

JOHN KAYE

NORTHERN PROMISES

Deciphering Putin's plans for Russia's Arctic

August 2025





BOARD OF DIRECTORS

CHAIR

Gerry Protti

Chairman, BlackSquare Inc, Calgary

VICE-CHAIR

Jacquelyn Thayer Scott

COO, Airesun Global Ltd;
President Emerita, Cape Breton University,
Sydney

MANAGING DIRECTOR

Brian Lee Crowley, Ottawa

SECRETARY

Elizabeth Burke-Gaffney

Commercial Negotiator, Oil & Gas, Calgary

TREASURER

Martin MacKinnon

Lecturer (part-time),
Cape Breton University, Sydney

DIRECTORS

Richard Boudreault, CEO,

AWN Nanotech, Montreal

Wayne Critchley

Senior Associate,
Global Public Affairs, Ottawa

François Guimont

Retired, Federal Public Service, Ottawa

Colleen Mahoney

Independent Researcher, Calgary

Simon Nyilassy

Founder, Marigold & Associates Limited,
Toronto

Hon. Christian Paradis

Co-founder and Senior Advisor,
Global Development Solutions, Montréal

David Schneider

Senior Investment Advisor,
Aligned Capital Partners, Victoria

Aaron Smith

Partner, Ernst & Young LLP, Nepean

Nigel Wright

Senior Managing Director,
Onex Partners, London, UK

ADVISORY COUNCIL

John Beck

President and CEO,
Aecon Enterprises Inc, Toronto

Aurel Braun,

Professor of International Relations and
Political Science, University of Toronto,
Toronto

Erin Chutter

Executive Chair, Global Energy
Metals Corporation, Vancouver

Navjeet (Bob) Dhillon

President and CEO,
Mainstreet Equity Corp, Calgary

Jim Dinning

Former Treasurer of Alberta, Calgary

Richard Fadden

Former National Security Advisor to the
Prime Minister, Ottawa

Brian Flemming

International lawyer, writer, and policy
advisor, Halifax

Wayne Gudbranson

CEO, Branham Group Inc., Ottawa

Calvin Helin

Aboriginal author and entrepreneur,
Vancouver

David Mulroney

Former Canadian Ambassador to China,
Toronto

Peter John Nicholson

Inaugural President, Council of Canadian
Academies, Annapolis Royal

Barry Sookman

Senior Partner,
McCarthy Tétrault, Toronto

Sam Sullivan

CEO, Global Civic Policy Society,
Vancouver

Rob Wildeboer

Executive Chairman, Martinrea International
Inc, Vaughan

Bryon Wilfert

Former Parliamentary Secretary to the
Ministers of Finance and the Environment,
Toronto

RESEARCH ADVISORY BOARD

Brian Ferguson

Professor, Health Care Economics,
University of Guelph

Jack Granatstein

Historian and former head of the Canadian
War Museum

Patrick James

Dornsife Dean's Professor,
University of Southern California

Rainer Knopff

Professor Emeritus of Politics,
University of Calgary

Larry Martin

Principal, Dr. Larry Martin and Associates
and Partner, Agri-Food Management
Excellence, Inc

Alexander Moens

Professor and Chair of Political Science,
Simon Fraser University, Greater Vancouver

Christopher Sands

Senior Research Professor,
Johns Hopkins University

Elliot Tepper

Senior Fellow, Norman Paterson School of
International Affairs, Carleton University

William Watson

Associate Professor of Economics,
McGill University

Contents

Executive Summary.....	4
Introduction.....	8
Russia’s Arctic: reality vs. rhetoric.....	10
Exploring Putin’s Arctic.....	13
Conclusion.....	27
About the author.....	31
References.....	32
Endnotes.....	40

Cover design: Renée Depocas (photo: Annie Spratt – modified)

Copyright © 2025 Macdonald-Laurier Institute. May be reproduced freely for non-profit and educational purposes.

The author of this document has worked independently and is solely responsible for the views presented here. The opinions are not necessarily those of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, its directors or supporters. This publication was funded by the Russia Strategic Initiative, US European Command. The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defence or the United States Government.

Executive summary | *sommaire*

In March 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke at the International Arctic Forum in Murmansk. He presented a confused and contradictory vision for the region. On one hand, Putin claimed that the Arctic had been drawn into a “Great Power” confrontation, fuelled by NATO’s increasing polar presence and US President Donald Trump’s bold proposition for the United States to acquire Greenland. On the other, Putin envisaged the Arctic as an area brimming with endless potential – a space for pragmatic, mutually beneficial co-operation, even amidst rising international tensions.

A review of Putin’s comments between 2014 and 2024, a turbulent period for Russia, highlights the strategic importance of the Arctic Zone to the country. For Western polar nations, including Canada, grasping Putin’s evolving vision for the Arctic is crucial as they strive to assert their sovereignty and pursue their economic and security ambitions in the region.

Putin’s assertions about the Arctic are rife with contradictions: he says that ecological concerns must be balanced, while pushing for mass resource exploitation; he decries Western militarization of the far north, while bolstering Russia’s own military might in the region; he pays lip service to the unique concerns of northern and Indigenous communities, yet pushes for massive, disruptive settlement in the region.

The Arctic is now at the forefront of global politics. The collapse of relations with the West after the country’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has seen Russia prioritize co-operation in the Arctic Zone with non-Arctic states like China and India. This complicates things further for Canada, the US, and their allies.

From the rush to exploit its reserves of critical natural resources to the human, economic, and security implications of climate change, the circumpolar region is a site of rapid change. Russia has sovereignty over half of the world’s Arctic coastline, and has ambitious plans to capitalize on the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The country’s sparsely populated Arctic Zone is home to immense reserves of natural resources and hydrocarbons, which Putin and his circle refer to as Russia’s “strategic resource base.” The region’s resources seem to offer Russia the promise of prosperity in a time of political and economic uncertainty.

Russia has excluded itself from productive partnership with Western Arctic nations to its own peril. While Putin projects the Arctic as a treasure-trove of possibilities in otherwise desperate times, Canada and its allies must remember that Russia and Russians are the main losers in the disruption of circumpolar Arctic co-operation – and must constantly remind Russia that its invasion of Ukraine is the reason for that disruption and loss. In becoming increasingly reliant on investment from countries like China and India, Russia has opened the door to non-Arctic states' participation in regional governance and development. This will be a hard door to close. In addition, while these relationships are often described by Russia as more pragmatic than those with other Arctic states, they are based purely on extraction and exploitation, rather than mutual stewardship.

Other Arctic states are well-placed to exemplify the benefits of rules-based co-operation in the circumpolar region. Western Arctic states have the expertise and motivation to develop the region sustainably and model leadership that takes local communities into account. It is imperative that the other Arctic states – and the world – push back on Putin's contradictory Arctic messaging. Key policy recommendations include:

- Canada, the US, and their Arctic partners must develop strategic communications that show the benefits of a democratic approach to the Arctic – an approach that at every stage exemplifies the leadership and input of the Arctic's inhabitants.
- At the same time, democratic Arctic nations must clearly articulate to Russian citizens what their nation is losing by allowing the Putin regime to act so belligerently on the world stage. Putin's war in Ukraine and other aggressions have alienated Russia's former partners in the Arctic. Putin and his regime will not tell the Russian people that – so the democratic Arctic countries should state this clearly and often.
- Canada and its Arctic allies must lead by example by engaging and collaborating with the Indigenous peoples of the polar region. Trends like Indigenous majority and co-ownership of development projects on treaty territories, as have been developed in Canada, can serve as an example of how to generate inclusive prosperity in a way that is better than dictates emanating from Moscow.

En mars 2025, le président russe Vladimir Poutine a prononcé une allocution dans le cadre du Forum international de l'Arctique tenu à Mourmansk. Sa vision de la région était floue et contradictoire. D'une part, il a affirmé que l'Arctique avait été entraîné dans un affrontement entre « grandes puissances » du fait de la présence renforcée de l'OTAN dans la région polaire et des revendications hégémoniques du président américain Donald Trump sur le Groenland. D'autre part, il a déclaré considérer l'Arctique comme une région au potentiel infini – un domaine de coopération viable et bénéfique pour tous, malgré les tensions internationales grandissantes.

L'examen des propos de Poutine de 2014 à 2024, une période mouvementée en Russie, permet de souligner l'importance stratégique de la région arctique pour ce pays. Compte tenu des efforts consentis par les pays polaires occidentaux, y compris le Canada, pour affirmer leur souveraineté et atteindre leurs objectifs en matière d'économie et de sécurité, ces derniers doivent surveiller de près les visions transformatrices de Poutine pour l'Arctique.

Les discours de Poutine sur l'Arctique sont truffés de contradictions : il prône l'équilibre écologique tout en supportant une exploitation extensive des ressources, critique la militarisation du Grand Nord par les Occidentaux tout en renforçant sa propre présence militaire dans la région, et prétend soutenir les besoins particuliers des collectivités nordiques et autochtones tout en favorisant une colonisation massive et perturbatrice.

À l'heure actuelle, l'Arctique est au cœur de l'action politique internationale. L'invasion illégale de l'Ukraine en 2022 a mis fin aux relations de la Russie avec l'Occident, de sorte que la Russie privilégie désormais la coopération en Arctique avec des pays non arctiques comme la Chine et l'Inde. Cela complique les choses pour le Canada, les États-Unis et leurs partenaires.

De l'exploitation intense de ses ressources naturelles essentielles à l'impact du réchauffement climatique sur ses habitants, l'économie et la sécurité, la région polaire est en mutation rapide. La Russie, qui exerce sa souveraineté sur plus de la moitié du littoral arctique mondial, planifie des projets d'exploitation de grande envergure pour la route maritime du Nord. Le territoire arctique russe, peu peuplé, renferme d'immenses réserves de ressources naturelles et d'hydrocarbures, qualifiées de « base stratégique des ressources » par Poutine et son entourage. Les ressources de la région semblent offrir à la Russie l'espoir d'une prospérité en temps d'incertitude politique et économique.

C'est à ses risques et périls que la Russie s'est retirée d'une coopération fructueuse avec les pays de l'Arctique occidental. Alors que Poutine voit l'Arctique comme une ressource précieuse même en temps désespéré, le Canada et ses partenaires doivent garder à l'esprit que le dérèglement de la coopération arctique lui est particulièrement préjudiciable – ainsi qu'à sa population – et persister à lui faire comprendre que c'est en tout premier lieu son attaque contre l'Ukraine qui la désorganise et l'appauvrit. En s'appuyant sur les investissements de pays comme la Chine et l'Inde, la Russie ouvre

la voie à des pays non arctiques pour sa gouvernance et son développement régional. Refermer cette porte sera difficile. Par ailleurs, bien que la Russie présente souvent ces relations comme plus pratiques qu'avec certains pays arctiques, ces dernières reposent strictement sur l'extraction et l'exploitation des ressources plutôt que sur une intendance réciproque.

Pourtant, divers pays arctiques sont idéalement situés pour promouvoir les avantages d'une coopération régulée dans la région polaire. L'Arctique occidental possède les compétences et la passion nécessaires pour favoriser le développement durable et orienter le leadership en tenant compte des besoins des collectivités locales. Il est essentiel que le reste des pays arctiques, tout comme le monde, n'adhèrent pas aux signaux contradictoires de Poutine concernant l'Arctique.

Voici nos principales recommandations en matière de politiques :

- Le Canada, les États-Unis et leurs partenaires arctiques doivent mettre en place des stratégies de communication qui exploitent les avantages d'une approche démocratique pour l'Arctique – une approche qui, à chaque étape, met en lumière le leadership et la contribution des populations arctiques.*
- Parallèlement, les pays démocratiques de l'Arctique doivent sensibiliser les citoyens russes aux conséquences de l'agressivité du régime de Poutine sur la scène internationale. Les actions militaires de Poutine en Ukraine et diverses autres manifestations d'agression ont détérioré les liens de la Russie avec ses anciens partenaires dans la région arctique. Poutine et son gouvernement ne partageront pas ces informations avec le peuple russe – les pays démocratiques de l'Arctique doivent donc assumer cette responsabilité clairement et régulièrement.*
- Il faut que le Canada et ses partenaires arctiques donnent l'exemple en collaborant étroitement avec les collectivités autochtones de la région polaire. Dans les régions visées par un traité, la présence majoritairement autochtone et la copropriété des projets de développement, typiques du Canada, peuvent démontrer comment engendrer une prospérité inclusive de manière plus aisée que les décisions de Moscou. [MLI](#)*

Introduction

In March 2025, President Vladimir Putin spoke to the audience at Russia's sixth International Arctic Forum, *The Arctic: Territory of Dialogue*. His remarks reflected both the instability of the time in which we are living and his concept of Russia's centuries-old Arctic mission. Putin told his audience that much of what seemed new in the Arctic had been seen many times before. Russia's ambitions for the Northern Sea Route were five centuries old, while the United States' reignited interest in Greenland was age-old (President of Russia 2025). Still, the Russian president's vision for the Arctic, and for what the Arctic could offer the rest of the country, was very much forward-looking. The warming climate and increased interest in Russia's resource-rich Arctic Zone were bringing investment and spurring development, Putin said. Russia's Arctic capabilities were unmatched. At the same time, the chilling political climate meant co-operation with Arctic states had forced Russia to find new and pragmatic partners. In a period of exceptional instability in the world, Putin's Russia was placing its bets on the Arctic.

This report examines Russian President Vladimir Putin's public statements on Arctic policy and the Russian Arctic Zone between 2014 and 2024. This decade covers a turbulent period in contemporary Russian history; our starting point in 2014 marks Russia's annexation of Crimea and the gradual deterioration of relations with the West. It ends in 2024, when Putin's Russia finds itself in the third year of its illegal and unprovoked full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine. Aside from its implications for the wider world, the war against Ukraine has been a geopolitical tipping point in the Arctic. Beyond the disruption of co-operation in key multilateral fora like the Arctic Council, political and economic pressures – from Western sanctions to the transition



Russian President Vladimir Putin speaks at the 5th International Arctic Forum in April 2019.

Source: *President of Russia 2019*.

to a wartime economy – threaten Russia’s ability to realize its ambitions in the Arctic (Marten 2023).

Most notably, these ambitions relate to the promise of both transport along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and access to vast reserves of natural resources in the zone, including hydrocarbons (oil, natural gas) and critical minerals. The development of this shipping route and extractive industries in the North is of strategic importance not only in the region, but to the entire country. That said, in the Russian political context the views of the president are especially consequential, given the so-called top-down “power vertical,” which concentrates decision-making power in the Kremlin. The president also appoints regional governors and he expects them to carry out his orders. For better or worse, this power structure implicates the highest seat of power in aspects of everyday politics far outside the walls of the Kremlin (Person 2015). This concentration of political power makes Putin’s public statements an especially valuable resource for analyzing Russia’s Arctic policy.

Putin’s public statements on the Arctic can be viewed at two loosely defined levels: the higher level encompasses recurring and ceremonialized broadcast speaking engagements and addresses to the nation, while the lower covers the Putin’s regular public-facing engagements. In these latter, more innocuous, quotidian addresses, he narrates the country’s Arctic policy not only in the language of geopolitics, but in the practical language of everyday policy. The purpose of this paper is not to map Russia’s Arctic policy over the past decade, but rather to gain insights into Putin’s thinking on the Arctic Zone by analyzing his public statements over time.

Russia's Arctic: reality vs. rhetoric

What “the Arctic” means in global affairs ebbs and flows with the prevailing winds in international co-operation and competition. The Arctic is at once a resource-rich region of exploration and discovery, a strategically important geopolitical space, a region of constructive co-operation, and the front line in the climate crisis. Most importantly, of course, it is home to more than 4 million people. Over half of those, including 40 Arctic Indigenous nations, live in the Russian High North, which holds sovereignty to up to 53 per cent of the world's Arctic coastline (Arctic Council 2025). Over a quarter of Russia's territory is located within the Arctic Circle. The Arctic is an integral part of Russia,¹ and Russia of the Arctic. Russia's actions in the “Arctic Zone” also have global consequences. Climate change and a growing interest in extracting natural resources and exploiting shipping routes is running up against existential questions about the future of the circumpolar region. At the same time, Russia's Arctic policy is, for now, not a collaborative project with its fellow Arctic states.

Multilateral co-operation stands at a crossroads. A convergence of interests and continuity of co-operation post-2014 have convinced some observers that the Arctic region has the potential to remain a stable arena for constructive engagement with Russia (see Roberts 2015). The deterioration of this co-operation, perhaps most notably the suspension of much of the work of the Arctic Council following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, has debased the notion of “Arctic exceptionalism” (Almeida Neto 2025; Koivurova and Shibata 2023). That idea is often traced back to a 1987 speech given by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who envisioned the Arctic as a “zone of peace” (Gorbachev 1987), or space free from the tensions and militarization that often characterize international relations and great power competition. Other scholars have rejected the idea of an Arctic Zone insulated from turbulent global politics and concluded that the Arctic is doomed to replicate the divisive politics of the day (Bertelsen 2024).

Russia's priorities in the Arctic region are complex and entangled. Russia's current Arctic Policy,² which outlines the country's key national interests, security concerns, and objectives in the region, was adopted by presidential decree in March 2020 (President of Russia 2020a) and amended in 2023 (President of Russia 2023a) to express Russia's intent to cultivate bilateral

relationships in the Arctic, as opposed to multilateral relationships developed through fora like the Arctic Council. Still, the current iteration of the policy did not contain any great departures from the previous strategy, which had been adopted in 2008 to cover the period until 2020 (Russia 2008). Both strategies position the Arctic as a “strategic resource base” to be exploited for the benefit of the Russian Federation as a whole, specifically as a stimulus for economic growth. This said, the 2020 edition has some interesting additions and is a significantly more robust document. First, Russia’s Northern Sea Route (NSR), takes prominence as a “globally competitive national transport corridor” (Klimenko 2020). Second, the Arctic Policy lists as one main objective to “guarantee high living standards and prosperity” for residents of the North, in addition to the protection of the homeland and ways of life of Indigenous peoples (Klimenko 2020). Finally, the document stresses the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the region.

“ *Russia’s priorities
in the Arctic region are
complex and entangled.* ”

Sovereignty is a particularly adaptable word in the Russian political lexicon and one that Putin himself uses quite often. One such example is the idea of “sovereign democracy,” which has been popularized by Putin’s political strategists and that denotes a vision for a Russian version of democracy free from hegemony, regulatory influence, and universalist approaches to international relations (Kortukov 2020). In the Arctic, Russia is preoccupied with many “sovereignities”: technological sovereignty, energy and resource sovereignty, and sovereignty over its territory. In Russia’s case, we can think of sovereignty as striving for non-reliance on other states in a material sense (energy, resources, technologies) and in a political sense (i.e., in decision-making). In this time of geopolitical upheaval, however, the policy documents of other Arctic states have also emphasized sovereignty, including Canada (Global Affairs Canada 2024) and the United States (United States Department of State 2022).

It is hard to overstate the strategic importance of Russia's Arctic. The region's vast natural resource reserves include mineral deposits, coal, rare-earth metals, natural gas, and oil. The total value of the mineral resources in Russia's Arctic territories is estimated to exceed \$30 trillion, with two-thirds attributed to energy resources. The NSR is a critical infrastructure component, providing a maritime corridor for transporting extracted materials and other cargo. In 2023, the NSR handled 36.2 million tonnes of cargo, including liquefied natural gas (LNG) and oil (Rosatom, Atomflot 2025). A 2024 study suggested that 50 to 60 per cent of all Arctic investment happens within the Russian Arctic Zone, with the lion's share being natural resource extraction (Business Index North 2024). The largest share of this investment is directed to the hydrocarbon-rich Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, but all Arctic regions have seen investment in raw materials, manufacturing, or shipping.

The scale of this investment, the current tense situation in international politics, and the nature of climate change mean Russia's plans for the Arctic have global significance. In an authoritarian system like Russia's, the will of the president carries decisive weight and sway in guiding wide-ranging overall policy as well as day-to-day minutiae. This paper follows Russian President Vladimir Putin's directions for his country's Arctic policy between 2014 and 2024.³ Putin speaks extensively about Arctic resources and ambitious plans for their exploitation for the benefit of the nation, while remaining ambiguous about climate concerns. Putin connects his "strategic resource base" in the Arctic to his broader security narrative in which Russia has both an unmatched military might and is constantly under threat of losing its sovereignty to hostile powers in the West. A central piece of Putin's forward-looking Arctic policy relates to addressing the demographic crisis in the region. While Putin spends time publicly engaging in the minutiae of social policy, the Kremlin's main concern in northern communities lies primarily in how they will serve and sustain the Arctic industrial developments that Russia desperately needs. Putin's rhetoric reveals three primary themes: the Arctic as a resource-rich frontier, the dualistic thinking on Russia's Arctic security, and the social development of the Arctic as a critical national project.

Exploring Putin's Arctic

The harmonious Arctic – balancing natural resource exploitation and ecology

Over the last decade, Putin's rhetoric focused on the "development" of the Arctic, by which he was specifically referring to natural resource extraction and the development of the Northern Sea Route. While his focus on development is a constant, Putin's statements about the unique ecology of the Arctic have changed over time. Russian presidential discourse on the Arctic is typically optimistic about the state's ability to reach ambitious goals set for regional development, even when economic and environmental priorities seem to be in conflict. Russia's Arctic policy certainly encompasses such contradictory interests. Aggressive resource extraction in the Arctic, or even the expansion of the regional tourism industry, are part of the same broader set of objectives that include environmental and wildlife protections, and considerations for local communities. Economy and ecology co-exist in Putin's rhetoric, too:

The Arctic is a vast region with unique natural resources. The development of these territories is of critical importance both for the global economy and for the global environmental situation... At the same time, the main priorities must remain the protection of the fragile Arctic ecosystem and the support of Indigenous peoples. (President of Russia 2019)

What makes the above quotation particularly interesting is the language Putin used to refer to the Arctic environment. In this 2019 greeting intended for a summit of Arctic Council member states and observers, the message balanced development (resource extraction), environmental concerns (fragility), and the needs of Indigenous peoples. Since 2019, while Putin still regularly discusses the Arctic ecosystem, he no longer refers to its "fragility." In the *Strategy for Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and Provision of National Security to 2035* (President of Russia 2020a), policy-makers describe the Arctic as having "extreme natural and climate conditions." The document calls Arctic ecosystems "highly sensitive" to external factors, "particularly in sparsely populated regions of Indigenous peoples." The dichotomy of environmental concerns from the Russian

perspective is written explicitly into the strategy – climate change is both a risk and an opportunity for the Kremlin.

In 2014, Putin declared that his plans for Arctic development would depart from the failures of the past, specifically as they related to the environment:

In essence, this is about eliminating the consequences of what was often a thoughtless, exploitative attitude toward the Arctic in the past. But it is important not only to make up for the damage done to nature over the past decades — we must not, and cannot, afford to repeat such mistakes in the future. We need a new logic, modern principles for working in the Arctic. (President of Russia 2014c)

In his interventions regarding Arctic regional development, Putin claims that he is motivated to right past development wrongs and that the ambitious plans of today will not result in similar or worse damage. Regarding the purported mistakes in environmental policy, he draws a distinction between the extractive industries of the past and those of the present. He cites oversights in the Soviet past while lauding technological advances that are making development today an altogether different endeavour. Interestingly, regional governors make occasional reference to the challenges posed by the remnants of the Soviet-built environment – for example dilapidated industrial and housing structures originally intended to be temporary and now impossible to repair (President of Russia 2024a; 2024b).

In a meeting between the president and ministers of the Russian government in 2016 (President of Russia 2016b), the minister of Natural Resources and Environment, Sergey Donskoy, provided an update on the “general Arctic clean-up” that Putin had ordered in 2012. The idea of an Arctic “clean-up” makes it into the presidential engagement with the Ministry of Defence, too – also in 2016, then Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu provided an update on both the development of defence infrastructure in the high north and the completion of the “ecological purification” of territories in use by the Armed Forces. In conversation with Governor Dmitriy Artyukhov of the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, home to Novatek’s Yamal LNG (liquefied natural gas) facility, Putin and Artyukhov broach the topic of environmental concerns, but only in passing and similarly referring to the “clean-up” or “ecological

purification” of the region (President of Russia 2018a). Later, Putin mentions national initiatives like the “All-Russian Project ‘Clean Arctic,’” which focuses on clearing territories of litter, industrial waste, and metal scraps – all part of what the president regularly refers to as the “harmonious development” of the Arctic (President of Russia 2022b). This sort of initiative indicates a particular understanding of the scale of environmental challenges in the Arctic. “Cleaning up” the natural environment conveys two things: first, that damage primarily occurred in the past, and second, that it does not take into account the impacts of climate change.

“*Putin’s statements make no reference to the potential environmental impacts of increased shipping traffic along the Northern Sea Route.*”

Putin’s statements make no reference to the potential environmental impacts of increased shipping traffic along the NSR. Rather, his statements tend to focus on the colossal scale of the NSR, how it will create prosperity, and the global prestige the project will bring. At the 2024 Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum, Putin called the NSR a “sought-after global artery” (President of Russia 2024d) that will carry up to 150 million tonnes of cargo (as compared to the 36 million tonnes that it carried in 2023). Earlier still, in 2017, on his annual telephone call-in marathon, Putin stressed that climate change and melting sea ice were affording Russia lucrative economic opportunities. He presented climate change as a *fait accompli*, making it an obvious and unproblematic way for Russia to reap benefits. Later on, at that same event, Putin stressed that climate change actually even *obliged* Russia to develop its Arctic Zone. With longer navigable periods occurring in Arctic waters, Russia had no choice but to assert its sovereignty in the region. Opportunity and obligation, Putin asserted, are pulling Russia northward:

The Arctic is a key region that will secure the future of our Russia. Once, Lomonosov said that Russia would grow

through Siberia. Today, we can confidently say that Russia's strength and capabilities will grow through the Arctic... by 2050, approximately 30 per cent of all hydrocarbons will be extracted in the Arctic. Our largest projects are already being implemented there. NOVATEK is building an entire plant in the Arctic Zone — they've built an entire city, an airfield, and a port. Extraction has already begun in the Arctic Zone.

So from an economic perspective, this is extremely important. If climate change continues to trend the way it has — despite the current cold in Moscow — the general tendency remains toward global warming, which means the navigation period in the Arctic Zone will increase. In turn, this means the Northern Sea Route will be used much more intensively than it is now. The navigation season will no longer last just one and a half to two months, but four to five. And so-called non-regional powers are showing active interest in this region. And that's a good thing — we are ready to co-operate with them. (President of Russia 2017c)

In addition to cargo and hydrocarbons, Russia has set its sights on the development of the cruise ship tourism industry in the Arctic. Shortly after a visit to Arkhangelsk Oblast in 2023, Putin signed into law provisions easing the development of cruise ship tourism in the Arctic, specifically a visa-free regime (which creates an exceptional suspension of border protocols) for cruise ship passengers (President of Russia 2023c). While for now cruises take place on icebreakers rather than luxury liners (Arctic Russia 2024), Russia has plans to create an international tourism industry that will rival both shipping and extractive industries. In this sense, Putin's environmental messaging is clouded by Russia's very explicit reliance on the impacts of the climate crisis to meet its goals, including retreating ice along the Arctic coastline.

Putin does not deny climate change outright, nor its disproportionate impacts in the Arctic Zone, nor the significant risk that the loss of permafrost poses to communities in Russia's regions. That said, neither does he draw connections between the climate crisis and Russia's dependence on hydrocarbons, nor does he question Russia's development of the Arctic from a climate perspective. On the contrary, his comments position Russia as a

victim of the warming climate, as a leader in green energy, and a principled climate actor in comparison with the West (President of Russia 2024c). Since 2020, Putin has largely left behind the Arctic Council’s language on climate, choosing instead to narrate Russia’s Arctic endeavours as “harmonious development.”

Dual-edged security rhetoric

Putin is of two minds about the security environment in Russia’s Arctic. His rhetoric claims that Russia possesses unparalleled military capabilities in the Arctic and a massive “strategic resource base.” At the same time, however, Russia is under threat – an increasing number of “unfriendly” states are closing in with the intent to undermine Russia’s sovereignty. Putin’s two-sided narrative of Russia’s security footing in the North appears throughout the decade’s worth of data analyzed here. The Arctic is an ideal space for Putin to manufacture legitimacy.

Putin articulates his assertive stance on several fronts, for instance, in Russia’s extended continental shelf claims in the Arctic Ocean or in references to its increased regional defence presence. The shelf claims are of immense strategic and economic interest to Russia given the potential for seabed resource exploration. Putin asserted Russia’s claim confidently at the 2017 “Arctic – Territory of Dialogue” forum held in Arkhangelsk. In the company of the presidents of Finland and Iceland, Putin framed the Arctic as inherently immune to conflict – even when it comes to contested issues like the continental shelf claim. Putin listed the Arctic coastal states and reminded them that they each have exclusive economic zones that they must pay attention to; he mentioned the sensitive continental shelf debate only in passing. Russia later spent considerable resources providing supporting scientific evidence for its claim (Hossain 2021). Putin’s short remarks contained a two-fold argument: all Arctic (coastal) states must consider their sovereignty, and in the non-conflictual North, territorial claims can be resolved with science, not politics.

Russia proceeds from the premise that there is no potential for conflict in the Arctic region. International norms clearly define the rights of both coastal and other states and serve as a solid foundation for joint efforts in addressing any issues — including sensitive ones such as the delimitation of

the continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean, the prevention of unregulated fishing in its central part, which is enclosed by the exclusive economic zones of the United States, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Russia. (President of Russia 2017b)

At the same time, Putin paid considerable attention to the state's vulnerabilities in the Russian Arctic Zone, including alleged threats posed by foreign states or terrorist organizations. In his remarks at an earlier 2016 meeting of the Collegium of the Ministry of Defence, then Minister Shoigu reiterated his ministry's intent to continue expanding Russia's military presence and capabilities in the Arctic in the coming year (President of Russia 2016a). In response, Putin provided the following summation, encapsulating his dual-edged security rhetoric, i.e., that Russia is at once assertive and unmatched in strength, while also perpetually sitting on a razor's edge:

At the same time, already today – taking into account many factors, including not only military factors but also our history, geography, and the internal state of Russian society – we can say with confidence: as of today, we are stronger than any potential aggressor. Any of them.

At the same time, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that if we allow ourselves to relax even for a minute, or permit even a single significant failure in the modernization of the army and navy, or in the training of the troops, the situation could change very quickly, given the speed of events happening in the world. We might not even have time to notice. Therefore, much depends on you in continuing the work that has been started and carried out over the past years. (President of Russia 2016a)

While reaffirming Russia's place as an Arctic power builds legitimacy, it is also indisputable fact. Beyond having sovereignty of over half of the world's Arctic coastline, Russia has continued its process of military build-up in the Arctic and has an unrivalled fleet of icebreakers, including nuclear vessels, with more on the way (Gronholt-Pedersen and Fouche 2022; Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation 2024). In underlining the strength and mission of



President Vladimir Putin at the keel-laying ceremony of the icebreaker *Leningrad*.

Source: *President of Russia 2024c*

Russia's fleet, Putin draws on the most powerful images in Russia's collective memory and on national pride. At the same time, he asserts that the vast and resource-rich Russian Arctic is vulnerable and must be defended. At the keel-laying ceremony of the icebreaker *Leningrad* in 2024, Putin evoked the memory of the defenders of his native city:

And the new mighty icebreaker will become yet another tribute to the immortal feat of Leningrad... The life, unity, and cohesion of the generation of victors will always be a great moral example for us, both in the struggle for sovereignty, for freedom, for our Motherland, and as a good example in both work and battle. (President of Russia 2024f)

The exploitation of the memory of the “Great Patriotic War” in post-Soviet Russia is well-documented (Fedor et al. 2017). In employing the imagery of Russia's canonical struggle against Nazi Germany to narrate Arctic policy Putin made a deliberate choice, one that links the naming of the icebreaker with an evocation of the blockade to the struggle for sovereignty. This rhetoric also casts contemporary Russia as the object of a blockade of sorts, echoing Russia's official discourse on Western sanctions and support for Ukraine. Defending Russia's sovereignty also means securing its resources, deploying costly technologies, and installing infrastructure in remote regions (President of Russia 2014a).

After Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin was forced to address the impact of sanctions on Russia's Arctic. Echoing the surrounded "Fortress Russia" narrative alluded to above, Putin outlined the security implications in the language of war:

As you know, due to the actions of unfriendly countries, a number of transportation and logistics chains have been disrupted... all responsible agencies involved in the Arctic must competently and swiftly reorganize their operations, primarily to ensure the uninterrupted supply of food, medicine, fuel, building materials, and equipment to residents of Arctic territories, shift workers, enterprises, and social facilities in the region – especially since the northern delivery season is about to begin. (President of Russia 2022a)

Here, Putin concedes that, in the face of confrontation with the West, Russia's particular vulnerability is the security of supply, ranging from food to medicine to materials. These issues are a challenge for Russia's Arctic Zone independent of the deepening political and economic confrontation with the West, but the current circumstances exacerbate those challenges.

According to Putin, Russia is not alone, however. Its ambitions in the North can draw strength from the investments of non-Arctic economic powers like China and India. Analysts have argued that it is unlikely that Sino-Russian economic co-operation in the Arctic will halt or even slow, even in the event of political tension or a rapprochement with Western states (Conley et al. 2024). Putin stresses that Russia is open to collaborate with partners outside of the circumpolar region:

I would like to emphasize that Russia is open to working jointly with all interested partners within both current and future programs and projects in the Arctic. This is evidenced by the special economic conditions created here, as well as various incentives for both Russian and foreign businesses.

I believe that under the current circumstances, it is important to more actively engage so-called non-regional states and organizations in Arctic co-operation – there is

enough work here for everyone. To all who, like Russia, are interested in the sustainable development of this unique region, we will offer opportunities for joint work. We view the Arctic not as a stage for geopolitical intrigues, but as a territory of dialogue, stability, and constructive co-operation. Let's get to work. (President of Russia 2022a)

Here, Putin presents Russia as a pragmatic and constructive partner, as opposed to its enemies, who deal in “geopolitical intrigues.” Russia has also sustained its public alignment with China on matters of Arctic governance. This could be a testament to the strength of the relationship, or Russia's need for a counterweight to the remaining, and allied, Arctic Council member states.

From 2014 to 2024, Putin described Arctic security in much the same way he does other aspects of national security – by evoking the past and warning of looming threats to national sovereignty. Presidential rhetoric projects a Russia that is at once assertive and vulnerable. In this regard, it echoes Russia's official narrative regarding the circumstances leading to its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (Cap 2023; Götz and Staun 2022). At the same time, Putin's Russia claims that it is holding the door open for co-operation with Arctic and non-Arctic partners alike, provided they remain “pragmatic” and respect Russia's sovereignty.

Putin: caretaker of the North

Much can be gleaned by examining the role of internal policy and socio-economic development in Putin's Arctic rhetoric. Analyzing Russia's 2023 *Foreign Policy Concept*, scholars Lipunov and Devyatkin (2023) describe the interconnectedness of its internal and external dimensions: “Russia's foreign policy in the Arctic is an organic extension of its domestic Arctic development policy.” Their claim is supported by the materials this paper analyzes, at least in terms of the frequency and substantive nature of presidential statements on matters of economic development in the region, as well as on everyday social policy. A close reading of Putin's rhetoric on this “internal” dimension of Arctic policy reveals a strategy for local communities in supporting the development and maintenance of the extractive industries and security infrastructure the state envisages for the region. Over the past decade, the Russian government



President Vladimir Putin meets with Andrey Chibis, governor of Murmansk Oblast, in 2025.

Source: President of Russia 2025.

has made significant investments to promote settlement and development in the Arctic, with Putin presenting these efforts as vital to the nation's economic growth and national security.

In publicized meetings with regional governors, Putin often raises the subject of northern economic development and social policy. In a 2016 bilateral meeting, Putin scolded then governor of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Igor Koshin, on his region's sustained lack of available daycare spots (President of Russia 2016c). This sort of focus on issues of everyday social policy is not uncharacteristic of Putin. A hallmark of the Putin-era social contract has been the readiness of the state, and the commander-in-chief himself, to intervene in everyday issues, including salary non-payment or local corruption (Feldmann and Mazepus 2018; Sokhey 2020). Putin also chooses these performative interactions as a way to build a favourable public image of himself as a defender of the people, and to display the upsides of the so-called "power vertical." Publicly visible "working meetings" with regional governors play a central role in broadcasting the domestic dimensions of Arctic policy. The substantive conversations play out as long-winded progress reports to one's superior. For his part, Putin offers curt commentary and clarifying questions, indicating to the audience that he is fully aware of the minutiae of regional happenings.

Throughout the decade, Putin's statements have demonstrated increasing concern about the demographics of the Russian Arctic Zone and the provision of socio-economic support. Starting in 2014 in a meeting with the Russian Security Council, Putin refers to the implementation of the government's policy for the "Socio-economic Development of the Arctic Zone of Russia for the period until 2020" as the second in a list of six security priorities in Russia's

Arctic policy (President of Russia 2014a). It is worth noting that Putin's preoccupation with the region's socio-economic development is a departure from that of his predecessor's government, which saw the region as a burden on the state given its socio-economic challenges, rather than a well of endless potential or a "strategic resource base" (Sergunin 2016). From 2014 onwards, social policy becomes a mainstay of Russia's rhetoric on the comprehensive security situation in the Arctic. One such topic is the demographic crisis and its implications for the viability of northern communities.

Between 2012 and 2019, migratory outflows from the Russian Arctic slowed by half, although populations in most Arctic regions remained in decline (Fauzer and Smirnov 2020). Russia's Arctic regions face a two-fold demographic challenge. First, outward migration to other regions and urban centres like Moscow and Saint Petersburg remains prevalent. Second, much of the population growth in the North in the late 2010s was due to international labour relocating to work in extractive industries, often on a temporary basis. In a 2014 meeting with Putin, then governor of Murmansk Oblast, Marina Kovtun, praised regional infrastructure developments and the highly qualified jobs they brought with them while lamenting the threat a declining population and soaring construction costs posed to the future of Russia's "gates to the Arctic" (President of Russia 2014b). Kovtun was not alone in her concerns, although sustainable solutions have been hard to come by.

In Russia's 2020 Arctic policy document, population decline in the High North and the underdevelopment of social infrastructure top the list of national security threats in the region (President of Russia 2025). Section 11 of the document also outlines the key objectives for state social development policy in the Arctic. As well as bolstering the quality and availability of health care and education services in the region, the section specifies the need for "expedited development of social infrastructure" in those population centres with national security or resource extractive industries and infrastructure. The policy also lays out the state's concern with maintaining both security of supply and year-round intra- and inter-regional transport connections. Russia's demographic crisis is particularly acute in the Arctic, where major developments need both infrastructure and people.

Russia's framing of population decline as a national security threat is hardly new and far from specific to the Arctic region, however. Russia's pro-natalist state policies have garnered global attention since the 2000s, including

the flagship “Maternity Capital” program, while scholars have questioned the policies’ effectiveness both in raising fertility and lowering family poverty (Cook, Iarskaia-Smirnova, and Kozlov 2023; Cook and Titterton 2023). It remains an open question how the war against Ukraine will affect the country’s demographics and the socioeconomic position of families now and after the slowing of the war economy. There has been early evidence that war casualties have had a disproportionate impact on socioeconomically underprivileged regions, including ethnic republics in Russia, where soldiers are often attracted to enlist by payouts considerably higher than average salaries (Bessudnov 2023). While it is not yet possible to draw firm conclusions, the most reliable, publicly available data indicate that sparsely populated regions in the Russian Arctic will be deeply affected by war casualties (Mediazona 2025). Existing negative demographic dynamics and the fact that the impact of war casualties lands nearly exclusively on populations of working-age men will further worsen the impact on Arctic communities. For disproportionately affected Indigenous communities, the demographic toll is devastating (Latypova 2025).

“ *Population decline and the underdevelopment of social infrastructure top Russia’s list of national security threats in the Arctic region.* ”

Russia’s elite typically describe the state as a “multi-national” state civilization, smoothing over imperial and colonial histories that have spanned the Russian Empire through the Soviet period to today. This narrative has a strong underpinning in the Soviet past during which the regime was able to at once occupy and exploit resources while imposing a system prioritizing Russification over early advances in representation of minority ethnic groups (Martin 2017). Russia’s official understanding of its own colonial past and present differs from the way the concept is understood in Western nations, uses a different vocabulary, and often considers its “continental empire” as fundamentally different from European iterations (Khomyakov 2020). For instance, in Russia, the term

“colonization” is widely understood to refer more neutrally to settlement (Khomayakov 2020), rather than bearing the weight it has in English-language discussions of the colonial past. No matter the position of the Russian state on the matter, a critical examination of the historical experience of some minority nationalities and their territories reveals a fundamentally colonial relationship and, under Putin, an acceleration of colonial practices that enables further state exploitation of resources (Hodgson 2022).

In addition, while Russian decision-makers regularly refer to Indigenous peoples and traditional ways of living in the Arctic, including reindeer herding, priority in socioeconomic policy-making slants clearly toward urbanization, settlement, and the establishment of businesses to accommodate the extractive industries. Emerging and expanding extractive industries have been described as the defining feature of contemporary Arctic colonialism (Silva 2022). At his annual press conference in 2017, Putin acknowledged Indigenous interests while subtly confirming they are secondary to the massive projects that are the cornerstone of his Arctic policy. In place of consultation, Putin offers compensation:

And finally, there is one more important consideration. We must never forget the interests of the small Indigenous peoples of the North. This is an extremely important issue. Their traditional economic interests, and so on, must not be violated. And if something inevitably comes into conflict with the implementation of major national projects, then, without a doubt, measures for compensation and substitution must be provided.

This is therefore a complex task. I hope that is how we will continue to approach it. (President of Russia 2017a)

While Russian policy documents and presidential rhetoric have nominally referred to the Indigenous peoples of the Arctic, these same people rarely factor into discussions of the “colossal” projects underway in the region. In addition, Russia has a track record of repressing and co-opting Indigenous organizations (Abramenko 2024). Observers in the circumpolar region should understand Russia’s push for socioeconomic development for what it is – a project intended first and foremost to advance state priorities.

Between 2020 and 2024, amid Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, presidential rhetoric on the Arctic increasingly emphasized establishing new, attractive settlements and, in particular, economic vitality. This preoccupation with establishing and stimulating growth in permanent settlements serves both the extractive and shipping industries, as well as the increasing need for security infrastructure in the North. One such policy is the establishment of Advanced Special Economic Zones⁴ (ASEZ) in Arctic regions, which offer tax incentives, preferential administrative services, and access to land and infrastructure for potential investors (Far East and Arctic Development Corporation JSC 2025). Russia's Far East piloted the policy and other regions are gradually taking it up, including in Russia's Arctic.

In 2016, when the former minister of Economic Development, Aleksey Ulyukaev, suggested that ASEZ be established in Arctic regions (President of Russia 2016b), Putin's response indicated that while eventually he wanted to extend the policy across Russia, he was prioritizing incentives for investments in the Far East. There is no such hesitancy anymore. Two flagship Arctic ASEZ projects have been established in Russia's western Arctic in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, designated the "Capital of the Arctic" and the "Capital of the North," respectively. Governor of Arkhangelsk Oblast, Aleksandr Tsybulsky, boasted to Putin that his export-reliant region had managed to overcome sanctions pressures, and even to reduce unemployment to a historic low of 1 per cent, thanks in large part to the establishment of the ASEZ (President of Russia 2024a).

The state has also intervened to help ensure that housing is available and affordable in the Arctic Zone, including through programs that give incentives for prospective homeowners to relocate northward. In 2023–24, the "Arctic Mortgage" program and related government schemes formed a central piece of Russia's socioeconomic development policy in the region. As was the case with the special economic zones, the mortgage program was originally piloted in Russia's Far East regions and later expanded to the Arctic. The program is specifically aimed at attracting young families with children to the Arctic Zone, as well as other select groups, including displaced persons from Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia and veterans of the so-called "special military operation" (RBK Real Estate 2025). In various meetings with Putin, regional governors and ordinary citizens alike laud the program as a success (President of Russia 2023b; 2024b). This vision manifests in social and housing policy

aimed at boosting the attractiveness of Arctic regions as an economically viable option for families and entrepreneurs.

Financial incentives alone are not enough to push young people to relocate to the relatively sparsely populated Arctic Zone. Publicly available discussions of regional development policy in which Putin participates often touch on establishing or expanding cultural and academic institutions in the Arctic. In a working meeting with the president, the leader of the Komi Republic, Vladimir Uiba, boasted that his republic houses the region's only opera and ballet theatre (President of Russia 2024e). Putin also stresses the importance of the network of federal universities – which he describes as “flagbearers” – in fostering development tailored to their regions' industries. This network includes the Northern (Arctic) Federal University, located in Arkhangelsk (President of Russia 2018b). Putin has used social policy to his political benefit since his early years as president (Sokhey 2020). Given that, we can assume the Kremlin understands that providing incentives to encourage northward migration will need to include not only prestige, but prosperity, too.

Conclusions

Researchers rely on publicly available and thus closely moderated sources of information to understand Putin's thinking on the Arctic. Still, a rigorous look at the development of the president's public rhetoric about the Arctic over time – and over a particularly turbulent time at that – is helpful in discerning which policy priorities may be fleeting and which are likely to be here to stay. For the most part, and in line with other analyses since the 2000s, we observe continuity in Russia's overarching vision for its Arctic policy. Despite major upheavals in relations with the West, Putin's focal points on the Arctic are holding steady: i) to develop the Northern Sea Route, ii) to develop extractive (hydrocarbon and critical mineral) industries, iii) to establish a forward security posture, and iv) to stimulate economic and demographic growth.

First, Putin will continue to stress the need to attract foreign investment to the Arctic and to restore Arctic collaboration. These are two of the potential leverage points at Russia's disposal in peace negotiations and potential

normalization of relations with the West. Second, Putin's vision for Russia's Arctic directly links socio-economic development and the future viability of the extractive industries. The Kremlin's investments to encourage settlement and entrepreneurship in the Arctic regions are a long-term initiative intended to inspire working-age Russians to migrate northward. Third, Putin's rhetoric describes the Arctic as a promising frontier that he envisions as engendering greatness and optimism.

Russia's Arctic is (still) open for business

The prospect of an end to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine raises the question of how the West will approach relations with Moscow in the future. There are already signs of Arctic implications from a potential Russo-American rapprochement that was set into motion during the first round of ceasefire negotiations in Riyadh in February 2025. Kirill Dmitriev of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) expressed cautious optimism about the potential resumption of pragmatic co-operation in the Arctic, which could include collaborative hydrocarbon exploration in the Arctic by ExxonMobil and Rosneft (Busvine 2025). Furthermore, there are indications that Washington may be interested in facilitating a ramp-up in natural gas sales from Russia to Europe (Hirtenstein and Rashad 2025). Europe's purchases of Russian gas are at less than half of pre-war levels, but numerous European states bound by supply and long-term contracts continue to purchase Russian gas, much of it from Novatek's operation in Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug. These dynamics cast uncertainty on Europe's ability to prevent energy dependencies from reforming. As demonstrated above, Putin's rhetoric leaves the door open to a resumption of business as usual with the West, including in the Arctic. In the meantime, the West – and especially the Arctic States – should be aware that Russia is taking full advantage of its “sovereign” High North to attract investment from non-Arctic partners.

Socioeconomic development as a keystone of Arctic policy and security

In Russia's Arctic Zone, human, environmental, military, and economic security are inextricably linked and interdependent. If our goal is to better understand the thinking of Russia's leaders on the Arctic, it would be counter-productive

to separate elements of foreign and security policy from other streams of public policy. For the Kremlin, addressing socioeconomic and demographic concerns is a central piece of the overall Arctic puzzle. The viability of strategically important initiatives in the regions, including bolstering the country's military presence and attracting investment in extractive industries, is often dependent on aspects of everyday policy that are quite mundane, from the availability of health care and child care services to higher education. To this end, Putin's Russia has adapted existing policy tools piloted elsewhere to suit its Arctic ambitions.

“Canada, the US, and their Arctic partners need to develop strategic communications that show the benefits of a democratic approach to the Arctic.”

The Arctic as Russia's promise for the future in turbulent times

Often referring to it as a “strategic resource base” to be exploited, Putin's promise of mastering the Arctic is a positive, forward-looking narrative in a time of insecurity. In narrating his Arctic ambitions, Putin draws parallels to the nation's hallmark achievements, from victory in the Second World War to space exploration. In Putin's Arctic, anything is possible and nothing is contradictory. In the president's Arctic rhetoric, Russian defence build-up does not equate to militarization, but rather the “development of capabilities” and “fulfillment of Russia's military responsibilities.” The impacts of extractive and emission-heavy industries can be “cleaned,” while the nation can reap the benefits of a rapidly warming northern climate. In the Arctic, Putin projects Russia not as an ostracized aggressor, but as a sovereign great power ruling over vast reserves of globally valuable resources. In this vision, Russia remains an internationally sought-after partner, the only difference since 2022 being a new host of pragmatically minded friends. In Putin's rhetoric, these resources, projects, and partnerships are also the promise of prosperity on the horizon. In an age of insecurity, Putin puts these northern promises to work in the tightly controlled Russian information space.

Policy recommendations

Putin is trying to shape domestic and international opinion about the Arctic. Therefore, Canada, the US, and their Arctic partners need to develop strategic communications that show the benefits of a democratic approach to the Arctic – an approach that at every stage exemplifies the leadership and input of the Arctic’s inhabitants.

Russia has been and remains the main loser from the disruption of circumpolar co-operation in the Arctic. Of course, everyone has lost because of Russia’s misguided and gratuitous aggression in Ukraine. But Russia has had to turn to Plan B players in the Arctic, nations that lack the same level of expertise, experience, and motivation to develop technology and policy for the region as Canada, the US, and the Nordic countries, not to mention others like South Korea and the members of the European Union. Russia is weaker in the Arctic without the relationships it used to have and that it compromised in 2022 in the name of imperialist dreams. Putin and his regime will not tell the Russian people that – so the democratic Arctic countries should state this clearly and often.

Exemplifying a democratic approach to the Arctic is a core step towards encouraging responsible Arctic governance. It is a step that will be greatly advanced by co-producing and implementing policy with Indigenous partners and northern communities, and by thoroughly integrating self-determination into policy. It is imperative that the northern Indigenous peoples are at more platforms than the Arctic Council to decide on the development and security of the lands on which they dwell. Trends like Indigenous majority and co-ownership of development projects on treaty territories, as have been developed in Canada, can serve as an example of how to generate inclusive prosperity in a way that is better than dictates emanating from Moscow. Russians deserve plain talk from their leaders about the Arctic and its future, not fearmongering and new brands of colonialism. [MLI](#)

About the author



John Kaye is a Canadian doctoral researcher in Russian, Eurasian, and Eastern European Studies at the University of Helsinki's Aleksanteri Institute. His research focuses on narratives in Russia's foreign and security policy, Putin-era ideology, and media studies. He holds an MA in Russian Studies from the University of Helsinki and an MA in Public Administration and Communications from the University of Vaasa, Finland. [MLI](#)

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Alexander Dalziel for his invaluable contributions, guidance, and the many stimulating conversations on Russia and the Arctic that helped shape the development of these ideas.

References

- Abramenko, Olga. 2024. "Indigenous Peoples in Russia: Criminalization Instead of Protection of Their Rights." Anti-Discrimination Centre, August 9, 2024. Available at <https://adcmemorial.org/en/articles/columns/indigenous-peoples-in-russia-criminalization-instead-of-protection-of-their-rights/>.
- Almeida Neto, Getúlio Alves de. 2025. "Security Cooperation in the Arctic after Ukraine: How the War Affected the Security Dilemma in the Polar Region." *The Polar Journal* (April 2025): 1–20. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1080/2154896X.2025.2492485>.
- Arctic Council. 2025. "The Russian Federation." Arctic Council. Available at <https://arctic-council.org/about/states/russian-federation/>.
- Arctic Russia. 2024. "Arctic Cruises: Unique Catalyst for NSR Development." Arctic Russia: Investment Portal of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation, March 3, 2024. Available at <https://arctic-russia.ru/en/article/arctic-cruises-unique-catalyst-for-nsr-development/>.
- Bertelsen, Rasmus Gjedssø. 2024. "Divided Arctic in a Divided World Order." *Strategic Analysis* 48, 6: 568–77. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2025.2453322>.
- Bessudnov, Alexey. 2023. "Ethnic and Regional Inequalities in Russian Military Fatalities in Ukraine: Preliminary Findings from Crowdsourced Data." *Demographic Research* 48 (June): 883–98.
- Business Index North – BIN Arctic. 2024. *Overview of Russia's Arctic Investments in 2017–2022*. Business Index North – BIN Arctic. Available at https://businessindexnorth.com/sites/b/businessindexnorth.com/files/2024/09/overview_of_russias_investments_in_the_arctic.pdf.

Busvine, Douglas. 2025. "Russia and US Eye Joint Arctic Energy Projects after Saudi Talks." POLITICO, February 18, 2025. Available at <https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-us-saudi-arctic-energy-rdif-ukraine-russia-capital/>.

Cap, Piotr. 2023. "Narratives of Geopolitical Representation in the Discourse of the Russia–Ukraine War." *Journal of Pragmatics* 218 (December): 133–43. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2023.10.008>.

Conley, Heather A., Sophie Arts, Bonnie S. Glaser, Kristine Berzina, and Jaine Archambeau. 2024. *A New Era of Arctic Geopolitics: Russia-PRC Strategic Alignment Is Driving Unprecedented Regional Collaboration*. German Marshall Fund [GMF]. Available at <https://www.gmfus.org/sites/default/files/2024-07/A%20New%20Era%20of%20Arctic%20Geopolitics.pdf>.

Cook, Linda J., and Mike Titterton. 2023. "Mapping Shifts in Russian and European Welfare Politics: Explaining Policy Responses to Shared New Social Risks." *Social Policy and Society* 22, 2: 321–37. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746422000732>.

Cook, Linda J., Elena R. Iarskaia-Smirnova, and Vladimir A. Kozlov. 2023. "Trying to Reverse Demographic Decline: Pro-Natalist and Family Policies in Russia, Poland and Hungary." *Social Policy and Society* 22, 2: 355–75. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474746422000628>.

Far East and Arctic Development Corporation. 2025. "Advanced Special Economic Zone." Far East and Arctic Development Corporation. 2025. Available at <https://erdc.ru/en/about-tor/>.

Fauzer, V.V., and A.V. Smirnov. 2020. "Migration of the Russian Arctic Population: Models, Routes, Results." *Arctic: Ecology and Economy*, no. 4, 40 (December), 4–18. Available at <https://doi.org/10.25283/2223-4594-2020-4-4-18>.

Fedor, Julie, Markku Kangaspuro, Jussi Lassila, and Tatiana Zhurzhenko. 2017. *War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus*. Palgrave Macmillan Memory Studies. Available at <https://research.ebsco.com/linkprocessor/plink?id=7a830bb0-5123-3164-aa2c-3b4d7a2c31e5>.

Feldmann, Magnus, and Honorata Mazepus. 2018. "State-Society Relations and the Sources of Support for the Putin Regime: Bridging Political Culture and Social Contract Theory." *East European Politics* 34, 1: 57–76. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2017.1414697>.

Global Affairs Canada. 2024. "Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy." Government of Canada. Available at <https://www.international.gc.ca/gac-amc/publications/transparency-transparence/arctic-arctique/arctic-policy-politique-arctique.aspx>.

Gorbachev, Mikhail. 1987. "Let the North of the Globe, the Arctic, Become a Zone of Peace." Speech on the occasion of the presentation of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star Medal to the city of Murmansk, October 1, 1987. Marxists Internet Archive. Available at <https://www.marxists.org/archive/gorbachev/1987/00001.htm>.

Götz, Elias, and Jørgen Staun. 2022. "Why Russia Attacked Ukraine: Strategic Culture and Radicalized Narratives." *Contemporary Security Policy* 43, 3: 482–97. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2082633>.

Gronholt-Pedersen, Jacob, and Gwladys Fouche. 2022. "Dark Arctic: NATO Allies Wake up to Russian Supremacy in the Region." Reuters, November 16, 2022. Available at <https://www.reuters.com/graphics/ARCTIC-SECURITY/zgvobmblrpd/>.

Hirtenstein, Anna, and Marwa Rashad. 2025. "US, Russia Explore Ways to Restore Russian Gas Flows to Europe, Sources Say." Reuters, May 8, 2025. Available at <https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-russia-explore-ways-restore-russian-gas-flows-europe-sources-say-2025-05-08/>.

Hodgson, Kara K. 2022. "Russia's Colonial Legacy in the Sakha Heartland." Blog. The Arctic Institute, November 15, 2022. Available at <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/russias-colonial-legacy-sakha-heartland/>.

Hossain, Kamrul. 2021. "Russia's Proposed Extended Continental Shelf in the Arctic Ocean: Science Setting the Stage for Law." *Insights* 25, 8 (May 24). American Society of International Law. Available at <https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/25/issue/8>.

Khomyakov, Maxim. 2020. "Russia: Colonial, Anticolonial, Postcolonial Empire?" *Social Science Information* 59, 2: 225–63. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1177/0539018420929804>.

Klimenko, Ekaterina. 2020. "Russia's New Arctic Policy Document Signals Continuity Rather than Change." Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], April 6, 2020. Available at <https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/2020/russias-new-arctic-policy-document-signals-continuity-rather-change>.

Koivurova, Timo, and Akiho Shibata. 2023. “After Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine in 2022: Can We Still Cooperate with Russia in the Arctic?” *Polar Record* 59: e12. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0032247423000049>.

Kortukov, Dima. 2020. “‘Sovereign Democracy’ and the Politics of Ideology in Putin’s Russia.” *Russian Politics* 5 (April): 81–104. Available at <https://doi.org/10.30965/24518921-00501004>.

Latypova, Leyla. 2025. “‘Extermination of Entire Nations’: Scientist Maria Vyushkova Counts Russia’s Indigenous War Dead.” *Moscow Times*, February 25, 2025. <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/02/25/extirmination-of-entire-nations-scientist-maria-vyushkova-counts-russias-indigenous-war-dead-a88090>.

Lipunov, Nikita, and Pavel Devyatkin. 2023. “The Arctic in the 2023 Russian Foreign Policy Concept.” Blog. The Arctic Institute, Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, May 30, 2023. Available at <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/arctic-2023-russian-foreign-policy-concept/>.

Marten, Kimberly. 2023. “Geopolitics and Security in the Changing Arctic.” In *Climate Change, Conflict and (In)Security*. Routledge.

Martin, Terry. 2017. *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939*. Cornell University Press.

Mediazona. 2025. “Потери России в войне с Украиной. Сводка «Медиазоны».” [*Russia’s Losses in the War with Ukraine. Mediazona’s Summary*]. Mediazona. Available at <https://zona.media/casualties>.

Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation. 2024. “Ледокольный флот России – самый мощный в мире” [*Russia’s Icebreaker Fleet Is the Most Powerful in the World*]. News Release. Russian Federation, Ministry of Transport, February 20, 2024. Available at <https://mintrans.gov.ru/press-center/news/11115>.

Person, Robert. 2015. “Potholes, Pensions, and Public Opinion: The Politics of Blame in Putin’s Power Vertical.” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 31, 5: 420–47. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2014.932142>.

President of Russia. 2014a. “Заседание Совета Безопасности по вопросу реализации государственной политики в Арктике” [*Security Council Meeting on the Implementation of State Policy in the Arctic*]. Президент России [*President of Russia*], April 29, 2014. Available at <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20845>.

President of Russia. 2014b. “Рабочая встреча с губернатором Мурманской области Мариной Ковтун” [*Working Meeting with the Governor of the Murmansk Region Marina Kovtun*]. Президент России [*President of Russia*], May 6, 2014. Available at <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20902>.

President of Russia. 2014c. “Совещание по вопросу эффективного и безопасного освоения Арктики” [*Meeting on the Issue of Effective and Safe Development of the Arctic*]. Президент России [*President of Russia*], June 9, 2014. Available at <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/45856>.

President of Russia. 2016a. “Расширенное заседание коллегии Министерства обороны.” [*Extended Meeting of the Board of the Ministry of Defense*]. Президент России [*President of Russia*], December 25, 2016. Available at <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/53571>.

President of Russia. 2016b. “Совещание с членами Правительства” [*Meeting with Members of the Government*]. Президент России [*President of Russia*], March 16, 2016. Available at <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51521>.

President of Russia. 2016c. “Рабочая встреча с губернатором Ненецкого автономного округа Игорем Кошиным” [*Working Meeting with the Governor of the Nenets Autonomous Okrug Igor Koshin*]. Президент России [*President of Russia*], February 15, 2016. Available at <http://kremlin.ru/catalog/persons/408/events/51313>.

President of Russia. 2017a. “Большая пресс-конференция Владимира Путина” [*Vladimir Putin's Big Press Conference*]. Президент России [*President of Russia*], December 14, 2017. Available at <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56378>.

President of Russia. 2017b. “Международный форум «Арктика – территория диалога»” [*International Forum “The Arctic – Territory of Dialogue”*]. Президент России [*President of Russia*], March 30, 2017. Available at <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54149>.

President of Russia. 2017c. “Прямая линия с Владимиром Путиным.” [*Direct Line with Vladimir Putin*]. Президент России [*President of Russia*], June 18, 2017. Available at <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54790>.

President of Russia. 2018a. “Встреча с врио главы Ямало-Ненецкого автономного округа Дмитрием Артюховым.” [*Meeting with the Acting Head of the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug Dmitry Artyukhov*]. Президент России [*President of Russia*], August 24, 2018. Available at <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/58341>.

President of Russia. 2018b. “Телемост с ведущими российскими вузами” [*Teleconference with Leading Russian Universities*]. Президент России [*President of Russia*], March 12, 2018. Available at <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56712>.

President of Russia. 2019. “Приветствие участникам и гостям VIII международной встречи представителей государств – членов Арктического совета, стран – наблюдателей в этом Совете и зарубежной научной общественности” [*Greetings to the Participants and Guests of the VIII International Meeting of Representatives of the Arctic Council Member States, Observer Countries in this Council and the Foreign Scientific Community*]. Президент России [*President of Russia*], October 5, 2019. Available at <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61686>.

President of Russia. 2020a. “Президент утвердил Основы государственной политики в Арктике” [*The President Has Approved the Fundamentals of State Policy in the Arctic*]. Президент России, March 18, 2020. Available at <http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/62947>.

President of Russia. 2020b. “Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 26.10.2020 г. № 645” [*Decree of the President of the Russian Federation dated 10.26.2020, No. 645*]. Президент России [*President of Russia*], October 26, 2020. Available at <http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/45972>.

President of Russia. 2022a. “Совещание по вопросам развития Арктической зоны” [*Meeting on the Development of the Arctic Zone*]. Президент России [*President of Russia*], April 25, 2022. Available at <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/68188>.

President of Russia. 2022b. “Участникам Всероссийского проекта ‘Чистая Арктика’” [*To the Participants of the All-Russian Project ‘Clean Arctic’*]. Президент России [*President of Russia*], March 28, 2022. Available at <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/letters/68503>.

President of Russia. 2023a. “Внесены изменения в Основы государственной политики в Арктике на период до 2035 года” [*Amendments Have Been Made to the Fundamentals of State Policy in the Arctic for the Period up to 2035*]. Президент России [*President of Russia*], February 28, 2023. Available at <http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/70570>.

President of Russia. 2023b. “Встреча с Получателями ‘Арктической Ипотеки’” [*Meeting with the Recipients of the ‘Arctic Mortgage’*]. Президент России [*President of Russia*], December 11, 2023. Available at <http://special.kremlin.ru/catalog/regions/ARK/events/72950>.

President of Russia. 2023c. “Подписан закон, направленный на развитие круизного туризма на Дальнем Востоке и в Арктической зоне Российской Федерации” [*A Law Aimed at Developing Cruise Tourism in the Far East and the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation Has Been Signed*]. Президент России [*President of Russia*], December 25, 2023. Available at <http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/73050>.

President of Russia. 2024a. “Встреча с губернатором Архангельской области Александром Цыбульским” [*Meeting with the Governor of the Arkhangelsk Region Alexander Tsybulsky*]. Президент России [*President of Russia*], November 28, 2024. Available at <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75666>.

President of Russia. 2024b. “Встреча с губернатором Мурманской области Андреем Чибисом” [*Meeting with the Governor of the Murmansk Region Andrey Chibis*]. Президент России [*President of Russia*], August 14, 2024. Available at <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/74714>.

President of Russia. 2024c. “Заседание дискуссионного клуба ‘Валдай’” [*Meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club*]. Президент России [*President of Russia*], November 19, 2024. Available at <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/75521>.

President of Russia. 2024d. “Пленарное заседание Петербургского международного экономического форума.” [*Plenary Session of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum*]. Президент России [*President of Russia*], June 7, 2024. Available at <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/74234>.

President of Russia. 2024e. “Рабочая встреча с врио главы Республики Коми Владимиром Уйбой” [*Working Meeting with the Acting Head of the Komi Republic Vladimir Uyba*]. Президент России [*President of Russia*], November 5, 2024. Available at <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/63970>.

President of Russia. 2024f. “Церемония закладки атомного ледокола «Ленинград».” [*Keel-Laying Ceremony of the Nuclear Icebreaker “Leningrad”*]. Президент России [*President of Russia*], January 27, 2024. Available at <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/73322>.

President of Russia. 2025. “Международный форум ‘Арктика – территория диалога’” [*International Forum “The Arctic – Territory of Dialogue”*]. Президент России [*President of Russia*], March 28, 2025. Available at <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/76554>.

RBK Real Estate. 2025. “Арктическая ипотека: как взять кредит на жилье под 2% в 2025 году.” [*Arctic Mortgage: How to Get a Housing Loan at 2% in 2025*]. RBK Real Estate, January 15, 2025. Available at <https://realty.rbc.ru/news/6554b3569a7947cf832b225c>.

Roberts, Kari. 2015. “Why Russia Will Play by the Rules in the Arctic.” *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal* 21, 2: 112–28. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1080/11926422.2014.939204>.

Rosatom, Atomflot. 2025. “Северный Морской Путь.” [*Northern Sea Route*]. Rosatom. Available at <https://www.rosatomflot.ru/o-predpriyatii/severnyu-morskoy-put/>.

Russia. 2008. “Об Основах государственной политики России в Арктике на период до 2020 года и дальнейшую перспективу.” [*On the Basics of Russia’s State Policy in the Arctic for the Period up to 2020 and Beyond*]. Government of Russia, September 18, 2008. Available at <http://government.ru/info/18359/>.

Sergunin, Alexander A. 2016. *Russia in the Arctic: Hard or Soft Power?* Ibidem Verlag.

Silva, Pedro Allemand Mancebo. 2022. “The Old Colonialisms and the New Ones: The Arctic Resource Boom as a New Wave of Settler-Colonialism.” Blog. The Arctic Institute, Center for Circumpolar Security Studies, October 25, 2022. Available at <https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/old-colonialisms-new-ones-arctic-resource-boom-new-wave-settler-colonialism/>.

Sokhey, Sarah Wilson. 2020. “What Does Putin Promise Russians? Russia’s Authoritarian Social Policy.” *Orbis* 64, 3: 390–402. Available at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2020.05.003>.

United States Department of State. 2022. “National Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR).” Blog. Government of the United States, Department of State, October 2022. Available at <https://2021-2025.state.gov/national-strategy-for-the-arctic-region-nsar/>.

Endnotes

- 1 The Russian Arctic, the “Arctic Zone” in official parlance, comprises the following regions of the Russian Federation: Sakha Republic (Yakutia), Republic of Karelia, Murmansk Oblast, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Krasnoyarsky Krai, Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, and the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug.
- 2 The full title of the document referred to in this paper as Russia’s “Arctic Policy” is *On the Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period until 2035* (President of Russia 2020b).
- 3 To address questions of methodology, we conducted a qualitative content analysis on a set of publicly available textual data that captures Vladimir Putin’s statements related to the Arctic. We compiled the dataset using a targeted keyword search for materials available on the Kremlin website via the Russian media’s Integrum online database. The dataset captures items published from 2014 to 2024. In order to retrieve a broad range of documents, we conducted a search for mentions of the most commonly used Russian-language terms that refer to Russia’s broader Arctic regions. A preliminary search produced a total of 1027 results that were reviewed manually for minimum search term frequency (i.e., a search term appearing in a minimum of three sentences) and later, that had substantial relevance to the research questions. Following subsequent readings, we created a finalized dataset consisting of 130 unique documents. We also determined that no additional, more targeted searches were needed (e.g., searches for names of specific regions, decision-makers, or other stakeholders). Where appropriate, our analysis makes use of other policy documents to contextualize findings from the primary dataset.
- 4 In Russian, these are called Territoria operezhayushchego (sotsialno-ekonomicheskogo) razvitiya (TOR).

excellent

“ Canada shall be the star towards which all men who love progress and freedom shall come.

- Sir Wilfrid Laurier

high-quality

insightful

CONSTRUCTIVE

important

forward-thinking

Critically acclaimed, award-winning Institute

The **Macdonald-Laurier Institute** focuses on the full range of issues that fall under Ottawa's jurisdiction.

WHERE YOU'VE SEEN US

- Winner of the Sir Antony Fisher International Memorial Award (2011)
- Templeton Freedom Award for Special Achievement by a Young Institute (2012)
- Prospect Magazine Award for Best North America Social Think Tank (2018)
- Short-listed for the Templeton Freedom Award (2017)
- Cited by five present and former Canadian Prime Ministers, as well as by David Cameron, then British Prime Minister.
- *Hill Times* says **Brian Lee Crowley** is one of the 100 most influential people in Ottawa.
- *Wall Street Journal*, *Economist*, *Foreign Policy*, *Globe and Mail*, *National Post* and many other leading publications have quoted the Institute's work.



constructive *important* forward-thinking
excellent *high-quality* insightful
timely *active*

GOOD POLICY

is worth fighting for.

WHAT PEOPLE ARE SAYING ABOUT **MLI**

MLI has been active in the field of indigenous public policy, building a fine tradition of working with indigenous organizations, promoting indigenous thinkers and encouraging innovative, indigenous-led solutions to the challenges of 21st century Canada.

– The Honourable Jody Wilson-Raybould

I commend Brian Crowley and the team at **MLI** for your laudable work as one of the leading policy think tanks in our nation's capital. The Institute has distinguished itself as a thoughtful, empirically based and non-partisan contributor to our national public discourse.

– The Right Honourable Stephen Harper

May I congratulate **MLI** for a decade of exemplary leadership on national and international issues. Through high-quality research and analysis, **MLI** has made a significant contribution to Canadian public discourse and policy development. With the global resurgence of authoritarianism and illiberal populism, such work is as timely as it is important. I wish you continued success in the years to come.

– The Honourable Irwin Cotler

M A C D O N A L D - L A U R I E R I N S T I T U T E



323 Chapel Street, Suite 300,
Ottawa, Ontario K1N 7Z2
613-482-8327
info@macdonaldlaurier.ca

macdonaldlaurier.ca

