This article originally appeared in The Hub.
By Richard Shimooka, February 9, 2026
Every February, the International Institute of Strategic Studies publishes its Military Balance, one of a handful of public resources that catalogues the world’s militaries. It’s an invaluable resource, and I’ll usually spend a day thumbing through its pages and seeing all of the developments once it’s released.
It’s an illuminating insight into which countries are taking their geopolitical positions for granted and which are prepared to be serious actors on the world stage. For the past decade, one can clearly see the contours of a massive military buildup that has emerged among Western states.
Since 2014, for instance, Poland’s government has launched a massive modernization of its military forces, acquiring cutting-edge capabilities to deter or fight a potential war with the Russian Federation. Some of the numbers are staggering, such as going from 600 to 900 tanks between 2015 and 2025, or the addition of 16 Patriot medium-range missile systems. The seeds of Poland’s efforts really can be traced back to political decisions made a decade ago when they first began sensing the urgency of their situation, and which are now bearing fruit. Furthermore, Warsaw often eschewed industrial benefits during this buildup, instead prioritizing low cost and quick delivery of the capabilities they were procuring.
Many of these efforts made by Poland and like-minded nations have come in response to the threat posed by China and Russia, whose growth in terms of modernized capabilities is palpable. Particularly concerning is China, which has started fielding new indigenous designs at scale as part of new force concepts and doctrines that leverage technological innovations.
Enter Canada, whose capabilities over this period have remained largely static, if not declined, due to obsolescence and lack of modernization vis-à-vis our adversaries. A representative case is that Canada’s tactical fighter fleet is in the midst of a major contraction as it retires a large portion of barely serviceable CF-18s in order to transition to the F-35 (which, as documented in these pages, may or may not even happen).
The Canadian Armed Forces’ most significant foreign presence is the 2200 troops currently deployed to Latvia—a pitifully small, embarrassingly ill-equipped force given the economic size of Canada. It is highly reliant on allies to provide it with key capabilities, such as long-range artillery or a large spectrum of air defence capabilities.
The on-the-ground reality, in other words, is at odds with the ambitious agenda Prime Minister Carney has set out over the past several months, culminating in last month’s Davos speech. Describing the rules-based order as a “partial fiction,” it essentially harkens back to older theoretical models of international relations that prioritize the primacy of projected power in determining international relations.
His speech highlighted the need for like-minded states to band together in order to preserve their peace and prosperity from “hegemons,” into which he all but lumped the United States in with other nefarious great powers. While many Canadian commentators applauded the speech, several parts of it simply do not conform to any grounded strategic and military assessment of Canada’s own capabilities.
The first reality is that there’s no potential arrangement of Western states that can effectively band together to counter China without the United States. While Japan, South Korea, Australia, Taiwan, and other asian states have beefed up their defence spending, it is far outmatched by what China can bring to bear militarily. Europe is in a significantly better position vis-à-vis Russia, with its lagging economy and suffering the negative consequences of the war in Ukraine.
What has not been appreciated enough is Moscow and Beijing’s deepening political and military cooperation. Over the past decade, this includes shared military bases in the Arctic and joint exercises, which culminated in combined military drills with nuclear-capable bombers in 2024—a highly ominous development.
Another sign of their deepening engagement was pointed out a few days ago in a U.K. parliamentary committee, which is that Beijing may be bankrolling as much as 60 percent of Russia’s war in Ukraine today. That hardening relationship means their potential threat to Western states can be magnified globally with even limited coordination.
As these international threats increase, Carney’s assertion that Canada’s relationship with the U.S. has been fundamentally altered is cause for significant concern. There is no realistic path for Canada on its own to replace even a modicum of the sovereign defence provided by NORAD. The U.S. provides the preponderance of capabilities and systems essential for Canada to defend the aerospace around and above Canadian territory, which also extends into the maritime domain. The mismatch between the threats and the resources Canada can reasonably provide from an economy of its size is far too great.
That understanding seems completely absent within the Canadian political debate, which seems unable to avert from its naval-gazing of building some sort of “strategic sovereignty” from the United States, as that is now perceived to be the greatest threat to Canada’s security. As mentioned, this has manifested itself in the F-35-Gripen debate. That there is even a discussion between the two fighters is bewildering to actual defence experts inside and outside of Canada.
Our petty preoccupations are completely at odds with the seriousness of the daily threats facing our allies from real adversaries with real intentions to use military force to impose their will on the world.
Perhaps the greatest disconnect between the prime minister’s rhetoric and reality is the lack of alacrity and clarity of purpose in dealing with these security challenges. Rather, there are clear signs that its priorities are elsewhere.
States like Poland get it—they have intrinsically understood these shifts, and have steadily but purposely worked to address their weaknesses. Canada seems unable to diagnose the problem or come up with solutions to address it.
A real “Elbows Up” posture to the threats we face would prioritize, first and foremost, massively improving our military capabilities. But that would require doing more than playacting. There’s little evidence that our political leaders or the public alike are interested in making those hard choices.
Richard Shimooka is a Hub contributing writer and a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute who writes on defence policy.
