This article originally appeared in National Security Journal.
By Joe Varner, August 28, 2025
A recent collision between a Chinese Navy destroyer and its own Coast Guard vessel near Scarborough Shoal has publicly punctured Beijing’s narrative of seamless maritime dominance.
-This embarrassing “unforced error,” which occurred while intimidating a Philippine ship, has triggered a predictable and dangerous response from China.
-Beijing is now escalating its aggression with unsafe aerial intercepts and is expected to swarm the disputed shoal with its naval and militia forces.
-This desperate attempt to “save face” is dangerously raising the stakes in a region where the U.S. has firm security commitments with the Philippines.
When Saving Face Risks Losing the Sea: China’s Dangerous Scarborough Escalation
When a People’s Liberation Army (PLAN) Navy destroyer rammed and crushed the bow of its own China Coast Guard (CCG) earlier this month China’s bid to project seamless maritime dominance instead exposed its own seamanship as a liability.
In the contested waters near Scarborough Shoal, the Chinese navy managed to deliver a humiliation to itself that no rival could have engineered. In a dangerous manoeuvre intended to intimidate a smaller Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) ship, a Chinese Type 052D destroyer collided with and crushed the bow of a CCG vessel that had been closing in on the same target. The intended show of seamless naval–coast guard coordination became, instead, a public display of confusion, miscommunication, and poor seamanship.
For Beijing, this was not simply a tactical mishap. In Chinese political and military culture, such incidents eroded the perception of competence and control—two pillars of the Chinese Communist Party’s claim to legitimacy in the South China Sea. The Party has spent over a decade building the image of an unstoppable maritime presence in these disputed waters. That image cracked when the PLA Navy and CCG vessels collided.
China is attempting to reassert dominance. A PLA fighter jet dangerously buzzed a PCG patrol aircraft, passing at an unsafe distance in a deliberate show of force. The message was unmistakable: the People’s Republic would not allow an operational blunder to undermine its claim to mastery over the South China Sea.
The South China Sea has long been the arena where Beijing combined ‘grey zone’ coercion, illegal warfare, and military intimidation to bend smaller neighbours to its will. The Scarborough Shoal is both a strategic outpost and a political symbol. Located well within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as defined by the 2016 Hague Tribunal ruling—which China has ignored—it has been under de facto Chinese control since 2012. Manila’s renewed patrols under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. have been a direct challenge to that status quo, backed by the US explicit security guarantees.
In this context, the destroyer–coast guard collision was more than an operational embarrassment; it was a challenge to the narrative of Chinese inevitability. Adversaries now had a propaganda gift: proof that China’s “maritime machine” was capable of stumbling over itself. In a contested region like the South China Sea where perceptions shape deterrence, losing face could be as damaging as losing a battle.
Historically, Beijing’s response to such humiliations has followed a predictable pattern. First comes a show of strength—often through increased patrols, harassment of rival vessels, and assertive air manoeuvres. This is aimed at quickly re-establishing the image of control. Second comes a sustained campaign to alter the status quo in its favour, whether by deploying more assets, expanding artificial island facilities, or creating new “facts on the water” through construction and enforcement. Third, a parallel propaganda push reframes events so that China appears the victim of foreign provocation.
All three phases may now be in motion. The unsafe intercept of the Philippine patrol aircraft was almost certainly the opening act of a broader pressure campaign. We should expect to see Chinese warships and coast guard vessels swarm the Scarborough Shoal over the coming weeks, forcing Philippine vessels to either withdraw or risk repeated confrontations. Maritime militia craft—civilian in name only—will likely add to the numbers, making it harder for Manila to counter without appearing to escalate.
Economics may also be weaponised. Beijing has previously restricted agricultural imports, delayed customs clearances, and cut tourist flows to punish Manila. Such measures allow China to raise costs without firing a shot. And if these steps fail to erase the embarrassment, Beijing could resort to a high-profile seizure—a fishing boat detained, a reef blockaded, or a Philippine supply mission turned back—to produce the imagery of dominance that domestic audiences expect.
The risk in this pattern is that the Philippines is no longer isolated. Under Marcos Jr., Manila has deepened defence cooperation with the US, Japan, and Australia, and opened more bases to US forces. Washington has repeatedly affirmed that any armed attack on Philippine public vessels or aircraft in the South China Sea would trigger mutual defence obligations. That raises the stakes for every “buzz,” every ramming, every blockade attempt.
China’s desire to save face could therefore become the spark for a wider confrontation. A single miscalculated manoeuvre could injure or kill Philippine personnel, prompting Manila to invoke the US treaty. In such a scenario, China would find itself facing not a solitary coast guard cutter but a coalition naval presence, with all the strategic costs that entails.
Beijing’s leaders must weigh the value of symbolic recovery against the danger of strategic overreach. The Scarborough Shoal is important, but it is not worth a direct clash with US treaty allies. Yet if history is any guide, the political imperative to demonstrate resolve—especially after a public embarrassment—will outweigh the caution urged by professional sailors and diplomats.
The ramming of its own vessel was an unforced error that punctured the image of Chinese maritime infallibility. The dangerous aerial intercept that followed signalled that Beijing intends to erase that memory quickly. But in the high-stakes environment of the South China Sea, regaining face is rarely a cost-free exercise.
In the South China Sea, the greatest threat to China’s ambitions may not be its rivals, but its own need to prove it never falters—no matter how close that urge sails to disaster.
Joe Varner is a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute in Ottawa and the Center for North American Prosperity and Security in Washington, D.C.
