This article originally appeared in the National Post.
By Joe varner, April 22, 2026
On Sunday morning, when Mark Carney declared that Canada’s historic closeness with the United States now represents “weaknesses,” he opened the door to a fundamental rethinking of Canadian foreign policy. But if diversification means turning toward China, Canadians deserve a clear-eyed assessment of the risks, not just the opportunities. That assessment becomes far more complicated when viewed against what is now unfolding inside China’s military leadership.
There is a tendency in Ottawa and other Western capitals to view China’s ongoing purge of senior military leadership as a familiar exercise in political control by Xi Jinping. That reading is too narrow. What is unfolding inside the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is not simply discipline imposed from the top. It is an indicator of stress within the system itself. It raises fundamental questions about trust, reliability and the cohesion of China’s most sensitive military capabilities. At its core, this is about confidence, and the erosion of confidence inside a nuclear-armed great power carries consequences that extend far beyond China.
The breadth of those removed reinforces the point. Former defence minister Li Shangfu was abruptly dismissed after disappearing from public view, following an earlier investigation into his predecessor Wei Fenghe. China’s top general, Zhang Youxia, and vice chair of the powerful Central Military Commission and former head of the Armaments Department were also sacked.
Inside the PLA Rocket Force, the scale has been even more striking. Former commanders Li Yuchao, Wang Houbin and former political commissar Xu Zhongbo were removed alongside deputy commanders Liu Guangbin and Zhang Zhenzhong.
Additional senior officers tied to missile operations and procurement networks have been detained or placed under investigation, while parallel sweeps through the Equipment Development Department have targeted those responsible for weapons acquisition and oversight.
Five more generals may have been formally dismissed last week, along with other senior military leaders and government officials, including Yang Guang, Commander of the Rocket Force’s 64th Base, which controls China’s land-based nuclear deterrent. This is not a narrow campaign; it is a systemic disruption touching the core of China’s strategic deterrent.
A similar argument might be made about personnel changes under Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, particularly toward officers associated with General Mark Milley or debates around DEI culture. But the difference is fundamental. In the United States, these moves occur within a system of civilian oversight and have not targeted the core of its strategic deterrent. In China, they have. When the most senior political leadership begins to question the reliability of its own missile forces, the implications are immediate.
Nuclear deterrence depends not only on capability, but on absolute confidence in that capability. If there are doubts about maintenance, fuel integrity, infrastructure, or the accuracy of internal reporting, then decision-making becomes more centralized and constrained, initiative declines and authority tightens at the top. The result is a system that is tactically cautious, but strategically fragile, where the margin for internal dissent narrows and the risk of miscalculation at the highest levels increases.
It is against this backdrop that the remarks delivered Sunday by Mark Carney take on greater weight. In calling for his government to be honest and upfront about the country’s intention to reduce its dependence on the United States and pursue a broader set of global relationships, the Prime Minister has opened a necessary conversation. Canada does need to think seriously about economic diversification, national security and strategic autonomy. But honesty must extend beyond intent, and it must also encompass the nature of the partners Canada is choosing to engage with, such as Beijing.
China is not a static economic opportunity. It is a system undergoing internal disruption at the highest levels of its military command. The removal of senior leadership from the Rocket Force and related structures points to uncertainty within the very institutions responsible for nuclear and conventional deterrence. For Canada, this raises a straightforward but uncomfortable question. What does it mean to pivot toward a state whose leadership is actively reshaping and purging the chain of command overseeing its most critical military capabilities?
There is also a practical dimension that cannot be ignored. Canadian patrol aircraft enforcing United Nations sanctions on North Korea have faced increasingly aggressive and unsafe intercepts by Chinese fighters. A reluctance to address these incidents openly, at a moment when clarity is essential, risks creating uncertainty about Canada’s willingness to defend its personnel and uphold its commitments.
Internal pressure is already shaping China’s military behaviour, and external ambiguity only makes it more volatile. The PLA purges point to eroding confidence, and in a nuclear-armed power that accelerates crises and shrinks the space for restraint.
If the government is serious about honesty with Canadians, then it must acknowledge this: a pivot to China is not just about trade, it is a strategic bet on a power whose internal stability can no longer be taken for granted.
Joe Varner is a senior fellow of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and the Center for North American Prosperity and Security in Washington, D.C.
