This article originally appeared in the Globe and Mail.
By Jonathan Berkshire Miller, August 25, 2025
On Aug. 11, two Chinese ships – one a coast guard cutter, the other a navy destroyer – collided with each other in a dramatic maritime incident near the disputed Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea. The Chinese ships engaged in aggressive manoeuvres against a Philippine coast guard resupply mission, ramming, water-cannoning and boxing in the BRP Suluan while the patrol vessel was on a humanitarian mission to Filipino fishermen in the area. China accused the Filipinos of “dangerous manoeuvres,” defended its actions as lawful, and warned of countermeasures.
In a striking response, Australia and the Philippines kicked off Exercise Alon 25 last Friday, marking their largest-ever joint military exercises in the region, joined by observers from countries, including Canada, in a vivid signal of reinforced international solidarity.
The incident was a reminder that while global attention remains absorbed by Ukraine and the Middle East, a quieter yet equally dangerous tectonic shift is unfolding in the South China Sea. It underscores not only Beijing’s tenacious efforts to assert control over contested waters and secure its commercial and fishing interests in the region by establishing naval presence, but also the growing peril these tensions pose to regional security, global biodiversity, food security and maritime supply chains in one of the world’s most productive fishing zones.
China’s aggressive maritime posture is escalating. Chinese warships and fighter jets have recently deployed near Scarborough Shoal, seeking to deter both Philippine and U.S. presence. Such efforts are emblematic of Beijing’s wider strategy: the militarization of artificial islands, the brazen use of a maritime militia, regular water-cannon attacks and provocations such as the 2023 Second Thomas Shoal confrontation, in which a blinding laser was fired at a Philippine resupply ship. These tactics don’t just threaten the sovereignty of Southeast Asian countries – they also drive unsustainable fishing, diminishing marine biodiversity and threatening the livelihood of millions.
But there is a deeper and more ominous backdrop to this conflict: the growing overlap between South China Sea rivalries and the potential for conflict between Taiwan and China. Last week, Philippine President Ferdinand (Bongbong) Marcos Jr. offered a rare, candid admission: in the event of what experts called the Taiwan contingency, the Philippines will be dragged “kicking and screaming” into the fray, regardless of its preferences. This blunt confession – which Beijing responded to angrily – draws a direct strategic line connecting the Western Pacific flashpoints.
In this context, Manila has quietly repositioned itself as a strategic pivot in the region. Under Mr. Marcos, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with Washington has been expanded to include sites within 500 kilometres of Taiwan. Its 2023–2028 National Security Policy explicitly lists a Taiwanese conflict among its greatest threats. Manila has also deployed coast-guard monitoring near the Bashi Channel and allowed U.S. Typhon missile systems in the north of the archipelago.
This convergence of pressure in the South China Sea and Taiwan contingency raises an alarming nexus of risk, as a conflict or even heightened tension in one theatre could cascade into the other. The Philippines is not only a front line claimant state in the West Philippine Sea, but also a geographic buffer between China and Taiwan. This dual role increases Manila’s vulnerability, but also its strategic value to like-minded democracies.
So where does Canada stand amidst all this tension?
Canada has demonstrated growing interest in the Indo-Pacific, and is now three years into the implementation of a regional strategy there. Fisheries enforcement, surveillance technology and conservation science are areas of expertise for Canada. Ottawa should continue to actively partner with the Philippines and Vietnam to detect and deter illegal, unregulated and destructive fishing, including maritime militia activity. Coastal monitoring systems, vessel-track sharing and dark-vessel detection technologies are also ready-made domains for Canadian support.
Further steps include deepening defence engagement, which should complement diplomacy through groups like the ASEAN-Canada Strategic Partnership and ad hoc coalitions of maritime democracies. On the regulatory front, Canada should champion toughened rules against illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and support transparency initiatives in naval and coast guard operations.
Canada’s sustained involvement would deliver a dual advantage: supporting Southeast Asia at a vulnerable juncture, while underscoring its own commitment to upholding international law and the maritime commons. After all, if Beijing succeeds in stamping its authority on the South China Sea, the move will embolden it elsewhere, from the Arctic to cyberspace.
But Canada’s approach must match its rhetoric. The choice is stark: either pro-active engagement now, or reactive scrambling later. The collision near Scarborough Shoal is not just a passing headline, it is a warning shot – and the global community must parse the message that Beijing is sending.
Jonathan Berkshire Miller is co-founder and principal of Pendulum Geopolitical Advisory and a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.
