- The US-Canada-Finland ICE-Pact for shared icebreaker production.
- The Australia–UK–US (AUKUS) agreement on nuclear submarines.
- The Norway–UK frigate manufacturing agreement.
- The Norway-Germany submarine manufacturing agreement.
- The Japan-Australia Mogami-class frigates agreement.
Finland leads the world in icebreaker technology, while the Dutch company Damen is also proficient in producing icebreakers and ice-capable naval surface boats. The advanced economies and technologies of Free North nations – from Japan to Finland – make them well-suited for a collaborative manufacturing effort, similar to AUKUS. Such a program could coordinate technology sharing and pool financial resources to strengthen the Free North’s defence industrial base.
Canada has proposed establishing a Defence, Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB) as a multilateral financial institution for like-minded partners to mobilize private capital for collective security. A DSRB boosted by participation of development financial institutions of the Free North’s larger economies – such as the US International Development Finance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank of the United States, the European Union’s European Investment Bank, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation and the Nippon Export & Investment Insurance, and others, could mobilize private capital for urgently needed Arctic defence manufacturing.
Free North hybrid warfare taskforce
Hybrid activities falling below the threshold of armed conflict are the most salient security threat across the Arctic and Baltic regions. Disinformation, cyberattacks, and threats to critical infrastructure are important tools in Russia and China’s strategy to disrupt, pressure, and sow division across the Free North region. These activities are designed to be a persistent irritant and coercive tactics while avoiding the prospect of an armed response. For the large part, the free world’s response has been ineffective in deterring such activities.
Free North nations should coordinate on a hybrid task force, drawing upon the experience of Baltic nations living under persistent Russian cyber-attacks and the recent NATO Baltic Sentry initiative. Securing critical infrastructure – including pipelines, undersea communication cables, and GPS systems – will be increasingly important from Taiwan to the Mediterranean to the Arctic-Baltic region.
The hybrid task force should clearly articulate its objective to deter grey-zone hybrid offensive actions by China and Russia and associated adversaries. This requires state-of-the-art technology to detect hybrid activities and their origins and develop a tiered, accelerated response to deter such activities. Importantly, the Task Force should engage in frequent real-world exercises to improve operational efficacy.
Commerce and economic development
The warming Arctic is transforming the region’s economy, opening new commercial shipping routes and expanding energy and mineral exploration. Fishing and tourism are also likely to increase.
The melting of the Arctic ice cap is likely to catalyze three potential sea routes connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans:
- The Northwest Passage through the Canadian archipelago.
- The Northeast Passage along the Russian Siberian coast.
- The Transpolar Passage – threading the centre of the Arctic Ocean (this is the most improbable of the three routes).
An operational northern sea route will convey substantial savings in Atlantic-Pacific transportation costs and be of keen interest to several north Asian and European export-oriented economies. At present, much of the shipping along the Northeast Passage terminates at Russia’s Yamal Peninsula, a leading hub of the Russian natural gas industry.
A 2009 US Geological Survey estimated that about 13 per cent of the world’s undiscovered oil and about 30 per cent of undiscovered natural gas lie north of the Arctic Circle. Most energy resources are thought to be offshore, with a preponderance of early natural gas deposit estimates to be off the Russian coast. Energy and mineral estimates are regularly updated with improved geological information through improved accessibility across the region.
The warming Arctic will likely launch a great-power scramble to explore and develop the region’s potential for commerce and natural resources. Free North nations have a clear interest in coordinating regional development standards. US-Japan collaboration on Alaskan natural gas exports could expand further north, while US-led Pax Silica may focus on northern critical mineral deposits. New mechanisms to buttress the Free North’s collective economic security should be explored; one option is incorporating Greenland into the United States–Mexico–Canada (USMCA) trade deal.
Indigenous communities
Free North Indigenous communities inhabit the northern edges of the region from Hokkaido to Alaska, across Canada and Greenland to Norway, Sweden, and Finland. They constitute the Free North’s front-line communities and the ones most attuned and informed of its changing weather patterns. They hold direct interest in the region’s economic development and enhanced security.
Establishing a Free North Indigenous Communities Task Force to facilitate greater cross-learning and coordination across the northern communities would be beneficial. Such a Task Force would improve coordination of commercial and economic development in the region as well as in constructing all-weather, dual-use transport infrastructure – particularly in North America.
Canada the catalyst
As the largest and centrally located democratic Arctic nation, with a motivated prime minister, Canada has a generational opportunity to convene and facilitate a Free North alignment of like-minded nations from Japan to Finland. It, along with the US, could become the fulcrum of a Free North alignment dedicated to collective national and economic security in a rapidly changing region.
Canada’s leadership and investments in Arctic security will strengthen its defence partnership with the US and its role in NATO. Its planned civil-military investments in its High North, aimed at fulfilling its 5 per cent NATO target, will yield extraordinary security and economic dividends for both Canada and the broader Free North region.
A Canadian-catalyzed Free North Alignment will constitute a most demonstrable confluence of the “value of Canadian strength” and the “strength of Canadian values.” Few actions by Carney may constitute a greater legacy than Free North nations coming together to preserve their shared geography for the good of their peoples and that of the free world.
About the authors
Kaush Arha is the president of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Forum and previously served in Trump and Bush administrations.
Lt.-Gen.(ret’d) Christopher Coates is director of Foreign Policy, National Defence and National Security at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and previously served as deputy commander of NORAD.
Peter Harrell is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for the Peace and previously served in Biden and Obama administrations.
