By Andrew Griffith, March 5, 2026
In October 2024, then-prime minister Justin Trudeau announced an about-face on mass immigration, admitting: “We didn’t get the balance quite right.”
Trudeau’s mea culpa ranks among the starkest understatements in recent political memory: record-breaking immigration levels contributed to a severe housing shortage, strained public services to the breaking point, suppressed wage growth and, in the process, shattered Canada’s once-stable pro-immigration consensus.
Although it was rolled out in 2021, the policy’s roots lie in the 2016 Advisory Council on Economic Growth, which argued for a massive increase in immigration levels, “from 300,000 to 450,000 over five years,” on economic and demographic grounds. At the same time, the Century Initiative advocated growing the population to 100 million by the end of the century.
However, the government does not bear the full blame for the sharp increase. Between 2020 and 2022, numerous business, educational and non-governmental organizations supported raising permanent and temporary immigration levels and easing restrictions on temporary workers.
The provinces, with the exception of Quebec, also generally went along with the federal immigration strategy, backing large numbers of international students, whose higher tuition helped fund post-secondary schools.
Ontario, which is dead last in government funding for post-secondary education, was particularly egregious in its use of international students to maintain the financial stability of its universities and colleges. This strategy aimed to compensate for its freezing of provincial funding since 2019, a policy that was only recently reversed.
The education sector overall was similarly bullish on international students, driven by limited provincial funding and the lucrative gains from higher enrolments. Universities Canada urged the federal government to “invest in diverse talent, both undergraduate and graduate, domestic and international.”
Colleges and Institutes Canada argued that, “International talent will play a critical role in tackling skills gaps in may sectors and meeting the labour needs of Canadian employers.” Neither seem to have considered the broader, longer-term impacts. Some academics noted the growing “education-immigration nexus” and institutional implications, but did not question the societal effects of high immigration.
Many academics and numerous conferences, including Metropolis and Pathways to Prosperity, supported higher levels of immigration. The Canadian Council for Refugees predictably argued for increased numbers of refugees after the pandemic.
The business community prioritized immigration as a cheaper means to meet labour-market needs than raising wages and investing in technology.
The Canadian Federation of Independent Business, which represents small and medium-sized enterprises, argued that the federal government should make it easier for businesses to bring in foreign workers, including those categorized as lower-skilled.
The Business Council of Canada surveyed companies and found that half thought Canada should increase the number of permanent residents, with the majority supporting the levels outlined in the government’s 2022–24 immigration plan.
The Conference Board of Canada and the Century Initiative similarly argued that, “Increasing Canada’s immigration levels remains the most effective lever to grow our economy and address persistent labour-market needs,” with the latter recognizing the need for “growing well,” rather than just higher numbers.
However, some demographers, geographers and labour-market economists offered a more balanced view of higher permanent and temporary immigration.
David Ley, a geography professor at the University of British Columbia, for example, highlighted immigration’s impact on housing costs. Economists Fabian Lange, Mikal Skuterud and Christopher Worswick noted that, “Increasing low-skilled immigration to increase the overall size of the economy risks driving down average living standards in Canada.”
Post-pandemic recovery and stakeholder pressure do not excuse the previous federal government’s ill-advised expansionist policies, even though those pressures are real, and hard for politicians and policymakers to ignore.
The recent decline in public support for immigration has not prompted serious self-reflection on the impacts to housing, health care, social services and infrastructure. In terms of the five stages of grief, most stakeholders have not progressed beyond the early states of denial, anger and bargaining.
Returning to measured, human-capital-based immigration policies depends on the grieving parties reaching the acceptance stage. They need to learn to live with the new reality, rather than trying to roll the stone back up the mountainside.
Andrew Griffith is the former federal director general for citizenship and multiculturalism, a fellow of the Environics Institute, a contributor to the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and author of ” ‘Because it’s 2015.…’ Implementing Diversity and Inclusion.”
