This article originally appeared in the Japan Times.
By Stephen Nagy, October 31, 2025
In the corridors of power from Washington to Tokyo, policymakers obsess over military capabilities and trade balances while missing the most consequential battlefield of the 21st century: the battle for narrative control.
As Sanae Takaichi enters office as the first female prime minister of Japan and U.S. President Donald Trump navigates his 10th month back in the White House, both leaders confront an adversary more insidious than any missile system — the systematic campaign by authoritarian states to rewrite reality itself through investing in “discourse power.”
Michel Foucault, the French philosopher who first theorized discourse power, understood what today’s democratic leaders struggle to grasp: that power and knowledge are co-constitutive, each producing and reinforcing the other through discourse. In our hyper-connected world, this insight has been weaponized. Beijing and Moscow aren’t just building militaries; they’re constructing alternative realities about history, legitimacy and the international order itself. Their targets aren’t just the Global South but the citizens of democratic nations worldwide.
Consider the masterclass in narrative manipulation orchestrated by Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister and Politburo member. With metronomic consistency, he brands the Japan-U.S. alliance a “Cold War relic” and “exclusive clique” designed to suppress China and the developing world.
When Takaichi assumed office this month, Beijing’s response was immediate and telling. There were no state-level congratulations but a patronizing lecture about her need for a “correct understanding of history” and warnings to “learn from past mistakes.” This wasn’t traditional diplomacy; it was discourse power in action, designed to delegitimize Japan’s leader before she could establish her narrative.
The sophistication of this narrative warfare extends far beyond simple name-calling. When Japan installs defensive systems to protect against Chinese aggression in the East and South China seas or a potential Taiwan contingency, Beijing doesn’t debate the merits, it simply labels Japan as “militarizing.” This trope resonates with pacifist elements in Japan, South Korea and even the U.S., who amplify it despite overwhelming evidence of China’s own military expansion. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute meticulously documents year-over-year increases in Chinese military spending that dwarf Japan’s modest defensive improvements, yet this reality struggles to penetrate the discourse Beijing has crafted.
Even the label “China hawk” applied to Takaichi represents discourse power at work. Beijing seeks to paint her as aggressive, hawkish and trigger-happy to sow discord domestically and among Japan’s allies. The reality — that Takaichi represents pragmatic realism in response to genuine security threats — gets lost in the rhetorical fog of war.
Trump presents an even richer target for authoritarian discourse warriors. They’ve successfully cast him as simultaneously a warmonger and isolationist, a Robespierre sparking revolution at home while embodying Wild West unilateralism abroad.
For Beijing and Moscow’s propaganda machines, Trump’s return to power has been a gift, a ready-made villain in their narrative of American chaos and decline. They paint him as aspiring to indefinite rule like Xi Jinping or Vladimir Putin, using his rhetoric about being treated unfairly to suggest authoritarian ambitions that delegitimize American democracy itself.
This gaslighting campaign extraordinaire serves multiple purposes. It seeks to undermine America’s credibility as a trusted partner, portraying it as a global wrecking ball with Trump as its perfect embodiment. The narrative suggests that the world’s problems, from economic instability to regional conflicts, stem from U.S. unpredictability and Trump’s personal characteristics rather than authoritarian aggression or systemic challenges.
To be fair, Trump’s administration often provides ammunition for these narratives. The cacophony of voices from different factions, the unpredictable treatment of allies and adversaries, praising then threatening Canada, mixed messages on Ukraine, contradictory signals to China, Russia and North Korea — all this creates confusion that authoritarian states eagerly exploit. Yet this noise obscures important continuities in American policy that Trump’s critics and enemies alike prefer to ignore.
The truth is that Trump has accelerated trends in U.S. domestic and foreign policy that began under President George W. Bush’s administration in the early 2000s. Indeed, MAGA represents the latest iteration of a foreign-policy evolution from President Barack Obama’s “policies for Main Street not Wall Street” to Bush’s initial populist appeals. The demand for increased allied defense spending didn’t originate with Trump, it’s been consistent U.S. policy for decades. As for domestic instability, one need only recall the Nixon years, anti-Vietnam War protests, or the civil rights struggles of the 1950s and ’60s to recognize that America is no stranger to social conflict.
Both Japan and Takaichi need to craft better “autobiographies” to counter these malicious narratives. Japan’s story is compelling yet poorly told: 80 years of pacifist Constitution, unwavering support for international institutions, and massive contributions to development in Southeast Asia, India and the broader Global South. It was Japan that provided the funds and technology that helped build modern China, a fact conveniently forgotten when Beijing paints Tokyo as a militaristic threat. Japan has done anything but militarize, and Takaichi — like many in the LDP — is no hawk but a realist confronting genuine threats from China, Russia and North Korea.
The solution must begin at home with better communication about domestic and foreign-policy objectives. Leaders must build relationships rather than create divisions based on short-term political calculations. For Trump, this means recognizing that Canada and Mexico aren’t just neighbors but friends, allies and critical partners for the MAGA agenda. Needless provocations over tariffs or immigration are more than diplomatic missteps, they’re narrative own goals that confuse allies and validate authoritarian critiques.
For Takaichi, while reconciliation with Beijing’s current government seems impossible given their track record of aggression and bad faith, Seoul-Tokyo relations have moved in a positive direction over the past two years. She can do more on this front through more judicious statements about history and creative initiatives to work with Seoul in overcoming their dark past. By building trust with democratic partners around China and in the Global South, Tokyo may be able to blunt the effectiveness of authoritarian discourse power.
Both nations must invest in strategic communication infrastructure that matches their military and economic commitments. This means coordinated messaging with allies, aggressive real-time fact-checking of authoritarian narratives, and proactive storytelling in the Global South where China and Russia have gained significant narrative ground. It means training diplomats and officials in discourse power techniques and creating rapid response teams to counter disinformation before it takes root.
The battle for discourse power isn’t optional; it’s existential. In an era in which a well-crafted lie travels faster than complex truth, democratic nations cannot cede the narrative battlefield to authoritarian competitors. Every policy decision, every public statement, every diplomatic gesture contributes to a larger story about what the U.S. and Japan represent in the world.
The authoritarian discourse machine never sleeps. It’s time for Tokyo and Washington to wake up to this reality and fight back with their most powerful weapon: the truth, strategically told. The future of the international order may depend less on missiles and trade deals than on who controls the story of what that order means and whom it serves.
Takaichi and Trump have the facts on their side, now they need to learn how to tell their story before others tell it for them.
Stephen R. Nagy is a professor of politics and international studies at the International Christian University in Tokyo and a visiting fellow with the Japan Institute for International Affairs. The tentative title for his forthcoming monograph is “Navigating U.S. China Strategic Competition: Japan as an International Adapter Middle Power.”
