By Stephen Nagy
January 27, 2026
Foreign interference in Canada is no longer an abstract concern whispered about in security circles. It is a lived reality – one that touches elections, communities, universities, and even the everyday trust that Canadians place in their democratic institutions.
While no single country has a monopoly on these activities, a growing body of evidence shows that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been a particularly active and consequential player. The cumulative effect is a slow erosion of sovereignty, confidence, and credibility at a moment when the global rules Canada has long relied upon are fraying.
Drawing on findings from public inquiries, intelligence assessments, and well-documented cases, this report argues that Canada faces persistent foreign interference campaigns that:
- Target all levels of government and democratic processes.
- Employ sophisticated tactics including elite capture[1], disinformation[2], and transnational repression.
- Exploit vulnerabilities in Canada’s regulatory framework and public awareness.
- Undermine public confidence in democratic institutions.
- Create strategic liabilities for Canada’s alliance relationships, particularly with the United States.
Thankfully there are clear measures Canada can take to strengthen its capacity to detect, deter, and counter foreign interference while protecting fundamental rights and freedoms.
Understanding the problem: Documented Foreign Interference in Canada
Foreign interference in Canada is not theoretical speculation or partisan allegation. Multiple official inquiries, intelligence assessments, and judicial processes have established its existence, scope, and severity through rigorous investigation.
The June 2024 report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) documented that some parliamentarians, both “witting and semi-witting,” engaged with foreign state actors to influence parliamentary business and leadership campaigns (NSICOP 2024). The report identified 11 current and former parliamentarians and 13 ministers, ministerial staff, and public office holders as targets or participants in foreign interference activities. While the report cited multiple foreign states, it identified the People’s Republic of China (hereafter China) as conducting the “most persistent and sophisticated foreign interference threat to Canada’s democratic institutions and interests.”
The Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions, led by Justice Marie-Josée Hogue, provided additional documentation through two comprehensive reports (Hogue Commission 2025a). The inquiry’s initial report in May 2024 concluded that while foreign interference occurred during the 2019 and 2021 federal elections, it did not affect overall election outcomes. However, the report noted that interference may have affected outcomes in a small number of ridings, with Chinese state actors employing a “sophisticated strategy to interfere” – including disinformation campaigns, undeclared proxy voting, and candidate targeting.
The inquiry’s final report in January 2025 reinforced these findings while providing unprecedented detail about the scope and methods of foreign interference. Justice Hogue concluded that “foreign interference is real” and that “some foreign states (China) are trying to interfere in our democratic institutions, including electoral processes.” The report specifically noted that while Canada’s democratic institutions “have thus far remained robust,” the phenomenon of foreign interference “poses a major risk to Canadian democracy” and constitutes “an existential threat” particularly through information manipulation.
The Commission of Inquiry heard testimony from CSIS Director David Vigneault in April 2024 confirming that foreign interference operations target all levels of Canadian government, academic institutions, diaspora communities, and civil society organizations (Hogue Commission 2024). Director Vigneault testified that interference activities include monitoring and intimidation of diaspora communities, covert funding of candidates, placement of agents of influence in political organizations, and systematic collection of information on Canadian political figures.
Specific documented cases reinforce these findings including:
- The 2023 arrest and charging of RCMP officer William Majcher under the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act for allegedly using his knowledge and contacts to help the Chinese government identify and intimidate individuals who posed credible threats to Chinese state interests (Banerjee 2024; Onishi 2023).
- The ongoing investigation into alleged Chinese police stations operating in Canada without authorization – with RCMP charging three individuals in June 2023 – that demonstrate Chinese operational presence on Canadian soil (Thompson 2024).
The Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics conducted its own investigation, hearing from 23 witnesses between March and June 2023 (Global Affairs Canada 2023). The committee’s October 2023 report documented patterns of foreign interference including elite capture, espionage through institutional co-operation, disinformation campaigns, political funding irregularities, and surveillance of diaspora communities.
Elections Canada and the Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections conducted reviews of foreign interference allegations from the 2019 and 2021 elections (Elections Canada 2023). While insufficient evidence existed to pursue prosecution under the Canada Elections Act, investigators found “indications that PRC officials gave impetus and direction to an anti-Conservative Party campaign, which was then carried out and amplified by an array of associations and individuals using various communication channels.”
The Xinhua Institute’s September 2025 report Colonization of the Mind provides direct insight into how Beijing conceptualizes information operations (Xinhua Institute 2025). The document explicitly frames Western public diplomacy as “white propaganda,” democracy promotion as grey zone cognitive manipulation, and intelligence activities as black operations, all serving integrated cognitive warfare objectives. While this represents Chinese strategic thinking rather than proven operations, it contextualizes documented interference activities within a broader strategic framework that views information influence as legitimate state activity.
The CSIS document “Foreign Interference Landscape in Canada: Key Actors and Objectives,” released in July 2025, provides an authoritative assessment that the PRC “is the most active state conducting foreign interference activities in Canada, in scale and scope of activity” (CSIS 2025b). The document establishes that India “is the second most pervasive foreign interference perpetrator in Canada” and that Russia, Pakistan, and Iran also engage in interference activities, though with different objectives and methods.
This substantial body of evidence – from multiple independent sources including parliamentary committees, judicial inquiries, intelligence services, and law enforcement – establishes beyond reasonable doubt that foreign interference in Canada is real, persistent, and sophisticated.
Domestic and International Consequences
The documented foreign interference operations generate concrete negative consequences across domestic governance and international relations.
Erosion of Democratic Legitimacy
When parliamentarians engage with foreign state actors to influence domestic political processes – whether wittingly, semi-wittingly, or unwittingly – public confidence in democratic institutions declines. The NSICOP revelation that sitting parliamentarians participated in interference activities undermines Canadians’ trust in representative government regardless of intent or awareness.
Justice Hogue’s final report acknowledged that “trust in Canada’s democratic institutions has been shaken” by foreign interference revelations and that restoration requires “greater transparency” (Hogue Commission 2025b). The inquiry documented that foreign interference “has undermined public confidence in Canadian democracy” even where it did not materially affect election outcomes.
Post-inquiry polling data supports this assessment. Public opinion research conducted following the initial report found significant erosion in Canadians’ confidence in electoral integrity and democratic institutions (Elections Canada 2025). This erosion of democratic legitimacy weakens social cohesion and governance effectiveness regardless of whether interference actually altered electoral outcomes.
The Standing Committee on Ethics noted that “the inaction of federal governments over the past 30 years in response to threats of foreign interference in Canada” contributed to the problem, with witnesses testifying that “intelligence services have been producing reports on foreign interference for many years, and that no one reacted.” This perception of governmental inaction – whether accurate or not – compounds the damage to public trust.
Vulnerability of Diaspora Communities
Chinese state interference operations systematically target diaspora communities through intimidation, surveillance, and coercion, creating what experts describe as “transnational repression” (Privy Council Office 2025). The Hogue Commission specifically noted that diaspora communities face “particular vulnerability” to foreign interference, with community members reporting self-censorship due to concerns about family safety in countries of origin.
Alliance Canada Hong Kong’s May 2021 report documented extensive patterns of harassment and intimidation (ACHK 2021). Examples include “Dissidents’ tires are slashed, activists are harassed and threatened, international students’ study permits are declined, and passport applications are rejected.” The report noted that “overt criticism of the PRC or pointing out its influence operations poses an enormous risk for members of the Chinese diaspora, such as lost career opportunities, business prospects, or research funding. Even their personal safety and that of their family members could be jeopardized.”
Testimony before the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics from Mehmet Tohti, executive director of the Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project, illustrated the severity of transnational repression (Parliament of Canada 2025). Tohti described being contacted by Urumchi state police in the PRC who had taken his uncle hostage and informed him his mother and two sisters were dead. He characterized Beijing’s “surveillance, threats, intimidation, and harassment” as constant, noting that “even in a democratic and free country like Canada, Uyghur Canadians are not free because of the constant Communist Party of China pressure and the threat of family members being taken hostage.”
The September 2023 assassination of Hardeep Singh Nijjar in British Columbia, which then Prime Minister Justin Trudeau publicly attributed to credible allegations of Indian government involvement, represents the most extreme manifestation of transnational repression – the extraterritorial killing of a Canadian citizen on Canadian soil (Public Safety Canada 2025b; Clarke and Schwarz 2023). The October 2024 expulsion of six Indian diplomats for involvement in “serious criminal activity in Canada,” including the Nijjar killing, further documented the scope of foreign state willingness to use violence against diaspora communities.
The CSIS document on the foreign interference landscape notes that transnational repression “threatens individuals’ freedom to engage in legitimate democratic practices and threatens to undermine democratic society and the sovereignty of states” (CSIS 2025d). This undermines Canada’s multicultural foundations and denies affected citizens full participation in democratic life, creating a two-tiered system where some Canadians effectively lack the protections others enjoy.
Compromise of Critical Infrastructure and Research
Foreign interference extends beyond electoral politics to target research institutions, critical infrastructure, and technology sectors. The CSIS 2024 Public Report highlighted attempted acquisition of sensitive technologies, intellectual property theft from universities, and targeting of individuals and organizations that keep our critical infrastructure functioning (CSIS 2025a). CSIS estimates that foreign interference costs the Canadian economy billions annually through intellectual property theft alone, while compromising Canada’s technological competitiveness and security in emerging technology domains including artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and biotechnology.
The case of the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg illustrates these vulnerabilities. CSIS expressed concern about researchers Dr. Xiangguo Qiu and Keding Cheng’s connections to Chinese authorities and potential intellectual property transfer (Tunney 2024). The Public Health Agency of Canada terminated their employment in 2021. Investigation revealed that one Chinese researcher who worked at the laboratory, Feihu Yan, was affiliated with the People’s Liberation Army Academy of Military Medical Sciences, which the Australian Strategic Policy Institute ranks as “very high risk” for potential leverage by the PLA for surveillance, human rights abuses, or military purposes.
Alliance Canada Hong Kong’s report documented systematic exploitation of Canadian research institutions: “Due to the vulnerable funding environment in Canada, the Communist Party of China utilizes its capital and resources so that it is able to fund specific research in Canadian institutions. In the end, it’ll be able to trade the intellectual property for a very low cost.” The report noted that Canada’s National Research Council had collaborated with entities linked to China’s military-civil fusion strategy, raising concerns about inadvertent technology transfer (Fife and Chase 2023).
The Standing Committee on Ethics heard testimony from a Canadian computer science professor (identity protected) who described Huawei’s recruitment approach as fundamentally different from legitimate corporate partnerships. The professor explained that Huawei representatives stated “As long as you have a good idea, we can get any data for you. It is not a problem at all. We have much more relaxed requirements than other countries” – an implicit reference to bypassing privacy and data protection regulations that apply in democratic countries.
United States Alliance Credibility and NORAD Integration
Documented foreign interference in Canada represents a direct security liability for the United States, Canada’s most important ally and security partner. The 2025 US National Security Strategy’s emphasis on “burden-sharing and burden-shifting” explicitly expects allies to maintain robust counterintelligence capabilities and protect shared information systems.
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) integration requires seamless information sharing and mutual confidence in security protocols. When foreign states successfully penetrate Canadian political institutions or establish operational presence on Canadian soil, this creates vulnerabilities that extend to integrated defense systems. The October 2024 revelation that Indian government agents were involved in criminal activity in Canada, including the assassination of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, raised immediate questions in Washington about the security of the Canada-US border and the potential for foreign intelligence services to operate with apparent impunity on Canadian territory (Public Safety Canada 2025a).
The US National Security Strategy explicitly states that the United States “will no longer tolerate, and can no longer afford, free-riding, trade imbalances, predatory economic practices, and other impositions” (The White House 2025). In this context, Canada’s perceived permissiveness toward foreign interference – whether real or perceived – creates friction in the bilateral relationship. When Canadian officials appear unable or unwilling to address foreign interference with the same vigour as US counterparts, it raises questions about Canada’s commitment to shared security objectives.
The specific case of Huawei illustrates these tensions. While the United States banned Huawei from telecommunications networks, citing national security concerns, Canada delayed its decision for years despite pressure from its Five Eyes intelligence-sharing partners. Although Canada ultimately announced in 2022 that it would ban Huawei equipment from 5G networks, the prolonged indecision created friction with Washington and raised questions about Canada’s willingness to align with alliance partners on technology security issues.
More fundamentally, the US National Security Strategy identifies the Indo-Pacific as a priority region where the United States seeks to “prevent an adversarial power from dominating” through partnerships with allies. Canada’s participation in initiatives like the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and Indo-Pacific Strategy positions it as a relevant player in regional security architecture. However, if foreign interference compromises Canada’s ability to reliably support shared objectives – or creates a perception among US policymakers that Canada cannot be trusted with sensitive information – this undermines the foundation of security co-operation.
The Trump administration’s transactional approach to alliances, as outlined in the National Security Strategy, makes these considerations more acute. The strategy explicitly states that the United States expects allies to “spend far more of their national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on their own defense, to start to make up for the enormous imbalances accrued over decades of much greater spending by the United States.” In this environment, allies that appear unable to address basic counterintelligence challenges risk being viewed as liabilities rather than assets.
Five Eyes Intelligence Sharing
Canada’s participation in the Five Eyes intelligence alliance depends on maintaining security standards acceptable to partners: the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. When foreign states successfully recruit or manipulate Canadian political figures, compromise research institutions, or establish unauthorized operational presence, this threatens the security of shared intelligence.
The experience of Australia provides instructive precedent. In 2017–18, revelations about Chinese influence operations targeting Australian politicians and institutions created significant bilateral tensions with the United States. Australian officials reported that US intelligence partners expressed concern about sharing sensitive information until Canberra implemented comprehensive foreign interference legislation through the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018 and National Security Legislation Amendment (Espionage and Foreign Interference) Act 2018 (Parliament of Australia 2018; Attorney-General’s Department 2025).
Canada faces similar scrutiny. The prolonged delay in addressing known foreign interference – with CSIS producing warnings for over thirty years according to testimony before the Standing Committee on Ethics – creates a perception among Five Eyes partners that Canada lacks either capability or political will to address the problem. When allied intelligence services observe that Canadian parliamentarians interact with foreign intelligence officers, that foreign states operate unofficial police stations on Canadian territory, or that Chinese state-linked entities acquire sensitive research institutions, they must necessarily reassess what information can safely be shared with Canadian counterparts.
The 2021 APT31 cyber campaign illustrates these vulnerabilities (Reddick 2024). The campaign, attributed to China’s Ministry of State Security, targeted 18 Canadian parliamentarians who were members of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China. While the attack was detected and unsuccessful, the fact that parliamentarians were not informed about the targeting until 2024 – three years after the incident – raised questions about Canada’s internal security protocols and information-sharing procedures.
More concerning from an alliance perspective is evidence that some parliamentarians provided “information learned in confidence from the government to a known intelligence officer of a foreign state,” as documented in the NSICOP report. Even a single such case creates reasonable grounds for allied intelligence services to question whether information shared with Canada might be compromised. The NSICOP report’s conclusion that Canada has been “slow to respond” to foreign interference threats reinforces this perception.
The implications extend beyond intelligence sharing to operational co-operation. When Five Eyes partners conduct joint operations or share sensitive collection methods, they must trust that all participants maintain adequate security. Persistent foreign interference in Canada – particularly when it targets the intelligence and security community itself – erodes this trust and may lead partners to exclude Canada from certain sensitive operations or limit the intelligence they provide.
Indo-Pacific Strategy Credibility
Canada’s 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy positions Canada as a reliable partner for regional democracies and a contributor to rules-based order (Global Affairs Canada 2022). The strategy commits Canada to “deepen economic ties in the region” and “support a more secure region where international rules and norms are respected.” However, documented Chinese interference operations undermine this positioning in multiple ways.
When Tokyo, Seoul, Canberra, New Delhi, and other regional partners observe Chinese state actors successfully penetrating Canadian institutions without robust countermeasures, questions arise about Canada’s commitment and capability as a security partner. The Alliance Canada Hong Kong report notes that “Canada lacks a comprehensive foreign interference framework to address these issues” and that “existing infrastructures in Canada are ill-equipped to address foreign state influence and interference today” (ACHK 2021).
The author’s work on middle power strategies emphasizes that credibility derives not from declaratory policy but from demonstrated capacity to protect national interests and contribute meaningfully to collective security (Asialink 2025). When Canada announces an Indo-Pacific Strategy while simultaneously appearing unable to address Chinese interference in its own democratic processes, it creates a credibility gap that undermines the strategy’s effectiveness.
Specific examples illustrate this dynamic. The 2016 British Columbia memorandum of understanding with Guangdong province on China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” – which remained in effect despite federal government concerns about the initiative’s strategic implications – sent mixed signals about Canada’s position on Chinese infrastructure diplomacy (Wood 2020). When British Columbia Premier John Horgan stated in 2020 that “foreign policy relations are the responsibility of the federal government, not the provincial government” while maintaining the Belt and Road MOU, it highlighted coordination failures that foreign partners observe with concern.
The case of the Port of Sydney agreement with China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) provides another example (Ayers 2018). CCCC, blacklisted by the United States for activities related to militarization of the South China Sea, signed a 99-year lease to develop a container terminal in Nova Scotia – a geopolitically strategic location facilitating access between Europe and Canada (Campbell 2018). The fact that municipal and provincial governments entered such agreements without apparent federal oversight or national security review raised questions among allies about Canada’s strategic awareness.
Most fundamentally, regional partners assess Canada’s reliability through its actions, not its strategies or commitments. When Chinese interference operations in Canada go unaddressed, when known intelligence officers operate with apparent freedom, when research collaboration with PLA-linked institutions continues despite warnings, regional partners observe and draw conclusions about whether Canada can be counted on as a serious security partner in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific region.
The Strategic Rationale: Why Beijing Conducts These Operations
The Xinhua Institute’s “Colonization of the Mind” report explicitly identifies Western allies as targets for cognitive warfare designed to “neutralize hostile narratives, shape policy environments favorable to Chinese interests, and identify and exploit vulnerabilities in adversary decision-making systems” (Xinhua Institute 2025). Canada represents what Chinese strategic documents term a “secondary target” – a US ally whose influence on Washington and economic relationship with China make it valuable for shaping, while its comparatively limited counterintelligence resources make it vulnerable to penetration.
China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law creates a legal framework compelling all organizations and citizens to “support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence work” (China Law Translate 2017). Article 7 states: “All organizations and citizens shall support, assist and co-operate with state intelligence work according to law, and guard the secrecy of any state intelligence work that they are aware of.” This provision effectively makes every Chinese national and company – whether state-owned or nominally private – a potential intelligence asset when operating abroad.
When combined with China’s 2014 Counter-Espionage Law and 2015 National Security Law, this framework permits Chinese authorities to compel co-operation from Chinese companies operating in Canada, Chinese students at Canadian universities, and diaspora members with family in the PRC (NPC 2014; Luo and Stratford 2015). This creates a structural vulnerability where individuals may be coerced into participating in interference operations regardless of personal preferences.
China’s “civil-military fusion” doctrine, formalized under Chinese President Xi Jinping, deliberately blurs distinctions between civilian and military sectors, academic and defence research, and commercial and state interests (US Department of State 2020). The doctrine’s explicit goal is leveraging all societal resources to advance state power and security. Canada’s resource wealth, technological capabilities in AI and quantum computing, Arctic territory, and participation in semiconductor supply chains make it valuable for technology acquisition and supply chain positioning.
CSIS Director David Vigneault’s February 2021 public identification of China as a “serious strategic threat to Canada” marked one of the few occasions where CSIS has publicly named a specific country as a threat actor (CSIS 2021). This public attribution signals both the severity of the threat and frustration within the intelligence community about the lack of a policy response.
The Hogue Inquiry documented that Chinese interference operations “target all levels of government” and are “party agnostic,” supporting whoever appears most useful regardless of political affiliation (Hogue Commission 2025a). Anne-Marie Brady’s research on “Magic Weapons” explains that United Front Work Department (UFWD), a specific branch of the Chinese government that aims to reach out and influence ethnic Chinese diaspora communities and potential allies (scholars, business leaders, politicians, etc.) that are friendly towards China or can be influenced by China, represents one of three core pillars of Chinese Communist Party strategy, with a mandate to create favorable external environments by co-opting foreign elites, shaping foreign public opinion, and suppressing overseas opposition to CCP rule (Brady 2017).
Understanding this strategic rationale is essential for developing effective countermeasures. Foreign interference operations targeting Canada reflect systematic strategic logic backed by substantial state resources and integrated across diplomatic, economic, technological, and information domains. As the CSIS foreign interference landscape document notes, “threat actors view Canada as a permissive environment to pursue their strategic interests.” Until Canada demonstrably changes this calculation through effective policy responses, the operations will continue and likely intensify (CSIS 2024).
Policy Recommendations
Addressing Chinese influence campaigns, disinformation, and interference requires comprehensive institutional reform grounded in documented vulnerabilities and international best practices. The following recommendations prioritize measurable outcomes based on findings from the Hogue Inquiry, NSICOP reports, and parliamentary investigations.
Implement Comprehensive Foreign Influence Transparency Legislation
Canada requires legislation modelled on Australia’s Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme Act 2018. The June 2024 Countering Foreign Interference Act created the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act (FITAA), but implementation remains incomplete (Thomas and Laudan 2024). The Hogue Inquiry recommended that “Members of Parliament, senators and their staff should be encouraged to check whether those with whom they interact are listed on the Foreign Influence and Transparency Registry.”
Priority implementation measures include clearly defining registrable activities beyond traditional lobbying to include academic collaboration funded by foreign governments, establishing meaningful criminal and administrative penalties for non-compliance as recommended by the Standing Committee on Ethics, and creating a public registry enabling citizens and policymakers to identify foreign influence activities. The Alliance Canada Hong Kong report emphasized that “there are no transparency mechanisms or regulatory standards of foreign actors in Canada, making it extremely difficult for Canadians to identify foreign state-affiliated actors.”
Enhance CSIS Operational Authorities Against Disinformation
Expand CSIS authorities to conduct threat reduction measures addressing modern influence operations that exploit social media platforms, particularly WeChat. The Alliance Canada Hong Kong report identifies WeChat as “among the top news sources for Chinese-Canadians” and a primary vector for Chinese state surveillance and disinformation.
The Hogue Inquiry recommended that “the government should develop a legislative framework to authorize collecting and assessing open-source domestic intelligence in a way that respects privacy rights.” CSIS requires technical capabilities to monitor foreign-directed disinformation campaigns and legal authority to share classified information with non-government entities to build resilience against influence operations. These enhanced authorities must be paired with robust oversight through NSIRA and NSICOP.
Establish a National Reporting Mechanism for Transnational Repression
Create a centralized mechanism for reporting foreign state harassment and intimidation. The Hogue Inquiry documented that “law enforcement, whether local or federal, are ill-prepared and ill-equipped to identify and address foreign harassment” and that “activists and dissidents are often bounced between enforcement agencies.”
The mechanism should provide a single point of contact with multi-lingual accessibility in Mandarin, Cantonese, and other relevant languages, establish clear protocols for triaging reports to appropriate agencies, and generate aggregate data on foreign harassment incidents to inform policy development. A 2020 Canadian Coalition on Human Rights in China and Amnesty International Canada report, titled Harassment & Intimidation of Individuals in Canada Working on China-related Human Rights Concerns, recommended establishing a national hotline specifically for reporting harassment by foreign states (CCHRC and AIC 2020).
Strengthen the Research Security Framework Against IP Theft
Implement comprehensive protections for Canadian research addressing vulnerabilities identified in the NSICOP report. The Alliance Canada Hong Kong report documented that “due to the vulnerable funding environment in Canada, the Communist Party of China utilizes its capital and resources so that it is able to fund specific research in Canadian institutions” and “trade the intellectual property for a very low cost.”
Required measures include mandatory disclosure of all foreign funding sources, prohibition of collaboration with foreign military or intelligence organizations except where specifically authorized, and tri-agency requirements that government-funded research cannot involve entities on a prohibited list of foreign state-controlled companies. Confucius Institutes and Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs) with documented ties to Chinese diplomatic missions must be subject to transparency requirements and foreign influence registry disclosure (CSIS 2025c).
Create a National Counter-Foreign Interference Office
Establish an independent National Counter-Foreign Interference Office (NCFIO) reporting to Parliament with investigative authority and coordination mandate. The Standing Committee on Ethics heard testimony advocating for an office that is “independent, separate from CSIS and from the RCMP, and needs to report directly to the House of Commons.”
The NCFIO should have investigative authority to examine foreign interference across electoral processes, parliamentary activities, and information operations; coordination mandate bringing together federal agencies to ensure whole-of-government response; public reporting obligations on threats and enforcement actions as Justice Hogue emphasized for “re-establishing trust”; and administration of the Foreign Influence Transparency Registry once operational. The office requires substantially greater resources than the $13.5 million over five years allocated for the current Coordinator position, which witnesses described as “inadequate.”
About the author
Dr. Stephen Nagy is professor of Politics and International Studies at the International Christian University, specializing in Indo-Pacific geopolitics and great power competition. He is a senior fellow and the China Project lead at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute (MLI), and a visiting fellow at the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA). He is affiliated with the Institute for Security and Development Policy, the East Asia Security Centre, and the Research Institute for Peace and Security. From 2017–2020, he served as distinguished fellow at the Asia Pacific Foundation and is currently a senior fellow. He serves as the director of policy studies for the Yokosuka Council of Asia Pacific Studies (YCAPS), spearheading their Indo-Pacific Policy Dialogue series. His work focuses on middle-power approaches to great-power competition in the Indo-Pacific. His forthcoming book is titled Japan as a Middle Power State: Navigating Ideological and Systemic Divides.
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[1] CSIS operational framing: “Elite capture is a process the Communist Party of China deploys through its UFWD” to create “agents of influence” within Canadian institutions – directly linking to ACHK’s “unrestricted network” and NML/Huawei tech theft patterns requiring Quad CT safeguards. See House of Commons (2023).
[2] “To offer a short minimal working definition of disinformation, we understand disinformation as the intentional creation and dissemination of false and/or deceptive information”. See: Hameleers (2023).
