

GLOBAL SECURITY

LOOK AHEAD

A Collection of Essays

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



**True North in
Canadian public policy**

A Macdonald-Laurier Institute Publication



True North in
Canadian public policy



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Introduction

The world is an increasingly messy place. Diplomatic relations between the major global powers – the United States, China, Russia, and the Europeans – are strained. Continued American leadership in military and economic affairs is uncertain: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) wobbles as a result. Armed brinkmanship in the Pacific, competition in the Arctic, and even open conflict in Europe remain distinct possibilities. Meanwhile, militant organizations control large swaths of territory in parts of North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. Mass-casualty terrorist attacks in the West have become a common occurrence. And cyber threats, from the exfiltration of sensitive data to attacks on critical infrastructure, continue to proliferate.

With the Global Security Look Ahead project, the Macdonald-Laurier Institute (MLI) dives headfirst into this complexity. We asked seven scholars from Canada and around the world to provide us with an expert assessment of the major threats and concerns Canadians, and their friends and allies, are likely to face in the coming year. MLI is going beyond today's headline to provide Canadians with a glimpse of tomorrow's security and policy concerns. Our goal is to cast our gaze forward, to provide Canadians with strategic guidance to the conflicts, challenges, and issues emerging on the horizon.

Each article in this series explores a distinct and timely issue. Renowned strategist Edward Luttwak from the Center for Strategic & International Studies assesses the geostrategic consequences of Chinese expansionism in the Pacific. Carleton University's Stephen Saideman discusses the effects a Donald Trump Presidency might have on US strategic planning and foreign policy. Ray Boisvert, Provincial Security Advisor to the Government of Ontario and formerly from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), describes various security considerations and strategies for addressing cyber security. Alex Wilner from Carleton University explores the counterterrorism and national security consequences of the Islamic State's defeat and collapse in Syria and Iraq. Stéfanie von Hlatky from Queen's University assesses NATO's nuclear and conventional deterrent capabilities for warding off Russian challenges in Europe and beyond. And lastly, turning their attention northward, Aurel Braun and Stephen Blank – from University of Toronto and the American Foreign Policy Council, respectively – gauge Russian ambition in the Arctic.

Complexity need not lead to strategic confusion. That contemporary global affairs have turned difficult, even chaotic at times, suggests only that Canadians need to redouble their efforts to better identify their priorities and secure their interests. MLI's Global Security Look Ahead provides some much needed clarity on the emerging issues that require greater Canadian attention.

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Why Canada Should Shift Its Military Focus to Asia

Edward N. Luttwak



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International relations theory tells us much about contemporary alliance structures and the emerging role Canada may have to play in the Pacific.

To begin with we must understand middle powers are not as limited in their potential as small powers, but they do lack the small-power privilege of protection from great powers. Small powers are non-threatening to their larger neighbours, while any great power hostile to them is likely to be inhibited by other great powers unwilling to accept the former's further aggrandizement.

That is how the Low Countries of Europe retained their independence as the Benelux trio of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, instead of being annexed by their greater neighbours. The British, French, and later German, great powers were each unwilling to let their rivals absorb them. Finland likewise was protected from Soviet Russia's 1939 invasion by word of British and French interventions, by Germany's pregnant silence as Russia's then covertly hostile ally, and by Sweden's generous support. North Vietnam was protected from the United States by both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, at that time divided by an uncompromising rivalry except for their joint support of Vietnam's struggle. In 1905 Japan was very much the small power as compared to the Russian Empire and accordingly benefited from British and American support.

All of this is in perfect accordance with the paradoxical logic of strategy which prohibits any form of linear progression in the realm of conflict. This logic ordains that great powers can defeat middle powers, but not small ones.

Middle powers must fend for themselves when faced by potentially hostile great powers. However, they do have the privilege of structural adaptation for self-defence on a

larger scale than comparable small powers. They can also aggrandize themselves by offering protection to adjacent small powers that have something to contribute to an alliance. Nor does the paradoxical logic of strategy prevent them from seeking a great power's protection as Canada has with the US.

Sweden's highly armed neutrality during the Cold War years is an interesting case of a potentially vulnerable middle power using structural adaptation. Having rejected the development of nuclear weapons, Sweden's post-Second World War governments instead chose aggrandizement. They strove to enhance Sweden's own inadequate power by strategically co-opting its smaller neighbours. Sweden offered tacit but credible security guarantees to Finland, Denmark, and Norway — the latter two members of NATO — by making itself the dominant tactical air power of Northern Europe. This was not a cheap proposition. It required a multi-decade effort to produce and operate successive generations of combat aircraft. The aim was to preclude a Soviet non-nuclear victory by providing air support to the Finnish army — strong in every way except in air power — and to the Norwegians who were faced with the task of guarding an impossibly long frontier. In exchange, neutral Sweden gained greater strategic depth to secure and defend its own regional interests.

Which brings us to the Pacific today, where shifting alliances of middle powers are contending with a new, aggressive great power — China.

CANADA AS A PACIFIC POWER

Like Sweden after 1945, Canada is today faced by a radically changed strategic environment that presents new threats and requires structural adaptation.

Long-term strategic struggles — such as the mostly tacit confrontation between China and the emerging Japan-Vietnam-India coalition that seeks to contain China with Australian and US support — are characterized by the constant weaving and unweaving of alliances. In this emerging contest allies will be gained or lost on each side. It appears, for example, that the Chinese government has succeeded in recruiting the leaders of the Philippines and the Malaysian Federation to its side. While Manila and Kuala Lumpur may well change their minds again, both countries are inherently small states with weak armed forces that add little to either side of the emerging Asian divide.

“Canada could add much to the coalition countering China. Indeed, it is the most globally significant of all middle powers.”

Canada could add much to the coalition countering China. Indeed, it is the most globally significant of all middle powers, but historically, the country has looked mostly eastwards to Europe rather than westwards to the Pacific. Canada has notably failed to change its orientation as the global situation has evolved around it, shifting the world's centre of gravity towards the Pacific.

One indication of what Canada could do as a Pacific middle power stems from its role in the overall efforts of NATO, of which it is undoubtedly an important member. For decades, a Canadian armoured brigade group was stationed in Germany, as were Canadian tactical air squadrons. Canadian naval forces were largely devoted to the security of trans-Atlantic shipping routes in wartime, when the Soviet Union was expected to focus its air, surface, and sub-surface efforts on cutting off NATO's European forces from reinforcement and resupply from North America. Canada was well represented in alliance headquarters and in supervisory bodies.

During the Cold War, the Canadian effort on the Pacific side was much smaller, with only a modest portion of its navy allocated to the Maritime Forces Pacific, which was headquartered in Esquimalt, B.C. Even less of its air power was involved because tactical air power (as opposed to maritime reconnaissance aircraft) was of little use without overseas bases which were in Europe, but not in Japan, Korea, or the Philippines.

Since then the global strategic situation has changed radically. In spite of Russian President Vladimir Putin's best efforts to keep war going in parts of Ukraine, it has emigrated from its historic principal home in Western and Central Europe to several Islamic countries and to East Asia, far more importantly. China's potentially global imperialism has led to the emergence of the anti-China coalition centred on Japan, Vietnam, and India, with nearby adjuncts. Australia has strongly expressed support for the coalition and the US provides inherent and additional security and nuclear guarantees. There is also North Korea, which is in the process of weaponizing its already tested nuclear devices, while developing ballistic missiles to deliver warheads over ranges that will include Canada and the US by approximately 2020.

One thing that is not new in today's strategic environment is Russia's return as an active power manifested in Europe, the Arctic, and the Middle East. However, China's arrival as an active Pacific power is not merely an automatic conse-

“Newly aggressive forms of border and maritime patrolling, increasingly frequent territorial intrusions, and even outright occupations added greatly to the concerns provoked by China's verbal demands.”

quence of its economic growth, but rather reflects a definite policy change. It would appear that China's leaders badly misread the 2007-2008 financial crisis and greatly overestimated China's gain in relative strategic power. This prompted them to abandon the very successful "peaceful rise" (中国和平崛起) or "peaceful development" (中国和平发展) foreign policy officially presented in 2004, but long practised before then. This policy set aside all Chinese claims against regional parties in order to have everyone's co-operation in China's economic growth.

Once that policy was abandoned, there ensued the loud and practically simultaneous assertion of Chinese territorial claims against Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia, the Sultanate of Brunei, Indonesia, Vietnam, and India, in a half-circle of expansionist pretensions. Newly aggressive forms of border and maritime patrolling, increasingly frequent territorial intrusions, and even outright occupations added greatly to the concerns provoked by China's verbal demands.

Inevitably, the threatened countries started to strengthen themselves militarily and to coalesce diplomatically. They did this mostly in pairs that became increasingly interconnected, but also in threes, as in the case of the India-Japan-Vietnam trio that accelerated Vietnam's deployment of Russian submarines.

Australia's exceptional activism is particularly notable within this coalescence and relevant for Canadian consideration. Since 2009 successive Australian governments greatly helped to weave together the emerging coalition, not least by bringing in the usually lethargic Malaysian Federation (notwithstanding its leader's recent tilt towards Beijing). Australia has long had something of an alliance within the Five Power Defence Arrangements (along with the UK, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore) under which Australian aircraft and troops rotate in the Butterworth base on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula. The base serves as the headquarters of the Integrated Area Defence System for Malaysia and Singapore, and is commanded by an Australian air vice-marshal.

Also notable and relevant for Canada has been the reaction of successive Australian governments to Chinese reminders of the importance of its raw material purchases for the Australian economy. These reminders were coupled with admonitions about Australian foreign policy, which the government explained is not for sale.

“Also notable and relevant for Canada has been the reaction of successive Australian governments to Chinese reminders of the importance of its raw material purchases for the Australian economy.”

Given Canada's propensity to assume international responsibilities, Northeast Asia's strategic situation presents three different elements that should amply justify the re-direction of Canada's strategic attention to the Pacific:

1. An ever more important China whose expansionism is in need of dissuasion—it does stop when resisted, as both Japan and Vietnam have demonstrated;
2. A North Korea that will soon have the capacity to attack Canada as well as the US with nuclear weapons, and whose sole leader is easily offended; and
3. Japan, a country of the first importance for Canada in several ways not merely economic, and which needs external support and foreign security guarantees in order to safely remain a non-nuclear power.

Nobody can reasonably suggest that Canada should restructure its armed forces on a very large scale in order to become a major power in Northeast Asia. But given that Canadian political and economic leaders know very well that the centre of gravity in world politics has changed, it would behoove Canada to gradually acquire a significant stabilizing role, in the agreeable company of Australia.



The Trump Presidency: Bringing “Interesting Times” to Global Affairs

Stephen M. Saideman



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Donald Trump's victory has much of the world nervous, and rightfully so. Outsiders - and Americans, too - are trying to assess which campaign promises President Trump will keep and which ones he will drop. Indeed, we might speculate that the campaigning Trump and the governing Trump are two different people: after all, politicians renege on their campaign promises all the time, don't they? In fact, that isn't true. Most politicians prefer to, and do tend to, keep their promises. Still, Trump is no ordinary politician, and he has frequently taken all sides of many issues, so it is hard to discern what he is likely to do.

Which gets to the heart of the matter: *Donald Trump generates uncertainty*. Because of his disregard for the norms of American politics, because of his habit of switching positions, and because he is not tied to any constituency, Trump raises doubts about American guarantees and commitments. Because the United States is the indispensable, fundamental supporter of the existing international order, Trump's election raises critical challenges not just for Canadian-American bilateral relations, but for global peace and prosperity. The stakes are simply that high.

Throughout the recent US Presidential campaign, Donald Trump took many stances that challenge and undermine the building blocks of the post-1945 and post-Cold War international order. For instance, Trump has taken the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) burden-sharing debate to a new level by suggesting that allied countries that pay less than they have committed to pay might not receive American assistance if they are attacked. The United States provides most of the alliance's military capability, which is linked to the US nuclear deterrent. In the past, the US has been more willing than most of the allies to commit to defending the Baltic countries. Those countries face the Russian threat most directly, but Trump's attitude towards

NATO raises questions about whether the alliance will aid the Baltics in a crisis. Those facts combined with reports that former campaign manager Paul Manafort, the future national security advisor Michael Flynn, and the secretary of state nominee Rex Tillerson have ties to Putin and Russia, lead to direct concerns about the future of NATO. [Ed.: Michael Flynn later resigned as national security advisor on February 13, 2017 and Rex Tillerson was confirmed as Secretary of State.] This should worry Canadians along with everyone else.

Similarly, Donald Trump has consistently expressed a desire to protect the American market from international competition. But the US market has been a key factor in international economic stability since the Second World War precisely because of its openness. In each major economic crisis, countries could be reassured that their firms would have access to the American market. With a threat to raise tariffs significantly on Chinese goods and a promise to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the US will no longer be the market of last resort. This, too, should worry Canadians. The lessons of the Great Depression will be unlearned, leaving the world without its most important defender of global trade. Trump has even threatened to default on the debt the US owes China. While this might just be loose talk, fear of any action like that could cause a financial panic.

Will Trump follow through on his musings? We do not know, which is not reassuring as uncertainty itself is very problematic. Throughout history, uncertainty about allies has been a frequent cause for war. As leaders of countries calculate the likely costs of a war, they have often misperceived the responses of the allies of their targets.

In the run-up to the First World War, for instance, the Germans hoped and expected that the British would not keep their commitment to the French. Had the Germans been more certain of the forces arrayed against them, they might have been far less eager for war. In 1950, the US tried to make its alliance commitments clear around the world, but omitted South Korea from its map of commitments. This may have encouraged North Korea to attack, dragging the United States into that war. The US then underestimated China's commitment, which led to the latter's intervention in the same war. In the summer of 1990, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein met with the American ambassador about border tensions between Iraq and Kuwait. Hussein left the meeting assured that the US did not have a position in the dispute. That was not meant as a green light for an Iraqi attack, but that is how Hussein saw it. Simply put, wars can start when there is uncertainty about alliance commitments. Uncertain-

“Trump’s attitude towards NATO raises questions about whether the alliance will aid the Baltics in a crisis.”

ty causes countries to anticipate, and leaves allies to hedge their bets by appeasing the likely aggressor or by investing in nuclear weapons.

How may this play out over the next four years? Already, Trump's phone call with the President of Taiwan – with conflicting stories of whether this was planned or improvised – has led to China flying a plane armed with nuclear weapons over the contested South China Sea. Trump's contradictory statements about NATO will almost certainly lead to a test by Russia's Vladimir Putin. These kinds of events can lead to one of two outcomes: countries may choose to fall under the influence of China or Russia to avoid being swallowed up, or we may find ourselves at war.

Likewise, uncertainty is bad for most financial markets. Businesses may hold off on investing until they have a better idea of what may happen, leading to a recession. In the current case, countries may opt to side with China, rather than the United States, if they feel the former is a greater source of economic stability. Already, the likely demise of the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) is giving China greater sway. Trump has promised to withdraw the US from the 12-nation trade deal on his first day in office. Indeed, even before he formally takes office, Donald Trump has caused markets to swing wildly after he made statements about Air Force One (Boeing) and the F-35 stealth fighter jet (Lockheed Martin).

Why is Trump an uncertainty engine? He sees himself as a deal maker, and as such, he frequently bluffs to get bargains. Such behaviour might be advantageous in real estate, but it has significant downsides in international relations. And, if there is one consistency in Trump's inconsistency, it is that he respects no norms or rules. A litany of controversies during the election campaign bear this out. With regard to global affairs, it was reported that during one of his first contacts with foreign leaders following the election, a call with Argentine President Macri, he sought assistance for one of his building projects (Trump and Macri both deny this). His spokespeople say that the rules on conflicts of interest do not apply to Trump, whose relationships and decisions in office could have significant repercussions for his sprawling business empire, though he could find himself running afoul of the "Emoluments clause" of the US Constitution, which prevents the President receiving gifts from foreign governments.

When it comes to foreign policy, Trump has demonstrated little real knowledge. Instead, he relies on his advisors, which would not be unusual for a president, but Trump's choices of advisors themselves have generated considerable contro-

“Donald Trump has caused markets to swing wildly after he made statements about Air Force One (Boeing) and the F-35 stealth fighter jet (Lockheed Martin).”

versy. Trump's first appointment on foreign policy was Lieutenant-General (retired) Michael Flynn as national security advisor. Flynn also serves on the transition team, perhaps shaping quite significantly subsequent national security appointments. But Flynn has had his judgment questioned over his connections with foreign governments. He spoke at an event hosted by Russia Today, a Russian propaganda outlet. And he has been criticized because his firm had lobbied for a company whose founder has connections to the Turkish government at the same time he was receiving intelligence briefings as Trump's foreign policy expert. Flynn is also considered by those who have worked with him to be temperamental, and has courted controversy with his views on social media, particularly with regard to Muslims. [Ed.: Michael Flynn later resigned as national security advisor on February 13, 2017.]

The job of the national security advisor is to present the President with options and then make sure decisions are implemented as intended. Having a national security 'hot-head' advising Trump, who is himself easily provoked, could prove disastrous. Much can go awry when the national security advisor lacks good judgment, as Ronald Reagan and Congress realized when John Poindexter oversaw the selling of arms to Iran to fund American-supported rebels in Nicaragua in the mid-1980s.

Trump has shown he can be easily influenced by his advisors. This can be positive. For example, after meeting with General James Mattis (retired), later selected as secretary of defense, Trump reversed himself on the question of torture. But while some might be assured that Trump is no longer so enamored with torture, the way he has changed his mind suggests that whoever is last to speak with Trump will be most influential. Already, we see his staff trying to manipulate him. During the campaign, for example, Paul Manafort, Trump's erstwhile campaign manager, reportedly lied to Trump about the campaign plane needing an extra day of maintenance in Indiana so that Trump, forced to spend more time with Mike Pence, would ultimately choose Pence as his running mate. More recently, Reince Priebus, the incoming White House chief of staff, was reported to have lied to Trump about a *New York Times* appointment with the then President-elect because he was afraid that Trump would underperform in a real interview.

Lastly, one of Trump's positive qualities can also contribute to uncertainty about his intentions: He has no ties to any constituencies. Trump did not come to power by appealing to specific interest groups within the Republican Party, which made him more attractive to the anti-system voters in the electorate. This means, however, that we do not know which

“If Trump destabilizes international markets, the Canadian dollar and the Toronto Stock Exchange will feel the effects ‘big league.’”

groups will be more influential in the years ahead or which commitments will really tie him down. This again makes Trump unpredictable, reinforcing global uncertainty about the future of US foreign, defence, and economic policy.

What does this mean for Canada? A bumpy ride is the best that Canadians can hope for. If Trump destabilizes international markets, the Canadian dollar and the Toronto Stock Exchange will feel the effects “big league,” as Trump would say. Increased trade barriers will obviously be extremely costly for Canadian producers. While Trump has had nothing to say about NORAD, his NATO stances will have a direct effect on Canada’s key military engagements in the world. If Trump pulls American troops out of East Europe, the Canadian deployment to Latvia would face a higher risk of being tested by Putin and Russia, forcing Prime Minister Justin Trudeau into a very tough spot. The bad news is that there is little Trudeau can do, as Canada does not possess many levers over Trump. Unless Trudeau can write some persuasive tweets it is not clear how he could reach Trump, who is surrounding himself with advisors who have their own agendas, none of which seem to put Canada’s good standing anywhere near the top of their priorities.

What can Canadian leaders do to deal with Trump’s uncertainty engine? They will have to avoid reacting to every swing, every statement. Perhaps it would be best to try to work at lower levels – where Canadian civil servants often meet with American bureaucrats. That is, Trump only appoints the top three or four layers of most agencies, so his people will not extend all the way into the Washington bureaucracy. Thus, perhaps the best bet is for Canada to work on the relationship and its many issues at the level of civil servants and not at the level of head of government. The good news is that Canada never got much negative attention from Trump. Perhaps just staying out of the way might be the way ahead.

Contemporary peace and prosperity have depended upon the certainty that the US would assist other nations in times of trouble. Countries did not have to anticipate and guess about that, which has meant that misperceptions and preemptive moves have not been a major part of international relations for decades. Alas, misunderstandings will now be of primary concern for the next four – and potentially eight – years. Given Trump’s rocky start in relations with China, the latter’s reputed ancient curse seems prescient: “May you live in interesting times.” As an international relations scholar, I find it strange to be longing for a less interesting time in world politics.

“Perhaps the best bet is for Canada to work on the relationship and its many issues at the level of civil servants and not at the level of head of government.”



Building a Cyber-Safe Society in a New World Economy

Ray Boisvert

Ray Boisvert is the Provincial Security Advisor to the Government of Ontario, and is the former Assistant Director, Intelligence, at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).

It can be justifiably said that in the Western world, 2016 was the year national governments awoke to the consequential, long-term effects of cyber crimes committed upon national security interests, privacy, and economic prosperity. And yet, current government cyber strategies – Canada’s included – creep forward with unevenly applied approaches and ill-coordinated tactical responses. In this country there is a growing awareness of cyber threats, both nationally and provincially, but disjointed responses. What is sorely lacking is deep situational awareness, along with an ability to address three critical elements of cyber strategy: deter, defend, and deploy.

Canada’s national cyber security strategy was written in 2010. In a networked or digital context, it is sorely outdated: back then, Blackberry was still the market-leading smartphone, the iPad had only just launched, cloud computing was emerging, and Uber had its first beta software release. Things have evolved since then – dramatically.

Thus far, governments in Canada have only delivered a disparate, almost non-sequitur, set of strategies to counter what is clearly a highly complex environment, involving a mix of actors with varying degrees of capability and competing motivations.

Although on-line criminals continue to pose a risk to personal identifiable information, the West faces an emerging reality in which the most sophisticated hacking methods and technologies primarily support illicit state interests. In this new era, malicious state-supported actors now operate in collusion with state authorities. These groups operate to make a profit, but they also serve nationalistic causes as plausibly deniable proxies. Those causes include hybrid warfare in a conflict zone, eroding an opposing society’s confidence in their institutions and government, or by targeting the critical infrastructure that simply supports the “enemy.”

In Russia, the intelligence clique surrounding President Vladimir Putin values a 21st century version of the “Kompromat” that combines calculated political smear campaigns

with old KGB finesse. Central to this strategy is an effort to compromise the economies and reputations of Western governments, institutions, and individuals. One case in point is the 2016 hack of the US Democratic National Committee and the strategic release of emails from Presidential candidate, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and other DNC leaders. The result, it seems, has been the successful influence of a US election by a foreign power. Through hacks of supposedly secure networks, and while working with supposedly credible organizations like Wikileaks, hostile intelligence agencies, such as those in Russia, successfully compromising messages intended to disrupt legitimate political processes. Given their success to date, from the US election to possibly Brexit results, the KGB successor state will be further emboldened to commit future acts of social and electoral sabotage, which are likely to include the next federal Italian, German and French elections in Europe.

The stakes are high. The explosive growth of internet-based commerce (US\$1 trillion by 2020 according to *Forbes*), and government plans to deliver seamless connectivity to their citizens, are at risk. Moreover, talk of US retaliation against Russia risks leading to serious and unintended consequences. Rapid military escalation is possible, given that Russian cyber incursions are taking place against a backdrop of cascading Western and Russian tensions.

In this context, Canada lacks a well-considered and clearly articulated framework for addressing immediate security needs and planning for longer term requirements. At issue is a cyber security gap that insidiously and routinely undermines Canadian safety, security, and prosperity. Canada needs a coherent vision and comprehensive policy for cyber security that actively and aggressively deters aggression and defends our interests.

DETER

Cyber deterrence can mean many things. First, engagement and diplomacy are critical. US and British dialogue with China on limiting state-sponsored targeting of private sector interests and critical infrastructure seem to have provided some relief. Given this measurable success, Canada must follow suit. In line with this approach, our government needs to refurbish the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties with cyber security in mind; the recent arrest in the Czech Republic of a suspected Russian hacker allegedly involved in the 2012 LinkedIn hack may soon represent the norm.

Canada's diplomatic team has yet to properly engage the cyber file; the profile and size of the team managing the issue

“Canada needs a coherent vision and comprehensive policy for cyber security that... deters aggression and defends our interests.”

on the global stage is small. Given the potential severity and impact of cyber sabotage on Canadian society, governance, and commerce, we must treat the cyber file with the same force and importance as trade, migration, climate change, and development. It is necessary to build an international consensus, if only with like-minded states, to establish guidelines for acceptable cyber behavior.

Would “naming and shaming” help stop cyber sabotage? The private sector, with behind-the-scenes assistance from Western security intelligence agencies, has sought to attribute blame for the recent hacks and attacks. However, interference with the US Presidential election, along with the theft of US Office of Personnel Management files, illustrates that Western governments themselves must unequivocally point the finger at malicious state actors. They must do so with transparency and authenticity, which includes releasing as much verifiable “proof” as can possibly be disclosed publicly – and they must then be prepared to act demonstrably, be it via criminal indictment or simple “name and shame.”

The charges of “economic espionage” and “aggravated identity theft” such as those made by the US against five Chinese People’s Liberation Army officers, are needed to deter cyber aggression. In 2014, John Carlin, the US Assistant Attorney General for National Security, warned that “cyber theft is real theft and we will hold state sponsored cyber thieves accountable as we would any other transnational criminal organization that steals our goods and breaks our laws.”¹ Whereas some of the statements and charges may have been political theatre, lessons derived from the indictment of CIA and Italian intelligence officers following a 2003 case of rendition against Egyptian Abu Omar² suggests that criminal processes can shift state behaviour.

DEFEND

The Internet of Things (IoT) – a world of connected devices ranging from cars to appliances – is expected to grow to 38.5 billion “things” in 2020. Equally important, production of data continues to grow daily at an exponential rate (2.5 quintillion bytes per day). Although all that data provides an unprecedented opportunity for personal development and enrichment, it also greatly multiplies the types of possible attacks and the number of items and devices that must be defended.

“What role does each level of government have in providing cyber defence?”

Defensive responsibility is a key part of the challenge. What role does each level of government have in providing cyber defence? What about the private sector: Should it not cover the costs of protecting publicly accessible networks, business systems, and financial assets? How do we return to an environment where products and services come with a guarantee of performance, rather than a digital disclaimer absolving vendors and service providers of any liability should their product fail to protect the consumer from cyber harm?

Given constitutional realities that include financial clout, access to cyber and other technical expertise via law enforcement, and security intelligence actions and prosecutorial power, the federal government must lead. But given the proximity and aspirations of local governments, from securing health care data to fostering “smart cities,” all levels of government have a role to play.

Canadian consumers also need a bill of digital rights to establish standards for data-driven products and services. A version of the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) could regulate, test, and certify digital products, from smart phones to smart cars. Canada needs national standards, perhaps modelled on the US National Institute of Standards and Technology, to guide and encourage small- and medium-sized businesses to participate in cyber security.

In addition, and through regulating market access, both federal and provincial governments must motivate the private sector to fully adopt a national standard. In other words, where private firms seek federal or provincial contracts, they must first meet a new norm for cyber resilience. This, in turn, will encourage the entire supply chain to become more cyber vigilant.

Conversely, governments must forge an entirely new relationship with private sector cyber security firms which, through more persistent innovation, have the most advanced technologies and skills to thwart cyber attacks at a fraction of the cost governments would have to pay.

In other areas, we must be quicker at modelling best practices from other jurisdictions. A recent report co-authored by three US agencies involved in regulating the financial sector call for the imposition of cyber security standards in that area to ensure an ability to “demonstrate effective cyber security governance” and a robust business continuity capability.

“Canada has thus far failed to develop a fully coordinated and effective plan to defend against cyber attacks.”

Elsewhere, the UK government has been the most aggressive at developing policy and allocating funding (reaching almost \$3 billion CAN). The UK has stated that it will not accept significant risk being posed to the public and the country as a whole as a result of businesses and organizations failing to take the steps needed to manage cyber threats.

In Australia, the government launched a revised cyber security strategy in April 2016, and linked it to Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull's economic plan. In addition, Turnbull appointed a minister for the file and committed to an annual cyber security meeting with business leaders. As importantly, within that strategy is a revamped government structure wherein all key agencies, from defence to the intelligence services and federal police, operate the cyber file from within a single Australian cyber security centre.

In the United States, there have been some calls to reorganize the way law enforcement agencies interoperate, from the FBI to the almost 20,000 other local, state, and federal agencies. These agencies must become better coordinated in a world of globalized crime. In Canada, the number of agencies is much smaller, but they remain stuck in the 20th century. Moreover, they have yet to be fully and clearly empowered and funded to address this new challenge head-on.

Despite facing the same level of threat as our closest allies, Canada has thus far failed to develop a fully coordinated and effective plan to defend against cyber attacks. In this new century, it is imperative that we vigorously defend our digital assets and space, nationwide.

“We now find that individuals, organizations, and corporations can build, access, or acquire certain weapons at will.”

DEPLOY

In the first of the three 2016 US Presidential debates, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton commented notably about Russian cyber attacks against fundamental US institutions, such as the attack on the Democratic National Party. “We’re going to have to make it clear that we don’t want to use the kinds of tools that we have. We don’t want to engage in a different kind of warfare. But we will defend the citizens of this country,” she said.³

Clearly, she was referring to the deployment of cyber warfare capabilities. In this context, “deploy” means building and applying weaponized digital tools to attack the net-

works and information operations of hostile states or non-state actors. However, the dialogue necessary in Western democracies to shape policies pertaining to the use of offensive cyber capability – known by experts as Advanced Cyber Defence (ACD) – remains absent.

Given that cyber and digital technology has created an era of asymmetric conflict, we now find that individuals, organizations, and corporations can build, access, or acquire certain weapons at will. What was not discussed in the US election, nor during the recently completed round of public consultation by the government of Canada on cyber security, is whether or not the state will attempt to retain the monopoly of power in this particular domain.

How then should Canada and other democracies regulate ACD? What about the “first strike” doctrine? Have we reached a conclusion that a cyber first strike would incur incalculable and catastrophic consequences? The answer is a very probable “no.” As a result, policy gaps and mitigation strategies must be addressed post-haste.

The US defence and intelligence communities, as well as some US lawmakers, are prepared to react to the shifting realities of warfare by pre-emptively destroying an opponent’s critical infrastructure. Important changes to the command and control of US cyber defence and offensive capabilities are being proposed by Congressional leaders. There is some discussion about making US Cyber Command a separate and distinct military entity dedicated to the degradation and possible destruction of an enemy’s infrastructure, while retaining the National Security Agency as an intelligence-gathering entity. The key issue for Canada is to recognize the importance and magnitude of this strategic shift – a shift in which five dozen countries are retooling as the US is – and to set forth a new policy direction that will ensure adequate funding for a credible Canadian response.

Separately, Canada must also consider how to establish a governance model to address the growing interest of using ACD to “hack back.” In hacking back, victims of cyber crime, even citizens themselves, retaliate in kind. We now recognize that passive cyber security has its limits, particularly given that attacks are increasingly state sponsored, so there must be some way to aggressively and proactively counter such attacks. How, then, do we use offence to improve our defensive strategy?

“Given these realities, the government of Canada must address the ACD challenge both domestically and internationally.”

Many organizations are reeling from the impact of relentless cyber attacks. An AT&T study found that 62 percent of US firms had suffered a data breach between 2015 and 2016. As a result, those with sufficient financial resources are reportedly considering ACD because there is a perception that governments are not sufficiently protecting privately held assets. Allowing for the unfettered application of ACD by private interests has important and very tangible consequences, however. Chief among them is that current international agreements can be undermined and the existing global security framework destabilized. Once an organization, firm, or citizen engages with an adversary outside of their own network, even if only to recover lost data, they enter a world devoid of traditional rules of engagement.

Given these realities, the government of Canada must address the ACD challenge both domestically and internationally. It must turn its attention to building a dedicated yet flexible public policy framework that will pre-empt a rapid growth in the adoption and use of ACD by private interests. To avoid inadvertently falling into broader state conflicts, governments must regulate Internet vigilantes who will be tempted to invoke their right to strike back. In addition, governments must set out what is to be achieved by a public agency working to protect Canadians via an ACD strategy. In order to achieve the desired outcome, governments must invest in and develop appropriate policies, and establish an effective review. Governments must also ensure that any offensive capability is built on a clear and appropriate legal footing, and be ethically and morally defensible.

“Canada must turn its attention to building a dedicated yet flexible public policy framework that will pre-empt a rapid growth in the adoption and use of ACD by private interests.”

CONCLUSION

The fusion of individuals, data, and devices – along with technological globalization and increasing levels of cynicism and distrust within and between societies – all but ensures that cyber security issues will continue to transform our nations in new and unexpected ways. Unless we secure our digital world today, we risk entering an era of incessant and uncertain cyber conflict. Even while we are mitigating the threats posed by cyber attacks, we must not let concerns over terrorist violence dictate Canada’s priorities in national security planning. It is important that the currently applied strategies derived from dated policies and approaches not be our primary response to an increasingly complex, malicious, and threatening environment.

A 21st century approach to cyber security requires the prioritization of new efforts across three pillars of governance that combine deterrence, defence, and deployment. The urgent task ahead is to secure our increasingly digital world, protect our privacy, and most of all, ensure the future prosperity of our liberal democratic nation.

ENDNOTES

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Defeating ISIS is Just the Beginning

Alex Wilner




On September 10, 2014, US President Barack Obama unveiled his long-awaited strategy for countering the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), also known as the Islamic State, ISIL, or *Daesh*. “Our objective is clear,” Obama noted, “We will degrade, and ultimately destroy, ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counter-terrorism strategy.” Two years later, following the horrifying attacks in Nice, France, in which an aspiring ISIS militant rammed a cargo truck into crowds celebrating Bastille Day, killing 86 people and injuring hundreds more, President Obama reiterated: “We will not be deterred. We will not relent... [W]e are going to destroy this vile terrorist organization.”

By most accounts the US strategy seems to be working. From a high point in early 2015, in which ISIS consolidated large swaths of Iraq and Syria under its so-called caliphate, ISIS territory has shrunk dramatically (see figure 1). In the past months, the group has retreated from the Iraqi cities of Ramadi, Tikrit, Abu Ghraib, and Falluja. An allied offensive against its last major urban stronghold in and around the city of Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, began in October 2016. And in Syria, ISIS lost control over Kobane, Manbij, Palmyra, and a strategic trading and smuggling corridor linking northern Syria and Turkey. Allied operations against Raqqa, ISIS’s Syrian capital, are expected to begin in the coming months. And further afield, ISIS has been largely pushed out of the coastal city of Sirte, Libya, its most prominent enclave outside Syria and Iraq.

ISIS’s territorial defeat is an absolute necessity. But the caliphate’s collapse will create new counterterrorism challenges in the months and years to come. One challenge stands out: ISIS foreign fighters and recruits, uprooted from their caliphate, may be especially motivated and prepared to spread mayhem abroad.

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Figure 1: Islamic State Territorial losses between January 2015 and December 2016



Source: Adapted from IHS Conflict Monitor with additional information from BBC

By all measures ISIS's recruitment has been phenomenal. Since 2011, American intelligence agencies estimate that 40,000 foreigners from over 100 countries have travelled to Syria and Iraq. Many have joined ISIS. By nationality, half of these foreigners have originated from within the region, with Tunisians (3,000 recruits), Saudis (2,500), Jordanians (2,200), and Moroccans (2,000) topping the list. But western European nationals account for over 20 percent of the group's foreign recruits, with France (1,800), the United Kingdom (800), Germany (750), and Belgium (450) producing the highest number. Several thousand recruits have likewise originated from Russia, the former Soviet Republics, and the Balkans, and a few hundred more have stemmed from Canada, the United States, and Australia.

These figures are not static of course. US estimates suggest that anywhere between 10,000 and 30,000 foreign fighters remain in the war zone. Travel to ISIS-held territory has likewise slowed significantly in 2016. US estimates suggest the number of foreign fighters entering Syria and Iraq dropped from roughly 1,500 per month in mid-2015 to less than 200 a month by mid-2016. And obviously some foreign recruits will die in battle: roughly 15 percent of European foreign fighters, for example, have perished fighting with ISIS.

With ISIS facing near certain strategic defeat in the coming year, attention must now be paid to anticipating what the caliphate's territorial collapse will mean to the remaining surviving foreign fighters and recruits. Five different scenarios could play out.

The most optimistic of all possible assessments is that some foreign recruits will leave the battle altogether once the caliphate falls, turning their backs on ISIS and turning away from terrorism for good. European intelligence reports note, for instance, that disillusionment with ISIS, along with battlefield trauma and regret, have motivated some European recruits to return home fully pacified. Reversions of this kind matter if only to counter the perception that all foreign "returnees" pose an inherent and immediate national security threat. Some returnees might rather provide a counter-terrorism boon. They may provide intelligence on ISIS recruitment processes, motivations, and ambitions, on the group's ideological narratives and propaganda machine, and on militant alliances, operations, training, and leadership. All of this will help in defeating the group militarily and in better understanding and countering violent radicalization more broadly.

Returnees, however, introduce another series of challenges. The first involves identifying individuals who have truly and fully rejected violence from those who continue to retain a degree of sympathy for ISIS and militancy. The former group might conceivably be rehabilitated and re-integrated into society, as Denmark and other states have illustrated. But the latter group provides a latent threat, a population base that might again accept militancy if the right conditions present themselves in the future. That is a concern. The second quandary stems from the first: is a rejection of militancy and violence sufficient in cases where returnees continue to adhere to non-violent but fundamentalist ideologies and practices anathema to liberal democratic norms and ideals? In other words, is walking away from terrorism enough, or will states require and demand that returnees also de-radicalize? Achieving the latter may prove difficult and contentious.

And then there is the dilemma of prosecution and incarceration. Criminal evidence that will hold up in court and prove a returnee's previous support for a blacklisted terrorist organization, or involvement in murder, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, may be difficult to acquire for many foreign fighters. But even where sentences are handed down, the insidious threat of prison radicalization looms. Here, jailed terrorists and radicals go on to preach

“Criminal evidence that will hold up in court and prove a returnee's previous support for a blacklisted terrorist organization, or involvement in murder, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, may be difficult to acquire for many foreign fighters.”

hatred within prison, converting other inmates to the cause of militancy. All of these competing issues will need to be weighed and addressed.

Turning to other scenarios, one potential outcome is that some foreign fighters may decide to stay put in Iraq and Syria, despite the caliphate's defeat. Even if Mosul and Raqqa fall, ISIS will not simply disappear. Its ideology will survive. So, too, will some of its networks. And remnants of the caliphate may take advantage of Iraqi and Syrian political instability and sectarian divisions to re-establish themselves as another terrorist or insurgent organization. After all, this is precisely how ISIS itself was formed, out of the ashes of its predecessors, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and the Organization of Monotheism and Jihad. Before it declared itself a state in 2014, ISIS functioned particularly well as a traditional, non-state terrorist organization. It may return to its organizational roots now to re-establish itself as a leaner, flatter, and more nimble insurgency, biding its time for an eventual comeback.

Another subset of ISIS's foreign recruits may otherwise join the ranks of other militant groups already active in the region. Al Qaeda's most prominent franchise, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra), controls territory in northern and western Syria, including large sections of Idlib province, and pockets in the south. Though ISIS and al Qaeda have had a violently strained relationship in the past, a merger remains a possibility. Perhaps the destruction of the Islamic State, and subsequent death of its core leadership, including Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, could provide the very impetus for a joining of jihadist forces. An emboldened al Qaeda is a distinct possibility.

“Though ISIS and al Qaeda have had a violently strained relationship in the past, a merger remains a possibility.”

Still other foreign fighters may travel to neighbouring countries besides Syria and Iraq, to establish or strengthen militant offshoots further afield in Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Yemen, and elsewhere. The analogy here draws from militant activity in the Sahel region of North Africa. We shouldn't forget that two years before ISIS declared the caliphate, a consortium of militants allied with al Qaeda and Ansar Dine did much the same in parts of Northern and Central Mali, ruling over and governing a territory roughly the size of France for nearly a year. Only international military intervention in 2013 – spearheaded by France with assistance from Canada and others – defeated this jihadi proto-state. But since then, surviving militants have regrouped both within and beyond Mali, spreading mayhem and death to Burkina Faso, Algeria, Niger, and Côte d'Ivoire. Sadly, six Canadians were among 30 killed

in one such terrorist attack in Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, in January 2016. As the caliphate dissolves, hardened fighters may find the prospect of spreading out beyond the contours of Syria and Iraq, and training their sites against their home soil, an attractive option. The number of people killed in terrorist attacks, which has only grown in recent years (see figures 2 and 3), is unlikely to decline any time soon.


Finally, some foreign fighters will be purposefully dispatched abroad by ISIS to establish terrorist cells and networks within their home countries in order to conduct acts of international terrorism on behalf of and in ISIS's name. In this case, foreign recruits serve as ISIS's expeditionary force, its foreign legion. At least a few of ISIS's European recruits who joined the group in hopes of strengthening the caliphate – and were, towards that end, eager to live and work within it – will today, as a result of ISIS's collapse, be purposefully “weaponized” for attacks abroad. That Europe faces a migrant crisis stemming in part from the conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa has compounded the threat that ISIS may smuggle militants into Europe “disguised as irregular migrants.”

Figure 2: Deaths from Terrorism in OECD Countries, 2000–2016



Source: Adapted from Global Terrorism Index 2016

Figure 3: Worldwide Deaths from Terrorism, 2000-2015



Source: Adapted from Global Terrorism Index 2016

These recruits will be provided with specific training in encrypted communications, explosives manufacturing, counter-intelligence, and terrorism planning. Some of these groups and individuals may link up with pre-existing networks of militants already in place overseas. Some will attract and be joined by home-grown radicals, frustrated by the elimination of the caliphate - a destination they were ultimately unable to reach - and smarting for a taste of their own revenge. Others will remain below the radar until they are ready to strike. All of this is already happening. The 2015 and 2016 attacks in Paris and Brussels, along with a string of other recent attacks across Europe, Turkey, and elsewhere, were orchestrated by foreign fighters purposefully sent by ISIS leaders in Syria and Iraq to conduct international acts of terrorism. More of the same should be expected.

The conflict with ISIS is entering a new and uncertain phase. As the caliphate collapses, the resulting shards may prove nettlesome to contain.

Deterrence is Back: Can NATO Handle It?

Stéfanie von Hlatky



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In 2002, during the NATO-Russia Council's Rome Summit, President Vladimir Putin seemed committed to peace and cooperation. In his speech, he declared that "Only by harmoniously combining our actions... will we open up wide-ranging possibilities for building a single security region - from Vancouver to Vladivostok." Fifteen years later, the NATO-Russia Council's pulse is weak and the only short-term hope for recovery gained access to the Oval Office on January 20, 2017: Donald Trump. The rift between NATO and Russia is deep, however. NATO suspended cooperation with Russia after its annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Ukrainian crisis remains unresolved, making a quick reconciliation unlikely. Moscow is also showing increasing unease, as NATO forces will be posted in the Baltics and Poland later in 2017. From Ukraine to the imminent NATO deployment, a range of difficult issues now consumes the sporadic meetings of the NATO-Russia Council. These political tensions feel familiar at times, a reminder that the Cold War left Russia dissatisfied with the status quo. Deterrence has indeed made a comeback and is reshaping the security environment in the Euro-Atlantic region. Although NATO never completely abandoned deterrence, the 2014 Summit in Wales marked a decisive shift and a commitment to show greater resolve when confronted with Russia's bellicose moves.

From the Russian perspective, these actions are justified and could well have been prevented. In fact, Moscow has orchestrated an intensive communications campaign to express its grievances, blaming NATO for the poor state of their relations. The biggest grievance is related to NATO's Open Door Policy, which resulted in the Alliance's enlargement. The fact that NATO proceeded with Partnership for Peace agreements with both Georgia and Ukraine was not well received and the Alliance is now officially making room for a 29th ally, after signing an Accession Protocol with Montenegro in May of 2016. Once all twenty-eight allies ratify the protocol, Montenegro will become an official NATO member state. In addition to its discontent over NATO expansion, Russia has hurled more colourful accu-

sations at NATO, like the claim that it provoked protests in Ukraine, or that it intends on building a military base in Georgia. In the NATO Headquarters, these accusations were not ignored and fostered a public diplomacy effort to address 32 of these made-in-Russia myths. The result is the document *Setting the Record Straight*, which provides detailed responses to all of Russia's accusations.

NATO is also pushing back through its summits, which provide biennial updates on the Alliance's priorities. The 2016 summit in Warsaw was an opportunity to publically reiterate NATO's disapproval of Russian foreign policy. The NATO communiqué made the point unequivocally: "Russia's aggressive actions, including provocative military activities in the periphery of NATO territory and its demonstrated willingness to attain political goals by the threat and use of force, are a source of regional instability, fundamentally challenge the Alliance, have damaged Euro-Atlantic security, and threaten our long-standing goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace." The political rhetoric of the last two years demonstrates the incompatibility of Russia's and NATO's strategic goals. Beyond the tense conversations, NATO has also shown its disapproval physically by strengthening collective defence and enhancing deterrence.

Collective defence is at the heart of NATO's *raison d'être*; it is one of the Alliance's core tasks and enshrined in Article V of the Washington Treaty. However, the other two tasks, crisis management and cooperative security, had become more salient throughout the 1990s and 2000s, as the US and its allies focused on building partnerships outside of the Euro-Atlantic region and then embarked on a long, out-of-area operation with the International Security and Assistance Force in Afghanistan, an intervention that continues today on a smaller scale under the banner of the Resolute Support Mission. Deterrence, then, was a word that remained in the lexicon of successive Strategic Concepts and NATO summit communiqués, but which was sidelined by the missions and operations of the day. In the post-Euro-aidan security environment, deterrence experts are back in business as NATO's member states can once again agree on the importance of bolstering their collective capabilities in the face of Russia's destabilizing actions. At the very least, this heightened external threat has increased alliance cohesion, strengthening the political commitment that is so important for the credibility of deterrence. The material architecture of NATO deterrence has also been bolstered. It relies on a combination of conventional capabilities, nuclear weapons, and missile defence, all of which have been

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given greater importance in NATO policy over the past two years, as political tensions continue to rise between Russia and NATO's 28 nations.

First, NATO's nuclear weapons policy, which was updated during the 2012 Chicago Summit with the Deterrence and Defence Posture Review, quickly became stale. In the lead-up to the summit, NATO allies were openly calling for the withdrawal of the estimated 150-200 American tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. Today, the political climate is further entrenching the nuclear status quo and the debate over whether these nuclear weapons should stay or go is over. These B-61 bombs are stored on the territories of five NATO countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and Turkey) and could technically be used in times of war, though this is a very remote possibility. In the US Nuclear Posture Review, NATO's nuclear sharing is defined as "arrangements under which non-nuclear members participate in nuclear planning and possess specially configured aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons [which] contribute to Alliance cohesion and provide reassurance to allies and partners who feel exposed to regional threats." These nuclear sharing arrangements are supplemented by extended nuclear deterrence commitments resting on the strategic arsenals of the UK, the US, and France, even if the latter does not participate in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, the Alliance's main body for nuclear consultations. Whether it is in reference to nuclear sharing or extended nuclear deterrence, the language referring to the Alliance's nuclear capabilities has been strengthened, especially during the 2016 Warsaw Summit. The 2012 *Deterrence and Defence Posture Review* needs to be rewritten.

“The assurance measures are varied and range from more frequent military exercises to AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) surveillance flights in Eastern Europe.”

Second, NATO's conventional capabilities have received a boost through a heightened readiness posture and what the Alliance has dubbed "an enhanced forward presence." During both the Wales and Warsaw summits, NATO outlined the contours of this plan, which includes new assurance measures for allies in Central and Eastern Europe and the establishment of a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, to increase the responsiveness of NATO forces on the Eastern flank. The assurance measures are varied and range from more frequent military exercises to AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) surveillance flights in Eastern Europe. As for forward presence, the plan is to deploy four combat-ready, multinational battalions in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The battlegroups will be under NATO command, with one member state stepping in as the lead to coordinate troops that have been committed by twelve other nations. These four "framework nations," to use NATO

parlance, are the UK, Canada, Germany, and the United States. Canada, for example, will send its own troops to Adazi, but will also integrate forces from Italy, Albania, Poland, and Slovenia, in its role as the framework nation for the deployment in Latvia. The biggest boost to deterrence is undoubtedly on the conventional front and represents the costliest investment and riskiest commitment by allies to collective defence and deterrence.

Third, NATO has proceeded apace with its ballistic missile defence (BMD) capabilities, one of the stated causes of the rift with Russia, which had expressed consternation at the prospects of such installations in Eastern Europe. Prior to NATO suspending practical cooperation with Russia in 2014, five BMD exercises had been held under the framework of the NATO-Russia Council, as plans were discussed for a common theatre ballistic missile defence. Instead, NATO BMD is now in a phase referred to as the Initial Operational Capability, to support the Alliance's deterrence objectives, with no prospects of including Russia now or in the future. While BMD continues to be justified as protection against a ballistic missile threat on the Southern flank, Moscow is not buying it.

To conclude, the nature of NATO-Russia relations have changed significantly during the last 15 years and it is difficult to predict if meaningful cooperation can be restored. The political crisis has translated into a renewed emphasis on deterrence, which includes both nuclear and conventional capabilities, as well as NATO's ballistic missile defence system. Perhaps most worrying from Moscow's point of view is that NATO countries have decided to establish a military presence in Poland and the Baltics. Yet there is another unpredictable variable in the NATO-Russia equation and it is President Donald Trump. Before and after the election, Trump had called the Alliance "obsolete" and indicated it was a waste of money. His tone softened during his first bilateral conversation with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg but allies continue to be on edge because of Trump's contradictory signals. The silver lining is that Trump could be successful in easing tensions with Russia, in which case we might witness a return to the kind of cooperative language that underpinned the NATO-Russia Council's Rome Summit, back in 2002 - but at what cost?

“The nature of NATO-Russia relations have changed significantly during the last 15 years and it is difficult to predict if meaningful cooperation can be restored.”



Looking North with Caution: Canada, the Arctic and Russia

Aurel Braun and Stephen Blank



A significant international actor such as Canada – a member of the G7, NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense Command), and the second largest territorial state in the world – naturally faces multiple and complex issues and even potential threats in an increasingly volatile world. A forward-looking Canada must be concerned about possible swings in American foreign, defence, and economic priorities, the continuing conflict in the Middle East, Russian aggression in Ukraine, global extremism, issues of trade and economic growth, and global environmental problems. The collective weight of all of these concerns might explain why the Arctic, a vital strategic region that only periodically garners attention in Ottawa and abroad, does not have the sustained policy focus that this vital strategic region deserves. Yet climate change, economic imperatives, the military strategies of regional states, and possible shifts in domestic political priorities in some of these countries all require that Canada have clear and involved policies for the Arctic. It is vital that Canadians understand the geopolitical context, and set the right policy priorities.

To be sure, Canada has not ignored the Arctic and its thousands of kilometres of shoreline. Historically, Ottawa has shown a keen interest in the area, and back in the 1920s even made a claim to extend its maritime boundaries to the North Pole (as the Soviet Union did shortly afterwards). Canadian concern for sovereignty protection strengthened during the Cold War when Ottawa not only claimed Arctic territories and the waters within the Canadian Arctic Archipelago as Canadian internal waters, but also took symbolic and substantive steps to enforce and signal its claims, from relocating Inuit families into the far North to hosting visits by Queen Elizabeth II and members of her family in 1970.

In the post-Cold War era, the Soviet threat seemed to disappear, but even then there remained political, economic, and legal disputes with a number of Arctic littoral states including Denmark (via its possession of autonomous

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Greenland) and the United States. Several factors have now magnified the importance of the Arctic and transformed the geopolitical picture. Global warming means that the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route (NSR) may have dramatically new navigational possibilities that could fundamentally change trade routes in an increasingly globalized world. The discovery of vast potential resources in the Arctic also creates opportunities and temptations for countries bordering this area. Additionally, there are new strategic considerations, particularly as Russia assertively pursues ambitious foreign policy goals.

Further, the potential opening of new Northern sea routes, and particularly the NSR, is bringing other powerful players to the Arctic region. China, especially, as the world's largest exporter and a new observer on the Arctic Council,¹ has shown great interest, which demonstrates that the region is now of concern to more than just the Arctic Council members (five littoral and three northern countries).

Additionally, the existence of and the *new potential* for exploration of vast energy and mineral resources in the Arctic considerably increase international interest. The Arctic region may possess as much as 22 percent of the world's undiscovered conventional energy sources, including upwards of 13 percent of undiscovered global oil, 30 percent of natural gas, various gas hydrates, and enormous reserves of minerals. While energy prices have stagnated in the past few years, they are still substantial. As the ice starts melting in the Arctic and with technological advances in drilling, there may be new possibilities and incentives for exploration, especially if global demand rises as predicted.

It is not surprising, then, that various countries, including Canada, Denmark, and the United States have made vigorous claims to large parts of the Arctic. Specifically, a number of countries that have extensive continental shelves, such as Canada, Denmark (via Greenland), and Russia, have made claims to huge portions of the Arctic Ocean using various mechanisms, but particularly via the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). These claims have, in some cases, included the North Pole.

As such, Canada is competing with a number of states in claiming potential resources in the Arctic, in assuring control or access to navigation routes, and, within these multiple quests of littoral states, protecting what it sees as sovereign territory and its Exclusive Economic Zones. It is worth noting though, that while Canada faces multiple claims from other littoral states, all except Russia are NATO members, and as such, allies pose only routine concerns.

“Global warming means that the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route (NSR) may have dramatically new navigational possibilities.”

WHY RUSSIA IS DIFFERENT

Canadian negotiations with the United States, Denmark, or Norway over the Arctic may at times be difficult, but as all are NATO members, there is little doubt that peaceful resolution, including arbitration, is the expected route; there is no reason to believe that these negotiations would devolve into violent military escalation. The relationship and situation with Russia is very different, and Canada should be alert to possible Arctic risks.

As Canada's then Foreign Minister Stéphane Dion had noted, Russia and Canada control about three-quarters of the Arctic shoreline, and the two countries have reasons to cooperate and avoid military confrontation. There are indeed many areas of mutual interest that can sustain good relations between the two nations, involving, for instance, shared cultures, cooperation on search and rescue, and relations with aboriginal peoples. One can therefore appreciate the temptations and possible advantages of dialogue with Russia. But negotiations should be based on a clear understanding of each nation's grand strategic political, economic, social and military interests. And poorly thought-out dialogue can have a profoundly deleterious effect on bilateral relations. There are at least four areas in dealing with Russia in the coming years that Canada needs to approach with conceptual clarity as part of a well-formulated grand strategy. These include geography, demographics, economics, and geo-strategy.

First, geography: Russia has the longest Arctic coastline in the world, with almost 50 percent of the adjoining land area, and long continental shelves that include the Lomonosov and Mendeleev Ridges. Although other countries bordering the Arctic also claim this continental shelf, the Kremlin assertively contends that these ridges belong to them, which means that it claims as a Russian possession vast tracts of the Arctic representing more than a million square kilometres. Moscow, moreover, posits its legal claims with Soviet-style legal tactics and single-mindedness.

Second, in terms of demography, no other country has as significant a population in the North as Russia. Roughly nine million Russians live in scores of cities and hundreds of large settlements in the Russian north. Thus, a large number of Russians have had the historical experience of living in the far north and have an attachment to the region — a number that is not matched by any other Arctic neighbour.

“Russia has an unmatched and growing military presence in the Arctic. It is where it bases its powerful Northern Fleet.”

Third, economically, Russia has invested far more in the Arctic than any other bordering country. About 20 percent of Russia's GDP and about one fifth of its exports are generated in this region. And as noted, the Arctic's vast energy potential only magnifies its economic significance to Moscow. With a uni-dimensional and non-competitive economy, the bulk of Russian exports consist of energy. Consequently, even with low energy prices, Russia continues to search for new sources. Should energy prices rise and should the West lift the sanctions that have kept some of the most advanced exploration technology away from Russia, Moscow would very likely sharply increase its already considerable efforts at hydrocarbon extraction in the Arctic. Given that Russia has proven to be extremely careless in protecting the environment - witness the sad case of the massive pollution of Lake Baikal, the world's largest single body of fresh water - such exploration in the ecologically fragile Arctic could have catastrophic environmental results for the entire region and should be of great regional, national, and global concern.

Fourth, Russia has an unmatched and growing military presence in the Arctic. It is where it bases its powerful Northern Fleet and significant numbers of its nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles. Moscow also has the world's most powerful fleet of heavy icebreakers, including several nuclear powered vessels. It launched the world's largest and most powerful twin-reactor nuclear powered icebreaker, the *Arktika*, in June 2016 (which should be operational by the end of 2017). Russia's use of the nuclear Northern Fleet also demonstrates the seamlessness of the country's global military strategy. This was clearly displayed in October 2016 when a group of powerful ships from this fleet sailed through the English Channel to the Eastern Mediterranean to boost Russian operations in Syria.

“ Apart from this enormous military capacity, Russia has placed great priority on the Arctic.”

Apart from this enormous military capacity, Russia has placed great priority on the Arctic. Going back to President Dmitry Medvedev in 2008, Russia stressed the Arctic's strategic importance as part of the “Strategy for National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020.” Later, in December 2014, the Kremlin established the Arctic strategic command with the same legal status as the four other long-standing military districts. And in 2015 President Vladimir Putin not only created a coordinated mission for the development of the Arctic vested with power in all areas and activities, but appointed as commission chair the notoriously anti-Western and aggressive Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, who infamously quipped that

“tanks don’t need visas.” Further, Russia has deployed an Arctic brigade about 50 km from its border with Finland and has conducted vast Arctic military exercises as it refurbished old bases and opened new ones.

CANADA’S APPROACH AND WHAT IT MUST DO NEXT

In sharp contrast, Canada has degraded its military capabilities in the Arctic by closing military bases, failing to adequately invest in Arctic mobility vehicles, and being slow to build heavy icebreakers. Russia’s policy of prodding and probing Western and NATO military defences in North America and Europe with its consequent risk of escalation, therefore, has been particularly stark in light of the weakness of Canadian military capacity in the North. Moscow’s large military build-up is ostensibly justified by a bizarre threat assessment that the West covets Russia’s natural resources and will use force to get them. Yet no Western state has shown any real interest in emulating Moscow’s military expansion in the Arctic. In other words, Russia has created a self-reinforcing threat assessment and build-up that now forces other Arctic states, including Canada, to follow suit.

Russian military assertiveness is also motivated by certain disturbing domestic factors. Whereas the Putin government may seem popular (particularly in the absence of a viable opposition), it suffers from a legitimacy crisis. It had built its legitimacy on the basis of a tacit understanding: it would deliver continued improvements to the standard of living of its citizens in exchange for their political complacency: the population would not challenge the government politically. As the Russian economy has stagnated and remains unreformed and uncompetitive, the Putin government has had to look for other sources of legitimization. Foreign military adventures and “glory” created by confrontations with real or imagined external threats has filled the gap. Playing this card is risky, however, and requires ever new adventures and new successes to feed the ultra-nationalistic fervor that the regime has purposely generated. Evidence suggests that the Arctic is an issue that Moscow has prioritized to help it invoke Russian glory and great power status. These trends undoubtedly make the nation a more reckless and unpredictable player.

“It would be wise for Canada to follow a balanced policy: to build capacity in the Arctic that would allow it to employ the right combination of soft and hard power, and to recognize that weakness only creates temptations for a Russia.”

Consequently, Russian attempts to create an impression of normalcy in the Arctic while it is assertive or aggressive elsewhere, and to somehow persuade other Arctic states to delink policy in the Arctic from global concerns, is neither viable nor prudent. Indeed, falling prey to that policy is actively dangerous. It may create a false sense of regional security and may well further embolden Russia. Ultimately, then, focusing exclusively on functional issues such as search and navigation safety, and dialogue in the Arctic, is likely to prove illusory and dangerous. Neither is it sensible to insist that hitherto all has been well on the Arctic Council itself – which admittedly may be true – even while Moscow simultaneously tries to intimidate states far and wide with its military buildup and assertive positions. It would be wise for Canada to follow a balanced policy: to build capacity in the Arctic that would allow it to employ the right combination of soft and hard power, and to recognize that weakness only creates temptations for a Russia that is far more unstable and opportunistic than Moscow’s proclamations in favor of a zone of peace and cooperation suggest.

ENDNOTES

1 The Arctic Council was founded in 1996 and has eight members: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, the U.S. and Sweden. Several states have observer status, including China. The council is intended to deal with issues facing the Arctic governments and indigenous people in the region, though formally it is not mandated to cover peace and security. The council issues non-binding declarations and engages in multiple functional activities such as search-and-rescue or navigation safety. Chairmanship rotates every two years, with the United States holding the office from 2015 to 2017.

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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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