



True North in
Canadian public policy


First Principles and the National Interest: Recommendations for a New Canadian Defence Policy

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Executive Summary

The Trudeau government is undertaking an extensive review of the country's defence policy, which is expected to be completed in early 2017. The Defence Policy Review (DPR) also included a public consultations component, in which experts and non-experts were given an opportunity to provide advice and input in this process through various mediums, such as stakeholder roundtables, House and Senate Committees, and an online portal. Canadian allies were also solicited for their views on this topic at bilateral and multilateral forums. As the government noted, this was “the first public consultation of this magnitude on Canadian defence policy in over 20 years.”

“To contribute to the debate on defence, this paper steps back to explore first principles of Canadian defence policy – by answering the ‘what’ and ‘why’ of defence rather than simply ‘how.’”

It is difficult to deny the need for revisiting Canadian defence policy. Nearly a decade has passed since the Government of Canada last released a statement on defence policy, this being the Conservative's 2008 *Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS)*. Circumstances have greatly changed. Successive governments reduced and reallocated promised defence funding to later years, raising questions on the CFDS's fiscal foundations. One can also add the changed global security environment, in which Canada must contend with a resurgent Russia, an aggressive China, and a renewed terrorist threat – not to mention a new US administration under President Donald Trump that has raised serious concerns in capitals around the world, including Ottawa.

To contribute to the debate on defence, this paper steps back to explore the first principles of Canadian defence policy – by answering the “what” and “why” of defence rather than simply “how.” In so doing, it goes be-

yond a relatively narrow discussion of the Canadian procurement system, recapitalization, and other “how” matters. Instead, it will provide more strategic-level input on the DPR by exploring the political objectives that should be achieved by the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).

The paper benefits from the input of 19 leading defence policy thinkers and practitioners from across Canada, who provided detailed comments based on a 12-question survey sent out in mid-2016. Their comments, in turn, are used to inform the paper's analysis of Canada's defence priorities and principles, security environment, alliances, UN involvement, and future capabilities. A full list of respondents appears in Appendix A. However, we do not identify respondents and their comments in the body of the paper itself. Of note, respondents do not necessarily endorse this paper or all of its recommendations.

The paper concludes that Canada's defence policy needs to be rooted in its national interests. Respondents provided honest and often unfiltered assessments of the country's national interests – from outlining Canada's wider security, alliance, and economic priorities to better situating the missions, expenditures, and capabilities of the CAF, which were used to frame the paper's analysis and inform its definition of what constitutes Canadian national interests.

The paper sets out a number of recommendations on Canadian defence policy that the Trudeau government – still in the process of completing its DPR – would do well to heed:

1. **Canada's defence priorities & principles:** The CAF needs to be funded and properly equipped, and should focus on responding to immediate defence concerns on global terrorism and supporting NATO in Eastern Europe. Global deployments need to be guided by clear rationales and exit strategies, and should occur alongside like-minded allies.
2. **Canada's security environment:** Canada needs to ensure its relationship with the US does not deteriorate over isolationist or security concerns, even as it reassures allies in Eastern Europe and the Asia-Pacific on the great power challenge posed by Russia and China. Weak governance and failed states in other regions will remain an ongoing concern. So too will issues of domestic terrorism and hate groups, cyber threats, WMD proliferation, and climate change and environmental disaster.
3. **Canada's alliances:** Canada needs to examine whether it should increase defence spending to 2 percent of GDP. It should also pursue information-sharing arrangements with the US (maritime intelligence, cyber-security), replace its aging CF-18 fighters, upgrade the North Warning System in the Arctic, and notify the United States of its interest in participating in ballistic missile defence. US participation in NATO also needs to be encouraged.
4. **Canada's role in the United Nations:** Military contributions to UN missions should be in areas in which the organization needs improvement. Training and technical support should be prioritized over deploying frontline ground forces. Canada also needs to work with like-minded countries in reforming the UN security and governance structure. But this should not prevent Canada from advancing its defence interests in regional, multilateral organizations in the Arctic and Asia-Pacific (e.g., Arctic Council, ASEAN, ADMM-Plus).
5. **Canada's future capabilities:** Canada needs a multi-purpose, combat-capable force, but certain niche capabilities can be enhanced (e.g., special forces, military training, and disaster assistance). In terms of procurement, opportunities for joint purchasing of military equipment with allies should be explored and off-the-shelf purchasing should be considered when possible. A "whole-of-government" approach is also essential if Canada is to leverage all its resources (including defence) in international affairs.

These recommendations form the preliminary basis for a "report card" that can be used to assess the state of Canadian defence policy in subsequent follow-up reports. This will provide an important benchmark to allow the tracking of the government's defence policy actions in coming years, and to assess the successes and failures of these actions, based on the degree to which they contribute or detract from these key priorities.

Sommaire

Le gouvernement Trudeau a entrepris un examen exhaustif de la politique militaire canadienne, exercice qui devrait être terminé au début de 2017. L'Examen de la politique de défense (EPD) a également intégré un volet de consultations publiques qui a permis aux experts et non-experts de fournir des conseils et des commentaires sur le processus par l'intermédiaire d'une série de tables rondes, des comités de la Chambre et du Sénat et d'un portail en ligne. Les opinions de nos alliés sur le sujet ont également été sondées lors de forums bilatéraux et multilatéraux. Comme le gouvernement l'a souligné, il s'agit de la « première consultation publique d'importance sur une politique canadienne de défense en plus de vingt ans ».

Il est difficile de nier la nécessité de revoir la politique canadienne en matière de défense. Près d'une décennie s'est écoulée depuis que le gouvernement du Canada a énoncé les fondements de sa politique de défense dans le document *Stratégie de défense Le Canada d'abord 2008 (SDCD)*, celle du Parti

conservateur. Les circonstances ont énormément changé. En effet, les gouvernements successifs ont réduit le financement promis, le repoussant à plus tard, ce qui a soulevé des questions sur les assises financières de la SDCD. On peut également faire valoir que le contexte de sécurité mondiale a changé, le Canada devant composer avec la résurgence de la Russie, la combativité de la Chine et la nouvelle menace terroriste – sans parler des vives inquiétudes suscitées dans les capitales du monde entier, y compris à Ottawa, par la nouvelle administration américaine sous la présidence de Donald Trump.

Contribuant au débat sur la défense, le présent document prend du recul et explore les premiers principes de la politique de défense du Canada – en répondant au « quoi » et au « pourquoi » et non pas uniquement au « comment ». Ce faisant, il va au-delà des discussions relativement étroites entourant le système de passation des marchés canadiens, la recapitalisation et d'autres questions relatives au « comment ». Il cherche plutôt à offrir une réflexion plus stratégique sur l'EPD en explorant les objectifs politiques que les Forces armées canadiennes devraient pouvoir atteindre (FAC).

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L'étude bénéficie de l'apport des 19 principaux experts et spécialistes de la politique de défense au Canada, qui ont offert des commentaires détaillés par l'intermédiaire d'un sondage de 12 questions réalisé au milieu de 2016. Leurs commentaires nourrissent à leur tour l'analyse qui est présentée ici à propos des priorités et des principes qui sous-tendent la défense du Canada, la sécurité de l'environnement, les alliances, l'intervention de l'ONU et les capacités futures. La liste complète des personnes interrogées figure à l'Annexe A. Cependant, nous n'identifions pas ces répondants ni leurs commentaires à l'intérieur du document. Il convient de noter que les répondants n'approuvent pas nécessairement les conclusions de ce document ni l'ensemble de ses recommandations.

Le document conclut que la politique de défense du Canada a besoin d'être enracinée dans ses intérêts nationaux. Les évaluations honnêtes et souvent directes des répondants à l'égard des intérêts nationaux du pays – des grandes priorités du Canada sur le plan de la sécurité, des alliances et des intérêts économiques jusqu'au réalignment des missions, des dépenses et des capacités des FAC – ont servi à encadrer l'analyse présentée ici et à définir ce qu'on entend par intérêts nationaux.

Le document énonce un certain nombre de recommandations sur la politique de défense du Canada que le gouvernement Trudeau – qui achève son EPD – aurait tout intérêt à considérer :

1. **Les priorités et principes en matière de défense au Canada :** Les FAC ont besoin d'être adéquatement financées et équipées et devraient répondre avant tout aux préoccupations de défense immédiates à l'égard du terrorisme mondial et du soutien de l'OTAN en Europe de l'Est. Les déploiements mondiaux exigent d'être guidés par des justifications et des stratégies de sortie claires et devraient survenir aux côtés des alliés qui partagent les points de vue canadiens.
2. **L'environnement de la sécurité au Canada :** Le Canada doit veiller à ne pas compromettre ses relations avec les États-Unis sur les questions relatives à la sécurité ou à l'isolationnisme, et ce, tout en rassurant ses alliés en Europe de l'Est et en Asie-Pacifique devant le pouvoir croissant de la Russie et de la Chine. La faiblesse de gouvernance et la défaillance des États dans d'autres régions demeurent des préoccupations constantes. Il en sera de même pour les questions de terrorisme intérieur ou qui concernent les groupes haineux, les menaces informatiques, la prolifération des ADM, les effets des changements climatiques et les catastrophes environnementales.
3. **Les alliances du Canada :** Le Canada aura à décider s'il doit accroître ses dépenses au chapitre de la défense en vue de les faire passer à 2 % du PIB. Il convient également de reconduire les ententes de partage de renseignements avec les États-Unis (le renseignement maritime, la cybersécurité), de remplacer la flotte vieillissante de CF-18, de mettre à niveau le Système d'alerte du Nord dans l'Arctique et d'informer les États-Unis de l'intérêt à participer à la défense antimissile balistique. La participation des États-Unis à l'OTAN doit également être encouragée.
4. **Le rôle du Canada dans l'Organisation des Nations Unies :** Le Canada doit contribuer militairement aux missions de l'ONU au sein des domaines dans lesquels l'organisation a besoin de s'améliorer. La formation et l'assistance technique doivent avoir préséance sur l'envoi de forces terrestres de première ligne. Le Canada doit également travailler à la réforme de la structure de sécurité et de gouvernance de l'ONU avec les pays qui partagent ses visions. Mais cela ne devrait pas l'empêcher de promouvoir ses intérêts en matière de défense auprès des organisations multilatérales et régionales dans l'Arctique et l'Asie-Pacifique (par exemple, le Conseil de l'Arctique, l'ANASE, l'ADMM-Plus).
5. **Les capacités futures du Canada :** Le Canada a besoin d'une force apte au combat et multifonctionnelle, mais celle-ci pourrait se spécialiser dans certains domaines précis (par exemple, les forces spéciales, la formation militaire et l'aide aux sinistrés). En ce qui concerne l'approvisionnement, les possibilités d'achats conjoints de matériel militaire avec les alliés et d'achats « standards » doivent être explorées lorsque c'est possible. Il est également essentiel que le Canada adopte une approche pangouvernementale s'il veut tirer parti de toutes ses ressources (y compris la défense) dans les affaires internationales.

Ces recommandations constituent la base préliminaire d'un « bulletin » qui pourrait être utilisé pour évaluer l'état de la politique de défense du Canada dans le cadre de rapports complémentaires. Il fournirait un point de référence important pour assurer un suivi de la politique de défense du gouvernement dans les années à venir et évaluer les succès et les échecs des actions entreprises, en fonction de la mesure dans laquelle elles contribuent ou nuisent à ces priorités clés.

Introduction

During the 2015 federal election, the Liberal Party pledged to “review current programs and capabilities, and lay out a realistic plan to strengthen Canada’s Armed Forces” (Liberal Party of Canada 2015). Now in power, the Trudeau government has undertaken the most extensive review of the country’s defence policy since the 1994 *White Paper on Defence* (Fife 2016). This ambitious review effort will ostensibly attempt to update the previous Conservative government’s 2008 *Canada First Defence Strategy*, widely seen as outdated and now unaffordable (Collins 2014). The Trudeau government aims to have its new policy released in early 2017.

In line with the new government’s general emphasis on consultations as part of major policy reviews in other areas, Minister of National Defence Harjit Sajjan has been soliciting opinions from experts and non-experts alike (PMO 2015). Under the auspices of the Department of National Defence (DND), eight initial roundtables were held across the country with defence experts and experienced practitioners, followed up by additional consultations on specific topics (e.g., gender, the defence industry). The roundtables solicited public input and over 20,000 Canadians submitted their policy suggestions to DND via an online portal. In conjunction with these public efforts, the House and Senate Committees on National Defence have undertaken defence policy review-related studies while Minister Sajjan has consulted with close allies and with a ministerial advisory panel (DND/CAF 2016).

Amid this new defence policy review, the Macdonald-Laurier Institute (MLI) has sought to contribute to the national defence discussion by stepping back and answering the “what” and “why” of Canadian defence policy. Simply put, before the government can determine the “how” part – including a plan for procurement reform or the need for specific military assets – we must understand what underlying first principles and objectives should guide Canadian defence policy. Subsequent policies and actions can be judged against the extent to which they advance or impede these national goals.

As such, MLI asked 19 leading defence policy thinkers and practitioners from across the country to help establish the right priorities for Canada’s defence policy. It is important to note that the respondents (see Appendix A) do not necessarily endorse this report or all of its priorities and recommendations.

The key takeaway from these experts is that any future Canadian defence policy be driven by the country’s national interests. That may seem self-evident. Surely almost everyone agrees that a country’s national interest should be at the heart of its defence policy. But, by drawing on these experts, we can better define what that national interest is – by outlining Canada’s wider security, alliance, and economic interests, and better situating the priorities, missions, expenditures, and capabilities of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).

Our survey respondents were clear-eyed realists about Canada’s place in the world and the underlying principles and objectives of Canadian defence policy. They eschewed any idealized vision of Canada being an “honest broker” and did not laud peacekeeping as an end in of itself. Their near-consensus view is that Canada’s defence policy must be centred on its relationship with the United States

Special thanks to Connor Lyons for his research assistance and to the expert contributors who responded to our survey.

– and the uncertain future of this relationship, due in large part to the ascension of the Trump presidency, is a major threat to Canada’s national interest.

The respondents viewed the national interest unromantically, yet saw it as critical for protecting and asserting Canadian territorial sovereignty, working closely with the United States on continental defence, and making judgments about military deployments based on national interests and “winnability” rather than on higher-minded conceptions.

Accordingly, this paper’s analysis leans heavily on the answers from our 19 respondents, based on themes addressing Canada’s defence priorities and principles, security environment, alliances, United Nations involvement, and future capabilities. The final section summarizes the recommendations that serve as the basis of a “report card” for subsequent defence policy follow-up reports. Future assessments, based upon these recommendations, will allow for the tracking of the government’s defence policy actions.

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Basic Primer on Canadian Defence Policy

National defence is the quintessential public good and federal responsibility. Neither individuals nor corporations can be expected to defend the country’s sovereignty or project its values and interests abroad. Neither is it reasonable to expect provinces or municipalities to carry out these responsibilities. National defence is one of the basic functions that the fathers of Confederation placed with the new national government (DND/CAF 2013).

Canada attained national responsibility for its military and defence policy only gradually. The 1931 Statute of Westminster, which saw Canada completely assume that responsibility, represents one of the principal steps in the maturation of Canada into a great nation. Decisions about when and where to send the CAF into harm’s way would no longer be dictated by old colonial commitments but rather by Canadian values and interests. These basic ideas have governed Canadian defence policy ever since.

It is critical that our defence policy continues to be underpinned by national principles and objectives. The stakes are too high to subject these decisions to political whims or scatter-shot judgments. Decisions about military deployments or even procurement priorities must be seen as part of a bigger picture. Simply put: governments must avoid the mistake of answering the “how” before deciding the “what” and “why.”

Since 1970 the federal government has set out five defence policy statements (Parliament of Canada 2010). The purpose of these documents has been to put forward the government's vision for defence policy, including the role of the CAF. At its core, a defence policy statement is concerned with

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the “what” and “why” of things – namely, it sets out broad principles of action, such as prioritizing our Arctic sovereignty or cooperating with the United States in continental defence, and high-level priorities such as emphasizing interoperability with US forces or expeditionary deployments abroad, including United Nations missions. It may also set the level of budgetary resources to be devoted to defence. But the implementation-level questions – or the “how” as the minister has put it – flow from a greater understanding of what the Canadian military is and what we as Canadians want it to do.

Establishing a defence policy statement is therefore an exercise in defining the national interest and how the priorities, missions, expenditures, and capabilities of the CAF can effectively serve these values and interests. The rest of this paper will set out the key principles and objectives for Canada's defence policy based on a survey of 19 leading defence policy thinkers and practitioners. This paper's goal is to establish the “why” and “what” for Canadian defence policy and to provide a basis upon which to measure and test future decisions.

Canada's Defence Priorities and Principles

When asked to name Canada's top three defence priorities, the opinion of the survey respondents largely coalesced around the three traditional priorities that have appeared, in one form or another, in official government documents since 1945: protecting Canada, defending North America, and upholding international security.

Regarding the protection of Canada, respondents singled out the country's territorial integrity, national unity, and economic prosperity as key areas of concern. Others suggested that defending Canada is more about military aid to civil powers (e.g., the 1970 October Crisis and the 2016 Alberta forest fires) and exercising sovereignty control, given that Canada does not face any existential threats from foreign powers. But, in exercising its sovereignty, Canada needs to develop and maintain “a robust territorial sovereignty regime” with a concurrent investment in planes, ships, and northern basing, in addition to relying on diplomatic means to stabilize the Arctic. Protecting Canada also requires investing in the government's “national instruments” beyond the military, such as Global Affairs Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard. In deviating away from a narrow conception

of defending Canada, one respondent recommended that priorities include improving the military procurement system, establishing stable defence funding, and articulating “strategic guidance for defence and foreign policy practitioners by clearly establishing Canada’s global interests and areas of concern.”

On the continental and international front, respondents saw Canada’s priority as cooperating with the United States in defending North America from military threats and providing “strategically responsive” CAF assets overseas for operations in line with Canadian interests. Cooperating with the US necessitates that the military be integrated and interoperable with its southern counterpart and have the capacity to “deploy broadly.” Internationally, current defence priorities involve combatting both global terrorism (especially the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS]) and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as participating in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) missions, especially in Eastern Europe, and contributing to “collective efforts to prevent and alleviate security and public safety crises in select parts of the globe.”

In terms of principles, the near-consensus view is that the “one overarching, paramount principle governing Canadian military deployments [is] the pursuit and defence of Canadian interests,” especially if it is to protect Canadian security. Contrary to the rhetoric, Canadian defence policy has long been guided by national self-interest – “anything else is bound to land us in failure.” If Canada is to deploy its armed forces, it should do so with clear political objectives, with mobilized political support and necessary resources, and support for those military members (and their families) who are killed or wounded on operation. Hence, interventions should be decided on the basis of “winnability”; that is, decisions to intervene should involve considerations of Canada’s military strengths and our prospective role, and be guided by ensuring that there is an exit strategy. Similarly, defence actions must be “consistent with and in concert with like-minded states,” with the use of force occurring in a coalition. In this context, the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) should *not* be used as a principle for defence unless “it can be justified in national interest terms.” In the words of one expert, defence policy should not be about making “political elites feel good about themselves.” That being said, Canada ought to seek leadership in international operations and “should not shy away from accepting limited term high-level responsibility mandates in crisis situations.”

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Respondents did argue for a normative framework that recognizes the role of Canadian values in helping to guide Canadian defence policy, which can in turn complement the national interest. One suggested that a defence principle should be the protection of human life and the counter-proliferation of WMD. Others highlighted a commitment to multilateral institutions, international law, and norms (including R2P) as principles; they said the same of a need for Canada to protect two “key freedoms...from fear and want” while “[p]reserving the liberal democratic order against revanchist and nihilist state and non-state actors.” Others cautioned that while normative principles should be applied with a degree of “humility” – there must still be an understanding of R2P’s limitations and the recognition that interventions are not easy.

Canada's Security Environment

Compared to some of Canada's allies, decision-makers in Ottawa have the luxury of not having to contend with *existential* threats. Geography has all but ensured that Canada is protected from conventional military threats. The Canada-US and NATO alliances, a long history of international engagement through global institutions like the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, and Canada's position as both a major trading nation and G7 economy leaves the country largely secure and prosperous. Still, Canada is not immune from ongoing or future threats, even if the country's survivability is not at stake. The current international security environment is both fluid and diffuse, and contains a number of threats and challenges that Canadian decision-makers would do well to recognize.

Any discussion about how Canada must tackle current or future security threats begins with the Canada-US relationship. Given Canada's proximity to the United States, and its role as Canada's primary economic and security partner, any alteration that sees US retrenchment from NORAD (North American Aerospace Defence Command) and NATO, with a move towards isolationism, would have a major impact on the shape of Canada's defence policy. One interviewee suggested that the "greatest threat to Canada is a significant degradation in our historical relationship with the United States." A change in the relationship could be brought about by the domestic political climate in Washington (e.g., the Trump presidency), or it could be the result of Canada becoming viewed as a threat to US security, likely to arise from a terrorist attack launched from Canadian soil. In such a scenario, the US reaction would inevitably result in a tightening of the border, harming the Canadian economy.

The possibility of a sudden deterioration in Canada-US relations led some interviewees to suggest that complacency remains a major security concern. This was a concern even in early 2016, when the interviews were conducted and few seriously predicted a Trump presidency. Trump's election has made such a concern all the more salient. Yet, due to our reliance on US prosperity, trade, and military power, Canadian decision-makers can all too easily abrogate their responsibility to understand threats to the country, such as the 1985 Air India bombing carried out by British Columbia-based Sikh extremists, or respond to them. One expert referred to this form of events as an "abdication" and "erosion of sovereignty." To address such complacency, Canada would do well to better diversify its trading relationships beyond its inordinate dependence on the US market, as well as pursue a joint approach in foreign and defence policy.

Further afield, numerous interviewees identified Russia and China as immediate nation-state threats confronting Canada and its allies. They are concerned about Russian and Chinese attempts to counter US global military and economic predominance. More specifically, Russia's increasing reliance on "military force to achieve its objectives" have put that country at odds with the West. Following its military interventions in Georgia (2008), Ukraine (since 2014, with the annexation of Crimea), as well as its ongoing support of dictator Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, the possibility of further Russian aggression that could "destabilize" the current international order cannot be discounted. From a Canadian perspective, the combination of Russian expansionism and how other countries – chiefly our European allies – respond to it creates ripple effects that could upset stability in the Arctic and Europe. It will therefore be incumbent on Canada and its allies to ensure that Russia "takes the steps necessary in order to respect the sovereign territory of its neighbours."

There has, in fact, already been movement on this matter. In the aftermath of the Crimean annexation, NATO members took measures to reassure the organization's Baltic allies and dissuade Russia from making more encroachments. Under the Harper government, this involved dispatching six CF-18s to the region for air patrols along with a company of infantry to Poland and a frigate to the Baltic Sea. Separately, there is also a non-NATO training mission under way in western Ukraine, where Canada continues to deploy 200 troops. The Trudeau government has likewise committed 450 troops to Latvia as one of four NATO battlegroups to be deployed throughout the Baltics (Brewster 2016).

Along with Russian aggression, China has risen as a global political, economic, and military power. Governments in the region have perceived China's actions in the Asia-Pacific over the past decade as aggressive. Beijing has demonstrated a "willingness to assert dominance in Asia by terra-forming [building islands in the South China Sea] and increasing the scope of their [China's] military operations." Such actions, including building man-made fortified islands in the South China Sea and having naval showdowns with Japan's self-defence forces over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, raise the risk of triggering an accidental crisis with Japan, South Korea, and key Western allies.

True, the size of China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLA(N) or PLA Navy) has continued to grow, especially in its pursuit of carrier operations and anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) missile technology geared towards preventing America from having unfettered access to its littoral zone. But there is no indication that Beijing is intent on using its forces against Canada or its close Western allies, the US and Australia. While the growth of China's military capabilities is not a direct threat to Canada, the expansion of the PLA(N) does give Canada a reason to invest in strategic intelligence capabilities. In short, Ottawa needs to be able to identify "worrisome capabilities and the nefarious intents of foreign powers or non-state actors." Indirectly, China's military capabilities could be disruptive to global trade. This is especially true along the world's major trade routes in the South China Sea in the event of conflict arising from China's sea boundary disputes with the Philippines or Vietnam, for instance.

Likewise, both China and Russia have engaged in shadowy cyber operations against Western governments and businesses. Chinese operations against US targets seems to have moderated in the past year, owing to recent efforts by Washington to engage with Beijing on this issue, although questions remain about how long this arrangement will last. More worrisome, at least in the near-term, is the cyber threat posed by Russia. The recent controversy over possible Kremlin-directed meddling in the 2016 US presidential election is merely the latest chapter in a long series of attacks Moscow has organized against Western democratic institutions. It would not be unexpected to see similar cyber operations taking place in Europe in the coming year, given upcoming elections in France, Germany, and elsewhere.

"Canada would do well to better diversify its trading relationships beyond its inordinate dependence on the US market, as well as pursue a joint approach in foreign and defence policy."

Concerns over Moscow and Beijing have not offset other challenges, particularly the post-9/11 threats of non-state actors, weak states, and nuclear proliferation. The region encompassing parts of the Middle East, Africa, and Southern Europe is referred to by one expert as an “arc of instability” that could be worsened by American retrenchment. Weak governance and civil strife in countries like Syria, Iraq, Libya, South Sudan, and Nigeria have led to an interrelated set of security problems involving massive refugee flows, human trafficking, and organized crime. Similar variables are seen at play in Central Asia, South Asia, and Central America. Weak states can serve as incubators of radicalization for “disaffected youth” who believe that their political institutions are insufficient in “providing the correct types of public goods” or are resentful over Western foreign interference, real or imagined. Such sentiments merely contribute to further destabilization in their own countries and accentuate the problems listed above.

Abroad, the development of fundamentalist Islamic movements, terrorist organizations, and state-like entities such as ISIS constitute a “real and present threat to the values and interests” of Canada and Western states alike. Terrorism at home will also remain an ongoing concern, though not one approaching an “existential threat to the country.” As “foreign fighters” exist in Canada and given

the 2014 terror attacks on Parliament Hill and at a Quebec military base, experts see domestic radicalization and the export of terror abroad as a pressing concern for Canadian authorities. The country could conceivably face a “Mumbai scenario” where terrorists seize and hold a building, presenting a situation in which “there may not be sufficient deployable force” to retake it. Officials should also remain vigilant about neo-Nazi or far-right groups considering the prevalence of such organizations in the United States.

“Terrorism at home will also remain an ongoing concern, though not one approaching an ‘existential threat to the country.’”

Rogue states, nuclear proliferation, and cyber threats will continue to occupy Canada and its allies for the foreseeable future. North Korea’s nuclear tests, Pakistan’s internal instability and fluctuating tensions with India, and a fragile agreement freezing Iran’s nuclear program indicate that even 25 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons proliferation remains a major international security concern. The North Korean nuclear situation carries the risk of regional destabilization and conflict in East Asia. Of course, the possibility of terrorist organizations obtaining a nuclear capability cannot be discounted. Respondents to our survey

believe that cyber attacks will represent an increasingly salient threat domestically to Canada. Crucial infrastructure such as electrical grids, water supplies, and financial and transportation infrastructure are susceptible to cyber attacks by both state and non-state actors. As recent cases have demonstrated, there is some overlap between Russian and Chinese international ambitions and cyber attacks, including industrial espionage and general subversion.

Canada's Alliances

Since the Second World War, the bedrock of Canadian defence has been its dual alliances: a continental defence pact with the United States built on various agreements and institutions (not least NORAD), and a transatlantic alliance with Europe and the US in the form of NATO. According to our survey respondents, the Canada-US defence relationship – through which the CAF maintains close connections with its southern counterparts – is strong and particularly beneficial to the country. But it is *not* a relationship of equals, given that Canada is dependent on American security and “freeload[s] on the US for... home defence.” While Canada’s dependency is currently accepted as the status quo on both sides of the border, this may not always be the case. The 2016 presidential election saw both Democratic and Republican presumptive candidates make statements concerning the “reliability of American allies.” It is thereby important that the relationship not “be allowed to atrophy.”

The Canada-US defence relationship has long been coloured by concerns from Canadian nationalists over sovereignty – particularly that the country retain control over its own territory. But the “option of distancing is not really a good strategy,” given the cost of maintaining an independent defence capability. Consequently, it is better for Canada to pursue those efforts that assure a Canadian “voice” in continental defence discussions and operations, and strengthen the existing relationship. The onus on Canada, then, is to first ensure that the CAF remains interoperable with its US counterparts. By having the technology, skills, training, and information necessary to operate alongside the US, Canadian decision-makers will gain the ability “to make our sovereign decisions.” Interoperability gives Ottawa a say in joint operations in Canadian airspace and territorial waters; it also “enhances US confidence in our ability to provide effective command and control of assigned forces.” Canada could improve its efforts to share information with the US, particularly in the maritime domain where Canada needs underwater intelligence for the Arctic (especially if the submarine service is retired), or by seeking “greater access to the US defence marketplace” to sustain Canada’s own defence industrial base.

Second, Canada’s influence is enhanced organizationally through NORAD. Established in 1958, NORAD is a bi-national command structure that has as its second-in-command a Canadian officer (Pickford and Collins 2016). Initially concerned with continental airspace defence, the strength of NORAD is that it allows Canada to protect its “sovereign decision-making” by having a seat at the table. One respondent recommended that NORAD be expanded to include an “integrated Maritime response” that includes Mexico and Caribbean states under one command. The existing North Warning System radar installations spread across the Arctic are in need of an upgrade, while the RCAF needs to be equipped with new jet interceptors. Other areas for improvement are better coordination on cyber operations and defence.

Another area the survey respondents singled out for action is ballistic missile defence (BMD). The Paul Martin government walked away from participating in the US BMD program in 2005. However, since then, Canada’s position has become more complicated due to Ottawa’s endorsement of NATO’s own BMD program in Europe (Futter and Collins 2016). Another issue is the 2004 decision to allow NORAD’s early warning information to be used in the US BMD system. This arrangement may have assuaged US concerns on Canada’s later refusal to participate in BMD but it is unlikely to survive indefinitely, especially since other US early warning assets have now made the link to NORAD increasingly superfluous. As one respondent noted, the current Canadian stance on BMD “is loony

and needs to be abandoned.” Moreover, non-participation in BMD leaves the country “vulnerable,” meaning Canadian foreign policy can “be held hostage” by governments (e.g., North Korea or Iran) capable of threatening Ottawa with missile strikes if a decision is made to deploy the CAF abroad. Joining BMD would allow decision-makers to “maintain space to act sovereign in foreign and defence affairs.” By participating in BMD, Canada will be plugging a gap in the existing NORAD framework by giving this country the “political and military mechanisms” to have a say in the operational interception of missiles directed at Canada. BMD would also provide decision-makers with additional technological, industrial, and intelligence benefits. Likewise, BMD represents a possibly “low-cost assurance of solidarity with the US when other interests may differ.”

“While ‘the future of NATO is expensive, over-extended, and unwieldy,’ all respondents emphasized the importance of Canada remaining a member of the world’s most powerful military alliance.”

In terms of NATO, Canada was a founding member of the alliance in 1949 with the Treaty of Washington, when western European states formed an alliance with the United States – and Canada – to deter the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has called into doubt the purpose of NATO, with one respondent suggesting that Canada should have left NATO. NATO spent the 1990s and 2000s expanding into former Warsaw Pact countries, becoming a “regional development organization.” The alliance has engaged in security sector reform to strengthen the governance and security forces of certain states and, since 9/11, it has operated out-of-region in responding to crises in North Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. However, Russian revanchism and Europe’s importance to Canada for economic and historical reasons means we should stay engaged with the alliance. Moreover, should there ever be a deterioration in the Canada-US relationship, NATO would serve as a means to buttress it.

While “the future of NATO is expensive, over-extended, and unwieldy,” all respondents emphasized the importance of Canada remaining a member of the

world’s most powerful military alliance. NATO’s key strength is that it is “a way to solve collective action problems” and defend and control allies. Consequently, NATO must remain a “bulwark” of Canada’s foreign and defence policy. NATO “priorities should remain Canada’s core priorities,” chief of which are BMD, counter-proliferation, and stability operations.

The need for staying within the alliance is attributed to a number of factors, one of which is deterring an increasingly belligerent Moscow. Russia’s actions in Ukraine will ensure that NATO remains “central to any Canadian response.” In fact, Russian ambitions make NATO “a necessary constraint” on Moscow and could possibly lead it to reverting to its Cold War-era role as a “collective defence pact and strategic alliance.”

On a larger level, NATO remains effectively the only “international intervention force in the world” and will remain a “critical force for stability.” As demonstrated in the former Yugoslavia and now in the Baltics, NATO provides a means to ensure stability in Europe through troop presence and admitting new members on the basis of their ability to accept “core democratic values of the alliance membership.” Finally, NATO’s existence ensures that the United States stays “institutionally engaged

in... collective security,” especially in the event of isolationist sentiment in Washington. Canadian participation can also help to “dampen expansionist enthusiasms” for more out-of-region operations. However, membership requires the CAF to be interoperable with major member states – the US, the UK, France, and Germany.

Differences emerged on what Canada’s contributions to the alliance should be. Given Canada’s relative wealth, some respondents argued for an increase in defence expenditures to the NATO goal of 2 percent of GDP, established during the 2014 Wales Summit. Others countered this view by arguing that Canada is a “marginal player within NATO” and “should continue to press for [more] ‘voice’” in the organization’s deliberations without taking on onerous costs or commitments. As such, some recommended that Ottawa push NATO to assess what capabilities and resources it needs for the near future. If Canada does commit to NATO operations, it should be small numbers of rapidly deployed special forces and training advisors. A minority view posited that Canada try and restrain NATO enlargement and push for the removal of the alliance’s tactical nuclear weapons, lest they provoke Russia. However, the majority of respondents favoured continued Canadian participation in NATO for the foreseeable future, even if Ottawa pursues stronger partnerships with non-NATO, like-minded states such as South Korea and Australia.

The recently inaugurated Trump presidency, however, does cast doubt over NATO’s future. During the campaign, Donald Trump “criticized NATO as obsolete” and demanded that NATO member states increase their defence spending in return for continued American security guarantees. With only a few exceptions, Trump’s executive appointments – such as Michael Flynn (who has since resigned as National Security Advisor) and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson – have done little to quell the continuing uncertainty about the new administration’s ties to Russia and commitment to NATO. The need for Canada to continue with its strong support for NATO is now particularly vital. Consequently, Canada may have to re-examine its financial commitments to defence from the current 0.9 percent of GDP (Payton 2017).

Canada’s Role in the United Nations

The Trudeau government has made Canadian engagement with the United Nations generally, and peacekeeping specifically, a key plank of its defence and foreign policy discussions. The government has not provided specifics (as of this writing), beyond pushing for a 2012-2022 security council seat and committing 600 troops to an as yet unnamed African country (possibly Mali), though this commitment now appears to have been put on hold pending further discussions with the new Trump administration.

Among respondents, the strengths of the UN are seen to be in non-security matters, such as in health care, education, and assisting refugees. The organization serves as the global focal point for discussions on international concerns, providing an avenue in which to reach compromises on major global problems. The UN, like other multilateral organizations, is “useful for upholding some international norms and mores.” The UN also serves as a “framework through which peacekeeping operations may be organized” and legitimized by security council resolutions, thus helping sustain domestic political support when military action occurs.

Consequently, Canada should “neither venerate nor spurn the UN just for the sake of doing so.” Instead, Canada “must work within the organization to advance its interests.” Given the limited money Ottawa spends on defence, Canada will need to establish networks and develop a cooperation strategy to further the country’s influence. Outside of NATO, the UN remains the only international organization in which joint military action is an actual position. Neither the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, the G7, or the G20 are likely to move towards a position where they would undertake collective military action. Canada should use its involvement in the UN to “invest... in organizational and financial reform efforts.”

“The need to support the transatlantic alliance and assist allies has characterized Canadian peacekeeping and non-peacekeeping missions ever since.”

However, scepticism remains on Canada-UN engagement, especially when it comes to peacekeeping. In the words of one respondent, the UN’s effectiveness in “international military undertakings should be viewed with a very jaundiced eye.” The operational failings of Rwanda, Srebrenica, and currently in the Democratic Republic of the Congo illustrate the organization’s inefficient decision-making structure and the “high threat that Canadian missions will become exposed to violence, or worse, placed again in a position of hapless observers of atrocity.” If the CAF is going to be sent abroad, it would be in a less vulnerable position if it deployed with NATO. Internally, the UN’s “outdated” security council structure and “oddities of committee membership rotations often preclude effective engagement.” Still, it “inexplicably carries the imprimatur of global ethical action,” and for this reason Canada should support “its security efforts.” Hence, if Canada does become involved, it should stick “to training as opposed to

deploy[ing] more peacekeeping troops.” The broad concept of peace support operations and the popularity of the concept give Canadian decision-makers some leeway in determining which of its comparative advantages, in training for example, can best contribute to UN missions.

However, key experts also posited that Canada should look at non-UN multilateral opportunities. While acknowledging the UN as a key diplomatic forum, Ottawa’s efforts and resources should be on regional organizations that address more immediate national interests, such as the Arctic Council, or smaller international organizations like the G7. Alternatively, Ottawa should further multilateral engagement in Asia where Canada has a “notorious ...deficit” in its involvement in regional organizations. Engagement with organizations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), through the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), and developing economic and security interests in the region “are a significant force multiplier” and would come at “relatively little cost” for Canada. Coalitions of the willing with like-minded nations, such as Australia, should also remain an option in the event that Canada opts for missions outside of a UN framework.

Of note, the survey respondents roundly criticized the Trudeau government’s push for Canadian participation in UN peacekeeping operations. The root of the problem is twofold: first, the mythologizing of peacekeeping as it relates to Canadian identity, and second, the conceptual challenges of the term itself. With the former, the term “peacekeeping” is “equal parts myth and political shibboleth,” which is attributed to a “misunderstanding of Canada’s role in... very early Cold War-era missions

(Suez, Sinai, Cyprus).” During the Cold War, Canada’s peacekeeping operations were more about “assisting NATO allies than it was about normative benefits of peacekeeping.”

The need to support the transatlantic alliance and assist allies has characterized Canadian peacekeeping and non-peacekeeping missions ever since. In fact, it can be argued that the most successful peacekeeping mission was Canada’s deployment to (West) Germany during the Cold War. In this light, taking command of a NATO battalion of troops in Latvia can be considered peacekeeping. Consequently, the government “needs to understand that peacekeeping is a means, not an end.” Canada does not need to pursue peacekeeping as a policy objective for its own sake. Because peacekeeping is “so deeply ingrained in Canadian identity... we will continue to do dopey things like look for peacekeeping operations where there aren’t any, or embrace operations that have no impact on Canadian interests.”

Governments of all stripes “should get real about ‘peacekeeping.’” (One respondent referred to it as “an imaginary role.”) The UN is dealing with much more complex conflicts today than the intra-state tensions of the past. As noted above, the current security environment is a mix of intra-state warfare, non-state belligerents, and criminal actors. Peacekeeping today is better understood as “peace support” with UN troops frequently involved in supporting a local government, protecting vulnerable populations, using force against outlaw factions, and building up the capabilities of indigenous security forces (security sector reform). However, countries that are strong supporters of peacekeeping are often from the developing world, like Bangladesh, who “rent out their troops for foreign exchange.” The size of Canada’s military precludes any possibility of the country becoming a “top troop contributor.” But Canada could play an important role in training foreign peacekeepers. In the end, any participation in UN missions must be “in areas where our strengths can be effective, and... [there exists] a clear exit strategy and end date.”

Canada’s Future Capabilities

In looking towards the future of Canadian defence, experts addressed the development of niche defence capabilities, procurement, and “whole-of-government” (WOG) approaches to policy-making. An important question is whether the CAF should remain a multi-purpose, combat-capable military, or pursue specific capabilities that complement allied militaries. Some respondents recommend a niche-CAF given that the military is both “too small to be all-singing, all dancing” and is constrained by a “lack of political will and fiscal will in peacetime.”

Given this understanding it would appear to make the most sense for the CAF to focus on comparative advantages driven first by Canada’s own territorial needs, and second, by alliance priorities. Respondents suggested a number of areas where Canada might invest in comparative advantages, including Special Operations Forces (SOF), intelligence gathering (using individuals and through the interception of signals), military and police training, cold weather deployment assets, coast guard air and naval capabilities, multilateral security and development projects, and disaster assistance relief (e.g., the Disaster Assistance Response Team [DART] and medical teams). Other suggestions included cutting entire fleets of equipment, like the Victoria-class submarines, in return for the navy concentrating on anti-submarine warfare. In this scenario, the air force would retain a minimal fighter jet capacity in exchange for investing more into lift and reconnaissance aircraft as the army reduces

its personnel numbers and the navy focuses on its surface fleet. Whatever structuring decisions are made, they should be done with the view of retaining a capacity to quickly rebuild a broad-spectrum military in the event of some future crisis.

In countering this view, other respondents pointed out that Canada offers no comparative advantage by developing a niche military. Any desired niche capability would require the maintenance of a “conventional force structure and training regime to produce true specialist capabilities.” SOFs,

for example, draw their recruits primarily from the ranks of the army but also from the air force and navy. In the end, decision-makers should be concerned about how we acquire capabilities and how much they will cost.

“The overriding consideration in defence procurement should be the ‘quality and utility of the product, and cost ratios,’ especially as Canada only spends limited amounts of money on defence.”

A number of experts posited that a constantly changing global security environment means that it’s “a fool’s errand to tend to develop a concentration or a so-called comparative advantage.” Canada should therefore keep to a multi-purpose military with “full spectrum warfare capabilities” because potential future crises may require such capabilities. A number of experts noted that a niche force could diminish Canada’s “economic and diplomatic sovereignty” and hamper the government’s ability to contribute to international operations. Of course, not everyone agreed with the either/or view on niche capabilities. The CAF could maintain its core competencies – fighter jets, armour, artillery, frigates – and still specialize in “areas that provide ... unique and robust capabilities,” like cyber, DART, defence diplomacy, cooperation and training, and special forces.

Opinion among the respondents was divided over the issue of procurement, too – specifically, whether governments should continue to leverage economic benefits, otherwise known as offsets, from procurement contracts. These offsets usually require businesses to spend money in Canada on certain industries (e.g., aerospace) in order to earn a procurement contract. For those who argue for staying with the current approach, “Canada has gone too far down that path,” especially in shipbuilding. Some respondents also pointed to the existence of a “very extensive regime of industrial benefits in place for decades.” Likewise, all other advanced economies engage in offset policies of some sorts. If done right, offsets can assist Canada in being a leading research, development, and scientific hub while providing the CAF with the best equipment it needs. However, any leveraging of procurement should be sustainable. Merely having companies set up factories and then close them once a project is complete is inefficient. The focus should be on strategic long-term capabilities, such as cyber, electronic warfare, or Arctic equipment. For those taking a more restrictive view, Canada should only leverage a procurement project if it is a product already “being produced (or could be easily modified) by an existing, solvent company.” Another view is that offsets should be also focused on acquiring strategic value, such as producing equipment that ensures interoperability with allies, as well as ensuring fiscal responsibility.

Opposed to this view is the argument that “[t]o build everything from scratch here costs far too much, is too slow, has limited markets abroad – and has left the CF with obsolescent equipment.” Governments will keep pursuing offsets because of votes in certain regions rather than because of military strategic or defence policy objectives. Offset policies are also said to be “notoriously difficult to measure and lead to massive inflation in costs” while contributing to delays. The better choice is to buy “off the shelf” from established producers or to engage in joint purchasing with allies who have similar requirements. The overriding consideration in defence procurement should be the “quality and utility of the product, and cost ratios,” especially as Canada only spends limited amounts of money on defence.

There was more consensus among the survey respondents on the matter of whether the government should approach defence from a whole-of-government perspective. There is a need to move beyond the status quo of government departments sticking to their individual mandates at the expense of cooperating with one another in regards to “any foreign and defence policy issue areas.” This is necessary for aligning defence dollars and establishing priorities on what capabilities the CAF needs to do its job. While the concept is said to be “a bit tired,” it is nevertheless important to remember that the military is only part of the solution; international diplomacy, humanitarian and economic assistance, reconstruction, and police and judicial training are all crucial for international deployments. Indeed, development aid should “always be used to shore up Canadian interests.” Ideally all defence policy and foreign policy reviews “should be done as parallel exercises, with a coordinating body to make sure there is consistency across the portfolios.” One possible coordinating body could be a UK-like joint operational cabinet committee involving defence, foreign affairs, development, and public safety. That being said, WOG is a challenge to implement effectively in conflict conditions as opposed to being simply “decree[d] in a national capital,” as became clear in Afghanistan, where it never worked well at either the Canadian or international level. If WOG is to work, the structures need to be “designed from the outset, and have to be built in ways that create and sustain a sense of ‘buy-in’ from all relevant players.”

Several experts agreed that WOG might be sensible but took issue with its practicality. One noted that only in “serious conflicts” did governments ever come together as “one cohesive whole” (e.g., Second World War) and that outside of such existential situations, departmental interests will dominate. Another referred to the concept as “*hole* of government” given the silo nature of departments. The Afghanistan conflict was a classic case of the latter: Foreign Affairs and National Defence “wrestled for influence” while the Privy Council Office and Prime Minister’s Office “ran the show.” Thus, at its worse, WOG simply becomes a mantra that masks “imperatives that come from crisis response or political pressures.” The only way to overcome the limitations on WOG approaches is to “ensure that individual international policies don’t contradict each other, especially when it comes to ‘values’ or principles.” One example is the tension of industrial benefits and selling arms to countries with spotty human rights records. Another would be trade or investment agreements with countries with state-owned enterprises engaged in overseas industrial espionage.

In sum, Canada needs to maintain a multi-purpose, combat-capable CAF even if it wants to develop niche capabilities that fulfill desired roles on international operations, whether under NATO, the UN, or otherwise. Criticism will continue to abound when it comes to defence procurement. But steps need to be taken to ensure the consideration of “off-the-shelf” equipment and joint purchasing with allies, in the absence of a quality but competitive product from a domestic manufacturer. Lastly, limitations aside, Canada should try and remove as many silos as possible in leveraging all its resources when undertaking international operations. The experiences of Afghanistan should not necessarily lead to a discarding of a WOG approach to Canadian defence policy.

Policy Recommendations

AREA	NUMBER	RECOMMENDATION
Canada's defence priorities & principles	1	Canadian defence policy should be guided by three priorities: defence of Canada; defence of North America; and support for international security.
	2	Canada's armed forces need to be funded and properly equipped to project power in the Arctic and over Canadian territory.
	3	Immediate defence operational concerns are responding with our allies to the threats of global terrorism and supporting NATO in Eastern Europe.
	4	International deployments need to be guided by clear rationales and exit strategies. Deployments should occur alongside like-minded allies.
	5	Canada must work to strengthen international norms surrounding the counter-proliferation of WMD, borders, democracy, and trade.
Canada's security environment	6	The Canada-US relationship cannot be allowed to deteriorate over isolationist or security concerns.
	7	Great power challenges from Russia and China will remain a major preoccupation. Canada will need to reassure its allies in Eastern Europe and the Asia-Pacific that state sovereignty will be respected and upheld.
	8	Investments in intelligence capabilities are required to properly assess the impact of great power challenges.
	9	Weak governance and failed states in North Africa, the Middle East, South and Central Asia, and parts of Latin America will remain an ongoing concern for defence planners.
	10	Domestic terrorism and hate groups represent a growing problem that will require investments in intelligence capabilities and cooperation with other government agencies.
	11	Cyber threats and the proliferation of WMD by rogue states will remain a defence concern.
	12	Defence policy will need to recognize and respond to the growing threat of climate change and environmental disasters both at home and abroad.
Canada's alliances	13	The US alliance is key to Canada's security. Ottawa needs to examine whether it should increase defence spending to 2 percent of GDP, the standard set by NATO.
	14	Canada should pursue information-sharing arrangements with the US on maritime intelligence and monitoring capabilities, and cyber-security.
	15	The Royal Canadian Air Force's CF-18 fighters need to be replaced as soon as possible.
	16	The North Warning System requires upgrading.
	17	Canada should notify the United States that it is interested in participating in the continental Ballistic Missile Defence system.
	18	US participation in NATO needs to be encouraged as it helps counter isolationism.
Canada's role in the United Nations	19	The UN's strengths are in non-security areas: humanitarian aid, health and education programs, etc. Canada's efforts should complement and improve these programs (e.g., disaster assistance, military field hospitals).
	20	Canada needs to work with like-minded countries in reforming the UN security and governance structure.
	21	Military contributions to UN missions should be in areas in which the organization needs improvement in – e.g., training and technical support – and not frontline ground forces.
	22	Canada must pay attention to advancing its defence interests in regional, multilateral organizations in the Arctic and Asia-Pacific (e.g., Arctic Council, ASEAN, ADMM-Plus).
Canada's future capabilities	23	Canada still needs a multi-purpose, combat-capable force, but certain niche capabilities can be enhanced so that they fulfill multilateral demands (e.g., special forces, military training, and disaster assistance).
	24	When it comes to future procurements, we must examine opportunities for joint purchasing with allies who have similar defence requirements.
	25	Off-the-shelf purchasing should be considered in military defence procurement. Domestically sourced acquisitions should be based on a competitive cost and quality basis only.
	26	A "whole-of-government" view to defence policy is essential if Canada is to leverage all of its resources in international affairs.

About the Authors



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Jeff was a political staffer and researcher for several provincial and federal politicians including the Ministers of National Defence and Veterans Affairs, New Brunswick's Legislative Secretary for Military Affairs, and the Chair of the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence.

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Appendix A:

List of Participants

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3. Andrea Lane, PhD Political Science Candidate and Deputy Director, Centre for the Study of Security and Development, Dalhousie University
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7. Eric Morse, Deputy Director, Defence and Security Studies Programme, Royal Canadian Military Institute
8. Eugene Lang, former Chief of Staff, Minister of National Defence (2002-2006)
9. Hugh Segal, former Senator and Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney
10. Jack Granatstein, Military Historian and Senior Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute
11. James Cox, Brigadier General (Retired), Senior Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute and Research Fellow, CDA Institute
12. Kim Richard Nossal, Professor of Political Studies, Queen's University
13. Michael Petric, Policy Advisor, Minister of National Defence (2012-2014)
14. Rachael Bryson, PhD Political Science Candidate, Carleton University
15. Rob Huebert, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Calgary
16. Roy Rempel, Fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and former Defence Advisor to Prime Minister Stephen Harper
17. Stéfanie von Hlatky, Assistant Professor of Political Studies and Director, Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen's University
18. Stephen Saideman, Paterson Chair in International Affairs, NPSIA, Carleton University
19. Stephen Toope, Director, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto



True North in
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The Macdonald-Laurier Institute fills a gap in Canada's democratic infrastructure by focusing our work on the full range of issues that fall under Ottawa's jurisdiction.

- The Macdonald-Laurier Institute fills a gap in Canada's democratic infrastructure by focusing our work on the full range of issues that fall under Ottawa's jurisdiction.
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- First book, *The Canadian Century: Moving out of America's Shadow*, won the Sir Antony Fisher International Memorial Award in 2011.
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"The study by Brian Lee Crowley and Ken Coates is a 'home run'. The analysis by Douglas Bland will make many uncomfortable but it is a wake up call that must be read."

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Independent and non-partisan, the Macdonald-Laurier Institute is increasingly recognized as the thought leader on national issues in Canada, prodding governments, opinion leaders and the general public to accept nothing but the very best public policy solutions for the challenges Canada faces.



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The Macdonald-Laurier Institute exists not merely to burnish the splendid legacy of two towering figures in Canadian history – Sir John A. Macdonald and Sir Wilfrid Laurier – but to renew that legacy. A Tory and a Grit, an English speaker and a French speaker – these two men represent the very best of Canada's fine political tradition. As prime minister, each championed the values that led to Canada assuming her place as one of the world's leading democracies. We will continue to vigorously uphold these values, the cornerstones of our nation.



Working for a Better Canada


Good policy doesn't just happen; it requires good ideas, hard work, and being in the right place at the right time. In other words, it requires MLI. We pride ourselves on independence, and accept no funding from the government for our research. If you value our work and if you believe in the possibility of a better Canada, consider making a tax-deductible donation. The Macdonald-Laurier Institute is a registered charity.

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Macdonald-Laurier Institute Publications




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
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
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
**Toward a More Fair
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Sean Speer and Ian Lee




**Risk, Prevention and
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Understanding FPIC
Ken S. Coates and
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Understanding UNDRIP
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What people are saying about the Macdonald- Laurier Institute

In five short years, the institute has established itself as a steady source of high-quality research and thoughtful policy analysis here in our nation's capital. Inspired by Canada's deep-rooted intellectual tradition of ordered liberty – as exemplified by Macdonald and Laurier – the institute is making unique contributions to federal public policy and discourse. Please accept my best wishes for a memorable anniversary celebration and continued success.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE STEPHEN HARPER

The Macdonald-Laurier Institute is an important source of fact and opinion for so many, including me. Everything they tackle is accomplished in great depth and furthers the public policy debate in Canada. Happy Anniversary, this is but the beginning.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE PAUL MARTIN

In its mere five years of existence, the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, under the erudite Brian Lee Crowley's vibrant leadership, has, through its various publications and public events, forged a reputation for brilliance and originality in areas of vital concern to Canadians: from all aspects of the economy to health care reform, aboriginal affairs, justice, and national security.

BARBARA KAY, NATIONAL POST COLUMNIST

Intelligent and informed debate contributes to a stronger, healthier and more competitive Canadian society. In five short years the Macdonald-Laurier Institute has emerged as a significant and respected voice in the shaping of public policy. On a wide range of issues important to our country's future, Brian Lee Crowley and his team are making a difference.

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