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# Commentary

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## Canada's New Defence Policy: Threats, Priorities, and the Failure to Achieve Long-Term Relevance

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On June 6, 2017, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland addressed parliament, delivering a detailed, and at times passionate, speech on the present and future condition of the international system, and Canada's role within it. The speech highlighted growing instability among nations, not least Russian adventurism in Ukraine and the increasing isolationist sentiments within the United States. In that, she echoed similar comments from German Chancellor Angela Merkel when she urged Europeans to "take our fate into our own hands." As Merkel concluded, "The times when we could completely rely on others are, to an extent, over" (Birnbaum and Noack 2017).

For a Canadian Foreign Minister to identify the failings of contemporary US foreign policy, and suggest Canada fill in its gap, is hardly unprecedented. The 1970 External Affairs White Paper had foreshadowed Pierre Trudeau's declining interest in NATO and emphasis on Europe and Japan to reduce Canadian dependence on the United States. Another example can be found in the Chrétien government's human security agenda and soft power efforts of the 1990s. Both cases, however, masked a further retrenchment of Canada's hard power assets - at least until they were partially reversed, such as with the 1975 defence structure review or with the infusion of funding after September 11, 2001.

Minister Freeland's speech had a very different purpose: a more muscular international policy, backed up by a rejuvenated, properly resourced Canadian armed forces. In so doing, it laid the foundation for the long awaited Defence Policy Review (DPR) statement, which was to guide the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) for the next 20 or so years.

*The author of this document has worked independently and is solely responsible for the views presented here. The opinions are not necessarily those of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, its Directors or Supporters.*

While the DPR makes a number of important contributions to improving the military's ability to manage the threats and advance the country's interests abroad, several of its features will actually hinder its ability to achieve that aim. At its core, the document fails to provide an adequate conceptual foundation for the Department of National Defence to plan for the future. It only speaks about Canada's interests in vague terms, largely declining to identify specific threats facing the country or its allies. Furthermore, it does not link the threats facing Canadian interests to actual responses. Instead its guidance to the CAF is largely predicated on supporting allies in multinational contexts.

The failure to provide proper planning guidance will have significant consequences, hindering the military's ability to adapt to future contingencies. This is particularly critical in an environment where technology development is accelerating and will likely revolutionize the conduct of war. By refusing to prioritize, the military must prepare for all scenarios, scattering precious resources over a wide area, and leaving significant gaps. Finally, these issues are likely to be exacerbated by particular features of defence administration in Canada. Underfunding of operations and rapidly shifting priorities will only serve to diminish the long-term influence of the DPR.

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## Structural Improvements

Unlike some of the more transformational white papers such as 1971 and 1994, the DPR does not bring about a fundamental realignment of Canada's defence policy. Rather, it largely recommitments the CAF to the present roles and force structure - one that was initially outlined in the 1994 White Paper and reiterated in the 2007 Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS).

The DPR's aims should be viewed in modest terms. First it is largely concerned with ensuring the CAF are able to meet current commitments and requirements, therefore fielding the forces that the government calls upon it to provide. This has been a serious issue for the past several years, as the CAF has struggled to meet force demands due to cutbacks and the prevalence of chronically under-strength units (in terms of number of personnel) in the military. The main thrust of the effort will occur between 2017 and 2022, when the Department of National Defence (DND) will focus on improving the availability and responsiveness of the armed forces.

This goal be achieved by improving the military's personnel situation, primarily by attracting a more representative cross section of the population into its ranks. With access to a wider pool of candidates, the CAF hopes to improve the availability and responsiveness of units and draw in the technical skills necessary to operate in the future battlefield.

The military will start to ramp up capital acquisitions after 2022. This two-phase approach is consistent with statements made by the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) in regards to building the capacity of the armed forces to absorb new equipment. The actual platforms to be acquired, for the most part, are the same ones identified in the 2007 CFDS, including the frigate/destroyer replacements (the Canadian Surface Combatant or CSC), maritime patrol aircraft, tactical fighter replacements, and a new fleet of army combat vehicles. These programs remain the primary procurement priorities for the CAF, both in terms of their operational necessity, as well as in their cost. However, much of the announced increases in funding would be for programs currently on the books, with a few exceptions - the government nearly doubled the estimated financial outlay for the CSC, and

added 23 additional aircraft to the future tactical fighter fleet, while expanding the CAF capabilities in three specific areas: space systems, cyber, and drone warfare. In sum, these increases and new programs will eat up much of the additional funding allotted within the DPR.

Although they are a good first step, they belie more serious problems with the review and the future of the CAF.

## Tactical Clarity, Strategic Myopia

Unconventionally, the DPR does not start with a discussion of the overall strategic environment, which is the norm for major policy documents of this type. An examination of major Canadian defence policy reviews from 1964 to the present (Bland 1997), as well as similar documents produced by Australia and the United Kingdom, show they follow a rough, logical structure:

- What are the country's foreign interests, and what threats/security challenges does it face in the future?
- How should the country's armed forces respond to them?
- What resources will be committed to meet those requirements?
- How will those resources be administered?

Rather than employ this timeworn process, the DPR launches into an overview of personnel policy. In isolation, this may be an acceptable approach, indicating the serious situation facing the CAF in terms of its under-strength units and problems retaining current personnel, and the priority accorded to personnel by the government. It would also align with the near-term focus of government policy and funding increase. The problem emerges in the subsequent sections that deal with the core questions that should inform any defence policy.

After Minister Freeland's forceful (albeit last minute) foreign policy statement, one would assume that the DPR would clearly identify the main security challenges facing Canada. Quite the opposite; the review provides a superficial examination, which is insufficient to guide subsequent questions on the CAF's goals, missions, and resources committed. This is readily apparent in its treatment on Russia, which "has proven its willingness to test the international security environment. A degree of major power competition has returned to the international system" (DND 2017, 50). This is followed up by perfunctory sentences on Russia's invasion of Crimea and its position in the Arctic.

Contrast this to the detail about Russian behaviour provided in just a portion of the 2015 United Kingdom Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR):

3.19 At the NATO summit in Lisbon in 2010, we committed to work with our Allies to build a partnership with Russia. But since then Russia has become more aggressive, authoritarian and nationalist, increasingly defining itself in opposition to the West. The illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and continuing support to separatists in eastern Ukraine through the use of deniable, hybrid tactics and media manipulation have shown Russia's willingness to undermine wider international standards of cooperation in order to secure its perceived interests.

3.20 Russia is mid-way through a programme of major investment to modernise and upgrade its military, including its nuclear forces. It has also increased its nuclear exercises and rhetoric, with threats to base nuclear forces in Kaliningrad and Crimea. Its military activity around the territory of our Allies, and close to UK airspace and territorial waters, is designed to test our responses. Russia's behaviour will continue to be hard to predict, and, though highly unlikely, we cannot rule out the possibility that it may feel tempted to act aggressively against NATO Allies. (United Kingdom Government 2015, 31)

The UK SDSR clearly identifies the threat posed by Russia, and later matches specific capabilities to it, including an optimized warfighting division “for high intensity combat operations” (United Kingdom Government 2015, 31). Similarly, the Australian Government’s recent Defence White Paper (2016) has extended sections on the aims and threats posed by the People’s Republic of China. The PRC is one of Australia’s leading trading partners and a major engine of economic growth. Nevertheless, the Australian White Paper is clear eyed about the threat posed by the PRC, and makes substantial investments to check them. By comparison, the Government of Canada is unable to even identify China as a potential threat, simply noting that it “is a rising economic power with an increasing ability to project influence globally” (DND 2016, 50).

This failure to identify threats will hinder the Department of National Defence’s ability to undertake proper planning. Continuing with the Australian example, the 2016 White Paper identifies foreign submarines as a major risk for the country’s security, pointing out that “half of the world’s submarines will be operating in the [Indo-Pacific] region” and China’s navy is expected to have more than 70 submarines by 2020. It further states:

Australia has one of the largest maritime domains in the world and we need the capacity to defend and further our interests from the Pacific to the Indian Oceans and from the areas to our north to the Southern Ocean. Submarines are a powerful instrument for deterring conflict and a potent weapon should conflict occur. (Australian Government 2016, 91)

To manage this threat, the Australian government committed itself to doubling its undersea fleet by 2030 from six to 12 “regionally superior submarines” (Australian Government 2016,19) as well as acquiring a whole range of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platforms. They include nine new ASW-specialized frigates, 15 Boeing P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, and seven Northrop Grumman MQ-4A Triton high altitude surveillance drones.

Canada is by no means inured from such threats. Chinese nuclear attack and conventional submarines can easily transit the Pacific and operate along our coastline and possibly even in the Arctic. Yet the DPR makes no reference to either China’s growing submarine fleet or indeed its massive investments in its naval force. Correspondingly, it does not either explore what qualitative ASW capabilities may be required or call for an increase in the quantity of Canadian naval capabilities to be deployed. Even its statement on the need to procure 15 Canadian Surface Combatants arises less from a calculation on the current/future threat environment and what capabilities these platforms can offer, than simply the need to maintain a similarly sized surface fleet for a naval task group, as in the immediate past.

Minister Freeland’s foreign policy statement also makes little mention of threats to Canada, other than perhaps in a cursory way. Yet her speech also provided a partial explanation for this omission: Canada itself has few direct threats to its security and therefore its foreign relations are guided, in part, by ensuring that it maintains a rule-based international order. This is by no means a groundbreaking concept: it has guided many prior defence white papers. Maintenance of the current stable international order is in itself a goal, and conducted through bilateral and multilateral security organizations, like the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the UN. This has consequences for the CAF, which is well summed by one Colonel Jonathan Vance writing in 2003, long before becoming CDS:

“This failure to identify threats will hinder the Department of National Defence’s ability to undertake proper planning.”

Canada, like other “medium powers” has a history of, and preference for being a force provider at the tactical level, and not a force employer at the operation[al] level of war . . . therefore CF [Canadian Forces] mission success is defined by its tactical presence in a theater of operations rather than its tactical performance in achieving Canadian strategic objectives. (Vance 2005, 273)

Vance’s thesis is that the role and focus of the armed forces is less about employing forces to achieve specific aims (force employer) but rather to provide effective contributions to multilateral bodies (force provider). By failing to identify threats or the possible responses to them, the military loses a powerful tool to identify and prepare for future challenges. Instead force decisions are guided heavily by meeting Canada’s multilateral commitments.

This view is evident in how the three roles and missions outlined for the CAF are explored within the DPR. Domestic security is designated the highest priority, but the document fails to list a single threat to Canada proper. Instead it vaguely points to the requirement of providing an “effective deterrent and prevent[ing] conventional military threats from reaching our shores” (DND 2017, 60). The only firm commitment that can be identified is to “maintain a robust capacity to respond to domestic emergencies” (DND 2017, 83). The DPR does not identify a direct threat to Canada, just the need to deter them, whatever they may be.

The subsequent sections “Secure in North America” and “Engaged in the World” follow a similar formula. Neither highlights any specific threats or interests, at least ones that a can effectively guide the military’s policy-making. A good example can be found in the following passage:

As a G7 country and founding member of NATO, Canada has a strong interest in global stability and open trade, and we will continue to do our part on the international stage to protect our interests and support our allies. Canada’s engagement in the world is also guided by values of **inclusion, compassion, accountable governance, and respect for diversity and human rights**. (DND 2017, 61; emphasis in original)

The DPR further states that Canada will “pursue leadership roles and will prioritize interoperability in its planning and capability development to ensure seamless cooperation with allies and partners, particularly with NATO” (DND 2017, 61). Interoperability, which entails achieving (ideally) seamless integration with allied forces, is the overriding focus. This can lead one to a desultory observation – that it is not what Canada actually needs to do the job at hand, but how much is required to satisfy its partners that it is making a sufficient contribution.

The DPR’s focus on cyber security provides perhaps the only exception to this rule. Canada and its allies have been the target of numerous cyber attacks, including mass espionage, infrastructure strikes, and election interference. Furthermore, the cyber domain lacks many of the norms that exist within “traditional” security domain, like difficulty of attribution and limits on action (Betz and Stevens 2011). Due to the direct imminent threat to Canada, the DPR provides an immediate forceful, robust response, including a clear mandate and the tools required by the military to act effectively in this area. This fact should be commended, even if it does little to address the overall situation.

## Changing Technological Battlefield

The DPR offers a good starting point to deal with cyber threats. Yet, even then, its focus on cyber security belies a significant weakness – specifically in managing technology. The document highlights the importance of innovation, noting that “technological developments point to a future of defence that is expected to be vastly different than today” (DND 2017, 55). Despite this realization, the DPR does not fundamentally alter how the CAF goes about modernization, to its increasing detriment. As noted above, the review fails to offer guidance about threats, and then to match the capabilities required.

Instead, the CAF will continue to practise a form of tactical adaptation to the threats, a consequence of the force provider approach on Canadian military procurement. It is forced to identify and adopt technologies employed by allies in order to maintain interoperability and operational relevance. A good example can be observed through the military's evolving relationship with unmanned aerial vehicles. Between 2001 and 2017 the tactical and operational considerations, largely in Afghanistan, drove Canadian policy towards drones, with a relative absence of higher political or strategic direction. Initially, the Army led the acquisition and fielding of a drone system, with limited Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) involvement (Schaub 2015).

This approach was haphazard and yielded unsatisfactory results. Only after several years of careful effort did the CAF field an effective capability, and this was by the time major combat operations ended in 2011. After that point, much of the organizational capacity disappeared, due to a lack of high-level direction, political concerns surrounding the technology, and an austere budget environment. With the DPR now giving the military a mandate for this area, one would hope it could be used to build the justification and institutional structure to sustain such a capability.

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Canada was fortunate that the Afghan theater initially started as a relatively low intensity conflict, and increased slowly over time. Early errors could be rectified without the CAF suffering major casualties. However, against a more capable opponent, these failures will be exploited with much more tragic consequences. Failing the identification of concrete threats and responses, the CAF will face the unpleasant task of playing catch-up for every new threat they face.

As an added complication, the accelerating pace of innovation also means that there is a narrowing window for embracing new technologies in order to obtain an advantage. Some are on the cusp of, or are currently, being fielded. These include additive manufacturing, directed energy weapons, and automation. Many of these have the potential to create a paradigm shift in military affairs, which is known in the United States as “Third Offset” strategies (Hicks et al. 2017). Perhaps the most significant development is the field in intelligence and targeting automation, where data analysis automation, combined with high bandwidth networks, is utilized to connect large numbers of sensor platforms to powerful data processing systems. This is a necessary shift, as the amount of data now being produced by sensor platforms is unmanageable by human beings in a timely fashion. These systems are proliferating down to even the tactical level, where individual soldiers are benefitting from enhanced information support (Dries 2017).

The DPR highlights the importance of information technologies, but it does not create an environment that can effectively manage or take advantage of them. Modernization efforts will remain focused on tactical developments, in order to ensure that specific platforms remain interoperable with allies. This also runs contrary to how these developments are altering military structures. This is evident in the recently released US Army and Marine Corps' *Multi-Domain White Paper*, which calls for:

[a] ready and resilient Army and Marine Corps combat forces capable of outmaneuvering adversaries physically and cognitively through the extension of combined arms across all domains. Through credible forward presence and resilient battle formations, **future Army and Marine Corps forces integrate and synchronize capabilities as part of a joint team** to create temporary windows of superiority across multiple domains and throughout the depth of the battlefield in order to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative; defeat enemies; and achieve military objectives. (US Army and Marine Corps 2017, 4; emphasis added)

The multi-domain strategy is simply the result of an ongoing push to bring various capabilities together and apply them in a truly joint fashion. The CAF, by comparison, will continue to pursue technologies in stovepipes. Commanders of the RCAF, Royal Canadian Navy, and Canadian Army will advance their own priorities, largely independently from each other and usually based on replacing existing platforms or acquiring capabilities currently employed by allies. This reactive approach to technology adoption is insufficient, considering that for many of these systems, the technology lifecycle is often measured in months or years, compared to decades, much like in the civilian sphere. The CAF seems destined to only identify and gain authorization for emerging capabilities after encountering mature versions of them being fielded by allies, placing them significantly behind the adoption curve.

Furthermore, the current procurement system, rooted in ensuring accountability of the public purse, is inadequate to deliver some of these systems in a timely manner. Indeed, they will generally follow the organizational priorities laid out by the environmental commands, which are more suited to the force provider concept and fail to take into account the broader cross-domain developments that are occurring. A former senior procurement official described the situation in a confidential interview with the author in the following terms: “Canada has a flip phone defence procurement system trying to operate in a smart phone world.”

Failing the proper identification of risks and threats, the DND could adopt an approach to manage technological change in a holistic manner. The DPR indicates that the government is committed to innovation, with an outlay of \$1.6 billion over the next 20 years on this area. However, this approach is more aimed at building and improving specific areas of technological competence; it is completely insufficient to adequately manage developments in this area. There simply are far too few dollars chasing too many large-scale needs.

Foreign allies have moved towards a more flexible and adaptive procurement model, with the implicit understanding of the risks it entails. For example, the United States has developed institutions tasked with identifying new technologies and delivering them to warfighters, including the Strategic Capabilities Office, Defense Experimental Units, and service specific organizations. Their efforts are understood to entail greater risk than before, and thus failure is not stigmatized as it would be in traditional procurements (Kollars 2017). Canada has no similar approach for how to identify which technologies should be employed, or a process to incorporate them into the CAF.

## Future Challenges: Funding and Focus

One of the key points the Liberal government was eager to showcase in the DPR was that it fully costed out all of its features, providing DND with fiscal stability going forward. The underlying issue for this is political will, which is highly uncertain. This is evident with regards to the CF-18 replacement program. In particular the interim purchase of 18 Super Hornets and the inexplicable “up to five-years” procurement timeline for a proper replacement has been almost universally panned by defence policy experts (McDonough and Crowley 2017) and illustrates how a government can easily override military prerogatives for political necessity.

Leaving aside questions about the overall reliability of post-2020 funding, a number of other factors will likely undermine the government’s assertion. The first is the funding of overseas operations, which has been a historic difficulty for DND. Successive governments tend not to adequately resource foreign deployments, to varying degrees. In these situations, DND must find ways to make up the shortfall and the consequences emerge in several different ways. Cuts primarily come out of other operational accounts, known as Vote 1 money, which includes deep cycle maintenance, modernization and upgrades, and other capital purchases for operational systems. This means that systems degrade or wear out, and require replacement earlier than expected.

Typically, capital accounts (known as Vote 5) are left as sacrosanct, and its funding never directly transferred to Vote 1. However, DND has in the past several years employed a financial accounting method that accomplished that. This involved not spending programmed funding for projects and returning it to the treasury, which would then repurpose it the following year in Vote 1 accounts. In some circumstances it may lapse, and is never returned to DND's budget. The consequences of this sort of cut is made evident in a 2015 study undertaken by the US Institute of Defense Analyses (IDA), which found a direct correlation between unstable funding climate and increases in unit procurement costs. For instance, the growth in unit cost shows up to a seven-fold increase compared to the unit cost growth rate evident in a more stable, accommodating funding climate (McNicol 2015). Thus delayed funding has a serious impact on program performance.

Furthermore, the changing nature of military technology means that iterative upgrades to platforms are becoming essential for keeping them relevant to a contemporary battlefield. A key component is the programming that is loaded onto the capabilities' hardware, commonly referred to as *software defined capabilities* (C4ISRNET 2017). For example, the Lockheed Martin F-35 fighter will have regularly scheduled major programming and technical updates every two to four years. As noted earlier, the funding for such upgrades will typically be paid through Vote 1 national procurement. However, those accounts are less reliable than other funding areas.

Relatedly, foreign operations tend to alter the military's capital priorities. This was evident during the years of Afghanistan, where the capabilities required to operate in that difficult intervention were given priority over others. Canada's procurement of drones in that tactical/operational context has already been mentioned. Other examples include the Leopard 2 tank, the CH-47F heavy lift helicopter, and the C-17 strategic lift aircraft. These operationally focused acquisitions displaced long planned programs for the Navy and the Air Force, such as the replacement for the Iroquois-class destroyer and Protecteur-class auxiliary oiler replenishment ship. This is not a situation limited to Canada. It has been questioned by the US Army, which faces a similar situation after the drawdown of major counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, as suggested by US Lieutenant-General H.R. McMaster, the former director of US Army Capabilities Integration Center and current National Security Advisor:

We've improved a lot of our equipment. We've developed equipment specifically for Iraq and Afghanistan to sustain counterinsurgency efforts and campaigns there. But we have not modernized our combat vehicles, our aircraft, our weapon systems. And so we have to analyze to ruthlessly prioritize with the assets we have. (McMaster 2016)

Canada's operationally-driven procurement situation can be attributed in part to the 1994 Defence White Paper, which called for Canada to operate in a full spectrum of operations. Even though Canada had been involved in intensive peace support operations in the Balkans for most of the 1990s, Afghanistan required the forces to further improve their capabilities in order to operate effectively. The DPR only perpetuates this trend, expecting the CAF to be able to be adaptable for all potential scenarios.

This fact is evident in the review's call to procure an air defence system. This was a capability divested in 2012 with the retirement of the ADATS [Air Defence Anti-Tank System] missile, in part due to fiscal constraints, obsolescence, and a perceived lack of need. However, the CAF is now committed to defending Eastern Europe against potential Russian encroachment, where air superiority is not assured. As a recent RAND war gaming study on a hypothetical Russian invasion announces:

The absence of short-range air defenses in the US units, and the minimal defenses in the other NATO units, meant that many [Russian air force] attacks encountered resistance only from NATO combat air patrols, which were overwhelmed by sheer numbers. The result was heavy losses to several Blue battalions and the disruption of the counterattack. (Shlapak and Johnson 2016, 9)



The importance of the statement is that without proper air cover, or effective air defence systems, CAF units deployed to Eastern Europe are in an extremely vulnerable position, which calls into question their value as a deterrent. In that sense, the DPR should be commended for recognizing a clear vulnerability on the part of its currently deployed forces, and committing to trying to mitigate that danger.

Yet it also shows just how short-term the DPR really is. After all, the decision to purchase an air defence system for the Canadian Army only emerged in the context of an ongoing operation, coincidentally when the DPR was being prepared. Little thought is also given on possible future threats and what capabilities may be required to deal with them. What will occur if there is another emergency requiring an accelerated purchase of a new capability, such as a sudden naval threat to Canada's coastlines? Would the government expand the fiscal parameters? Or would it force DND to rearrange its capital priorities? The latter approach, as the Afghanistan example suggests, is much more likely.

## Conclusion

On balance, the DPR makes a number of significant alterations to the operation of DND, which should improve a number of major issues the military currently faces. It seeks to remedy perhaps the most pressing issues facing the Canadian Armed Forces, the personnel crisis, which will put the entire defence enterprise on surer footing going forward.

While these are important considerations, the DPR will likely have less relevance in the coming years. Focusing on funding and capabilities in some respects are the most transient part of the Department of National Defence administration. Funding levels invariably change, as do capability priorities. Moreover, technology development is charging ahead and may make those policy decisions outmoded, something the DPR at least acknowledges. There is no guarantee that many capabilities areas identified in the review for replacement in a 10- or 20-year timeframe will not be rendered obsolete by technological developments, unforeseen new threats, or unexpected operational requirements.

To put it another way, the DPR may be appropriate for dealing with the international security environment of 2017. However, it will be sorely challenged to produce a military that is current for 2027, let alone 2037.

These considerations can be managed, particularly if identified early on. However, by declining to identify threats and military priorities, the DPR will make the CAF less adept at dealing with those eventualities. Its approach will continue to be reactive, either guided by what allied states are acquiring or capability shortfalls in operational environments. Given the increasingly lethality and efficacy afforded by new technologies, this is becoming a less viable strategy.

A more effective review would provide the justification for DND to explore how it can better deal with potential threats and operations. Linked to this, DND should try to create an institutional structure and organizational culture that allows it to become much more agile at identifying and procuring new systems. Failing this, the government may elect to introduce legislation that compels it to undertake a review after a set interval of time, much like in the United States or the UK. This may ensure that its contents remain relevant to the evolving strategic environment.

Failure to address these issues will only further relegate the CAF behind rapidly evolving developments, putting service personnel lives in danger and the country's national interests (whatever they may be) at continuing undue risk.

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*In five short years, the institute has established itself as a steady source of high-quality research and thoughtful policy analysis here in our nation's capital. Inspired by Canada's deep-rooted intellectual tradition of ordered liberty – as exemplified by Macdonald and Laurier – the institute is making unique contributions to federal public policy and discourse. Please accept my best wishes for a memorable anniversary celebration and continued success.*

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE STEPHEN HARPER

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*The Macdonald-Laurier Institute is an important source of fact and opinion for so many, including me. Everything they tackle is accomplished in great depth and furthers the public policy debate in Canada. Happy Anniversary, this is but the beginning.*

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*In its mere five years of existence, the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, under the erudite Brian Lee Crowley's vibrant leadership, has, through its various publications and public events, forged a reputation for brilliance and originality in areas of vital concern to Canadians: from all aspects of the economy to health care reform, aboriginal affairs, justice, and national security.*

BARBARA KAY, NATIONAL POST COLUMNIST

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