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1,988

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сказать по
тем...

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724

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935

ALEXANDER DALZIEL

FORCE MULTIPLIERS

How Russia's governors amplify
Putin's polar partnership with China

August 2025





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Executive summary | *sommaire*

In May 2025, Chinese President Xi Jinping made his eleventh trip to Russia to meet Vladimir Putin. The Russian president himself has been to China some 20 times. But not all the action is at the top level. On one special dimension of the Russia–China relationship – one that has many implications for Canada and its allies – regional governors in the Russian Arctic are tying these two powers closer together.

The governors make every effort on social media to show Putin that they are implementing his Arctic and China agendas, creatively and energetically – and within the bounds set in Moscow. Their posts are something of an executive accountability measure. They are also marketing the closer association between the two countries to Russia’s Arctic populace, to showcase the purported wisdom of the president’s leadership and the supposed benefits of greater ties with China.

To that end, the governors show themselves rolling out signature policies with regions in China. Those policies include the development of the Northern Sea Route – the Arctic maritime transport route that can connect the Russian north to China and beyond – and the strengthening of trade and people-to-people ties between their regions and counterparts in China. They claim Western sanctions are failing. They point to the practical goods – car parts, consumer tech, home appliances, and so on – that are entering Russia from China through the Arctic ports, showing how partnership with China is making the lives of everyday Russians easier. They extol the roles that federal policies and agencies are playing in supporting trade. And they present a popular image of China as a partner in a time of need, a “friendly” country with peoples and regions connected to Russia by culture, sport, education, and science.

All these actions illustrate that Russia is open for Chinese business in the Arctic. While Russia remains reluctant to co-operate militarily with China in the region, civilian and economic co-operation, under the guiding hand and eye of the Russian state, is being encouraged. When the governors talk a good line on social media, it is a way to concentrate everyday Russian minds on the benefits of the relationship and its positive potential without getting into thorny strategic preoccupations like Russian subordination to China in the relationship or maintaining Russia’s primacy over Beijing’s in Arctic decision-making.

But there can be no doubt that the Arctic Zone governors are advancing strategic priorities – and that interregional relations are a pathway for greater Chinese influence and presence in Russia’s Arctic.

The implications don’t end there. The governors are also building momentum for the Kremlin’s priority of developing Russia as the preeminent Arctic leader. Russia is trying to draw in countries beyond China in the expanding “BRICS” group of countries interested in the Arctic, of which China is only one (albeit a very important) part. Brick by BRICS, the governors’ actions are helping embed Russia’s Arctic in a non-European, non-US-centric network of nations – in part to convey the idea that Russia is not overly reliant on China and in part to build up leverage to manage Beijing. In doing so, the governors are weaving the Arctic into the fabric of Russia’s broader international relations. There may be barriers to Russian–Chinese relations in the Arctic, but the social media activities of its Arctic Zone governors show that Russia is deploying a wide scope of initiatives designed to enable the relationship, not hinder it.

In short, Russia is running a full-court press to encourage China to become involved in the economic development of the Arctic, but in a manner that maintains Russia’s control. Moreover, Russia is using the region as part of its brand – an authoritarian brand with a highly selective respect for the security of other states and for the interests of its own people.

Russia’s goals and activities in its Arctic demand that Canada, the United States, and the Nordic countries reinvigorate their own international engagement in their Arctic regions by promoting policies that are centred on economic development, science, Indigenous governance, and education. Democratic Arctic countries must showcase their evolving efforts to ensure that Indigenous communities have a greater say in decision-making – all with the goal of improving the recognition of their right for self-determination. Such actions will prove a counterpoint to Russia’s centralized authoritarian option – and a surer bet for long-term, sustainable partnerships in this unique region of the world. [MLI](#)

En mai 2025, le président chinois Xi Jinping a effectué son onzième voyage en Russie pour y rencontrer Vladimir Poutine. Le président russe s’est lui-même rendu en Chine une vingtaine de fois. Néanmoins, l’action ne s’est pas déroulée qu’au sommet. Un aspect particulier de la relation russo-chinoise – celui aux nombreuses conséquences pour le Canada et ses alliés – a trait au rôle joué par les gouverneurs régionaux de l’Arctique russe pour resserrer les liens entre les deux puissances.

Sur les réseaux sociaux, les gouverneurs s’efforcent de démontrer à Poutine qu’ils consacrent toute leur énergie à mettre en œuvre ses programmes pour l’Arctique et la Chine de manière inventive et dynamique – et dans les limites fixées par Moscou.

Leurs messages constituent une sorte de reddition de compte exécutive. Ils s'adressent également à la collectivité arctique russe pour faire l'éloge de l'étroite collaboration entre les deux pays, illustrant ainsi la prétendue sagesse de la conduite du président et les bénéfices présumés d'un approfondissement des liens avec la Chine.

À cette fin, les gouverneurs se voient exhiber les politiques de marque poursuivies avec les régions chinoises, politiques qui englobent le développement de la Voie maritime arctique – la route maritime de l'océan Arctique qui peut relier le Nord russe à la Chine et même au-delà – et le renforcement du commerce et du dialogue entre leurs régions et les partenaires chinois. Ils prétendent que les sanctions occidentales sont inefficaces. Ils insistent sur les produits utilitaires importés en Russie depuis la Chine via les ports arctiques – pièces automobiles, technologies grand public, appareils ménagers et ainsi de suite – pour démontrer les bienfaits du partenariat avec la Chine sur le quotidien des Russes. Ils saluent le rôle des politiques et des agences fédérales dans l'appui au commerce. Enfin, ils dépeignent la Chine comme un bon partenaire en temps de besoin, un pays « ami » dont les populations et les territoires sont liés à la Russie par le biais de la culture, du sport, de l'éducation et de la science.

Toutes ces actions indiquent que la Russie se montre réceptive aux initiatives commerciales de la Chine en Arctique. Alors que la Russie hésite à collaborer militairement avec la Chine dans cette région, elle encourage, par contre, une coopération civile et économique, guidée et supervisée par l'État. Lorsque les gouverneurs prononcent de belles paroles sur les réseaux sociaux, ils le font de manière à focaliser l'attention des Russes sur les bénéfices de la relation et sur son potentiel positif, et à mettre en sourdine certains enjeux stratégiques délicats comme les rapports de subordination à la Chine ou le maintien de la prééminence russe sur Pékin en matière de décision sur l'Arctique.

Il est indéniable que les gouverneurs de la zone arctique s'emploient à promouvoir des objectifs stratégiques – et que les relations interrégionales présentent une voie possible pour une présence et une influence accrue de la Chine dans l'Arctique russe.

Les répercussions ne s'arrêtent pas là. Les gouverneurs donnent aussi une impulsion à l'objectif prioritaire du Kremlin qui vise à faire de la Russie la principale puissance de l'Arctique. Concrètement, la Russie souhaite attirer d'autres pays que la Chine dans le groupe élargi des pays membres du « BRICS » intéressés par l'Arctique, la Chine (bien que très influente) n'en étant qu'un membre. Brique par BRICS, les gouverneurs contribuent au processus d'enchâssement de l'Arctique russe dans un réseau de nations hors des axes européen et américain – en partie pour transmettre l'idée que la Russie ne dépend pas trop de la Chine, mais aussi pour disposer d'un levier en vue de gérer Pékin. En procédant de la sorte, les gouverneurs se trouvent à intégrer l'Arctique dans la vaste toile des relations internationales de la Russie. Les relations russo-chinoises pourraient se heurter à des barrières dans l'Arctique, mais la Russie entreprend de multiples démarches pour les faciliter plutôt que de les entraver, comme l'indiquent les discussions des gouverneurs sur les réseaux sociaux.

En bref, la Russie déploie de grands moyens pour inciter la Chine à participer au développement économique de l'Arctique, mais d'une manière qui préserve le contrôle russe. La Russie courtise en outre d'autres partenaires non régionaux pour qu'ils l'aident en la matière, utilisant l'Arctique comme un aspect de sa marque – une marque qualifiée d'autoritaire, associée à un respect très sélectif de la sécurité des autres États et des intérêts de son propre peuple.

Les aspirations et les initiatives de la Russie dans son Arctique exigent que le Canada, les États-Unis et les pays nordiques intensifient leur propre engagement international dans le leur en favorisant les politiques centrées sur le développement économique, la science, la gouvernance autochtone et l'éducation. Les pays de l'Arctique démocratique doivent faire voir leurs efforts constants pour garantir une plus grande participation des collectivités autochtones dans le processus décisionnel, dans l'optique d'accroître la reconnaissance de leur droit à l'autodétermination. Ces actions serviront de contrepoids à la stratégie autoritaire et centralisée de la Russie – une option fiable pour établir des partenariats durables à long terme dans cette partie singulière du monde. [MLI](#)

Introduction

Russian President Vladimir Putin hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping in Moscow in May 2025 – again. It was yet another in a series of top-level meetings of the type that garners world attention, reflecting a trend of increasingly closer relations between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Beset by sanctions and tensions with its European and Atlantic neighbours, Russia has turned to China in a way that is, for many, captured in the apparent camaraderie of the two countries’ leaders.

Unsurprisingly, however, the focus on the leaders does not tell the full story. That focus suggests that the relationship is founded on a personal rapport, rather than an alignment of strategic interests. More seriously, it fails to account for the various domestic developments that are shaping Russia’s ability to apply power abroad – and its domestic attempt to strengthen its international power. That failure makes it harder to answer questions about the durability of the relationship – and its seriousness. The focus on a supposed “bromance” (see, for example, Ahmatović and Hartog 2024; Bicker 2025) makes it harder to discern how relations and the level of institutional trust will evolve on the most strategically sensitive questions for Russia, for instance, on the Arctic.

But the current Russia–China relationship is far more than a convivial connection between the two leaders. It is advancing and deepening thanks in part to the efforts of a full government promotion from Russia. Leaders in centralized, highly bureaucratic, authoritarian states like Russia and China set the priorities and embody the policies of their states. But as in any other state, they rely on loyal personnel to carry out and fulfill the objectives they set. In Russia, a key group of people executing the president’s orders are the presidentially appointed governors of the Russian regions (variously called okrugs, oblasts, and republics in official Russian parlance, hereafter to be

referred to generically as “regions”). As we will see, in Russia’s “Arctic Zone,” the governors are working hard to build inter-regional ties with China, sell the merits of the partnership to their inhabitants, and thereby justify the political arrangements of a heavily centralized Russian state that seeks to permeate the life of its citizens in the north. The governors of the Russian regions are convenors, executing the nuts and bolts of China-Russia relations in the Arctic.

This is a relationship that is not about to crumble with a change of leadership in Russia.

In the eyes of Putin and the elites that surround him, Russia’s Arctic – known officially in Russia as the “Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation” – is pivotal to the country’s future, economically and geostrategically. Economically it is a centrepiece of the evolving compact between Putin’s regime and Russia’s citizens to deliver economic growth and stability by tapping the country’s resources and developing the sea lanes along its coast. It is also a geostrategic centrepiece, as the Kremlin sees the Arctic as a way to define the country, protect it, and emphasize Russia’s position in the world. Connecting Russia’s Arctic to the economic and political heft of China, both physically through trade routes and culturally through forms of exchange, is a task that the governors are pursuing with vigour. Strategic communications carrying key messages are important to a regime seeking legitimacy (Bouffard et al. 2024; Landriault and Renaud 2024).

Putin has tasked the Arctic Zone governors with entrenching the economic and cultural dimensions of the Russia–China relationship, to weave stronger ties between the two countries in the Eurasian Arctic that Russia controls and that it exploits with China. This paper will explore how they are doing that. To do so, the paper will examine selected social media posts since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 until the end of March 2025. A search for that period of the governors’ and selected mayors’ pages on vKontakte (hereafter VK), Russia’s most prominent domestic social media site, pin-pointed posts that mention China by name. It identified some 200 posts,¹ ranging from the banal to detailed articulations of government policy.²

Some of the governors were active users of VK when it comes to talking about China. Arkhangelsk Governor Aleksandr Tsybulskiy (tenure, 2020–present) was the most prolific user, followed by Governor Artur Parfenchikov of Karelia (2017–present) and Governor Aysen Nikolaev (2018–present) of

Yakutia. In the rest of the cases, most governors posted a dozen or fewer times about China, and some, such as current (acting) Governor Rostislav Goldstein of Komi (tenure November 2024–present) and Nenets Governor Irina Gecht (March 2025–present), have not mentioned China at all in their posts. In general, the posts of western Arctic Zone governors like Tsybulskiy, Parfenchikov, and Murmansk’s Andrey Chibis (2018–present) contained more trade and economy-related material – likely a function of the greater disruption of trade ties with neighbouring European countries following onset of the war in Ukraine – whereas the posts from the governors of other regions contained a higher percentage of content about culture, education, sport, and language learning, especially posts from Yamal-Nenets Governor Dmitriy Artyukhov (2018–present) and Komi Governor Vladimir Uyba (2020–24). Each tries to show how they are supporting the president within the confines Putin has set. But what is clear in all the posts is Russia’s full endorsement of China as an economic partner in the Arctic. Each post *is an attempt to portray a positive view of China in at the regional level to local Russians*.

**No Kontakte:
Russia’s constricted
social media space**

Russians have had no access to Facebook, Twitter/X, or Instagram since 2022, and the Russian state censor, Roskomnadzor, is choking off download speeds for the once-popular YouTube. The agency is receiving large investments to improve its ability to block virtual private networks (VPNs) that now provide a way for Russians to circumvent its restrictions. Russia is trying to create a domestic information space centred on VK and other domestic platforms where the state has decisive say on their content (Epifanova 2025). That is the context within which the Arctic Zone governors are using VK.

The posts show that the ways in which the regional governments are striving to build stronger ties with China can be broken down into three main themes. First, the governors are portraying China as a partner in the Russian Arctic’s economic future, a partner that makes Russians’ everyday lives better. Second, they are emphasizing the cultural factors, including sports, education, and science, that are bringing Russian and Chinese citizens together and are a component of consummating the relationship between the two countries. Finally, the governors are articulating a geopolitical narrative, sometimes explicitly, of the thriving, dynamic “non-Western” network of foreign partners with which Russia can grow and develop. The governors are

expressing each of these themes in the service of the president's agenda; their social media posts are a sort of public accounting to the Kremlin, showing that they are carrying out President Putin's agenda (Dalziel 2024; Sukhankin 2024a and b), displaying to him their compliance and explaining to the citizens of their regions why co-operation with China is attractive (especially in the absence of what were formerly well-established ties to Europe)(for more on the governors' use of social media, see Zinnatullin 2024).

Family ties: From bromance to a no-limits partnership

The Xi-Putin “bromance” interpretation does at least one disservice, however: it diminishes the strategic depth of the relationship, making it seem that the association could be overwhelmed at any moment by historical grievances or other tensions. But strategic interests define the current relationship, not personal camaraderie.

The leaders' chummy relationship may be an expression of genuine affection. Regardless, that chumminess is an expression of a strategic necessity. They want to show that they – and their countries – have a strong relationship, to persuade domestic audiences of that strength, but also, and significantly, to signal it to international audiences.

Since 2022, Russia-China relations have flourished. The countries' strategic interests give them sound foundations for the relationship and make it unlikely that they will be pried apart (Umarov 2025). It is true that Russia and China have not been friends historically – they even fought a border war in the late 1960s. Moreover, they have authoritarian political cultures that are far less conducive to resilient institutional links than, for instance, the liberal democratic countries of NATO. Further, there is, and almost certainly will continue to be, distrust of each other's intentions at the deepest levels, especially over strategic areas like the Arctic. But this is a common feature of the bilateral relationships of authoritarian states like Russia and China (Radchenko 2024). It is the baseline of authoritarian foreign policies – it does not preclude extensive co-operation.

In fact, the countervailing forces pushing the two countries together are stronger than historical legacies. The two countries need each other at this geopolitical moment. Both are suspiciously eyeing the United States and its networks of allies, which they see as the main threat to their regimes' political survival. There are no unmanageable points of tension, like there was in the 1960s and 1970s (Radchenko 2024). Their borders are settled. Confident that their mutual border is secure, Russia can focus its attention on Ukraine and Europe (and the Arctic), while China concentrates on Taiwan and the Western Pacific (Brands 2025). Despite both having slowing economies, trade is thriving, having gone from under US\$10 billion a year in total volume in 2019 to US\$22 billion in 2024 (Rudnik 2025). Whatever has happened in the past, they believe their current and future prospects are closely aligned. (Dalziel 2024; Gabuev 2021 and 2023; for perspective on how China is promoting itself in the Arctic, see Lajeunesse and Lackenbauer 2024).

There are two key branches to Russia's approach to China in the Arctic: 1) the call in its 2023 revisions to the 2020 Arctic strategy (Russian Federation 2020 and 2023) to seek new bilateral relations for the region and the identification of China as a primary partner, and 2) the ongoing strategic imperative President Putin sees in Arctic economic development with China as a partner in it. The partnership with China focuses on natural resource development and Arctic shipping via the NSR and was reaffirmed in a joint statement on May 8, 2025 (Russian Federation 2025) during Xi's visit to Moscow. Other strategic statements are more muted. For example, the fact that the very last entry of the May 8 joint statement is relatively unadorned language about preserving peace and stability and preventing "military-political" tensions in the region alludes to allegations both make about the United States and NATO "militarizing" the region (Bouffard et al. 2024).

The joint statement is indicative of what "no limits" means in practice in the Russian Arctic: that there very much are limits. Moscow's approach involves an openness to economic and cultural ties (under the guiding hand and supervision of the Russian state), and a careful negotiation of instances when Chinese "sharp" power, such as its military and coast guard, can appear in the Russian Arctic. Some of the limits on economic ties have to do with the limits of the Russian state itself to undertake infrastructure development and protect foreign investments from a bureaucracy that has serious corruption problems. Those problems stem from the bureaucracy's orientation towards

enriching elites while accepting little decision-making input from citizens or regional governments (Yakovlev 2021; Flikke 2021; Zannatullin 2024).

Consequently, the governors' social media posts should be read with this framework in mind. The priority on China as an economic development partner for Russia in the Arctic is likely to persist. The governors are among Putin's main tools to make that priority a reality.

Arctic governors: On the president's public service

Putin has tasked the Arctic Zone governors with implementing his vision of the relationship with China. That vision requires, in part, building inter-regional relations that can function as a type of "proxy" diplomat (Pertsev 2025b). Those diplomatic connections form a peripheral part of the coterie of officials that Putin can dispatch to deal with issues: in this role they have some room for initiative, but it is bounded by Putin's persona and strategic directives. Social media posts are part of how the governors provide accountability to Moscow and to their regional audiences. Those posts also, at a deeper level, communicate the power relationship between the dominant national centre and the subordinate Arctic periphery. Citing meetings between Putin and Xi, the governors' posts then amplify how the relationship is manifested at the regional level.

Some examples from Yakutia, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, and Krasnoyarskiy Kray illustrate the relationship of the governors to Putin. Following a visit by Xi to meet Putin in 2023, Yakutia Governor Nikolaev announced that he had met the PRC's ambassador to Russia and they had agreed to foster co-operation between Russia's and China's regions and strengthen "brotherly relations" between the two "great countries." Later that year he reported that he was meeting in China with the governor of Heilongjiang Province, describing the meeting as following the course set by Xi and Putin. Putin sets the example and issues the orders, and the governors make every effort to show they are complying (Nikolaev 28/03/2023, 17/10/2023).

In another example, Arkhangelsk Governor Tsybulskiy stated directly that he was engaging with China's regions on the president's orders to expand

the “geography and structure” of Russia’s export markets and he indicated that Russia was still a part of globalization, in line with the multipolarity of the world order. By going to China, for instance, he was doing “practical implementation,” carrying out Putin’s directive to promote Russian goods to Chinese markets. He framed his travel to China as part of “continually growing Russia–China co-operation under their heads of state,” something that he is implementing at a “regional level.” He was also developing his region’s relationship to its “greatest foreign economic-trade partner” in part by setting up exhibits at a trade show in Liaoning and meeting senior officials in Harbin and Dalian to talk about a “short list” of economic development opportunities in maritime transport, logistics, energy, forestry, and ports sectors. “We are separated from China by 1000s of kilometres,” he told his readers, “but a large set of our interests are aligning – on economics, business, culture and the friendship between our peoples” (Tsybulskiy 15/05/2024a and b, 17/05/2024, 25/10/2024 b and c).

“*The Northern Sea Route is central to the governors' discussion of China as a legitimate Arctic partner.*”

The governors publicly express their alignment and co-operation with Putin. Murmansk Governor Andrey Chibis bluntly described how his work linking his part of the Russian Arctic to the Far East was following presidential national priorities. In Krasnoyarskiy Kray, then Governor Uss (2018–2023) cited an agreement between Putin and Xi as getting “one step closer” to constructing the Power of Siberia 2 natural gas pipeline to China, an initiative that his government was fully committed to seeing accomplished and the benefits of which he touted for the region. In reality, Chinese foot-dragging has meant that as of the time of writing, the two sides had yet to sign a deal (*Moscow Times* 2025). Uss’s successor, Mikhail Kotyukov, posted the next year that he was in China with Putin to develop interregional co-

operation and that they were looking for investments in raw materials refining and for sources of technology and equipment. Russia's Arctic Zone governors justify themselves to Putin, and through Putin to the Russian public (Chibis 28/02/2024; Kotyukov 17/05/2024a and b ; Uss 22/03/2023).

Promoting the NSR, defying sanctions

When it comes to economic development and geostrategic relevance, the NSR is central to the governors' discussion of China as a legitimate Arctic partner. The most vocal proponent and publicist of that partnership was Arkhangelsk Governor Tsybulskiy. In early 2024, he announced that a "historic" transit between Arkhangelsk and Shanghai had laid the grounds for a regular route, named "Arktik Ekspress #1," which he promoted throughout the year in forums in both countries as a means of connecting Russia and China. Tsybulskiy waxed both eloquent and hyperbolic, claiming that over the next four decades the NSR would "revolutionize" global trade and logistics and was a "mission of the epoch that would advance Russia–China joint activities across the board." Chinese "partners" were showing a lot of interest in it and in the Arctic, he claimed. His statements played up the transit route, comparing it favourably as more competitive than the Suez Canal because of its shorter transit times. "This is only beginning," he said, and the NSR would lead to "large scale" development of the Arkhangelsk port as transport hub, a development that President Putin had initiated in a visit to the port in February 2023. China appears to have less interest in the port than Tsybulskiy and Putin would like it to have, however, as an investment that China promised in 2016 has yet to materialize (Tsybulskiy 03/01/2024, 15/05/2024c; 17/05/2024, 06/06/2024a, 07/06/2024; Dagaev 2025).

Nonetheless, Tsybulskiy lavished praise on Chinese partners for making things happen. China was part of the economic dynamism of his region, he said, which would see the region make its contribution to getting to Putin's goal of 200 million tons of cargo travelling on the NSR each year. The joint Russia–China NewNew Shipping Lines was a key partner in reaching that number (and a key suspect in the cutting of a Baltic Sea cable in 2023 – see ERR News 2025). Tsybulskiy reported on his meeting with the company's chairman in 2024 and the company's voyages on the NSR's "Arktik Ekspress #1" lane, tabulating its statistical successes in expanding his region's trade

in a series of posts. He touted new export deals for Arkhangelsk products like tree cellulose – a material used in pharmaceuticals, weapons manufacture, and a range of everyday and high-tech goods – that would sail the route to China; plans were underway for a near-term expansion. He praised the Chinese Transport Expeditionary Company’s general director for an agreement to increase cargo turnover in the port of Arkhangelsk. The efforts of Arkhangelsk would have geopolitical payoffs for Russia, he claimed, as its ports would replace those of the Baltic states – he used the Russian term “Pribaltika” – as an export point for minerals heading to (somewhat curiously) Africa and South America. Under his leadership Arkhangelsk would “stay on course” – a course set by President Putin (Tsybulskiy 15/05/2024a, b and c; 07/06/2024, 29/11/2024, 08/01/2025).

By building up trade with Chinese ports, Tsybulskiy was carrying out the president’s goal of increasing cargo turnover on the NSR. He pointed out the team effort: President Putin had nuclear icebreaker construction in hand, he noted, citing Russia’s shipbuilding plans to 2030 (Russian Federation 2022). Now it was important his region be ready, as coastal infrastructure was key to the NSR and Putin had made Arkhangelsk a transport hub. Arkhangelsk was helping to build the NSR by, and as per the president’s orders, becoming a key point for “cabotage” services – that is, shipments between ports within Russia – that were sending construction products to, for instance, the town of Pevek in Chukotka. Even cabotage was tying Russia–China trade closer: Tsybulskiy proclaimed that the first such subsidized voyage had delivered a shipment to the Russian port of Nakhodka (near Vladivostok) for onward overland transport to China (Tsybulskiy 23/07/2024).

Other governors have promoted other forms of connectivity between the Russian Arctic and China. Yakutia Governor Nikolaev promoted the idea of new tourist route for Russians and Chinese early in 2022 and soon after touted China, along with Turkey and the UAE, as developing export markets. He told his followers that he had also taken part in discussions at the Eastern Economic Forum in sessions entitled “Northern Delivery: A New Supply System” and “Opening of the Far East: Reconceptualizing Spatial Development.” Later in 2024, Nikolaev portrayed Yakutia as playing a key part in strengthening Russia and China’s trade and economic relations, with almost half of his region’s exports going to China. He also noted that sectors like energy, transport, tourism, and finance offer other venues for co-

operation to harness Yakutia's potential (Nikolaev 21/03/2022, 06/09/2022a and b, 17/05/2024a and c).

Other governors have articulated that, through Arctic co-operation, China is a remedy for Western sanctions. According to Karelian Governor Parfenchikov, sanctions were even a good thing, a “trampoline,” as he put it, for economic development. “They hit us, we get stronger,” he trumpeted. Exports were essential for a sustainable economy in Karelia, he contended, citing economic statistics that indicated that the region had exported a third of its production to Europe. He regularly invoked geopolitical factors as the reason why his region was turning to China: because Finland and Sweden were joining NATO, he claimed, Karelia had to form “new socio-economic connections” and harness “new impulses for development.” By October of 2022, he was touting on social media that his government, with support from Moscow, had replaced European export markets with alternatives in China and Turkey – it was a “new economic model” for the region (Parfenchikov 26/08/2022, 05/10/2022, 20/10/2022, 20/12/2022).

According to Parfenchikov, key to opening new markets for Russia were pathways to China through the Arctic – and thus the emphasis on Karelia as Arctic-oriented, giving substance to another Kremlin priority. Karelia would seek new logistical pathways through its participation in the NSR's development, thereby opening markets in China, as well as in Turkey, India, and Iran. These logistical pathways would include, for instance, improved road connections to Arkhangelsk and Murmansk, upgrades to the White Sea Canal, and building a deep-water port in Belomorsk, which would tie Karelia into the NSR. He emphasized that he was reporting back to Putin on developments and cited praise from Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on Karelia's progress. In practice, northbound transport infrastructure has encountered persistent delays. Authorities in Murmansk, for example, have complained about Moscow's failure to provide funds for a promised railway (Parfenchikov 24/05/2024; Zagore 2024).

Similarly, then-Governor Uss of Krasnoyarskiy Kray asserted that sanctions were barely touching his region's lumber exports, almost all of which were headed to China, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt. He was seeking new logistical networks to move forestry exports, and the NSR would add capacity to the busy trans-Siberian railway. His successor, Governor Kotyukov, struck a business-as-usual tone (for a political system heavy on economic

intervention), and noted that he was heading to China to source technology and equipment and to promote the refining of raw materials (Uss 25/03/2022; Kotyukov 17/05/2024 a and b).

Investment and technology

As Kotyukov's post suggests, many of the governors were stating that new investment from China was helping develop the Russian Arctic. Nenets Governor Bezdudniy posted on VK that he had held a working meeting with a Chinese delegation on investing in the region, a strategic and "hopeful" line of effort "in the new economic realities." The meeting had focused on technology and equipment. Later, he announced that discussions with the China Engineering Corporation (CEC) – "China's largest state company" – had borne fruit: it would be opening a subsidiary in Nenets, one of an international portfolio of 147 countries in which CEC operated. Bezdudniy was signalling that his region was still integrated into the global economy. He said he would seek to lower the cost of expensive flights from Russia's North to international destinations like China, Vietnam, and India (Bezdudniy 21/03/2023, 17/08/2023, 07/09/2023).

Putin's China policies: Making Russian lives better in the Arctic

The governors emphasized that Russia's Arctic Zone was exporting natural resources and processed bulk goods to China in return for imports of Chinese manufactured machinery and technology relevant to the daily lives and challenges of Russians. The Arkhangelsk and Karelian governors Tsybulskiy and Parfenchikov paid special attention to forestry products, mainly lumber and paper, along with quarried stone as Russian products that were going to China. Russians were receiving car parts, electronics, household appliances, and consumer goods in return. The socio-political logic here is that key industries in Russia were thriving and that Russians were getting the products that they required for a stable life (Parfenchikov 06/11/2022, 05/06/2024; Tsybulskiy 30/09/2023, 06/06/2024, 12/08/2024, 20/09/2024).

Other governors echoed the line that trade with China was making the lives of Russians better. Chukotka Governor Roman Kopin (2008–2023) posted in early 2022 that despite China having prepared the cable, South Korean sanctions had delayed the installation of a subsea fibre-optic line to Anadyr’ and that he and Rostelcom were working on resolving the issue. His successor in Chukotka, Vladislav Kuznetsov, highlighted the “action agenda” he was implementing following discussions he had held with China’s consul general in Vladivostok about pre-fabricated housing, electricity generation, greenhouse agriculture, and new economic opportunities on the NSR. These fit within the framework he had set out for his social media audience the year before at the 2023 Eastern Economic Forum he had attended, where he publicized that President Putin had emphasized infrastructure investments like public gas works and the NSR as the “the priority of the 21st century.” For his part, Yakutia Governor Nikolaev reported on a meeting of the Northern Forum, a Russian-Asian consortium on Arctic research, with China, Indonesia, and India, on sustainable development, climate change, and economic projects to improve living conditions in the Arctic (Kuznetsov 13/09/2023, 26/07/2024; Kopin 28/03/2022; Nikolaev 17/02/2025).

Economic engagement with China was not limited to profit, trade, and investment. Murmansk Governor Chibis pointed out that China was a leading example of a country capable of monitoring of toxicity in fish products – for instance, it could identify dangerous substances like arsenic in fish and seafood. That co-operation on standards, he implied, would make Russians healthier and their food supply safer (Chibis 28/02/2024). China’s involvement in the Russian Arctic was an example of how Putin’s regime was deflecting attention from the costs to Russian citizens of its disastrous invasion of Ukraine.

Embedding centralized economics

Developing their relationships with China also serves as a way for the governors to vindicate President Putin’s Arctic development policies. Preferential taxation, customs, and regulatory regimes for the Arctic Zone, as well as the support of Russian federal trade agencies are two examples of governors attempting to display the local and regional merits of Kremlin-centric state interventions in the economy. Chibis, Parfenchikov, and Tsybulskiy, for instance, all amplified on VK the role of preferential regimes and infrastructure programs, such as the federal target programs “Socio-Economic Development of the Arctic Zone

of the Russian Federation” and “Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation as a Territory with Special Support Measures of State” when discussing economic development and trade with Chinese state and business representatives. Posts from Krasnoyarskiy Kray’s Governor Uss and Murmansk’s Governor Chibis also cited the role of these preferential regimes, guaranteed credit, and subsidies for sectors like forestry, for example via the 2014 “Territory of Advanced Socio-Economic Development” preferential regime (*Территория опережающего социально-экономического развития*, or *ТОР*) (Chibis 27/04/2023; Parfenchikov 26/08/2022; Tsybulskiy 14/06/2024, 13/02/2025; Uss 25/03/2022).

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These governors and their counterpart in Yakutia also extolled the role of the Russian Export Centre (*Российский экспортный центр* – РЭЦ, hereafter REC in English) and its network of Regional Export Support Centres (*Региональные центры поддержки экспорта* – РЦПЭ, hereafter RESCs in English) across the Arctic Zone in aiding the transition to a China-oriented export model. Parfenchikov, for example, told his followers that his government had helped radically restructure Karelia’s foreign trade, a difficult task made easier by federal support from REC that would help revive Karelia’s region of Pomor’ye (*Поморье* – the coastal territories around the White Sea). Praising an award-winning enterprise in Yakutia, Governor Nikolaev posted that the business was now working with Yakutia’s RESC to develop markets in China, Turkey, and the UAE. For his part, Arkhangelsk’s Tsybulskiy noted how the REC was successfully helping his region’s business at “all stages” in developing export markets, including China, as well as a long list of others. In these posts, the governors had a clear message: the Russian federal government under Putin’s supervision, and via his loyal governors, is a partner for

regional development in the Russian Arctic, which will unleash its economic potential and overcome infrastructure deficiencies hindering its development (Nikolaev 06/09/2022a; Parfenchikov 05/10/2022, 20/10/2022; Tsybulskiy 14/02/2025, 29/03/2025).

China in the Russian Arctic: First among many

Russian governors implicitly manage the notion that Russia is over-reliant on China. They do this by framing China as one among an array of partners. Belarus, Turkey, India, and Iran are their most common references, each garnering at least 5 or more mentions in the data set. Regions such as Southeast Asia, Africa, and South America are also mentioned repeatedly. The governors also use euphemisms. Karelia Governor Parfenchikov and Yamal-Nenets Governor Artyukhov, for example, both speak of “eastern” markets and “eastern studies” (*востоковедение*) in which China is not the sole country – Artyukhov mentions Indonesia in this context, while Parfenchikov (more questionably) cites Turkey and Egypt – but China is almost certainly the primary market. China is a part, but not the whole, of the Russian Arctic’s trade picture in the sanctions era (Artyukhov 12/03/2023, 06/07/2023, 07/08/2023, 23/04/2024; Parfenchikov 08/04/2022).

Chibis and Tsybulskiy both speak of a network of “friendly” states. In the context of “crisis,” Chibis noted that 16 new export contracts were signed between Murmansk enterprises and such states, listing “Kazakhstan, Belarus, India, China, and the UAE” (notably, China was not first on the list). Tsybulskiy stated that diplomats had come from “friendly” countries to Arkhangelsk to see the NSR. The “Arktik Ekspress #1” maritime shipping route between Arkhangelsk and Shanghai had gotten the attention of Brazil and Malaysia – suggesting that China was but the first of many possible partners for Tsybulskiy’s region in NSR-related trade. With such statements the governors are aligning themselves with the Kremlin’s stated Arctic strategy, which in 2023 called for more bilateral relationships with non-Arctic states in the region (Chibis 31/10/2022; Tsybulskiy 13/02/2025; Russian Federation 2023; see Sukhankin and Lackenbauer 2024 for a critical perspective).

Cultivating long-term ties: Language, culture, sport and (selective) memory

The governors add legitimacy to the economic dimension of the China–Russia relationship by strengthening the long-term foundations of that relationship by promoting language education, culture, science, and sport in the Russian Arctic. Cementing good relations with China is something that everyday Russians can partake in, they convey. Their efforts are designed to weave together long-term ties between the Arctic regions and China – while also emphasizing that Russia remains in the driver’s seat when it comes to the far north.

Talking the talk: Learning Chinese

Language learning is one of the ways Russia is deepening ties between Russian and Chinese citizens and preparing Russians for economic opportunities. Among Arkhangelsk Governor Tsybulskiy’s many posts are ones mentioning his activities in the “humanitarian sphere,” of which the introduction of Chinese as a second language at Northern (Arctic) University in Arkhangelsk is one such example. Language learning is tied to developing the Arctic Zone, he commented. In one post, Tsybulskiy celebrated a young person’s fascination with Chinese language and culture; he announced that Arkhangelsk’s institutions of higher education were joining a “language education alliance” with Chinese counterparts, part of a larger program of forging more institutional ties in the fields of education and science, as President Putin desired (Tsybulskiy 17/05/2023, 12/01/2024, 17/05/2024).

One Arctic leader made language and culture the core of his message about Russia’s “turn to the East.” Every post mentioning China from Yamal-Nenets Governor Artyukhov was about language: promoting its study; adding it to the curriculum (alongside English) and making it the first foreign language in some schools; creating regional competitions in “oriental studies” (*востоковедение*); and sending groups of students and teachers to China to study Chinese as part of wider studies of “Eastern” culture and traditions. These travel opportunities were open to schools across his region, Artyukhov noted, re-enforcing a message of inclusiveness. He observed that economic and trade relations were based on cultural and traditional values; they were part of strengthening relations with China and so learning Chinese would “give an

advantage to the next generation in the labour market.” Artyukhov himself had witnessed the benefits of such trips when meeting with the participating students and teachers: their travels had inspired them to further study “the language and culture of the East” and the children’s eyes were “sparkling” with enthusiasm (Artyukhov 27/04/2022, 12/03/2023, 27/05/2023, 06/07/2023, 07/08/2023, 25/08/2023, 25/08/2023, 23/04/2024).

The evidence also suggests that municipal leaders are promoting language and education particularly on social media. Arkhangelsk (city) Mayor Dmitriy Morev backed up his governor while with him on a delegation to Dalian, China, in 2024 by posting about education, culture, and sport; he also spoke of student exchanges, language schools, and sharing teaching practices. He visited a school where they discussed deepening the study of foreign languages and he signed an agreement with Dalian’s mayor to “twin” their cities’ schools so students could become more familiar and knowledgeable about each other. The head of Syktyvkar, Vladimir Goldin, in Komi, and the head of Novy Urengoy, Anton Kolodin, in Yamal-Nenets, have also called for including Chinese in the curriculum for school-age children in the few posts they have made about China (Goldin 24/05/2023; Morev 15/05/2024, 18/05/2024; Kolodin 17/07/2024).

Friendly competition: Culture and sport

The further east one moves in the Russian Arctic Zone, the more the governors emphasized culture and sport in their social media channels as a mechanism for connecting with China and its peoples. Yakutia Governor Nikolaev, for example, while visiting China as part of a delegation with Putin – a trip that, he proclaimed, would have “historical significance” – used one post to emphasize his region’s traditional connections of culture and sport with China; he noted that Putin spoke about a youth sporting event in Yakutia while there. His counterparts across the Russian Arctic Zone largely emulated his example, a form of “sportswashing” in Russia’s foreign relations³ (Nikolaev 16/05/2024a).

Competitive and sporting events are aspects of culture that generate interaction between Russian and Chinese people. The governors of all the Arctic Zone regions mention these events. They range from China-Russia summer and winter games to lumberjack competitions, a hackathon, a “School Olympics” featuring Chinese foreign language competitions, choir

competitions, championships in checkers, and so on. In most cases, the events centre on youth participation (Tsybulskiy 13/08/2022, 28/11/2023; Uyba 23/03/2023; Parfenchikov 12/10/2023, 16/12/2023; Chibis 13/12/2022, 20/12/2022; Kuznetsov 14/09/2024; Nikolaev 25/11/2023; Katel'nikova 04/06/2023).

While the general theme is one of friendly competition among Russian and Chinese youth, some of the competitions are a means for the governors to undertake a more pointed advocacy for Russian state policy. For instance, Arkhangelsk Governor Tsybulskiy used the 2022 “Lumberjack of the 21st Century” Championship to laud Chinese forestry technology as half the price and the same quality as the products of Russia’s “senseless Western opponents,” with the aim of legitimizing China as a partner in “import substitution” and to promote the “localization” of manufacturing in Russia. Both are policy efforts that the Kremlin has doubled down on since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which resulted in sanctions from Europe, Canada, the United States, and others. “Together we are stronger” Tsybulskiy extolled state economic policy, “including together with China.” Western companies have been permanently displaced, he continued. Sport and state goals continue to merge in Russia, and these examples assert the healthy relations between the peoples of Russia and China (Tsybulskiy 13/08/2022).

Arctic Indigenous peoples in Russia-China Arctic exchange

Among those peoples, the governors rarely mention their Indigenous populations in posts relating to China. Those that did mention Indigenous people were primarily from Yakutia and Chukotka, in the eastern-most reaches of the Russian Arctic. The few mentions there relate to a specific fusion of ecological balance, traditional culture, and peaceful competition as a means of attracting international co-operation with China and other countries in science and cultural exchanges. While in early 2023 Yakutia’s Governor Nikolaev mentioned a reindeer herding competition that included competitors from Greenland and Iceland alongside China, by 2025 the competitors in events centred on traditional Indigenous activities had reoriented towards China and other neighbours from Central Asia like Mongolia and Kazakhstan, and in the case of bone-carving competitions, Belarus (Nikolaev 16/03/2023, 20/03/2025). Given the high casualty rates of men from the Arctic Zone in the fighting in Ukraine (Tabarkovsky 2025;

Layton 2025; Owen 2023), the further development of a strategy to mask these losses with a gloss of Indigenous-oriented propaganda will likely begin appearing on the governors' VK channels.

The governors' social media posts emphasized that these friendly cultural competitions in the traditional activities of the Indigenous peoples of northern Russia are building relations with China. Chukotka Governor Kuznetsov, for instance, told his audience about the Uelen (Уэлен) bone-carving Grand Prix in Magadan, where competitors from China, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus gathered; he described the municipality of Magadan as a centre of Indigenous culture in the Arctic. The head of the city of Novy Urengoy in Yamal-Nenets, Anton Kolodin, also promoted the "Spirit of the North" bone-carving competition, which again had entrants from across northern Russia and China, as well as from Central Asia (Kuznetsov 28/10/2023; Kolodin 14/08/2024).

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A particular fusion of Indigenous culture and ecology on the international stage was Governor Kuznetsov's posts about the science conference "Universe of the Polar Bear" in Anadyr' and Moscow in 2024 and 2025. Kuznetsov spoke to his social media audience of the "non-conflictual" co-existence of Chukotka's Indigenous people with polar bears as a facet of "the mutual activities of Indigenous peoples of the Arctic with the animal world" (*"взаимодействие коренных малочисленных народов Арктики с животным миром"*). He raised the idea that Russian policy was seeking to achieve an ecological-economic balance, for instance by studying the effects on polar bears of shipping along the NSR. Kuznetsov combined Indigenous languages and traditions with ecological and cultural themes with the aim of creating an attractive appeal to international visitors, including Chinese, Kazakhs, and Brazilians, to attend the annual conference – and to attempt

to depict Russian policy as taking multiple variables such as the environment and Indigenous society into consideration (Kuznetsov 19/03/2024, 22/02/2025).

Science was another element of the relations. Nenets Governor Bezdudniy said that President Putin's visit to China "gave a diplomatic impulse to developing partner relations" and had led to talks with Chinese institutions about ecological and biodiversity-related projects. Together, Russia and China were also tackling climate change, he said. Yakutia Governor Nikolaev posted about the 2024 "International Conference on Climate Change and Permafrost Melt," where representatives from China, India, Japan, and (unusually) the US had taken part (Bezdudniy 02/11/2023; Nikolaev 23/03/2023).

China and the politics of remembrance

For their Russian audiences, the Arctic governors linked China with the solemnity of Russia's World War II sacrifices. Under Putin's regime, state narratives about World War II have propagated a particular brand of historical commemoration for what is known as the "Great Patriotic War" – particularly as a fight against fascism in which Russia is supposedly still embroiled militarily in Ukraine and rhetorically with neighbours like the Baltic states and Poland. To that end, the governors emphasize Russia's relations with China by including the latter in Russian ceremonies and narratives of World War II. (Unsurprisingly, they do not refer to the history of Soviet-China conflict, which led to a short border war in 1969 (see Yu 2022).) Krasnoyarskiy Kray Governor Kotyukov posted that he had participated in a wreath-laying ceremony in China in 2024, as did Arkhangelsk Governor Tsybulskiy later that year. Governor Andrey Chibis spoke in 2022 of the sacrifices of Chinese and other allied soldiers, and Yakutia Governor Nikolaev emphasized Russia's fronts in China and Mongolia at a commemoration in 2023. As usual, Tsybulskiy gave the most fulsome articulation of the relationship between the Russian and Chinese sacrifice, speaking of the aid Russia rendered to China in its fight against Japan, and how the preservation of the memory of those events exhibits a common historical, cultural, and spiritual heritage, "the main element in strengthening bilateral co-operation," as he put it (Chibis 08/10/2022; Nikolaev 21/11/2023; Kotyukov 18/05/2024; Tsybulskiy 25/10/2024).

Conclusion: Handling China in the Arctic

The governors are living up to the task Putin has set them – at least in the VK world. As much as can be judged by their presence on social media, they are loyally carrying out his orders. There is no evidence of public misalignments or divergences in how each is talking to his (it is rarely "her" in Russia's male-dominated regional leaderships) audience about China as an actor in the Russian Arctic. Of course, any discrepancies in carrying out the president's orders, or even if they become too popular while doing so, can lead to a governor's dismissal or worse. This was the case of Sergey Furgal, a former governor of Khabarovsk in the Russian Far East who authorities arrested for (potentially trumped up) murder charges in 2020 (openDemocracy 2021), though they may have been more worried about his high popularity among his constituents. Acceptable social media posts in Russia display loyalty, and ultimately subservience, to Putin and his agenda.

There is a degree of variance among the governors. Not all use social media as much or as adroitly as some of their peers. Tsybulskiy is by far the most active and most deft – and given that he is the only one to use a self-promoting hashtag, #Tsybulskiy, is the governor apparently most politically conscious of his public persona. Western Arctic Zone governors like Tsybulskiy, Parfenchikov, and Chibis speak mostly about trade, investment, and the NSR, whereas their more eastern counterparts Nikolaev and Kuznetsov talk more about culture, education, and sports. But they are all finding ways to talk up the agenda that Putin has set for the Arctic region and China.

So more than a bromance with Chairman Xi, Putin is trying to knot family ties between Russia and China. The Russian Federation's Arctic Zone is a full and indeed central participant in the relationship, substantively through the export of oil and gas by both pipeline and the NSR, and on a smaller but symbolically important scale (at least to Russia) through container shipping on the NSR. The attention Russia is paying to language specifically, and culture more generally, also shows it is attempting to embed the idea of a partnership with China in the popular consciousness over the long term. China has been a partner in Russia's time of need and the partnership has – and will have, if Russia can manage it – popular connective tissue to sustain and grow it.

Might an Arctic governor have a role in a post-Putin future? While one observer has called them "powerless viceroys" and "carpetbaggers" (Pertsev

2025c), the growing importance of the Arctic to Russia's economy and geostrategy could add to their national prominence. In remote regions outside of the St. Petersburg–Moscow corridor of power, they would seem weakly positioned to take on larger roles in Russian politics, but their working two priority files – the Arctic and China – might well give them some advantages. Nikolay Patrushev, the long-time secretary of the Russian National Security Council, demoted in 2024 – is, for instance, rebuilding his power “horizontally” – in part by focusing on the Arctic and maritime files (Pertsev 2025c). The opaque and complex inter-clan rivalries and machinations that underlie Russian politics (Pertsev 2025a) make succession a murky business. In what is increasingly becoming a gerontocracy (Pertsev 2024), a record of loyal execution and successful public engagement through social media might fit into a political resume that would capture Putin's attention. Tsybulskiy stands out in this regard.

The Arctic, brick by BRICS

The governors' social media posts also furnish a window into the work Russia is doing to advance a non-European, non-North American Arctic future by appealing to countries that are hedging their relationships with the United States by diversifying their foreign relations. The governors' is a humble contribution to a BRICS dynamic,⁴ but collectively has the potential to help Russia make strides in its global position and influence as BRICS expands to take on new members. Their activities provide another line of sight into Russia's attempts to broaden its Arctic partnerships (see Sukhankin and Lackenbauer 2024).

Sussing out the significance of BRICS and its expanding roster of countries is an analytical challenge, but this paper furnishes evidence of the regional efforts to give it meaning and life. Transacting business at the inter-regional level is a small but arguably crucial step in Russia using its Arctic to advance its national interests, for instance by trading in non-US dollar dominations with other countries (as it is often doing with China) (Gabuev and Stuenkel 2024). The Arctic lends a political attractiveness to this movement, an attractiveness that the governors are honing in relation to China. Some analysts have noted that Russia is seizing an unexpected degree of leadership in BRICS at the moment, taking advantage of its role

as a “peacemaker and moderator” in the tense China-India relationship and convening non-aligned countries on an array of topics, including alternative payment systems, in order to weaken US sanctions (Baunov 2024). Persuading Russians that their country is part of a viable alternative world order to one that includes North America and Europe is a vision that the governors can advance, and selling the image of a dynamic relationship with China is one aspect of that effort’s viability and impact. The role of the governors in tying their regions to those of Russia’s most desired partners bolsters the argument that the Arctic is increasingly becoming a key element of Russia’s pitch to the world that it has considerable geopolitical strength and relevance (Dalziel 2024). The dim prospects for mega-projects outside of BRICS partnerships, given the questionable attractiveness of Russian Arctic oil and gas ventures to private sector entities in Europe and North America, will add further impetus to Moscow’s attempts to stimulate such interest in the non-aligned countries of South America, the Middle East, and Asia (Vakulenko 2025).

China and Russia's Arctic civil-state-military fusion

The governors are emphasizing the civilian dimension of the civil-state-military fusion (Dalziel 2025b) that Russia is pursuing in the Arctic to improve its access and strengthen its control over the region. Their online statements provides a hint of the limits of the no-limits partnership. There is a lot of openness in Russia to the idea of China as *a* – maybe *the* – central Arctic partner, a role China is positioning itself to fill by indulging in shipping ventures in the Arctic and being a primary recipient of sea-born liquefied natural gas from Russian Arctic sources (namely, Yamal LNG) (Humpert 2025). But Russia still appears reluctant to conduct joint military activities with China in the region. The governors themselves have no say in military affairs or the affairs of the national security agencies. So, the governors are providing a partial view into the preferred Russian model of a relationship with China. That model is based on exchange in the Arctic, one focused on the economy, official culture, and (state managed) sports, educational, and cultural engagements, not one where China has a dominant presence.

Implications for Canada, the US, and allies

Canada, the United States, and their Nordic allies will want to pay attention to the ground-level and interregional dynamics of Russia's efforts to weave China into its Arctic. Putin and Xi, as the governors note, set the course of bilateral relations. But both need others in their political and economic systems to implement that course. Their success at the interregional level will, in part, determine the success of the overall project to build stronger, more durable Russia–China ties. Attention to not just regional governments, then, but also to business enterprises, state-controlled “civic” institutions, and scientific ventures is warranted in gauging the long-term prospects of Russia–China relations generally – and crucially in the investment-hungry Russian Arctic, where single investors and partners can gain an outsized influence. In an Arctic where China finds the other regional players skeptical of co-operation with it, working with Russia is its main way to play a role in the region and tap its economic opportunities (Sørensen 2024; Dalziel 2024).

Russia is also looking beyond China to showcase its version of the Arctic. Canada, the United States, and their Nordic allies cannot be indifferent to this effort and should reconsider how they engage countries outside the Arctic Circle. Most of the partners Russia is courting are looking to use Russia to hedge their economic and strategic ties, not to align with it. Globally, many countries (other than China) are keen to better understand the Arctic in its own right as a fascinating place of natural, cultural, and scientific beauty, as well as learn how it fits into their own energy security, global shipping, and climate change policies.

Russia's centralized authoritarian model cannot be the only one presented vigorously to the “non-aligned” world. That presents an opportunity for Canada and its Arctic partners – and crucially, in concert with their northern inhabitants and Indigenous institutions – to initiate or reinvigorate co-operation agreements among economic sectors, Arctic research institutions, universities, and civil society organizations. The democratic Arctic countries have a responsibility to model a circumpolar region built on national co-operation and shaped by the growing role of Indigenous co-development, co-ownership and self-determination. It will be hard for President Putin and Russia's governors to outcompete that. [MLI](#)

About the author



Alexander Dalziel is a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute with over 20 years of experience in Canada's national security community. Previously, he held positions with the Privy Council Office, Canada School of Public Service, Department of National Defence, and Canada Border Services Agency. During that time, he worked across multiple operational and strategic domains. Dalziel holds bachelor's and master's degrees in history from Memorial University of Newfoundland and Labrador, as well as certificates in Russia and Baltic Area Studies from the University of Eastern Finland and in European Studies from the University of Bonn. [MLI](#)

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Endnotes

- 1 A complete list of the posts can be found in this paper's appendix.
- 2 The author would like to thank Elena Holmgren for her excellent research and many insights supporting this paper.
- 3 The author thanks an anonymous reviewer for this point.
- 4 The BRICS, ostensibly a grouping of emerging economies, has consisted of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa since 2010, and in 2024 began to expand to a BRICS+ format, taking on new members, such as Egypt, Indonesia, and Iran.

Appendix

Social media posts analyzed in this paper from the Russian platform vKontakte (VK)

Artyukhov, Dmitriy. 12/03/2023. “Впервые учебный год заканчивают ученики наших новых билингвальных классов. Школь...” (For the first time, students from our new bilingual classes are finishing the school year. They’ve studied subjects in both Russian and Chinese.). vKontakte, March 12, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall517493162_79547.

Artyukhov, Dmitriy. 27/04/2023. “Открыли сегодня в Лабытнанги гимназию после реновации. Получилось отлично. Много...” (Today we reopened the renovated gymnasium in Labytnangi. Bright spaces, lots of light and color—perfect for creativity and rest. A great atmosphere!). vKontakte, April 27, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall517493162_50090.

Artyukhov, Dmitriy. 27/05/2023. “Наши школьники из билингвальных классов завершают первую языковую стажировку в К...” (Our bilingual students just completed their first language internship in Kazan. Literature, math, biology—everything was taught in two languages.). vKontakte, May 27, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall517493162_79917.

Artyukhov, Dmitriy. 06/07/2023. “Наши школьники вернулись из Китая с первой для ямальских ребят языковой стажиров...” (Our schoolchildren returned from China after Yamal’s first language immersion trip. Students from across the region joined this national delegation.). vKontakte, July 06, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall517493162_81231.

Artyukhov, Dmitriy. 07/08/2023. “Шестнадцать учителей из Нового Уренгоя, Салехарда, Ноябрьска, Лабытнанги, Муравл...” (Sixteen teachers from Yamal cities traveled to China to study Eastern teaching methods. They’ll bring new skills back to their schools.). vKontakte, August 07, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall517493162_81695.

Artyukhov, Dmitriy. 25/08/2023a. “Сегодня весь день работаю в Ноябрьске. Накануне вечером пообщались с жителями. Р...” (Spent the day working in Noyabrsk. I met with locals yesterday evening—they truly love their city and care about how it looks and its future.). vKontakte, August 25, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall517493162_87357.

Artyukhov, Dmitriy. 25/08/2023b. “Заехал в седьмую школу Ноябрьска – одну из сильнейших в нашем округе. С 2015 год...” (I visited School No. 7 Noyabrsk—one of the best in the region. Since 2015, 30 students scored top marks on national exams—1 in 5 Yamal medalists.). vKontakte, August 25, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall517493162_87471.

Artyukhov, Dmitriy. 23/04/2024. “Встретился с финалистами нашей первой региональной олимпиады по востоковедению...” (Met the finalists of our first regional East Asian Studies Olympiad. Over 1,000 students entered; only a few made it to the final round.). vKontakte, April 23, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall517493162_97474.

Bezdudniy, Yuriy. 21/03/2023. “Сегодня состоялась рабочая встреча с представителями китайской делегации. Основн...” (Today we held a working meeting with a Chinese delegation. The main goal was to discuss Chinese participation in regional investment projects.). vKontakte, March 21, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall165513385_20788.

Bezdudniy, Yuriy. 17/08/2023. “Провел переговоры с представителями делегации China Energy Engineering Corporati...” (I held talks with representatives of China Energy Engineering Corporation—one of China’s largest state corporations, operating in 147 countries.). vKontakte, August 17, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall165513385_23770.

Bezdudniy, Yuriy. 07/09/2023. “Сезон отпусков в этом году стал «сезоном справедливых претензий» к авиаперевозчи...” (This year’s vacation season turned into a “season of justified complaints” against airlines. With Talagi Airport closed, flights to Arkhangelsk were diverted.). vKontakte, September 07, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall165513385_24392.

Bezdudniy, Yuriy. 02/11/2023. “Визит Президента России Владимира Владимировича Путина в Китай дал дополнительные...” (President Putin’s visit to China gave new momentum to our bilateral ties. We continue to work jointly with our Chinese partners.). vKontakte, November 02, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall165513385_25648.

Chibis, Andrey. 08/10/2022. “Сегодня в Долине Славы с почестями захоронили останки 132 воинов Великой Отечест...” (Today, in the Valley of Glory, we buried the remains of 123 Red Army soldiers and commanders with honors.). vKontakte, October 08, 2022. Available at https://vk.com/wall537777114_441594.

Chibis, Andrey. 31/10/2022. “Итоги оперативного совещания: - Мы направили больше 1 млрд рублей в экономику ре...” (Results of the operational meeting: - We sent over 500,000 tons of cargo for export - Nearly 8,000 residents of the region will receive payments for gasification.). vKontakte, October 31, 2022. Available at https://vk.com/wall537777114_445667.

Chibis, Andrey. 13/12/2022. “Ксения Коржова вошла в сборную России по конькобежному спорту. Северянка предста...” (Kseniya Korzhova joined the Russian national speed skating team.). vKontakte, December 13, 2022. Available at https://vk.com/wall537777114_455779.

Chibis, Andrey. 20/12/2022. “Наши спортсмены сделали региону очень крутой подарок к Новому Году – стали победителями целого перечня соревнований...” (Our athletes gave the region a very cool New Year’s gift – they won a whole series of competitions...). VK, December 20, 2022. Link unavailable.

Chibis, Andrey. 27/04/2023. “Активно развиваем сотрудничество с Китаем. Для нас это перспективный рынок для э...” (We are actively developing cooperation with China. It is important for us to ensure stable transport connections with friendly countries, including BRICS nations.). vKontakte, April 27, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall537777114_477092.

Chibis, Andrey. 23/05/2023. “Премьер-министр России Михаил Владимирович Мишустин перечислил множество перспе...” (Today’s focus is on building new kindergartens, renovating schools, and improving public spaces. We’re working toward real results!). vKontakte, May 23, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall537777114_480917.

Chibis, Andrey. 16/09/2023. “Выходим на новый уровень партнерства с Китаем. На встрече с руководителями портов во главе с генеральным директором «Шан...” (We’re reaching a new level of partnership with China. At a meeting with port executives led by the general director of “Shan...). vKontakte, September 16, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall537777114_498194.

Chibis, Andrey. 19/11/2023. “Итоги недели в Мурманской области. ✓Решение о выделении Мурманской области ден...” (We discussed the outcome of the meeting with Chinese partners. We’re advancing joint logistics chains and expanding exports.). vKontakte, November 19, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall537777114_510880.

Chibis, Andrey. 23/11/2023. “Второй рабочий день в Минске. Наша делегация посетила несколько ключевых произво...” (We launched a new production site in Kola—another step toward building a strong, modern economy in the region. I’m confident we’ll succeed!). vKontakte, November 23, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall537777114_590148.

Chibis, Andrey. 28/02/2024. “⚡Выдвигаем новые инициативы на рабочей группе Госсовета по развитию Арктики. ✓...” (Today at the State Duma session, we discussed Arctic security and sustainable development. Defending the North’s interests is our priority!). vKontakte, February 28, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall537777114_529147.

Goldin, Vladimir. 14/09/2022. “Сегодня посетил известное в России и за её пределами сыктывкарское производство...” (At the Russia–China Expo in Harbin, the Komi Republic presented its investment opportunities and natural resources to potential Chinese partners.). vKontakte, September 14, 2022. Available at https://vk.com/wall741375255_142.

Goldin, Vladimir. 01/03/2023. “Продолжаю знакомиться с работой местных предприятий в условиях санкций. Очередны...” (I continue familiarizing myself with the work of local enterprises under sanctions. Another example is today’s visit to the Syktyvkar plywood factory.). vKontakte, March 1, 2023. Available at: https://vk.com/wall741375255_602

Goldin, Vladimir. 31/03/2023. “Хор детской музыкальной школы Сыктывкара «Голос детства» стал победителем Всерос...” (The choir “Voice of Childhood” from Syktyvkar’s children’s music school won the All-Russian choral competition. Congratulations to the young artists and their teachers!). vKontakte, March 31, 2023. Available at: https://vk.com/wall741375255_671

Goldin, Vladimir. 24/05/2023. “Общественникам Сыктывкара презентовали опыт реализации муниципального проекта «Т...” (Civic activists in Syktyvkar were presented with the experience of implementing the municipal project “You Decide!"). vKontakte, May 24, 2023. Available at: https://vk.com/wall741375255_924

Goldin, Vladimir. 02/10/2023. “Сыктывкарские предприятия продолжают помогать бойцам СВО. Одно из таких – швейна...” (Syktyvkar enterprises continue supporting the fighters in the special military operation. One example is a local sewing company producing gear for our servicemen.). vKontakte, October 2, 2023. Available at: https://vk.com/wall741375255_1648

Katel'nikova, Svetlana. 29/04/2023. “Губернатор Андрей Чибис провел рабочую встречу с Генеральным консулом КНР в Санк...” (The “Northern Lights” festival is underway in Murmansk—a cultural event that brings together everyone who loves and values our Arctic region.). vKontakte, April 29, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall-206753546_873.

Katel'nikova, Svetlana. 28/05/2023. “Губернатор Андрей Чибис представил промышленный и инвестиционный потенциал Мурма...” (Today I presented awards to distinguished rescuers. They are true heroes who risk their lives every day to save others.). vKontakte, May 28, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall-206753546_915.

Katel'nikova, Svetlana. 04/06/2023. “◆Северянки вошли в пятерку лучших по итогам Российско-Китайских молодежных летни...” (I visited the construction site of a new sports complex. Very soon, children and youth will be able to train in modern facilities!). vKontakte, June 04, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall-206753546_930.

Katel'nikova, Svetlana. 18/06/2023. “◆Делегация города-героя Мурманска посетила с рабочим визитом Харбин (КНР).” (Warmest congratulations on Defender of the Fatherland Day! I'm proud of everyone who safeguards peace and security in our North!). vKontakte, June 18, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall-206753546_948.

Khozianova, Natalia. 26/04/2022. “Первым разведчиком в Китае, работавшем под конспиративным именем Коми был Владим...” (The first Soviet intelligence officer to work in China under deep cover was Vladimir Panyukov—he operated under the codename “Komi.”). vKontakte, April 26, 2022. Available at https://vk.com/wall552329861_19046.

Khozianova, Natalia. 06/07/2022. “Кстати- Китайцы охотно скупают Русский Иван-чай, называя его “Зеленое золото”, прекрасно понимая что их знаменитый Кит...” (By the way—Chinese buyers are eagerly purchasing Russian Ivan tea, calling it “Green Gold,” fully aware that their famous Chi...). vKontakte, July 06, 2022. Available at https://vk.com/wall552329861_19766.

Khozianova, Natalia. 07/07/2022. “Учёные пришли к выводу, что впервые на Земле эти деревья появились на территории...” (The annual “Diplomat School” project has launched in Komi. It’s a platform for youth to explore foreign policy and international cooperation.). vKontakte, July 07, 2022. Available at https://vk.com/wall552329861_19786.

Kolodin, Anton. 17/07/2024. “Готовимся к новому учебному году и сезону олимпиад. Пятеро новоуренгойских школь...” (Getting ready for the new school year and Olympiad season. Five students from Novy Urengoy are now studying at MIPT’s summer science school.). vKontakte, July 17, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall630551417_9181.

Kolodin, Anton. 14/08/2024. “Уже завтра в Новом Уренгое начнется международный конкурс косторезов «Душа Север...” (Tomorrow, Novy Urengoy hosts the “Soul of the North” international carving competition. Participants are coming from across Arctic Russia.). vKontakte, August 14, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall630551417_9375.

Kopin, Roman. 28/03/2022. “Подводный кабель для ВОЛС Петропавловск-Камчатский - Анадырь полностью изготовлен и находится в Китае...” (The submarine cable for the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky–Anadyr fiber-optic line is fully manufactured...). Telegram, March 28, 2022. Available at <https://t.me/romankopin/107>.

Kopin, Roman. 02/08/2022. “Фестиваль Берингов пролив (<https://beringstrait.ru/>) открыт! 💡 Сам фестиваль мы задумали ещё в 2019 году, а за...” (The Bering Strait Festival (<https://beringstraitfestival.ru/>) will be held in Anadyr from August 12 to 14...). Telegram, August 02, 2022. Available at <https://t.me/romankopin/767>.

Kopin, Roman. 26/11/2022. “Китай обновляет рекорды по заболеваемости коронавирусом, а в мегаполисах России уже фиксируется рост числа...” (China is seeing record coronavirus cases. Our vaccination campaign is proceeding as planned...). Telegram, November 26, 2022. Available at <https://t.me/romankopin/1382>.

Kotyukov, Mikhail. 17/05/2024a. “Выступление на пленарном заседании Российско-Китайского форума в Харбине” (Spoke at the plenary session of the Russia–China Forum in Harbin.). vKontakte, May 17, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall797285502_35165.

Kotyukov, Mikhail. 17/05/2024b. “Российская делегация во главе с Президентом Владимиром Владимировичем Путиным ра...” (The Russian delegation, led by President Putin, is visiting China. I presented Krasnoyarsk Territory as part of our official engagement.). vKontakte, May 17, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall797285502_35205.

Kotyukov, Mikhail. 18/05/2024a. “В Харбине возложил цветы к памятнику советским воинам, погибшим при освобождении...” (In Harbin, I laid flowers at the memorial to Soviet soldiers who died liberating China in August 1945. Then visited the Northeast Agricultural University.). vKontakte, May 18, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall797285502_35262.

Kotyukov, Mikhail. 18/05/2024b. “Привез в Китай произведения Виктора Петровича Астафьева, 100-летний юбилей котор...” (I brought works by Viktor Astafyev to China in honor of his 100th anniversary. Donated books to the Russian literature section of the Harbin library.). vKontakte, May 18, 2024. Available at <https://vk.com/wall7972855>.

Kuznetsov, Vladislav. 13/09/2023. “Главным на ВЭФ стало пленарное заседание, на котором выступил Владимир Владимирович Путин. Наш Президент...” (The main event at the EEF was the plenary session where President Putin delivered a speech...). vKontakte, September 13, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall805433424_839.

Kuznetsov, Vladislav. 28/10/2023. “Отличная новость и очередной повод для гордости! Уэленские косторезы стали обладателями Гран-при...” (Great news and another reason to be proud! Uelen bone carvers have won the Grand Prix...). vKontakte, October 28, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall805433424_1140

Kuznetsov, Vladislav. 19/03/2024. “В Анадыре и Москве открылась VII Международная научно-практическая конференция «Вселенная белого медведя»....” (A modern cinema opened in the capital of Chukotka. All digital equipment is Russian-made...). vKontakte, March 19, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall805433424_2020.

Kuznetsov, Vladislav. 26/07/2024. “Накануне провел конструктивную встречу с Генеральным консулом Китайской Народной Республики в г. Владивостоке...” (The first KAMAZ dealership in the region opened in Anadyr. We’re strengthening the economy...). vKontakte, July 26, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall805433424_2686.

Kuznetsov, Vladislav. 14/09/2024. “Пять медалей завоевали наши спортсмены в Приморье. Сегодня прошел финал межрегиональных соревнований по боксу...” (Chukotka produced 25 tons of gold this year—a contribution to all of Russia’s development...). vKontakte, September 14, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall805433424_2849.

Kuznetsov, Vladislav. 08/02/2025. “Поздравляю ученых, преподавателей, исследователей с Днем российской науки! Чукотка – уникальный регион: очень...” (For years, the district lacked new road machinery. Today, 11 vehicles were handed over to municipalities...). vKontakte, February 08, 2025. Available at https://vk.com/wall805433424_3433.

Kuznetsov, Vladislav. 22/02/2025. “Чукотка готовится к восьмой международной конференции «Вселенная белого медведя». Белый медведь — один из...” (Two new air routes have opened in Chukotka. This will improve transportation access...). vKontakte, February 22, 2025. Available at https://vk.com/wall805433424_3469.

Morev, Dmitriy. 19/10/2022. “Как подготовилось Мезенское дорожное управление к зиме, я сегодня проверил непосред...” (Today I inspected how the Mezen Road Administration is preparing for winter, right at the company’s operations base. The goal: a more confident winter season.). vKontakte, October 19, 2022. Available at https://vk.com/wall40615930_12156.

Morev, Dmitriy. 15/05/2024. “Сегодня в составе делегации под руководством губернатора Александра Цыбульского...” (Today I’m in Dalian, China, as part of the delegation led by Governor Tsybulsky. In 2023, the first Arctic Express cargo route from Arkhangelsk to China was launched.). vKontakte, May 15, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall40615930_30107.

Morev, Dmitriy. 18/05/2024. “Еще немного об итогах состоявшейся командировки в город Далянь (Китай). Накануне...” (A bit more about our trip to Dalian, China. Our delegation visited a school specializing in foreign languages. There are great prospects for cooperation.). vKontakte, May 18, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall40615930_30184.

Morev, Dmitriy. 05/06/2024. “В Архангельск с рабочим визитом прибыла делегация из Китая. Динамика развития др...” (A Chinese delegation arrived in Arkhangelsk today. Relations are growing fast—just two weeks ago we signed a memorandum of understanding.). vKontakte, June 05, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall40615930_30637.

Morev, Dmitriy. 05/07/2024. “Сегодня отмечает 440 лет ровесник Архангельска – морской порт! Наш город начинал...” (Today we celebrate 440 years of our peer—the Arkhangelsk Sea Port! The city began at the pier, and the port remains vital to our Russian maritime heritage.). vKontakte, July 05, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall40615930_31347.

Nikolaev, Aysen. 21/03/2022. “Был очень рад в очередной раз встретиться с моим добрым другом, путешественником и исследователем Богданом Булычёвым, который со своей командой вернулся из очер” (I was glad to once again meet my good friend, traveler and explorer Bogdan Bulychev, who just returned from another Arctic expedition.). vKontakte, March 21, 2022. Available at https://vk.com/wall532632737_7582.

Nikolaev, Aysen. 06/09/2022a. “Конкурсная комиссия всероссийской премии «Экспортер года» определила победителей в Дальневосточном федеральном округе.” (The national “Exporter of the Year” award has announced its winners for the Far East. The prize honors businesses advancing Russian exports.). vKontakte, September 06, 2022. Available at https://vk.com/wall532632737_13109.

Nikolaev, Aysen. 06/09/2022b. “Итак, делюсь итогами второго рабочего дня на Восточном экономическом форуме: С Губернатором Амурской области Василием Александровичем Орловым мы подписали мемо” (Here’s a recap of Day 2 at the Eastern Economic Forum: signed a cooperation deal with Amur Governor Vasily Orlov and advanced export discussions.). vKontakte, September 06, 2022. Available at https://vk.com/wall532632737_13158.

Nikolaev, Aysen. 16/03/2023. “В рамках председательства России в Арктическом совете в Якутии проводится Международный чемпионат по традиционному оленеводству.” (As part of Russia’s Arctic Council chairmanship, Yakutia is hosting an international traditional reindeer herding championship—an honor for our region.). vKontakte, March 16, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall532632737_16390

Nikolaev, Aysen. 23/03/2023. “Международная конференция по вопросам изменения климата и таяния вечной мерзлоты в Якутии – большое событие. В конференции принимают участие представители Китая” (Yakutia is hosting a major international conference on climate change and permafrost thawing, with participants from China, Mongolia, and beyond.). vKontakte, March 23, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall532632737_16494.

Nikolaev, Aysen. 28/03/2023. “Встретился с Чрезвычайным и Полномочным Послом Китайской Народной Республики в России господином Чжан Ханьхуэем. Мы обсудили перспективы развития нашего дальней” (Met with Chinese Ambassador Zhang Hanhui. We discussed long-term cooperation prospects between Yakutia and the People’s Republic of China.). vKontakte, March 28, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall532632737_16564.

Nikolaev, Aysen. 17/10/2023. “Работаю в Китайской Народной Республике. Провел переговоры с Секретарем партийного комитета Коммунистической партии Китая провинции Хэйлунцзян господином Сюй Ци” (Currently in the PRC. Met with Xu Qin, Secretary of Heilongjiang’s Communist Party Committee, to strengthen interregional ties with Yakutia.). vKontakte, October 17, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall532632737_20513.

Nikolaev, Aysen. 18/10/2023a. “Через несколько минут в Доме народных собраний КНР в Пекине начнется третий форум международного сотрудничества “Один пояс - один путь” с участием председателя “ (In a few minutes, the 3rd Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation will begin at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.). vKontakte, October 18, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall532632737_20549.

Nikolaev, Aysen. 18/10/2023b. “В рамках форума “Один пояс - один путь” выступил на пленарной сессии “Углубление межрегионального сотрудничества – способствование общему развитию.” (Spoke at the Belt and Road Forum session on interregional cooperation. We deeply value China’s partnership and shared development goals.). vKontakte, October 18, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall532632737_20605.

Nikolaev, Aysen. 21/11/2023. “Сегодня на заседании Республиканского организационного комитета «Победа» обсудили подготовку к празднованию великой даты - 80 -й годовщины Победы в Великой Оте...” (At today’s Republican “Victory” committee meeting, we discussed preparations for the 80th anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War.). vKontakte, November 21, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall532632737_21027.

Nikolaev, Aysen. 16/05/2024a. “В эти дни Президент России Владимир Владимирович Путин находится с государственным визитом в Китайской Народной Республике. Для меня большая честь быть в состав” (President Putin is currently on a state visit to China. I’m honored to be part of the Russian delegation for these important talks.). vKontakte, May 16, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall532632737_22961.

Nikolaev, Aysen. 16/05/2024b. “В Большом национальном театре Китая состоялась церемония открытия перекрестных годов культуры России и Китая, посвященная 75- летию установления дипломатических” (At Beijing’s National Grand Theatre, we attended the opening ceremony of the Russia–China cultural year, marking 75 years of diplomatic ties.). vKontakte, May 16, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall532632737_22966.

Nikolaev, Aysen. 17/05/2024a. “Центральное мероприятие ЭКСПО - IV Российско-Китайский форум по межрегиональному сотрудничеству. Вместе с губернаторами провинций КНР и регионов РФ, руководитель” (The highlight of the EXPO was the 4th Russia–China Interregional Cooperation Forum, with leaders from Chinese provinces and Russian regions.). vKontakte, May 17, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall532632737_22981.

Nikolaev, Aysen. 17/05/2024b. “На открытии VIII Русско-Китайского ЭКСПО с участием Президента России Владимира Владимировича Путина. Впереди – насыщенная деловая программа, которая, я уверен,” (At the Russia–China EXPO, we presented Yakutia’s investment opportunities. There’s real interest in our Arctic projects and raw material potential.). vKontakte, May 17, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall532632737_22969.

Nikolaev, Aysen. 17/05/2024c. “На VIII Российско-Китайском ЭКСПО презентовал Президенту России Владимиру Владимировичу Путину и заместителю Председателя Китайской Народной Республики Хань Чжэ” (Today I met with the governor of Heilongjiang. We agreed to deepen our cooperation in logistics, resource development, and education.). vKontakte, May 17, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall532632737_22973.

Nikolaev, Aysen. 18/05/2024a. “С вице-губернатором Народного правительства провинции КНР Цзянси Ся Вэньюном подписали Соглашение о дружественных связях между нашими регионами. Основой нашего “ (The 4th Russia–China Forum on Interregional Cooperation opened today in Harbin. We’re proud Yakutia is part of this dialogue.). vKontakte, May 18, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall532632737_22992.

Nikolaev, Aysen. 18/05/2024b. “Якутия и провинция Хэйлунцзян КНР - давние партнеры и друзья. Между нами ведется активный диалог, обмены и сотрудничество в торгово-экономической и гуманитарной” (We’re preparing a joint project with China to build a regional center for training personnel to work in Arctic climates.). vKontakte, May 18, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall532632737_22995.

Nikolaev, Aysen. 04/07/2024. “Сегодня посетил гала-концерт II Международного конкурса оперных певцов имени Айталины Афанасьевой-Адамовой и закрытие 53-го театрального сезона. Конкурс прошёл “ (Today I held talks with the chairman of China Railway Construction Corporation—one of the world’s largest infrastructure companies.). vKontakte, July 04, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall532632737_23396.

Nikolaev, Aysen. 30/07/2024. “В Якутске во время охранных археологических раскопок недавно были обнаружены уникальные берестяные грамоты, относящиеся к 17 веку. Сегодня на встрече с руководи” (During my visit to Harbin, I took part in a cultural dialogue session. We discussed Yakut cinema and creative industry exchanges with China.). vKontakte, July 30, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall532632737_23651.

Nikolaev, Aysen. 24/09/2024. “Сегодня обсудили перспективы развития Дальнего Востока и Арктической зоны России на заседании Ленского клуба с участием ведущих экспертов нашей страны. В заседа...” (Today we discussed prospects for the development of the Russian Far East and Arctic Zone at a meeting of the Lena Club, with participation from leading experts across the country.) vKontakte, September 24, 2024. Available at: https://vk.com/wall532632737_24211

Nikolaev, Aysen. 10/10/2024. “В Якутии стерх считается птицей счастья, символом хрупкости и красоты природы республики. В этом году у нас зафиксировано рекордное количество восточной популяц...” (In Yakutia, the Siberian crane is considered a bird of happiness, a symbol of the region’s fragile and beautiful nature. This year we recorded a record number of individuals from the eastern population.) vKontakte, October 10, 2024. Available at: https://vk.com/wall532632737_24551

Nikolaev, Aysen. 04/12/2024. “Провел рабочую встречу с Генеральным консулом Китайской Народной Республики в Хабаровске Цзян Сяояном. Мы обсудили перспективы дальнейшего сотрудничества между...” (Held a working meeting with Jiang Xiaoyan, Consul General of the People’s Republic of China in Khabarovsk. We discussed prospects for continued cooperation between . . .) vKontakte, December 4, 2024. Available at: https://vk.com/wall532632737_24991

Nikolaev, Aysen. 09/12/2024. “Начал серию совещаний по итогам финансово-хозяйственной деятельности за 2024 год и планам на 2025 год с крупнейшими предприятиями Якутии...” (I began a series of meetings reviewing financial and operational performance for 2024 and plans for 2025 with Yakutia’s largest enterprises.) vKontakte, December 9, 2024. Available at: https://vk.com/wall532632737_25025

Nikolaev, Aysen. 17/02/2025. “Провёл совещание по вопросам деятельности Северного форума, подвели итоги работы за прошлый год и наметили планы на 2025 год. Северный форум, созданный в 1991 г...” (Held a meeting on the activities of the Northern Forum—we summarized the results of last year’s work and outlined plans for 2025. The Northern Forum, established in 1991. . .) vKontakte, February 17, 2025. Available at: https://vk.com/wall532632737_25551

Nikolaev, Aysen. 20/03/2025. “Настоящий праздник оленеводов прошёл сегодня на озере Сайсары! 🦌❄️Здесь собрались оленеводы со всей Якутии, а также гости из других регионов России, Китая и М...” (A true celebration of reindeer herders took place today at Lake SaySary! Herders from all across Yakutia gathered here, along with guests from other regions of Russia, China, and Mongolia.) vKontakte, March 20, 2025. Available at: https://vk.com/wall532632737_25895

Parfenchikov, Artur. 18/03/2022. “Начали подготовку к первому международному форуму камнеобработки. Проведём его в...” (We’ve started preparing for the first international stoneworking forum, which we’ll hold in May in Petrozavodsk. Stoneworking is our craft, our history.) vKontakte, March 18, 2022. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_618030.

Parfenchikov, Artur. 08/04/2022. “Северное Приладожье: Лахденпохья. Сегодня мой рабочий день проходит здесь. Графи...” (Northern Priladozhye: Lahdenpokhya. I’m working here today. The schedule is packed—on-site meetings with local enterprise leaders are underway.) vKontakte, April 08, 2022. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_622169.

Parfenchikov, Artur. 11/06/2022. “Планы развития Питкярантского целлюлозного завода обсудили на совещании с руково...” (We discussed development plans for the Pitkyaranta pulp mill. Most of its output is exported—this plant plays a key role in the republic’s economy.) vKontakte, June 11, 2022. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_636256.

Parfenchikov, Artur. 23/08/2022a. “На «Петрозаводскмаше» жарко – поток заказов для оборудования атомных электростан...” (Things are heating up at Petrozavodskmash—orders for nuclear power plant equipment are growing. This year’s output will nearly double.). vKontakte, August 23, 2022. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_652709.

Parfenchikov, Artur. 26/08/2022b. “Сегодня в Петрозаводске проходит большой форум «Вперёд, Карелия!» К нам приехали...” (A major forum, “Forward, Karelia!” is underway in Petrozavodsk. Russian experts and public figures are here. Six parallel sessions are in progress.). vKontakte, August 26, 2022. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_653324.

Parfenchikov, Artur. 05/10/2022. “Обеспечить устойчивость карельской экономики, в том числе экспортной – главная н...” (Ensuring stability in Karelia’s economy—including exports—is today’s top priority. Over a third of our output is traditionally exported.). vKontakte, October 05, 2022. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_666395.

Parfenchikov, Artur. 20/10/2022. “Сегодня важный день - в МИД России мы презентовали экономический и инвестиционный...” (An important day—we presented Karelia’s economic and investment potential at the Russian Foreign Ministry with Minister Sergey Lavrov attending.). vKontakte, October 20, 2022. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_672432.

Parfenchikov, Artur. 20/12/2022. “Нас бьют - мы крепчаем. очередной, уже никто не помнит какой по счету, пакет сан...” (They hit us—we get stronger. Another round of sanctions (who’s even counting?) only pushes Russia to expand domestic production.). vKontakte, December 20, 2022. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_687497.

Parfenchikov, Artur. 02/04/2023. “你好 Nǐ hǎo! Жаль, но это все, что я могу сказать по-китайски 😊. Не в пример тем,...” (你好 Nǐ hǎo! Sadly, that’s all the Chinese I know 😊. Not like the students at our new Chinese language school, which opened last September!). vKontakte, April 02, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_706657.

Parfenchikov, Artur. 22/05/2023. “🔔🔧 Друзья, уже завтра в Петрозаводске начнет работу международный форум камнеобр...” (Friends, tomorrow the international stoneworking forum opens in Petrozavodsk. Last year’s debut was such a success we’re doing it again.). vKontakte, May 22, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_714410.

Parfenchikov, Artur. 23/05/2023. “Еще пару слов о «Карелфоруме» Событие, безусловно, масштабное и значимое. Об это...” (A few more words about “KarelForum”—a large and important event. Over 150 participants from across Russia and abroad attended.). vKontakte, May 23, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_714547.

Parfenchikov, Artur. 14/09/2023. “👉Петрозаводск стал первым российским городом, который принимает у себя региональ...” (Petrozavodsk is the first Russian city to host a regional BRICS scientific cooperation conference. We’re honored to welcome it.). vKontakte, September 14, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_729805.

Parfenchikov, Artur. 12/10/2023. “⚡ Только что пришла отличная новость из Китая! Наш Владислав Ларин завоевал золо...” (Great news just in from China! Our Vladislav Larin won gold at the Grand Prix taekwondo tournament. He’s the best again!). vKontakte, October 12, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_733269.

Parfenchikov, Artur. 16/12/2023. “🏆Владислав Ларин вновь лучший! Наш тхэквондист, Заслуженный мастер спорта России завоевал золото на турнире мировой сер...” (Vladislav Larin is once again the best! Our taekwondo athlete, an Honored Master of Sport of Russia, won gold at a World Series tournament...). vKontakte, December 16, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_744639.

Parfenchikov, Artur. 19/12/2023. “Рассказал о том, как развивается наша экономика, сегодня на пресс-конференции в...” (I spoke about Karelia’s economic growth today at a TASS press conference. Investment keeps flowing despite sanctions.). vKontakte, December 19, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_745079.

Parfenchikov, Artur. 22/01/2024. “«Петрозаводскмаш» приступил к производству оборудования для первой атомной элект...” (Petrozavodskmash has begun producing equipment for Egypt’s first nuclear power plant. Orders are up—we’ve shipped parts for Kursk NPP.). vKontakte, January 22, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_751947.

Parfenchikov, Artur. 23/04/2024. “В мае проведем в Петрозаводске «Карелфорум». Столь масштабное событие будет прох...” (This May we’ll host “KarelForum” in Petrozavodsk for the third time. Last year’s stoneworking platform was a major success.). vKontakte, April 23, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_768737.

Parfenchikov, Artur. 06/05/2024. “На суоярвском лесозаводе «Форест-Тревел» готовятся запустить новую линию. Это по...” (At the Suoyarvi sawmill “Forest-Travel,” a new line is being launched to boost output. I visited the site as part of a working trip.). vKontakte, May 06, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_770663.




Parfenchikov, Artur. 21/05/2024. “Будем производить в Карелии буровые установки. Меморандум об этом подписали сего...” (Karelia will start producing drilling rigs. A memorandum was signed today at KarelForum between local and Kazakh companies.). vKontakte, May 21, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_771878.

Parfenchikov, Artur. 24/05/2024. “Потенциал наших северных территорий представил сегодня на ВДНХ в Москве участник...” (I presented the potential of our northern territories at VDNH in Moscow during the plenary “Russian Arctic: Road to the Future.”). vKontakte, May 24, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_772327.

Parfenchikov, Artur. 05/06/2024. “В Кондопоге построим завод по производству рыбных кормов, в Сегеже - предприятие...” (We’ll build a fish feed plant in Kondopoga and a UAV and weapons factory in Segezha. Just a few of the agreements signed today.). vKontakte, June 05, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_773839.

Parfenchikov, Artur. 09/07/2024. “Новый завод по производству строительной продукции из натурального камня начнет...” (A new natural stone construction materials plant will open in Petrozavodsk—part of the Karelian stoneworking holding “Colorful Granites.”). vKontakte, July 09, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_777290.

Parfenchikov, Artur. 12/09/2024. “Принимаем участников большого экономического форума «Карелия 20/24»! К нам приеха...” (We’re hosting the large economic forum “Karelia 20/24”! Delegates from over 30/??/2024 regions and from China, Belarus, and Uzbekistan have arrived.). vKontakte, September 12, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_784374.

Parfenchikov, Artur. 23/10/2024. “   Сегодня встретился с Хокимом Ташкента Шавкатом Умурзаковым Обсудили вопрос...” (Today I met with Tashkent’s Hokim, Shavkat Umurzakov. We discussed bilateral cooperation—Uzbekistan is especially interested in Karelia’s stone sector.). vKontakte, October 23, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_787076.

Parfenchikov, Artur. 13/11/2024. “👏 Открыли в Петрозаводске новый цех по камнеобработке В Южной Промзоне холдинг «...” (We opened a new stoneworking shop in Petrozavodsk today. The “Colorful Granites” holding launched production of natural stone goods.). vKontakte, November 13, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_790052.

Parfenchikov, Artur. 10/01/2025. “🏆👏 И снова юные карельские спортсмены радуют нас своими успехами! 🇷🇺🇨🇳 Лыжница Анна К...” (Our young Karelian athletes are making us proud again! Skier Anna Koryakova won the 10km classic race at the Russia–China Games.). vKontakte, January 10, 2025. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_797606.

Parfenchikov, Artur. 22/01/2025. “👏 Хорошо учиться, заниматься любимыми лыжами, привозить в Карелию золотые медали...” (Good grades, passionate skiing, and golden medals for Karelia—our Anya Koryakova does it all! I met her today to offer personal congratulations.). vKontakte, January 22, 2025. Available at https://vk.com/wall419407976_799627.

Serdechkin, Yuriy. 26/11/2024. “🇷🇺🇨🇳 Делегация Мурманска работает в Китайской Народной Республике. Принял участи...” (Thank you to everyone involved in the “Road Home” project—we are bringing back the remains of soldiers who went missing during the war.). vKontakte, November 26, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall611314210_8372.


Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 13/08/2022a. “Чемпионат “Лесоруб XXI века” в этом году, возможно, самый важный за все семь лет проведения. Всегда успешная лесная отпра...” (This year’s “Logger of the 21st Century” championship may be the most important in its seven-year history. The always successful forestry sector...). vKontakte, August 13, 2022. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_111710.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 13/08/2022b. “Прокатился на отечественной тяжёлой технике. Вот умеют же наши делать, горжусь с...” (Took a ride in some heavy domestic equipment. Our engineers really know what they’re doing—I’m proud of them! The trip was short but very comfortable.). vKontakte, August 13, 2022. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_111715.


Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 02/12/2022. “8,5 тысяч предпринимателей и юрииц работают с областным Агентством регионального...” (8,500 entrepreneurs and businesses work with the Regional Development Agency. In the last 2 years, it helped design financial models for nearly 500 projects.). vKontakte, December 02, 2022. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_122383.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 11/05/2023. “Принимаем в Архангельске Первую Международную конференцию по биоресурсам и рыбол...” (We’re hosting the First International Conference on Bioresources and Fisheries in the Arctic in Arkhangelsk, despite current geopolitical challenges.). vKontakte, May 11, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_132878.



Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 14/05/2023. “weekly video digest.” vKontakte, May 14, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_133098.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 16/05/2023. “ Рабочий день сегодня начался со встречи с коллегами из Китая. С генеральным...” (Today began with a meeting with colleagues from China. With Consul General Wang Wenli, we discussed key areas for cooperation between our regions.). vKontakte, May 16, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_133219.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 17/05/2023. “Преподавание китайского языка как второго иностранного будем вводить в нашем Сев...” (We’ll introduce Chinese as a second foreign language at our Northern (Arctic) Federal University. We agreed on this today with the rector of MGIMO.). vKontakte, May 17, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_133279.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 21/05/2023. “ Продолжаем развивать торгово-экономические и дружественные связи с Китаем.” (We continue to develop trade and economic ties—and friendly relations—with China.). vKontakte, May 21, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_133807.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 09/08/2023a. “Как и в прошлом году, предложили тест-драйв на китайской технике. С удовольствием...” (Just like last year, we offered a test drive in Chinese equipment. I had fun—this time it was a tractor. Short trip, but great ride.). vKontakte, August 09, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_141065.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 09/08/2023b. “На выставке техники чемпионата «Лесоруб XXI века» пополнение  Более чем на треть...” (New equipment on display at the Logger XXI exhibition  The number of forestry equipment brands represented has grown by more than a third since last year.). vKontakte, August 09, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_141063.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 30/09/2023. “⚡Из Архангельска в Шанхай готовится к отправке первое судно по Северному морско...” (The first ship from Arkhangelsk to Shanghai via the Northern Sea Route is being prepared. Our forestry products are attracting growing interest in China.). vKontakte, September 30, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_146708.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 01/10/2023. “😊По Севморпути из Архангельска в Шанхай отправляется первое судно с пиломатериал...” (The first ship carrying lumber to Chinese furniture producers is en route from Arkhangelsk to Shanghai via the Northern Sea Route.). vKontakte, October 01, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_146761.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 19/11/2023. “На сессии «Новая сила регионов», которая прошла сегодня на международном экспорт...” (At today’s “New Strength of the Regions” session of the Made in Russia forum, we discussed export potential and interregional cooperation.). vKontakte, November 19, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_148666.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 28/11/2023. “Победителем Международного хакатона по искусственному интеллекту стал Константин...” (Konstantin Dyachkov from Arkhangelsk Oblast won the International AI Hackathon—part of the Digital Breakthrough project. Well done!). vKontakte, November 28, 2023. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_152579.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 03/01/2024. “В 2023 году Архангельская область перевернула ещё одну страницу в истории развит...” (In 2023, Arkhangelsk Oblast turned a new page in port development and sea cargo transport. In the fall, a ship sailed from Arkhangelsk to Shanghai.). vKontakte, January 03, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_157066.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 12/01/2024. “Всегда приятно исполнять желания детей. Даша Алексеева из Северодвинска в свои д...” (It’s always a joy to fulfill a child’s wish. Dasha from Severodvinsk is only ten but already serious about foreign languages—and lately, Chinese.). vKontakte, January 12, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_158247.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 04/02/2024. “Экономический потенциал области представили на первом фестивале-ярмарке российск...” (We presented the region’s economic potential at the first “Made in Russia” festival-fair of Russian goods in China.). vKontakte, February 04, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_160391.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 27/02/2024. “Активно вовлекаем начинающих предпринимателей в экспортную деятельность. Особое...” (We’re actively involving novice entrepreneurs in exports, with special focus on training. Presidential programs are boosting their skills.). vKontakte, February 27, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_162132.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 08/05/2024. “Даём старт регулярным морским перевозкам между Архангельском и Китаем. Сегодня п...” (We’re launching regular sea transport between Arkhangelsk and China. Today, the regional government signed a shipping agreement.). vKontakte, May 08, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_169148.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 12/05/2024. “Более 10 рейсов по Севморпути из портов Китая в Архангельск запланировано на это...” (More than 10 Northern Sea Route voyages from Chinese ports to Arkhangelsk are planned this year.). vKontakte, May 12, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_169431.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 15/05/2024a. “Вторую половину недели работаю в Китайской Народной Республике, которая для наше...” (Spending the second half of the week in the People’s Republic of China—our region’s largest international trade and economic partner.). vKontakte, May 15, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_169561.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 15/05/2024b. “В Даляне мощнейший контейнерный морской порт: 254 пристани и 47 км причального ф...” (Dalian has a major container port: 254 berths and 47 km of quays. It handles much of Liaoning Province’s foreign trade—mostly with China.). vKontakte, May 15, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_169571.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 15/05/2024c. “На фотографии — среднетоннажный рыболовный морозильный траулер «Кулой». Его пост...” (Pictured: the medium-capacity fishing freezer trawler “Kuloy”, built in China for the Mezen fishing collective. It’s ready to fish in the Barents Sea.). vKontakte, May 15, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_169580.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 16/05/2024. “Сегодня работаю в Пекине, идет подготовка к участию нашей делегации в 8-м Россий...” (I’m working in Beijing today. We’re preparing for our delegation’s participation in the 8th Russia-China Expo and coordinating with colleagues in Arkhangelsk.). vKontakte, May 16, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_169641.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 17/05/2024. “На Российско-китайском форуме по межрегиональному сотрудничеству в Харбине расск...” (At the Russia-China forum on interregional cooperation in Harbin, I spoke about our work with Chinese partners and its promising future.). vKontakte, May 17, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_169762.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 18/05/2024a. “На Конференции по сотрудничеству в области логистики и цепочек поставок в рамках...” (At the logistics and supply chain cooperation conference of the Russia-China Expo in Harbin, we discussed strengthening trade relations.). vKontakte, May 18, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_169804.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 18/05/2024b. “На стенд Архангельской области на Российско-китайском ЭКСПО попасть непросто — о...” (Long line at the Arkhangelsk stand at the Russia-China Expo 😊 Our entrepreneurs are well-represented—clearly, demand is high!). vKontakte, May 18, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_169806.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 20/05/2024. “Обобщая результаты рабочей поездки в Китай, обозначу основные направления, по ко...” (Summing up our working trip to China: we’ll focus on expanding transport and logistics, shipbuilding, and new trade projects.). vKontakte, May 20, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_169949.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 28/05/2024. “ Эти мирные залпы провожают новое судно мезенских рыбаков колхоза «Север» из Кит...” (These peaceful fireworks send off the Mezen fishermen’s new vessel *Kuloy* from China to Russia—just two weeks after its launch in Dalian.). vKontakte, May 28, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_170717.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 02/06/2024. “ Из Китая в Россию отправился новый морозильный траулер «Кулой» для рыбаков обла...” (A new freezer trawler, *Kuloy*, has departed China for Russia—built for our region’s fishing industry.). vKontakte, June 02, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_171109.


Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 05/06/2024. “На совместной панельной сессии РЭЦ и РБК «Цифра для экспорта» предложил ввести т...” (At a joint REC-RBC panel, I proposed a cross-border e-documentation system for exporters. Digital platforms are key to competitiveness.). vKontakte, June 05, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_171294.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 06/06/2024a. “Второй день работаем на ПМЭФ. На панельной сессии «Северный морской путь: расшир...” (Day two at SPIEF. At the panel “Northern Sea Route: Expanding Arctic Horizons,” we discussed NSR’s growing importance in global logistics.). vKontakte, June 06, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_171470.


Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 06/06/2024b. “На панельной сессии «Россия – Китай» рассказал о возможностях расширения сотрудн...” (At the “Russia–China” panel, I spoke about opportunities to deepen cooperation between our region and the People’s Republic of China.). vKontakte, June 06, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_171548.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 06/06/2024c. “С губернатором Народного правительства провинции Ляонин КНР господином Ли Лэчен...” (Met with Governor Li Lecheng of Liaoning Province at SPIEF. We discussed ways to continue regional cooperation between Arkhangelsk and Liaoning.). vKontakte, June 06, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_171551.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 07/06/2024. “В словаре терминов ПМЭФ (его не существует, но нужно срочно завести) сегодня утром появились новые термины: “миссия эпох...” (In the SPIEF glossary (which doesn’t exist yet, but urgently should), new terms appeared this morning: “mission of the epoch”...). vKontakte, June 07, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_171634.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 09/06/2024. “ Делегация китайского Даляня посетила Архангельск и оценила возможности Арханге...” (A delegation from Dalian, China visited Arkhangelsk and evaluated the capabilities of the Arkhangelsk Commercial Sea Port.). vKontakte, June 09, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_171787.


Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 14/06/2024. “Над созданием этих игрушек из дерева работает целая команда северодинских масте...” (These wooden toys are handcrafted by a team from Severodvinsk. Safe, eco-friendly, and educational—plus they teach kids practical skills.). vKontakte, June 14, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_172065

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 05/07/2024. “ Без преувеличения скажу — сегодня состоялось историческое событие, которое кр...” (No exaggeration—today marked a historic shift in global logistics. Together with our Chinese partners, we launched a major new cargo route.). vKontakte, July 05, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_173811.


Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 07/07/2024. “Дан старт новому мультимодальному маршруту «Арктический экспресс №1». Контейне...” (Launched the new multimodal route “Arctic Express No. 1.” A container ship from the Moscow region will deliver cargo to Arkhangelsk for shipment to China.). vKontakte, July 07, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_173938.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 23/07/2024. “В порту Архангельск под загрузку встало судно, которое совершит первый в этом го...” (A vessel is now being loaded in Arkhangelsk for the first subsidized cabotage voyage of the year—headed for Pevek via the NSR.). vKontakte, July 23, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_175066.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 12/08/2024. “Впервые за последние 30 лет в порт Архангельск прибыл груз с импортной продукцией...” (For the first time in 30/??/2024, imported goods have arrived at Arkhangelsk port—from China, via a new logistical corridor.). vKontakte, August 12, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_176081.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 18/08/2024. “ В порт Архангельск прибыло судно из Китая с импортной продукцией: по Севморпут...” (A ship from China arrived in Arkhangelsk with imported goods: ~500 containers via the NSR. It returns to China with regional exports.). vKontakte, August 18, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_176370.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 18/09/2024. “Уже четвертое по счету судно с экспортной продукцией готовится к отправке из Арх...” (The fourth ship with Arkhangelsk exports is nearly ready to depart for China via a new logistical route. It leaves in just over three weeks.). vKontakte, September 18, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_178282.

Tsybulskiy, Aleksandr. 20/09/2024. “ Теперь Архангельскую область и Китай связывает еще один маршрут по транспорту...” (Arkhangelsk and China are now linked by another cargo route. A train just arrived in Xi'an, marking a new phase in regional logistics.). vKontakte, September 20, 2024. Available at https://vk.com/wall358141318_178543.



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