WHERE TO DRAW THE BLUE LINE

How civilians and contractors can let police do the policing

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True North in
Canadian public policy

Christian Leuprecht

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Executive Summary

Stressed municipal budgets, expanding public expectations, growing complexity of police services, and mounting salary pressures are all driving calls to reform the way policing services are delivered in Canada.

Police budgets have been rising steadily since 2002 at rates in excess of inflation. At the same time, municipalities, especially smaller ones, have come under pressure to drive down costs where policing budgets have been cannibalizing other services. Canada faces a dilemma: Policing has become more complex and increasingly demanding while resources have become scarcer.

There is no one factor driving costs; there is no simple solution for reform. One the one hand, reformists tout "civilianization," privatization, and contracting as possible game-changers to contain rising costs, improve service delivery, and deliver community safety outcomes. On the other hand, law-and-order traditionalists – police associations and chiefs first and foremost among them – deem alternative service delivery (ASD) a disruptor.

Policing has become more complex and increasingly demanding while resources have become scarcer.

But many industries and sectors are being disrupted by technology and new business models, including crime. Why not policing?

The public has an intuitive sense of how core a service really is: studies show that popular support is higher for uniformed police to deliver services involving Criminal Code offences than to deliver other services, such as security at public events. In the words of former RCMP Assistant Commissioner Cal Corley: Why do we need a master mechanic to perform an oil change? In effect, the police are not optimized to deliver these latter non-core services.

This study details the gains in efficiency and effectiveness that come from switching to ASD for non-core policing. To illustrate the point, it examines a series of case studies drawn from across Canadian cities. Together, they show the range of services that civilians are already delivering around the country on behalf of police services. Unsurprisingly, the approaches and extent of service delivery vary across the country. Nonetheless, it turns out that the "civilianization of service delivery" that is highly contentious and hotly debated in one place has long been delivered successfully elsewhere. The study finds that the greatest obstacles to change come from police associations and chiefs who are stiffly resisting the efforts of legislators and other civilian authorities to implement new approaches.

The study contains several key findings. First, there is much confusion about concepts such as privatization, civilianization, and contracting; the study explains those concepts in depth, which will help ensure that the public discourse on ASD and Non-Core Policing (NCP) is clear and sensible.

Second, what may be acceptable and appropriate in one context may not be doable in another, but the study emphasizes that better and more systematic evidence will go a long way toward alleviating such concerns from the public, associations, and the law enforcement members.

Third, evidence shows that many of the concerns raised about ASD can be addressed with proper, enforceable contracts and careful selection of a qualified, appropriate, experienced ASD provider, especially if that provider's personnel are drawn from retired police or military members who are already experienced and understand the policing culture.

Fourth, while it may be tempting to think of ASD primarily in terms of efficiencies, observations from across the country indicate that reducing the amount of non-core policing done by police really provides more effective service delivery with better outcomes, which enables police services to reinvest the money and personnel they save in the uniformed service.

Finally, the study points out that the legislative environment sets different standards and expectations, and in many cases exposes municipalities to potential liability, which deters them from even experimenting with ASD in non-core policing. Implementation will remain tepid unless provincial legislation reduces that liability while providing for a more coherent and systematic set of standards.

Canadian police departments are gradually shifting to an operational model that does not necessarily have expensive, highly skilled, highly trained members respond to calls where public safety is not in jeopardy. Building on these trends raises the prospect of better service, greater efficiency, and better value for money.

Sommaire

Les contraintes budgétaires des municipalités, les attentes grandissantes du public, la complexité croissante des activités policières et les pressions salariales de plus en plus lourdes exigent chacune en soi que nous réformions le mode de prestation des services de police au Canada.

Les budgets des services de police se sont régulièrement accrus depuis 2012 à des taux supérieurs à l'inflation. Parallèlement, les municipalités, en particulier les plus petites, ont été contraintes de réduire leurs coûts lorsque ces budgets empiétaient sur ceux d'autres services. Le Canada est confronté au dilemme que voici : les activités policières sont devenues plus complexes et exigent de plus en plus de ressources qui, elles, se raréfient.

Il n'y a pas qu'un seul facteur expliquant ces coûts, pas plus qu'il n'y a de solution simple de réforme. D'une part, les réformistes laissent entendre que la « civilarisation », la privatisation et l'externalisation pourraient ouvrir de nouvelles voies pour contenir les coûts croissants, améliorer la prestation des services et rendre les collectivités pus sûres. D'autre part, les traditionalistes en matière d'ordre public – les associations policières et les cadres policiers en tout premier lieu – estiment que le nouveau mode de prestation de services (NMPS) est perturbateur.

Les activités policières sont devenues plus complexes et exigent de plus en plus de ressources qui, elles, se raréfient.

Or, de nombreuses industries et branches d'activité sont perturbées par la technologie et les nouveaux modèles d'affaires, y compris la criminalité. Pourquoi donc ne pas y exercer une surveillance policière?

Le public comprend intuitivement à quel point un service est fondamental : certaines études montrent qu'en général, l'appui populaire est beaucoup plus grand à l'égard du travail policier en uniforme qui est consacré aux infractions au *Code criminel* qu'à celui qui est dévolu à d'autres activités, notamment au maintien de la sécurité lors d'événements publics. Comme l'a souligné Cal Corley, ancien commissaire adjoint de la GRC : pourquoi avons-nous besoin d'un maître mécanicien pour effectuer un changement d'huile? Effectivement, les services des agents en uniforme ne sont pas optimisés dans le cadre de ces activités non fondamentales.

Dans cette étude, nous examinons les gains d'efficience et d'efficacité résultant du passage vers le NMPS pour les activités policières non fondamentales. Une série d'études de cas recensés dans les villes canadiennes permet d'illustrer ce point. Elle présente la gamme de services déjà offerts partout au pays par des employés civils pour le compte des organisations policières. Les approches adoptées et l'étendue des services rendus varient d'une région à l'autre, ce qui n'est pas étonnant. Toutefois, ce qui est ressorti de l'étude, c'est que si la « civilarisation des services »

fait l'objet de vives controverses et d'âpres discussions à certains endroits, elle a été mise en œuvre depuis longtemps avec succès ailleurs. L'étude conclut que la résistance la plus vive émane des associations policières et des cadres policiers, qui s'opposent farouchement aux travaux des législateurs et d'autres autorités civiles pour mettre en place de nouvelles façons de faire.

L'étude présente plusieurs conclusions clés. Premièrement, il y a beaucoup de confusion à propos de concepts tels que la privatisation, la civilarisation et l'externalisation; ces concepts sont expliqués en profondeur, ce qui peut contribuer à éclairer le débat public au sujet du NMPS et des activités policières non fondamentales.

Deuxièmement, ce qui peut être acceptable et approprié dans un contexte donné peut ne pas être réalisable dans un autre, mais l'étude souligne que des données améliorées recueillies de manière systématique contribueront grandement à rassurer le public, les associations et les membres des organisations policières.

Troisièmement, les faits démontrent que de nombreuses préoccupations soulevées au sujet du NMPS peuvent être résolues en concluant des contrats adéquats et exécutoires et en choisissant de manière rigoureuse des fournisseurs qualifiés, compétents et expérimentés, en particulier lorsqu'ils comptent dans leurs rangs des policiers ou des militaires à la retraite qui font déjà preuve d'expérience et de connaissance de la culture policière.

Quatrièmement, même s'il peut être tentant d'envisager le NMPS principalement du point de vue de la rentabilité, selon les cas recensés au pays, limiter les activités non fondamentales exercées par les agents en uniforme permet réellement d'offrir des services plus efficaces et d'obtenir de meilleurs résultats, tout en laissant aux organisations policières la possibilité de réinvestir les économies de personnel réalisées au sein du service en uniforme.

Enfin, l'étude souligne que l'environnement législatif permettant aux activités policières non fondamentales de prendre diverses formes d'une région à l'autre du pays mène à des pratiques et à des attentes inégales et expose, dans de nombreux cas, les municipalités à des problèmes potentiels de responsabilité, ce qui décourage les mises à l'essai. L'avancement de ces activités policières restera mitigé si la législation ne réduit pas ces problèmes tout en prévoyant un ensemble de normes plus cohérentes et uniformes.

Les services de police canadiens adoptent progressivement un modèle opérationnel qui ne compte pas nécessairement sur un personnel coûteux, hautement qualifié et très expérimenté pour répondre aux appels qui ne sont pas en lien avec les menaces à la sécurité publique. S'appuyer sur ces tendances permettra d'améliorer le service, d'accroître l'efficience et d'offrir un meilleur rapport qualité-prix.

Introduction

This study explores the prospects of alternative service delivery (ASD) for non-core policing (NCP) functions in Canada. In the process, it weighs arguments and evidence for and against ASD in policing. The study opens by framing the problem facing the delivery of police services. It then goes on to define ASD and NCP – these contentious concepts are poorly understood and often conflated, so it is important that their meaning be clear. The study breaks ASD down into three distinct yet commonly confused components: "civilianization," contracting, and privatization. The study then separates non-core policing from core duties. The section following gives the historical context for ASD, distinguishes between the conventional and tiered models of policing in law enforcement, and details an extensive array of tasks which the private sector can undertake in the delivery of public safety and security.

Drawing on case studies from Vancouver, Calgary, Winnipeg, Quebec, Nova Scotia, Edmonton, and Northern Alberta, the study then highlights possibilities for ASD partnerships, and offers evidence as to its utility and performance. These case studies gauge the extent to which contracting ASD for non-core tasks is a viable alternative for delivering some of the services that police currently perform. Furthermore, the case studies show that many of the concerns raised about ASD can be addressed with well-drafted and enforceable contracts and careful selection of a qualified, appropriate, experienced ASD provider. Drawing on this evidence, the study closes by identifying best practices across ASD partnerships, listing the boundaries that need to be set and the characteristics of an ideal ASD provider, and explaining the key impediment to greater uptake of ASD for NCP.

ASD is part of a broader debate about community safety and democracy.

ASD is often considered purely instrumental as a way of generating more efficient and effective service delivery. However, ASD is part of a broader debate about community safety and democracy. On the one hand, the means and ends of policing have been subject to greater public scrutiny as of late. That begs the question: are there better ways to deliver some services to specific communities and achieve intended outputs and outcomes more efficiently and effectively? On the other hand, as calls for service and the remit of policing expand, we are reminded of the basic premise of liberal democratic values that underpin the way Canadians are governed: limited state intervention. Policing is the ultimate form of state intervention: exercising powers of detention and arrest is one way the state manifests its legitimacy and authority in the lives of its citizens.

The modern state is based on a social contract to provide citizens with public goods in the form of security, law, public order, and basic services for which, in return, they will pay taxes (Collier 2009, 220; Milliken and Krause 2002, 752; Holsti 1998). The state does this by maintaining effective and legitimate institutions of government that preserve and enforce the

monopoly over the use of force within a given territory (Weber 1946, 1958; Tilly 1985; Mann 1984; Carment, Prest and Samy 2010; Tikuisis and Carment 2017, 1; Patrick 2011, 8).

But rather than simply expanding police services and the responsibility of policing by default, a democracy should actively determine what police services are essential for the state to deliver. One could argue that all forms of state intervention other than the use of force should be delivered by means that are less assertive and intrusive in people's lives. In other words, the conventional way in which police do business is being called into question not just on grounds of efficiency. There are basic questions that citizens of any democracy need to ask about what services they want and need the state to deliver directly, and where the citizenry may be better served by other means.

Private companies have long been contracted to provide services in other sectors, such as health care. By comparison, such discussion has been less prominent about policing (Cukier and Tomlinson 2005). Could policing services stand to benefit from the ASD model, not just to save money but to improve the quality, quantity, efficiency, and effectiveness of service delivery? ASD is an attractive alternative as Canadian police departments struggle to provide efficient and effective services as demand increases and resources become more constrained. This tension between service delivery expectations and the ability of Canadian police departments to deliver to the expected standard will only be exacerbated with the emergence of cyber- or transnational crime (Fyfe 2004; Council of Canadian Academies 2014, 13-43). Citizens still demand the same quality of service, but the threats from which they want to be protected are becoming more wide-ranging, complex, and harder to manage. Threats are now global, transregional, all-domain, and multi-function (Leuprecht, Sokolsky, and Hughes 2018). By way of example, although not every crime is a cybercrime, most crime nowadays is technologically enabled.

Due to a confluence of factors – some of them beyond the control of police – police budgets have been rising steadily since 2002 at rates in excess of inflation (Leuprecht 2014, 7-9). At the same time, municipalities, especially smaller ones, have come under pressure to drive down costs where policing budgets have been cannibalizing other services (Leuprecht 2014, 10; Whitelaw et al. 2012, 413). Canada faces a dilemma: Policing has become more complex and increasingly demanding while resources have become scarcer. Canadian police departments have been coming under pressure to adapt: "as society changes, so must policing" (Forst 2000, 61). These circumstances leave police with little choice but to turn to others who can deliver complementary skills and conduct business in innovate ways (Council of Canadian Academies 2014; Kiedrowski, Ruddell, and Petrunik 2019; McKenna 2014; Leuprecht, 2014; Whitelaw, Smith, and Hansen 2012).

ASD holds out the promise of better value for money, better outcomes, meeting growing demand for new skills, and making policing and public safety more affordable, especially for smaller municipalities without a growing property-tax base. No surprise then that survey data show that a clear majority of Canadians regardless of gender, age, or region of residence support private companies offering supplementary policing tasks (Ipsos 2017). The same survey also shows only 28 percent support NCP for reasons of efficiency, while 59 percent support policing as a public service, irrespective of cost. The number of those who do not know where they stand is relatively high at 14 percent. Support for NCP efficiencies is higher among men (33 percent) than women (22 percent), among high-income earners (42 percent), and among residents of Quebec (42 percent), followed by residents of Ontario (29 percent).

Framing the Problem

The traditional model of policing on which law enforcement has relied in Canada holds police responsible for addressing operational, administrative, and social duties. The remit of what police are expected to contend with has been expanding into hitherto unconventional areas, including social assistance, mental health, and community safety. As a result, police, as an extension of the state, are becoming increasingly involved in everyday life and the private sphere (Law Reform Commission of Canada 2006).

First, police are, in effect, the law in action. As such, the state bestows on police unique powers. Thus, in a democracy, the expansion of policing into new areas raises a host of questions. What level of interaction and interference by the state is appropriate in a liberal democracy that is premised on limiting the intervention of the state in the private sphere? When should the state, through law enforcement, intervene, how should it do so, and under what conditions? Police can use coercive force and have special skills. Under the "policing by consent" model, they should only be called into the private sphere when coercive force is required (Bayley and Shearing 2001).

The traditional way of delivering policing services is unsustainable.

Second, the traditional way of delivering policing services is unsustainable. Although police are asked to do more, budgets are not keeping pace with the rate at which the demand for police is growing. Total expenditure on policing has increased for 20 consecutive years between 1995 and 2015 (Mazowita and Greenland 2016). In the 2017/18 fiscal year, Canadians spent $318 per capita (using constant dollars) on municipal, provincial, and territorial policing, up from $316 a year earlier (Conor, Robson, and Marcellus 2019). Figure 1 demonstrates the growing cost of responding to an array of social ills as the per capita cost of policing continues to escalate. The rising cost is straining police resources. Already some police services are contracting with the private and/or volunteer sectors for NCP tasks.

Evidence and experience indicate that contracting out is not all that radical a departure from modern policing practices. Today, all democracies have more people engaged in private security than sworn members of government-provided police forces. Private security is omnipresent in many functional areas, such as malls, community safety, and prisoner transport. But is this model necessary or effective in Canada? Furthermore, if Canadian police adopt ASD, what type of ASD is appropriate?

Shifting the business model should not be a matter merely of economies and efficiency. Rising expectations and an increase in calls for service have been overwhelming police (Leuprecht, 2014). Dispatching uniformed members to address the seemingly unending demand for their services strains police resources. Police are neither optimally trained nor equipped to meet expanding expectations. This affects the quality of service delivery. These changes in the public's

FIGURE 1: POLICE EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA, CURRENT DOLLARS AND CONSTANT DOLLARS, CANADA, 1987/1988 TO 2017/2018

Source: Conor, Robson, and Marcellus 2019

expectations of the means and quality of service delivery, coupled with a shift in focus from what police do to what they achieve, are major drivers of the modernization of community safety (Toronto Police Service 2017). The cost of policing is important to politicians and police departments, but less so to the public, which tends to place more priority on the quality of service delivery.

In Canadian public discourse, this discussion is often reduced to response times – irrespective of the fact that the relationship between response time and public safety is tenuous. Nonetheless, citizens habitually measure how happy they are with police as a function of how quickly authorities arrive on site – even when there is no threat to public or personal safety. For example, a woman who lives and works in Edmonton experienced a delayed response time following a disturbance at her fitness studio. Frustrated with the delay, the woman filed a Freedom of Information Request and found that "police met their response time target seven percent less often this year than in 2011. And in the summer months, that dropped to 16 percent less than two years ago" (Kozicka 2013).

Edmonton Police linked their slow response times to a number of causes – including an overwhelming number of calls for non-emergency assistance – and suggested that ASD stood to improve response times. According to then Edmonton Police Acting Chief Brian Simpson, "With the city's boundaries and population growing, so do our calls for service. It is becoming more of a challenge to get to lower-priority calls for service as quickly as we would like to. Demands have steadily grown. Year to date, for 2013 and 2012, the EPS has seen an increase in dispatched calls by 4.3 percent, or 4,479 calls to be exact" (Kozicka 2013). The Chair of the Edmonton Police Commission added that police were overwhelmed by paperwork and non-

core policing responsibilities that take them off the street, with negative consequences for the quality of policing (Kozicka 2013).

Overall, the percentage of Canadians who are satisfied with the performance of police correlates with the frequency with which the public interacts with the police. As of 2014, 74 percent of Canadians who had not been victimized were satisfied with the ability of police to ensure the safety of citizens, and 72 percent of people who had not been victimized reported that they believed that police responded expeditiously. However, after one incident of victimization, the percentage of people satisfied with police and response times dropped to 61 percent and 60 percent, respectively. These percentages dropped to 49 percent for respondents who were victimized twice, and to 42 percent (in ensuring the safety of citizens) and 45 percent (for response times) when respondents were victimized three or more times (Cotter 2015). Rates of satisfaction are also lower among Indigenous and immigrant populations (Ibrahim 2018).

ASD, then, is a way of optimizing the deployment of scarce resources: the idea is to deploy highly trained, well-paid uniformed personnel where appropriate, and assign civilianized or contracted personnel to functions for which they are better positioned to respond to effectively and efficiently. Failure to optimize police assets in this way and instead retain the prevailing business model is likely to drive up public dissatisfaction with service delivery.

Alternative Service Delivery

Alternative service delivery, or ASD, is commonly understood as "the organizational and structural dimension of improving the government's performance in delivering programs and services" (Treasury Board of Canada 2002). ASD "ranges from basic reorganization to outright privatization" (Wilkins 2003, 174) and encompasses contracting tasks to private entities and nonprofit organizations; franchises and leasing; grants and vouchers; Build-Own-Operate-Transfer projects (BOOT); mobilization of non-government organizations, community groups, residents associations, and charitable organizations; self-service and self-reliance (McMaster 1999, 2-5). In other words, ASD is a broad concept and so the term is relatively meaningless if not defined and used with care. To define ASD carefully entails clarifying expectations and needs for service delivery in order to gauge the means by which services are to be delivered.

Contracting, privatization and civilianization are characterized by different levels of control and involvement. Contracting has the private sector perform or deliver a service under the direct guidance and control of the contracting organization. Not all responsibilities are devolved to the private entity. By contrast, privatization affords the ASD provider greater independence and may include the transfer or sale of government assets to the private sector. Public-private partnerships (P3), which fall between contracting and privatization, are beyond the scope of this study. P3 commonly refers to the co-activity of government and private for-profit or not-for-profit sectors (Ohemeng and Grant, 2014).

Privatization is the "transfer of ownership of physical assets from public to private ownership" (Domberger and Jensen 1997, 67). In the context of ASD, private citizens can look to private agents to complete a task as one option when they are unsatisfied with an aspect – efficiency, effectiveness, or economy – of the way in which the state is delivering a service, such as hiring

security guards or private investigators instead of turning to police (Forst 2000, 22). However, when the state privatizes services it typically transfers ownership of a physical asset, such as a hospital, telephone line, water company, etc. (Domberger and Jensen 1997, 67). This transfer of assets distinguishes privatization from civilianization and contracting. The government will "transfer or sell assets to the private sector so that they are no longer responsible for operating a program or delivering a service" (Ohemeng and Grant 2014, 549). Once privatized, the government is no longer in control of, or accountable for, a whole sector of hitherto public delivery. If the government were to privatize policing, this would amount to turning over responsibility for community safety to private security corporations.

Civilianization refers to "the deployment of non-sworn personnel in police services to augment and support agency operations" (Kiedrowski, Ruddell, and Petrunik 2019). Civilianization is easily confused with privatization, as both processes include the assignment of responsibility to an unsworn police body for certain tasks and a focus on reducing costs. Where privatization requires the complete outsourcing of a task or service, civilianization enables government to retain accountability and control, as it, not a private company, still manages the private individuals. Indeed, there is a long history of civilians working alongside police, dating back to the start of policing in 1829 (Kiedrowski, Ruddell, and Petrunik 2019).

The UK's Police Community Support Officers (PCSO) exemplify civilianization: they patrol, protect crime scenes, question, provide community support, and more (NPIA 2010). The tasks that PCSOs perform have been civilianized, not privatized, for they do not need police powers to make arrests or to undertake services that complement the core tasks of the police, and the government is still responsible for managing them and setting and overseeing standards. These individuals are not trained to the same standard as traditional police, do not have the same responsibility, and thus command a lower salary. However, PCSO officers are not traditional civil servants: they are contracted to complete a set task, but they are not managed by a private corporation. While their aims may be similar – reduce costs, improve services, and outsource tasks traditionally completed by government – civilianization and privatization are distinct from one another.

"Civilians completing non-core policing duties" can encompass civilianization, but this definition can also include contracting. *Contracting* enables government to "[contract] providers to deliver all or part of the production and delivery of goods to citizens" (Ohemeng and Grant 2014, 549). The management of specific tasks differentiates contracting from privatization and civilianization. Privatization involves the complete transfer of a sector or industry to the private sector. Instead of such wholesale outsourcing, a branch of the public sector, such as a police department or hospital, will hire a private organization to provide civilians to fill certain roles and to complete some tasks. In lieu of outright privatization, the private sector will hire and manage civilians to complete tasks as outlined in a contract between the private organization and the public sector. The private organization is held to standards outlined in the contract.

Like civilianization, contracting means that civilians will fill certain roles. However, in contrast to civilianization, those individuals work for and are managed by a contractor: "service delivery contracting includes not just allocating to vendors responsibility for producing the service but also includes delegating to vendors important management responsibilities, such as monitoring the quality of service outcomes" (Brown and Potoski 2006, 324). By contracting a service, the government relinquishes some, but not all, of its responsibilities for that service. The government contracts a private company to hire, regulate, and vet new employees to work alongside

police officers. However, government retains control of the agency and sets standards through the competitive bidding process.

The competitive bidding process enables "competition for the market as opposed to competition in it" (Domberger and Jensen 1997, 67). It allows the public sector to retain a good deal of control by framing the parameters of the contract. With privatization, that control is lost. By contracting, the public sector retains control over who receives the contract, how performance is measured, what the financial penalties are, and it can replace or exclude contractors who fail to live up to their promises and contractual obligations (Domberger and Jensen 1997, 67).

Contracting is an opportunity to improve efficiency and effectiveness through ready access to specialized skills while retaining full control of the process:

> Contracting out... means opening up to competition a set of economic activities which were previously immune from it. Organizations are invited to submit bids for contracts to provide particular services to the client. The distinctive feature of contracting out is the element of ex-ante competition – competition for the market as opposed to competition in it. The market in this case is defined by the contract specification, and the bidding process resembles an auction. Other things being equal, the lowest-price tenderer would win the right to supply for the duration of the contract term. In this way the government is able to secure the provision of services at the lowest possible cost. With contracting out, the client retains a fair measure of control over the activities concerned, monitoring performance, imposing financial penalties, and replacing the contractor in cases of outright performance failure. This level of control is not afforded by privatization. (Domberger and Jensen 1997)

Although both involve civilians, contracting is thus one step removed from civilianization.

The ASD contracting process has three phases: a feasibility assessment, the actual contracting process, and monitoring and evaluating the vendor's performance (Brown and Potoski 2003, 155). The contract may mandate a vetting process to ensure the organization or individual meet set criteria, such as not possessing a criminal record. The third stage gives the public sector leverage to review the contract and ensure that non-sworn personnel are meeting key performance indicators and expectations.

There are limits to contracting for police services. If routine police work were contracted out – as is the case with the G4S security company in the UK – police risk losing those skills and becoming over-reliant on the private security industry, which could hold the public service "hostage to private service demands or would be unable to respond to instances in which the private sector failed to deliver on its contractual obligations" (Kiedrowski et al. 2016). To prevent monopolies (i.e., where one company continuously supplies the government with services), competition is encouraged (Brown and Potoski 2003, 153; Hefetz and Warner 2004; McMaster 1999, 6). Renewing an ASD contract every few years encourages competition among service providers. Bidders have to innovate to be competitive. Competitive bidding also gives an incentive to the current service provider to deliver high quality service.

The purpose of ASD remains the same, irrespective of the approach. ASD is meant to, "ensur[e] that new technologies, management practices and organizational structures are used to optimise service delivery" (Paquet 1996, 32). This definition of ASD emphasizes the two main purposes

TABLE 1: COMPARING ATTRIBUTES OF PRIVATIZATION, CIVILIANIZATION, AND CONTRACTING

PRIVATIZATION	CIVILIANIZATION	CONTRACTING
Whole industry/service is transferred to the private sector.	Certain tasks are removed from the realm of sworn personnel. Civilians are hired to fill some roles at a lower cost.	The public sector identifies certain roles that can be completed by civilians. The public sector then selects a private organization to fill these roles, manage the civilians, and meet standards and expectations outlined by the public sector.
Workers managed by the private corporation.	Workers managed by the public sector.	Workers managed by the private corporation. Private organization reports to the public sector.
Government transfers all responsibility and control.	Government retains complete direct responsibility and control by hiring civilians. The public sector must now manage civilians and sworn members, and remains the primary overseer of operations by managing employees.	Government transfers all responsibility and control.

of an ASD structure: the effective use of resources and their efficient use. ASD is intended to optimize service delivery; this goal includes ensuring that resources are allocated properly and efficiently while improving the delivery of services.

Policy-makers have four aims with ASD: "1) deficit and debt reduction through reductions in public expenditure; 2) reduction in the size of the core public service through devolution of service responsibility; 3) improvement in the efficiency, effectiveness and cost of public organizations; and, 4) improvement in the functioning of the core public service to meet 'taxpayer' expectations of quality" (Evans and Shields 1998, 17). These goals highlight how important effectiveness, efficiency, and economy are to ASD (Paquet 1996). These three objectives must be balanced; while ASD encourages cost saving and the competitive contracting of services (Brown and Potoski 2003, 153), it must not be reduced to mere free market service delivery models. Its goal includes "fundamentally improving and transforming service delivery" for the benefit of all (Davidson and Collier 2012, 3). When governments want to promote flexible, efficient, and effective service delivery, then ASD is a viable option.

Background

ASD gained in popularity during the wave of economic neoliberalization in the 1980s (Wilkins 2003, 176). Neoliberalism promoted free-market ideals such as decentralization, privatization, and austerity. Outsourcing was thought to lead to more economically efficient service delivery (Krueger, Walker, and Bernick 2011, 687). These neoliberal ideals influenced early examples of ASD in the 1990s, as "semi-autonomous operating agencies" and new contracts were established under the ASD moniker (Wilkins 2003, 176). In these early days, ASD was considered more as a type of privatization rather than a collaborative contract or symbiotic relationship.

Canadian policing services struggled to put their limited resources to the best and most efficient use.

However, this approach evolved through the 1990s as problems with privatization became apparent. Confronted with fiscal restraint, Canadian policing services struggled to put their limited resources to the best and most efficient use. For service delivery to be effective "in a context as diverse as the Canadian scene, the public policy process must become a series of local systems of public policy loosely federated through a fishnet-type structure" (Paquet 1997, 43). ASD was seen as an innovative, citizen-orientated, flexible, collaborative, and efficient approach to service delivery.

The combination of unease with the results of privatization and fiscal restraint shifted ASD away from privatization to the "mixed model approach" (Ohemeng and Grant 2014, 549). In 1995, the Treasury Board released a framework describing the Canadian government's approach to ASD and provided a step-by-step guide to completing ASD (Treasury Board of Canada, 1995). ASD was posited as a method to "reinvent government" and "getting government right" using a variety of new mechanisms to "create a more client-oriented, affordable and innovative program delivery environment" (Treasury Board of Canada 1995, 1).

According to this document, the first step to ASD was the "program review" stage, to ensure resources were used in the most "innovative and cost-effective" way (Treasury Board of Canada 1995, 2). At the federal level, this meant giving departments the freedom and incentives to improve service delivery mechanisms. The suggested models were "special operating agencies; the government owned, company-operated form of delivery; the Infrastructure Program partnership between federal, provincial and municipal levels of government; and a partnering arrangement between the federal and provincial governments and private industry to establish Canada Business Services Centres" (Treasury Board of Canada 1995, 3).

ASD was conceptualized as "a creative and dynamic process of public sector restructuring that improves the delivery of services to clients by sharing governance functions with individuals, community groups and other government entities" (Ford and Zussman 1997, 6). ASD was

conceived as a partnership that would bring expert civilians into the fold. This change represents a further shift away from the concept of ASD as privatization. Two decades hence, this definition still encompasses a variety of approaches to ASD and is widely used (Furlong and Bakker 2010, 350).

ASD gained popularity in the 2000s as Canadian public services began to adopt the model. In 2002, the Treasury Board approved the *Policy on Alternative Service Delivery*. It identified the need for ASD in specific departments, and suggested that new organizations – such as service agencies, crown corporations, and administrative tribunals – be established along with new partnerships with other sectors and new levels of government (Treasury Board of Canada 2002, 3-4). The ASD model was henceforth applied to health care, education, and utilities services. In these examples, ASD included devolution of government authority by turning oversight and responsibility back to local actors and reconstructing business services by creating stand-alone agencies, private sector contracting, and privatization (Furlong and Bakker 2010, 351-352).

Still, ASD is not the norm in Canada where public services have traditionally been delivered by federal, provincial, and municipal governments directly. However, this traditional approach to service delivery is often criticized for being too rigid and for hampering government reforms (McMaster 1999; Wilkins 2003). ASD emphasizes contracting, and concentrates more on meeting the immediate needs of smaller municipalities than on planning strategically for the general delivery of services across the country. In an era of fiscal constraint and onerous public service hiring practices, ASD makes it possible to contract new staff as a way of meeting municipalities' identified needs and interests. ASD thus allows governments to respond to a changing fiscal and social environment by ensuring that public services are delivered effectively, efficiently, and economically (Evans and Shields 1998; Fyfe 2004).

ASD in Policing

While Canada was quick to embrace the ASD model in sectors such as health care and education, other countries applied ASD models to their police services. The UK, US, and Netherlands all hired civilians to diversify their workforce.

Police in the US have been contracting civilians for specific tasks since the 1980s. Those tasks include collecting and analysing forensic evidence, management duties, and more (Griffiths et al. 2006, 252- 256). Between 1995 and 2002, the US Department of Justice also funded the MORE (Making Officer Redeployment Effective) program. It covered the cost of technology, equipment, and civilian salaries for a year to enhance community policing (Kiedrowski et al. 2016, 11). The attacks of 9/11 reaffirmed the need for law enforcement and private security to "work collaboratively because neither possess the necessary resources" to "protect the nation's infrastructure." The changing threat environment was a vivid reminder that no one actor could provide security for the whole country (Morabito and Greenberg 2005, 7).

The UK introduced Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) in 2002: an unsworn, uniformed quasi-police given the task of responding to "antisocial behaviour." Their uniformed presence in the street increased visibility and reduced costs (Cooper et al. 2006). A similar

program in the Netherlands introduced police surveillants and city guards. The latter only have citizen powers to complete basic policing tasks, while police surveillants have limited powers of arrest under specific circumstances (Johnston 2003, 189). Both approaches rely on a mixed model, including contracts and civilianization, not privatization.

Both examples exemplify the development of "tiered policing" (see figure 2): diversify and incorporate more civilians into the workforce (Council of Canadian Academies 2014; Kiedrowski, Ruddell, and Petrunik 2019; Leuprecht 2014; McKenna 2014; Montgomery and Griffiths 2016). By creating different types of police, with different legislated powers, the police service model deploys "a broader mix of different 'types' or tiers of police personnel to perform a mix of police functions and activities at a lower cost, making public policing more fiscally sustainable" (McKenna 2014, 5).

By contrast, Canada is still wedded to the conventional model of policing that distinguishes between police and non-sworn personnel, and where the hierarchy of actors is clear. Although Canadian police have begun to hire more civilians, there is still a clear distinction between sworn and non-sworn personnel (McKenna 2014, 5). The police system is still defined by rigid structures instead of a holistic approach to community policing (Frost 2000). For reasons of cost effectiveness, management skills, quality of policing, and devolving power, this business model is proving increasingly unsustainable.

FIGURE 2: COMPARISON OF CONVENTIONAL AND TIERED POLICE SERVICE MODELS

CONVENTIONAL POLICE MODEL	TIERED POLICE MODEL
Regular officers (85%)	Regular officers (60%)
Non-sworn personnel (15%)	PCSOs (20%)
	Civil Police (10%)
	Private Security (5%)
	Auxiliary/Special (5%)

Source: McKenna 2014, 5.

Non-Core Policing

As scholars re-conceptualize law enforcement networks and as new nodes of policing emerge, the line between "core" and "non-core" police duties is becoming blurred (Council of Canadian Academies 2014; van Buuren and den Boer 2009, 19). One way to distinguish between the two roles is to analyse the attributes of a sworn member. A unique feature of a sworn member's job is defined by the latent threat of force and legal powers (Forst 2000, 22; Pearson-Goff and Herrington 2013, 17). Non-core duties, then, do not require "fully trained and legally empowered police officers" (McKenna 2014, 15).

However, there is no overarching consensus on how to distinguish between "core" and "non-core" duties. This is an area that requires further research (Huggins, Wright, and Murphy 2014, 20; Montgomery and Griffiths 2016, 63). To understand what non-core policing tasks exist, scholars and practitioners must first establish who would be completing these non-core tasks. Should non-core tasks be completed by a sworn member? A civilian managed by the state? An individual hired by a private corporation? Or should the task be outsourced completely to a private company? The answers to these questions affect accountability and cost considerations. Since security is a public good, policing tasks have an associated degree of accountability. Cost savings matter to ensure that the taxpayer is getting the best value for money, but so does how and by whom these non-tasks are going to be completed, which necessitates a more accurate description of non-core duties.

Police stand to benefit from expanding the role of civilianization within their departments.

In short, NCP encompasses tasks that can be contracted out, such as those that do not require full powers of arrest, a uniform or police symbols, a weapon, tasks that a private company can reasonably be expected to manage, and tasks whose performance is amenable to measurement. Police stand to benefit from expanding the role of civilianization within their departments. Some positions can be converted entirely to ones performed by civilians. Other departments and positions might benefit from mixed teams of sworn and civilian members (Griffiths and Pollard 2013, 111). These mixed teams are advantageous insofar as they harness synergies between the private and public sectors. Civilians who join a police service typically have specialized credentials and skills.

A literature review by Montgomery and Griffiths (2016) provides a comprehensive list of tasks that lend themselves to contracting (see table 2).

These rubrics can be summarized as: private security services; specific events; specialized support; analysis, research, and investigation; and administrative and business services. Each will be discussed in turn.

TABLE 2: SERVICES PROVIDED BY PRIVATE SECURITY FIRMS

GUARD AND PROTECTIVE SERVICES

- guard and low profile uniform guard services
- concierge services
- static security
- mobile patrols
- close protection and executive/VIP protection
- emergency alarm response services

INVESTIGATION

- cold case witness locates and interviews
- technical surveillance counter measures
- undercover operations and surveillance
- interviewing / interrogation
- injury / long-term disability investigations
- litigation support

LOSS PREVENTION

- loss prevention officers

HUMAN SAFETY AND SECURITY

- special event security and management
- nurse call and healthcare security
- personal locators

ASSET/PHYSICAL PROTECTION

- commercial and residential security systems design, installation, service and monitoring
- physical and electronic protection system design
- access controls (systems and gates)
- remote monitoring
- secure fencing
- biometrics

TECHNICAL PRODUCTS AND SERVICES

- GPS locators
- video analytics
- video management (including thermal cameras)
- visitor management (including X-ray and other screening)

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

- physical infrastructure network identification
- interdependency analysis
- specialized vulnerability assessment
- critical infrastructure risk assessment

HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SUPPORT

- high risk terminations
- pre-employment screening
- background checks
- employee drug testing
- human resource assessments
- occupational health & safety consulting

ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT

- due diligence research
- reputation management
- global security and protective services
- procurement management
- security project management and program development
- competitive intelligence
- intellectual property

SECURITY CONSULTING AND RESEARCH

- anti-bribery and corruption mesures – implementation and compliance
- cyber security assessment

THREAT AND RISK ASSESSMENT

- risk, threat and vulnerability assessment and mitigation
- open source intelligence research (e.g., data mapping and analysis using complex tools)
- surveillance – criminal, civil, corporate, insurance and litigation
- hazard assessment

CASH SERVICES

- corporate cash management
- cash logistics
- armoured transport

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS CONTINUITY

- emergency management
- emergency management continuity planning
- pandemic planning

SPECIALIZED SERVICES

- aviation pre-boarding security screening
- organizational security, safety and risk management training
- labour disruption security

Source: Montgomery and Griffiths 2016, 44.

Private security

Private security includes "services other than public law enforcement and regulatory agencies that are engaged primarily in the prevention and investigation of crime, loss, or harm to specific individuals, organizations, or facilities" (Forst 2000, 23). Private security guards and investigators have limited powers of arrest, search, and detention as per section 494 of the *Criminal Code of Canada*. Security guards may wear uniforms and may be authorized to carry firearms, but private investigators cannot wear uniforms and may not carry firearms (Swol 1998, 3).

Private security groups differ from police in that the former work for their client, the latter for the state (Swol 1998, 3). Police are held accountable through the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* and civilian oversight. By comparison, private security personnel are held accountable through provincial regulations, civil litigation and law, self-regulation, and by their employer (Cukier et al. 2003, 241). If the employer of the private security firm is the state, then the firm has a contractual obligation to the state to complete the designated tasks to the best of its ability. Ultimately, however, both have public safety as a goal: "public police and private security both serve the same common goal, [the] maintenance and protection of the institution of private property, and of the alliance between capital and the state" (Cukier et al. 2003, 243).

The number of people designated as security personnel has surged in recent years and private security firms are filling a gap in the market, as "citizens and organizations have come to recognize that their municipal police departments have limited capabilities, and they have taken matters into their own hands" (Forst 2000, 35). The private security industry is not hampered by bureaucracy, politics, or major legal precedents. Private security is thus often more agile and flexible in responding to changing environments, clients, and expectations. These firms can be hired on a temporary or part-time basis, respond to surges or reduced staffing more easily and on demand, and address a wide variety of needs and clients. Private firms also tend to be more agile; they can be quicker to innovate and take risks.

The presence of private security personnel frees up resources because police can reduce the number of patrols in certain areas, and economies of scale reduce the per-unit cost of services delivered (Forst 2000, 51-52). The benefits of such arrangements include "reducing the costs of public police operations, providing private security officers with access to training and development, providing the public police with access to resources and technologies held in the private sector, and bolstering emergency planning capacities and preparedness" (Montgomery and Griffiths 2016, 22).

Industries that rely on private security personnel include manufacturing, construction, transportation and storage, communication, trade, finance, insurance, real estate, business, government, education, health, universities, subways, and shopping centres (Forst 2000, 34; Swol 1998, 10). Across these industries, there are three general types of private security: physical, information, and employment-related (Montgomery and Griffiths 2016, 9). This reconceptualization of private security goes beyond physical security and to include financial transactions and cybersecurity.

Specific events

Governments routinely hire private security for official functions. During the Vancouver Olympics in 2010, the Integrated Security Unit coordinated 6,000 law enforcement officers, 4,500 military personnel, and 5,000 private security guards to secure 30 venues and 27 functions (McIntyre and Kaminska 2011; Council of Canadian Academies 2014, 35). When Canada hosted the G20 summit in 2010, the RCMP, private security, the Canadian Armed Forces, the Ontario Provincial Police, and Toronto and Peel police services worked together (Council of Canadian Academies 2014, 41). Between the two examples, the Olympics were more successful in terms of planning, coordination, and leadership, but both events demonstrate the merit of a mixed-model approach to security where public and private partners collaborate (Murray et al. 2010).

Specialized support

Specialized civilian policing skills include training coordination, crime analysis, legal services, occupational health and safety, civilian managers responsible for personnel, information technology and data processing, training and fitness or equipment coordination, and photo radar (Kiedrowski, Ruddell, and Petrunik 2019). These specialists routinely work alongside police to enhance service delivery. In South Australia, for example, a private company operates red-light and speed safety cameras on behalf of police.

Mixed teams have also responded to emergency response calls involving mental health problems. Due to the variety of mental health issues and suicidal behaviours, "police officers are expected to deal with depression among elderly persons, anger and frustration among youths, and psychosis among persons with severe mental illness" (Matheson et al. 2005, 1). When police are called, civilians expect them to diagnose or alleviate distress. Police officers have even faced prosecution for being unable to respond appropriately (Lurigio and Watson 2010, 8).

When police are called, civilians expect them to diagnose or alleviate distress.

One response to such criticism is to train police so they can respond to mental health calls appropriately. In Canada, police officers are currently trained under the TEMPO program (Training and Education about Mental Illness for Police Organizations) to qualify them to respond to mental health calls (Coleman and Cotton 2014). However, the prevailing police-only approach may not be all that effective at dealing with mental health calls. In Memphis, Tennessee, the police response is integrated with mental health community resources and mental health professionals. This model is now used in most major cities in Canada (e.g., Toronto Police Service, 2019). One study found that specialized teams made up of a mental health specialist and police responding to mental disturbance calls resulted in fewer arrests; instead, clients were more likely to be diverted to treatment (Steadman et al. 2000). A similar approach has been tested successfully in Victoria, Edmonton, Calgary (Public Safety Canada 2012, 6), and Toronto.

How effective such a mixed approach is can be measured as a function of police time, arrest rates, and the diagnosis and treatment of the individual. This mixed team approach allows for private-police partnerships to evolve and enhance the quality of service. This method can be applied to any service in police departments that requires specialized skills. Contracts offer a way for police departments to supplement skills and knowledge in support of law enforcement.

Analysis, research, and investigation

Police widely and commonly contract civilians to support forensics. In the UK and US, civilians initially support the collection and analysis of evidence (Kiedroswki et al. 2015, 15), specifically, the recovery of fingerprints, and foot, tool, and tire impressions, photographing crime and collision scenes, preparing sketches, collecting, preserving, and transmitting physical and biological evidence, comparing fingerprints and palm prints, and organizing presentations for school groups that come to visit the evidence unit (Griffiths and Palmer 2006, 252-256). For example, the Miami Crime Scene Investigation unit noted that a "unit's technician staff are an extremely experienced cadre with an average of 12 years of expertise" (Griffiths and Palmer 2006, 252).

Police contract for expertise, skills, or knowledge as needed, and can hire temporarily instead of having to commit for the long term. For example, the Vancouver Police Department contracts "external expertise" to help with investigations as required, including anthropologists, biologists, chemists, and more (Griffiths and Palmer 2006, 250). These types of contracts have "produced an excellent working environment along with a higher quality work product" (Griffiths and Palmer 2006, 255). Civilian investigators drive down the costs of investigations, especially major crime, by offering economic efficiency, work on temporary basis, and improved quality in specialized areas of expertise.

Administration and business services

Departments hire civilians for administrative positions and some supervisory staff positions. A survey of police executives in Canada found that civilians were working in administrative duties that included tasks such as department errands, financial administration, human resources, fleet management, and material and corporate management (Kiedrowski, Ruddell, and Petrunik 2019). As figure 3 shows, a recent survey found that civilians in administrative positions made up 39 percent of the total non-sworn personnel, and that administrative services was the area with the largest proportion of civilians among Canadian police services.

There is a growing debate about whether or not to hire civilians to fill management positions in police departments. The argument for doing so is that police should be hiring seasoned, experienced professionals for positions with specific and highly skilled requirements, such as human resources director. Currently, police officers looking to qualify for management take a 13-day course on leadership techniques and tasks (Canadian Police College 2017). Needless to say, such professional development is much less rigorous than a business or MBA degree along with years of specialized experience in that field. Civilian management thus holds out the promise of harnessing efficiencies: "one police executive pointed out that hiring a civilian coordinator for the management of staff and skills made it possible to combine several administrative activities that had been carried out by different police officers into a single position" (Kiedrowski, Ruddell, and Petrunik 2019).

TOTAL SWORN PERSONNEL

Other areas **4%**
Specialized support **3%**
Investigative assistance **12%**
Administration **4%**
Community service officers **21%**
Uniformed Services **54%**
Detention block/Cell block/ Prison escort **2%**

TOTAL NON-SWORN PERSONNEL

Other areas **10%**
Specialized support **28%**
Administration **39%**
Investigative assistance **11%**
Uniformed Services **3%**
Community service officers **4%**
Detention block/Cell block/Prison escort **5%**

Source: Kiedrowski et al. 2016, 28.

Canadian Case Studies

Calgary

Calgary has applied ASD principles to the city's transit system. Infrastructure and riders need to be secure, but medical emergencies, vandalism, assaults, and thefts on public transit aside, Calgary's LRT system must also ensure fare compliance. Like other metropolitan areas, Calgary Transit developed a Calgary Transit Peace Officer program. The Calgary Police Service (CPS) believes that this "low cost investment by police can yield a high return for public safety" (Whitelaw, Smith, and Hansen 2012). Peace officers cost Calgary Transit about $9.5 million, which is about 3 percent of the annual budget. However, their presence has reduced fare evasion to just 1.7 percent in 2015 (Calgary 2016). This low evasion rate has also yielded $1 million in fines, which is projected to increase as more peace officers are added (Whitelaw, Smith, and Hansen 2012).

Calgary Transit does not lack for suitable candidates to join its transit peace officer program. In 2015 alone, 700 candidates applied for 13 positions as peace officers with Calgary Transit, including "a former SWAT team member from Australia and a Dutch husband and wife team, both of whom used to be police officers" (Stark 2015). Oversight of peace officers by Calgary Transit

has nonetheless been controversial. Although the program had been in place for 30 years, the issue was debated by Calgary city council and CPS in 2008. The relationship between Calgary Transit peace officers and the CPS is governed by a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that is reviewed every three years. This MOU stringently and thoroughly outlines how peace officers must conduct themselves in incidents involving weapons, domestic disputes, and investigations. In those particular situations, the CPS is called to respond.

Instead of assigning sworn members to the LRT system – whose skills would make them largely overqualified for the system's specialized needs – peace officers ensure 24/7 coverage and are responsible for enforcing liquor laws, non-moving violations, and trespassing. Although these peace officers are civilians, public oversight mechanisms are in place to govern their conduct. The peace officers are appointed by the provincial solicitor general and the minister of justice. Peace officers also respond to inquiries by customers, report crime to the Calgary Police Service, execute arrest warrants, and deter crime. They can also enforce municipal and transit by-laws. Armed with pepper spray and batons, they have access to police databases, can conduct criminal record checks, and may use red and blue lights for their vehicles. Peace officers can apprehend when there is a warrant for an arrest and can re-lease eligible persons, which alleviates the pressure on provincial correctional staff and police. However, the peace officers are not police and are thus limited to a citizen's arrest.

Although the Calgary Transit peace officers enforce by-laws and have limited authorization to apprehend and investigate, they do not fall under the purview of the Calgary Police Service. They are hired, trained, and managed by Calgary Transit. Still, they respond to a variety of calls for service on the LRT, which significantly reduces the burden on CPS. Fewer than 100 Calgary Transit peace officers respond to over 25,000 calls annually (Stark 2015). That rivals the volume of calls the CPS attended to in the third quarter of 2016: 27,636 publicly generated calls for service (Calgary Police Service 2016). In 2016, Calgary Transit had 25,865 calls for service. Of those, 2,000 were for welfare checks, 1,156 for an unwanted guest, 693 for a notification, 289 for a wanted subject, and 136 miscellaneous. However, Calgary Transit peace officers also deal with crimes against persons: in 2016, there were 83 common assault calls, 39 calls for assault causing bodily harm with a weapon, and 26 robberies (Passifiume 2017).

Peace officers are not police and are thus limited to a citizen's arrest.

The program endures for several reasons. The close working relationship between Calgary Transit and the CPS works because employment as a peace officer is highly competitive; applicants are highly qualified and subsequently well-trained to common standards. Peace officers have a proven track record of responding to a variety of calls and have noticeably improved fare compliance. Calgary Transit peace officers know their legal limits and reduce the heavy burden that transit policing would otherwise place on the CPS. Each party knows its role and coordinates with the other. Finally, periodic review of the MOU makes it possible for both parties to address concerns expeditiously.

Another reason for the program's success is that Alberta is an innovator in crafting legislation covering peace officers. Faced with rising policing costs, the province has reviewed the alternative options it has to enhance community safety. The Alberta government has reviewed the special constable program repeatedly. In 2005, a review led the province to establish Alberta provincial officers and community peace officers. The *Alberta Peace Officer Act* (2007) encourages police to tailor their functions or approaches in line with their experiences and knowledge of the community they serve (Whitelaw, Smith, and Hansen 2012). The Act also encourages police to embrace peace officers as a method of complementing their service. The CPS experience with Calgary Transit was instrumental to this effect.

Vancouver

Whether to designate a position as one that should be filled by a civilian or a sworn member is not straightforward and is determined by a number of contextual and institutional factors (Griffiths et al. 2015). The Vancouver Police Department (VPD) uses a decision tree to triage roles:

> (1) Does the position require law enforcement powers (i.e., powers of arrest, use of force, statutory requirement, and carrying a firearm)?

> (2) Are the skills, training, experience, or credibility of a sworn police officer required to fulfill the duties of the position?

> (3) Can a specially trained civilian fulfill the requirements of the position?

> (Griffiths et al. 2006, 47; Kiedrowski, Ruddell, and Petrunik 2019)

In 2005, the VPD systematically assessed whether civilianized positions within the force were effective in an effort to identify further opportunities for civilianization. At a ratio of 0.26 civilians to every sworn officer, the VPD had the lowest rate of civilianized positions in Canada. Civilians were largely confined to roles in finance, information technology, management, and public affairs. The subsequent comprehensive staffing review sought to add 469 sworn members and 170 civilians. The University College of the Fraser Valley was contracted to review the plan and its recommendations (Wiebe 2006). It defined civilianization as "the practice of assigning non-sworn [civilian] employees to conduct police work that does not require the authority, special training, or credibility of a sworn officer. Civilianization has generally occurred as part of the movement towards professionalism" (Griffiths et al. 2006).

While only 16.4 percent of the police force had been civilianized by 2006, section 35 (Special Municipal Constables) of the *British Columbia Police Act* (1997) had already clarified the processes by which municipal police boards could collaborate to appoint civilians as special municipal constables, the process for their remuneration, and the terms of their employment. Although the police board is involved in these appointments, special constables are not sworn members. They have the powers of a peace officer, do not carry firearms, have not completed the training program that sworn members undergo, and have no powers of arrest. In fact, they are more akin to by-law and provincial offences enforcement officers than police (Griffiths et al. 2006).

But which positions should be civilianized? The public needs to trust that police powers will be enforced properly and that the same standard of conduct is expected of civilians as it is of sworn police. In a 1992 study, L.J. Parrett (in Griffiths et al. 2006) identified seven principles that help determine whether or not to civilianize a position:

1. Whether police powers must be exercised;

2. Whether police training and skills are required;

3. Whether there is a need to provide career development opportunities and administrative skills;

4. Whether the risk of disruption from industrial action by civilian personnel can be contained;

5. Whether civilians can be recruited to fill the post;

6. Whether officers in this position can occupy operational roles;

7. Whether the number of civilian employees is rising at the expense of maintaining sworn officers (they should not be).

In line with these principles, an evaluation of the findings of the original strategic report found that some positions should be civilianized. Backed by a third party independent review, Vancouver City Council approved the request for an increase in staffing. In 2005, the VPD hired 19 civilians into positions that had previously been held by sworn members and also monitored overtime. Both activities generated savings. A year later, city council and the VPD hired 31 more sworn members and an additional 46 civilians (Wiebe 2006).

To measure the impact of these changes, Wiebe (2006) distributed a survey to 1,720 employees at the VPD; of the 528 who completed the surveys, 396 were sworn members (constables or sergeants) and 132 were civilian employees. Twenty-three percent of the sworn respondents had supervisory roles as did 19.7 percent of the civilians who responded. Most had fewer than 10 years' experience with the VPD, a figure that roughly aligns with the tenure of the majority of sworn personnel at the VPD: 54 percent of sworn members have less than 10 years experience with the VPD. Most sworn respondents had operational roles; the majority of civilians who responded had administrative roles. During the interviews, respondents explained that they considered the additional 100 officers a huge success: "the Strategic Plan has directly resulted in improved processes and new business initiatives that have the VPD further ahead than it was in 2004" (Wiebe 2006, 80). Survey results indicate that the steps the VPD took to incorporate more non-sworn members into trusted positions were well received.

The VPD case shows the merits of greater civilianization, though it does not realize the prospect of contracting. For example, the VPD could have hired a private organization to identify, screen, and hire candidates, and to handle the paperwork associated with managing them. A contractor could dedicate specialized resources and expertise to tap the pool of potential civilian candidates.

Winnipeg

The experience of the Winnipeg Police Service (WPS) illustrates that more police does not necessarily correlate with better policing. The WPS conducted an environmental scan of the institution's mandate, resources, and internal processes to ensure that it was allocating its resources most effectively. It considered civilianization as a way to augment its capacity to manage and prevent crime in the city.

Winnipeg has struggled with crime owing to both poverty and a large transient population. In fact, Winnipeg has been among the most violent cities in Canada; it has the highest

homicide rate and is the "only Western Canadian city to record an increase in the violent crime rate between 2010 and 2011 (+6%)." The city has also struggled with gangs (Griffiths and Pollard 2013). At the same time, Winnipeg's government scaled back its social services programs, which ended up downloading extra work onto other departments. This had a notable effect on the WPS. By 2012 Winnipeg's emergency response time was seven minutes longer than the national average: it took 51 minutes for the WPS to respond to a child safety emergency call, for example. How could the WPS confront increased workloads with constrained resources?

The WPS undertook an operational review which revealed that 55 positions could be transferred from sworn members to civilians (Griffiths et al. 2010), that the number of sworn officers could be reduced by 30, and that 85 civilian members could be added. The added civilian members were intended to resolve the force's lack of analytic capability to help streamline resources and to save money. The budget was projected to increase by $500,000 to accomplish these personnel changes and salary costs were expected to rise by $2 million. Overall, however, these changes were anticipated to save the WPS $1.5 million. The changes were predicted to enhance expertise and increase the number of employees. Costs aside, the intangible benefits of such changes include better management of resources, greater officer satisfaction, and more visibility of the WPS on the street (Santin 2013).

Any reduction in the number of sworn members is likely to be cause for concern.

Initially, any reduction in the number of sworn members is likely to be cause for concern. A major barrier to civilianization is the fear that sworn members will be replaced by civilians and may lose their jobs. However, in the case of the WPS, the operational review did not recommend replacing half of the sworn members with civilians, nor were sworn members forced out. Instead, the WPS found that it could use attrition to achieve the recommended personnel balance and then could move officers from non-core positions to operational roles. The WPS could then backfill that position with a civilian. This approach is as feasible as it is practical: in 2017/18, 7,416 officers were eligible for retirement across the country, about 11 percent of total uniformed complement (Conor, Robson, and Marcellus 2019). In 2015, then Chief Devon Clunis reaffirmed that he would not be asking for more uniformed members: "what he needed were civilians to support them" (Association of Municipalities of Ontario 2015, 18, fn 25).

The actual impact of civilianization on the WPS has not been measured independently in the open source literature. However, a hypothesis that has long been accepted in modern civilian policing posits that greater police visibility on the street deters crime. While one should be cautious about drawing a direct causal link between crime rates and civilianization in the WPS, Winnipeg's crime scene investigations have declined by 13 percent between 2009 and 2010 and the city experienced a 13 percent drop in the robbery rates in 2010 (Brennan and Dauvergne 2010). These declines also track the creation of the WPS

Cadet Program that selects special constables to engage with the community and increase police visibility. The cadets respond to non-violent intoxication calls, direct traffic, guard crime scenes, and support those with mental health concerns, all of which account for a growing number of calls for service (McKenna 2014). Special constables free up time for the regular police to devote to core policing responsibilities. Cadets are hired at a fraction of the cost of sworn members.

However, beneficial as the cadets are, the WPD still remains responsible for all of the costs associated with hiring, training, managing, and regulating them. The WPD trains the cadets to meet police qualifications and provincial standards, a process that is lengthy, costly, and time consuming. The WPD should also consider contracting with the private sector to hire civilians with appropriate backgrounds for non-core policing roles, and train them to meet expectations and standards. The WPD could prioritize private companies that specialize in hiring military or police veterans who will already meet some of the qualifications and experiential requirements, as these companies have ready access to a pool of prepared, trained, and skilled applicants. Doing so would relieve the WPS of the training and HR management costs and responsibilities associated with NCP roles. While hiring cadets is less costly than hiring sworn members to fulfill NCP roles, contracting has the potential to fill these roles even more efficiently and effectively through a transparent, competitive bidding process.

Québec

Quebec's provincial police force, the Sûreté du Québec (SQ), has also been incorporating more civilians in recent years. The SQ assigns civilians to non-core policing roles in an "initiative to assign civilians to non-core policing functions wherever possible (e.g., photo radar duties), allowing officers to concentrate on frontline police work. This initiative aims to use resources optimally and achieve efficiencies" (Public Safety Canada 2013a).

This initiative began in mid-2012 in the form of civilianization – not ASD (Public Safety Canada 2013b). Civilians were added directly to the SQ and incorporated into the structure instead of being hired by a third party. The SQ must manage these civilians and their challenges, talent, and paperwork.

The SQ now counts about 400 special constables in its ranks (Canadian Press 2017). These special constables have fairly comprehensive responsibilities, from guarding buildings to court security. However, their budget, call response times, and effectiveness cannot be assessed based on the open literature available at this time.

Northern Alberta

The Northern Alberta Commissionaires provide NCP assistance to the RCMP, the Edmonton Police Service (EPS), and the Alberta sheriffs. The commissionaires also provide a detention guard service and general security for larger detachments, including fingerprinting, front-desk security, or data input for the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC). The RCMP trains contracted commissionaires to their standards but Northern Alberta Commissionaires is responsible for sourcing about 950 candidates, providing some training, and for managing personnel. The commissionaires free up the Mounties for more essential policing roles.

The commissionaires used to provide officer traffic safety and photo radar for the Edmonton Police Service (EPS). Although the unit reported directly to the EPS, it was subsequently

absorbed by the city to which they now report. Commissionaire peace officers can also be found in the detention management unit of the EPS where one sworn member oversees the commissionaires conducting fingerprints, searches, and paperwork. The presence of that sworn member guarantees quality and oversight. However, outcomes are more effective and efficient than in the past because the three commissionaires replace work previously done by four uniformed members. Commissionaires also provide security at the EPS training centre, rifle ranges, loading docks, and vehicle issuance centres. Commissionaires also assist Alberta sheriffs by providing general security and screening people who enter the legislature and courthouses.

Contracts with the Northern Alberta Commissionaires usually range from three to five years. In a testament to both quality and value for money, the RCMP, EPS, and Alberta sheriffs have all renewed their contracts – in the case of the EPS for over 30 years.

Nova Scotia

The Nova Scotia Commissionaires have been operational since 1937. The organization employs commissionaires across Nova Scotia and holds contracts with the Halifax Regional Police, a handful of municipalities, the RCMP, Halifax Harbour, Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Greenwood, and the federal courts.

The Nova Scotia Commissionaires have held a contract with the Halifax Police Department for over 60years, which involves about 40 commissionaires who are responsible for front-desk management, data processing, background checks, managing a store room, providing data for the CPIC, and ID services.

The Nova Scotia Commissionaires also have renewable three-year contracts to provide detention guards on an "as needed" basis for the RCMP. Nova Scotia Commissionaires is responsible for all human resource matters related to the commissionaires: recruitment, training, administration, and management. The cost to the RCMP is about one-third that of a sworn member without the RCMP having to manage or employ that commissionaire directly.

The Nova Scotia Commissionaires have patrolled the Halifax Harbour Bridge since it opened in 1954: 52 commissionaires are employed full time, some as special constables. They issue tickets, citations, and contact local law enforcement when needed. This NCP role involves many levels of government: the province owns the bridge but it is located in a municipality. So commissionaires who enforce the *Highway Traffic Act* interact with different levels of government. Sworn members provide oversight and feedback when the contract comes up for renewal.

The Nova Scotia Commissionaires attribute some of their success to the quality of their personnel. They hire military and law enforcement veterans, first responders, and people who have completed police foundations post-secondary courses. Personnel tend to be older and thus more mature and have work and leadership experience. Retention rates average 85 percent; this consistency promotes institutional memory and continuity.

Benefits of Contracting in Non-Core Policing

Non-core policing enjoys considerable popular support, but that support is nuanced: Canadians are most supportive of private involvement in areas such as event security and least supportive in areas such as criminal investigations (Ipsos 2017). In other words, Canadians have an intuitive sense of which police services are more or less core to uniformed service delivery. When broken down by different tasks, although the differences are small, support for private involvement is generally greater overall among men than women, among younger than older people, and in Quebec.

Critics of ASD have three principal concerns. First, they fear that by introducing civilians into police workforces the fundamental, democratic values of policing will be compromised and commercialized. Police have powers to arrest people because they are part of the democratic system and hence are "accountable to every citizen through the mechanisms of representative government" (Bayley and Shearing 1996, 596). However, only 32 percent of survey respondents thought outsourcing puts public safety at risk while 45 percent thought public safety would not be put at risk (Ipsos 2017). Second, citizens who pay taxes expect police to provide them with security; critics fear that contracting with civilians fundamentally changes the values of policing in a democratic society (Sklansky 2006). Third, critics worry that the commercialization of security turns policing into a free market commodity that can be bought and sold to the highest bidder (Krahmann 2008; Montgomery and Griffiths 2016, 15; van Buuren and den Boer 2009). However, these concerns are manageable, and the benefits of incorporating ASD into NCP outweigh the risks.

Budgets

The public expectations that police will respond to mounting calls for service strain police resources, regardless of how those services are delivered. Expanded public expectations have not been matched by an influx of resources. The costs of policing have increased each year for eight years straight. In 2015/16, Ontario had the highest policing costs at $362 per capita, an increase of $15 from the year prior and $34 per capita above the average of all provinces at $328 (Henderson 2017). Salaries make up the bulk of costs (Association of Municipalities of Ontario 2015). So police are under growing pressure to respond to a greater array of calls, while maintaining their core policing responsibilities on a constrained budget.

Contracting to fulfill NCP roles is meant to rein in costs. However, having for-profit entities take over some tasks in the public sphere raises concerns about a private sector not adhering to the same ethical standards as the public sector.

The profit-driven nature of private enterprise could stratify the delivery of policing. Critics are concerned that two tiers of policing could emerge: dynamic policing for those who can afford to pay, and the old model of policing for the rest (Pearson-Goff and Herrington 2013, 3; Ruddell and Jones and van Sluis 2014; van Buurn and den Boer 2009, 32). During interviews, private security personnel acknowledged that "those parties who want additional protections and are willing and able to pay for it will be able to secure it, while the public police will respond to the safety and security needs of those who are unable to purchase private services" (Montgomery and Griffiths 2016, 56).

Private contractors are filling in gaps as clients seek more or different services and police are stretched (Forst 2000, 34). A proliferation of organizations compete with each other to meet the

growing demand: Canadian security and investigation groups grew by 69 percent between 1991 and 2001 (Sanders 2005, 7). This trend has continued apace (Montgomery and Griffiths 2016). In 2012, approximately 140,000 individuals and 3,000 businesses in Canada were licensed in the private security industry – an increase of 40 percent since 2006 (Hovbrender 2012). Meanwhile, there were about 70,000 police officers in Canada at that time. Ontario now counts 83,653 private security licences in Ontario, an increase of over 50 percent from 55,000 in 2010 (Ministry of the Solicitor General 2019; Montgomery and Griffiths 2016, 7). Comparable trends can be observed in other provinces.

However, there is no evidence that this trend has led to two-tiered policing. The premise of the criticism is that ASD is more expensive than public policing: only the wealthy can afford it. However, ASD can actually generate savings. Private security companies must compete for contracts, and so their prices must stay competitive (Swol 1998). ASD thus has the potential to make services more, rather than less, available.

Opponents of ASD have also suggested that contracting positions will come at the expense of sworn members. This concern is genuine: US case studies reveal that a 10 percent reduction in the proportion of sworn personnel can have a disproportionately adverse effect on crime control: in one case, a 10 percent reduction resulted in a 6 percent increase in robberies and a 3 percent increase in serious assaults (Heaton and Jackson 2012). And the drop in the number of sworn members may not necessarily generate savings. Ruddell and Jones (2014) used a Canadian case study to determine the impact of a 10 percent increase in the number of sworn members in Saskatchewan: once the broader impact on community safety and social services was taken into account, they found that a 10 percent increase might actually save $50,023,355.

The contracting process is beneficial because it generates competition.

However, ASD does not always result in fewer sworn members. Instead, ASD often removes the sworn member from a position that requires certain expertise and reallocates the member to a position that requires their specific skills and training. That is, ASD is not a zero-sum game. A private company can be hired to find a replacement for the original position. The private organization works within the boundaries of the contract to source, interview, hire, and possibly even manage the civilian performing the task.

From a financial perspective, the contracting process is beneficial because it generates competition. Police can award the contract to the bidder that best meets the department's expectations and needs at the best price. Furthermore, since the civilian is not in uniform, he or she may be paid less than the sworn member, yet be more current about changes in the field and possess innovative expertise. There are hidden costs to having a sworn member including training at the expense of the department and inflexible contracts. By contrast, civilian workers arrive with the necessary job skills, do not require further training, and often have years of multifaceted expertise. The private organization must ensure that the civilian meets provincial standards. The savings generated from the switch could potentially free up money to hire additional sworn members. ASD thus allows police to add more "blue" to the streets, gain expertise, and harness efficiencies.

As mentioned, civilian members are generally less expensive to employ than their sworn counterparts. Victoria Police Inspector Stuart Ruff acknowledged this advantage as early as 1999. He explained that civilianization is a more efficient method for maximizing limited police resources. For example, at the time, the total cost for hiring a sworn member as a constable in a crime analysis unit was approximately $86,452; a civilian member of the force could occupy the same position for $58,220.

Nor does ASD necessarily reduce the number of police. After undertaking a phase of civilianization, the VPD not only hired more civilian workers, but hired more sworn members as well (Wiebe 2006).

Bédard and Guénette (2015) estimated that subcontracting human resources, communications, and administrative positions could save Montreal's police department $3.2 million annually. By way of example, an 8.5 hour checkpoint usually costs about $4,994. However, when staffed by two sworn members and six security agents it costs a mere $2,332 for the same period.

Quality

Critics worry that civilians and private companies may be prone to abusing their powers and deliver a poorer quality of service than the sworn police (Montgomery and Griffiths 2016). This concern could partially be a function of the relatively young median age of private security officers and investigators as most private security personnel are under 25 (Swol 1998).

Training

ASD could potentially give rise to a workforce that must perform critical tasks but is filled by low-wage workers with poor skills. Although contracted civilian members can be paid as much as $14/hour less than sworn members, a study of Canadian private security officers found that cost is commensurate with quality. In this study, only 30 percent of private security officers were able to meet the writing standard. Furthermore, many also had underdeveloped reading and mathematical skills (Montgomery and Griffiths 2016).

These standards suggest that candidates are screened using relatively low thresholds. By contrast, sworn members must have at least graduated from high school. However, 80 percent of sworn members participating in one study had earned a higher education compared to just 66 percent of private investigators. Among security guards, only 53 percent pursued post-secondary education. While police often train candidates for three to six months followed by a year of training in the field, private security officers are trained for as little as two weeks. Moreover, few Canadian provinces have mandatory minimum training requirements for private security officers aside from a minimum threshold for hours spent training and a certificate (see Appendix 1).

At the same time, responsibilities between the two differ fundamentally. Concerns could be mitigated if private security companies prioritized hiring military or police veterans. Many police officers retire around age 55; they are a relatively untapped potential pool of highly qualified and experienced private security candidates. Although some are given the opportunity to return as civilians on a full- or part-time basis, many end up putting their skills – taught, developed, and honed on public money – to work elsewhere in the private sector.

ASD companies that hire former military members mitigate critics' concerns that the level of education by private security company guards is insufficient. By employing former police and military personnel, these private security companies can provide quality service at a lower cost while

supporting retired veterans. As of 2008, 48.2 percent of regular military members had a post-secondary degree or diploma as did 69.4 percent of reservists (Park 2008). This pool is projected to grow as the Canadian Armed Forces population ages and more members retire.

Expertise

ASD needs to prove itself as being not only more efficient, but more effective: the quality of policing must not be sacrificed for economic gains. Moreover, the change from sworn police to ASD civilians is unlikely to prove successful if the sole incentive for doing so is to reap economic benefits. There needs to be a political and public appetite to improve service delivery. So, does "engaging in these newer economic forms of policing necessarily mean that the public interest will suffer?" (Ayling 2008, 341).

As early as 1967, the US President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice established that ASD can indeed promote a more efficient and better quality police force, "communications, planning, and laboratory work could be performed better by civilians with specialized training than by sworn officers" (Kiedrowski, Ruddell and Petrunik 2019). ASD offers the benefit of civilians who already have specialized skills: first they train, then they are recruited. By contrast, sworn members are recruited first, then trained. So the civilianization of some police services holds out the promise of a less expensive and more comprehensive force: "Police are expensive; that is because they are excellent at the broad range of activities that they do. Private security, on the other hand, deals with a narrow range of security and allied issues" (Pearson-Goff and Herrington 2013, 8).

A clash of cultures

Police are often resistant to the rise of contract personnel working alongside them. As Forst (2000, 46) noted, "some sworn officers are bound to resent the placement of civilians in positions that are perceived to compromise sensitive information, interfere in sworn officers' exercise of discretion, and disrupt operations." Introducing civilians to police departments in the UK precipitated a clash of cultures (Cope 2004). The difference in working styles between civilians and sworn members is part of this issue as academies socialize police to hold certain values while civilians join with a less regimented, more individualistic set of values.

The clash is partly a function of the difference in values between police and contractors: police work for the community; contractors work for an employer (van Steden, van der Wal, and Lasthuizen 2015). However, a Dutch study suggests that there may be less of a difference between police and non-sworn personnel than is commonly assumed (van Steden, van der Wal, and Lasthuizen 2015). Yet even this study concludes that values between the two groups differ and that they view each other differently. Hiring military and police veterans would help bridge this difference.

Some critics believe that because they hold different values, uniformed members should be the primary service delivery providers and non-sworn personnel should play only a limited role:

> In the opinion of the Chair of a municipal police board, private security could provide low-level "policing," including apartment and neighbourhood monitoring and access control monitoring. This respondent advocated a hybrid model wherein the public police have primary responsibility and can access private resources when required. (Montgomery and Griffiths 2016, 59)

As policing adapts to integrate more civilian personnel, sworn and non-sworn personnel must build a more equal partnership. That relationship progresses along six stages, according to Stenning (1989): denial, grudging recognition, competition and hostility, more control and beginning of acceptance, active partnership, and finally an equal partnership.

Another point of concern for critics is how sworn members are trained and educated. The critics think that standards of policing decline as civilians are incorporated into the workforce. Contractors will not have been trained to the same extent as police. When police undergo their training they are introduced to a set of core values and skills that prepare them for their job; private citizens lack this type of education, training, and socialization.

Canada's training regulations for private security personnel are less rigorous than European ones and vary greatly depending on where that private security is employed (Manzo 2009, 383-384). Proper training not only ensures the equal and professional application of the rule of law, but also safeguards trust in and integrity of law enforcement. Police officers undergo uniformed training regimens that are intended to impart an understanding of necessary skills and core values. By way of analogy, "similar to other military and para-military organizations, new recruits to the CAF [Canadian Armed Forces] undergo a process of organizational socialization to institutional values and norms" (Davis 2016).

Organizational socialization has two main aims. The first is to instruct officers and to impart new information. The second is social assimilation. Social assimilation encourages integration, team building, and bonding. Social assimilation will occur under ideal conditions and lead to diverse, tightly knit, dense social networks (Sato 2003). Generally, police training reinforces "group loyalty," which can be essential to a group's success as uniformed members often have to cooperate under pressure. Training has also been found to correlate positively with organizational commitment, which is part of organizational socialization. However, this commitment has been shown to decline in uniformed members during field training and thereafter (Sato 2003).

Contract workers are not subject to this socialization process because the police service does not have to train them extensively. Instead, contract workers were likely to have undergone training (and by proxy, socialization processes) in previous jobs and during their post-secondary education. There is a trade-off here. Contractors generate savings by passing the cost of vetting and hiring individuals on to the private sector. However, contractors may not share the same tacit organizational core values as uniformed members. This has the potential to produce friction if the contract worker occupies a position that requires them to work closely with uniformed members.

Police are trained as "generalists" who are able to respond to a variety of situations, but police forces also need more specialized skills such as IT, mental health knowledge, analytical skills, human resources, administration, and more. These highly specialized, professional skills cannot be readily acquired through mere professional development.

A commonly cited specialized skill that is in high demand among police is that of technology expert, especially with the rise in cybercrime (Council of Canadian Academies 2014, 26). Technology is evolving much faster than professional development for police; without post-secondary training in information technology, it is difficult to keep up and be effective. Rather than re-training police with public money to become experts in these fields, one option is simply to hire contractors who are already competent. In the end, it is easier for police departments to "hire individuals with expertise rather than training officers to work in non-core policing jobs that required specialized training" (Kiedrowski, Ruddell, and Petrunik 2019, 213).

While shared core values may be an initial concern, police management are more concerned about effective and efficient police work. Contract workers may not have been exposed to the same socialization process as uniformed members, but it is easier to hire contract officers and then socialize them than it is to re-train sworn members. Furthermore, for a multitude of roles, it may be unnecessary to socialize contract workers at all if they do not have to work closely with sworn members.

Furthermore, ASD is not an "all or nothing" approach. Successful ASD in policing depends on a mix of civilians and sworn members. Civilians can contribute expertise, experience, and cutting-edge knowledge. However, a workforce composed solely of civilians would deprive the department of institutional memory, the close-knit culture propagated by police training, experience, and the specialized skills that sworn members have. The right mix of sworn and non-sworn personnel thus improves effectiveness and efficiency in service delivery.

How to resolve the clash of cultures

As policing roles change and civilians become more integrated into the police workforce, there will be a premium placed on partnerships (Council of Canadian Academies 2014, 105-108). Partnering successfully entails clarifying the roles assigned to each party, identifying shared purposes, and understanding how each partner should assess risk. The Netherlands uses such a team work approach where "police establish and sustain the collaborative relationships by whatever works, be it hard or soft tactics, as the situation requires" (Council of Canadian Academies 2014, 133). In the Dutch model, police are just one actor among many that contribute to community safety.

In the Netherlands, public and private police needs are complementary rather than adversarial (van Bruun and den Boer 2009, 20). Non-sworn personnel are not looking to replace a sworn member but to work alongside them. Whitelaw, Smith, and Hansen (2012, 429) call it "principle-based partnering" when police move away from the current model to a "public safety governance or anchored pluralism" model as they work with a range of actors to provide public security. The civilianization of police functions gives rise to a "security web" where a range of personnel, with different skills and viewpoints, each contributes diverse skills to enhance public safety (Council of Canadian Academies 2014).

The team player approach emphasizes the need to align mutual interests and emphasizes co-operation over competition. Effective partnerships develop with an understanding of "common goals; knowledge of the capabilities and missions of the participants; a tangible purpose; agreement as to how the partnership will function; and a mutual commitment to provide the resources required to sustain the partnership" (Montgomery and Griffiths 2016, 18, 63). These criteria refer to the marriage of interests between sworn and non-sworn personnel. This can be worked out practically if both parties work towards similar goals, such as those measured by arrests, crime rates, public satisfaction, and business growth. By finding commonalities and working towards common aims, the team player approach offers to calm the clash of cultures between sworn and non-sworn personnel.

Representation and inclusion

Private security has a better track record of employing women and visible minorities than the sworn police services. Civilians with a range of backgrounds are more able to relate to a wide array of people, and to provide meaningful service to diverse communities.

Volume

Ontario's *Police Services Act* outlines police duties as preserving the peace, preventing crimes and other offences, assisting victims of crime, apprehending criminals, laying charges, prosecuting and executing warrants, and completing the prescribed training (Swol 1998). However, police departments also have to show that they are compliant with the laws and regulations that govern the conduct of police and are increasingly involved in social rehabilitation that other strained services used to provide: "at some point, Americans decided that the best answer to every social ill lay in the power of the criminal justice system... homelessness, drug use and mental illness are now handled by armed men and women" (*The Economist* 2015).

Police departments have been forced to handle a multitude of complex and large social ills while still providing their core responsibilities. The strain has financial and institutional ramifications. In 2016, Dallas Police Chief David Brown expressed the frustration that many departments face: "We're asking cops to do too much in this country…. Every societal failure, we put it off on the cops to solve... 70 percent of the African American community is being raised by single women, let's give it to the cops to solve that as well…. Policing was never meant to solve all those problems" (CBS DFW 2016). Contracting enables sworn members to concentrate on "front line, high visibility duties that are more consistent with their training and experience" (Griffiths et al. 2006, 38).

Findings

Demand

Contracting private companies that hire civilians to fulfill non-core policing roles has emerged as one of the biggest changes in police culture in decades (Kiedrowski, Ruddell, and Petrunik 2019). However, the practice dates back as far as 1829 when the London Metropolitan Police hired civilians to complete administrative tasks. As of 2017, 30 percent of the personnel in Canadian police departments were civilians, an increase of 2 percent year over year (Conor 2018). While the majority of civilians work in administrative roles, nearly 10 percent are managers, analysts, and scientists (Mazowita and Greenland 2016, 7). At the same time, the ratio of police to civilian personnel has been on the gradual wane in this country (see figure 4), though Canada's figures lag in an international comparison.

At the same time, the gradual civilianization parallels population growth; so, the proportion of civilians in policing per 100,000 population has actually remained unchanged for decades (see figure 5).

Public expectations

Although their roles are distinct, non-sworn personnel work closely with sworn members and may, depending on the job, wear a uniform or show a police symbol, and even carry a weapon. These similarities may confuse the public (Cukier et al. 2003, 255) as was reportedly the case in Ontario: "the Special Constables indicated that the public expects them, while wearing such a uniform and driving a police vehicle, to behave as police officers" (Johnston 2010, 19). When

FIGURE 4: RATIO OF POLICE OFFICERS TO CIVILIAN PERSONNEL, CANADA, 1962 TO 2005

Source: Sauve and Reitano (2005).

FIGURE 5: RATE OF POLICE OFFICERS AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL PER 100,000 POPULATION, CANADA, 1962 TO 2018

Note: Police officers represent the full-time equivalent permanent, fully-sworn police officers of all ranks. Civilian personnel include permanent civilian personnel, permanent special constables and recruits employed by a police service. Populations are based on July 1st, 2018 estimates from Statistics Canada, Demography Division. Additional data are available on Statistics Canada tables 35-100-0076 and 35-10-0078.

Source: Conor, Robson, and Marcellus 2019

the public perceives civilian personnel as police, they expect the same services from them. A civilian doing an NCP task must understand these discrepancies in public expectations while being accountable and transparent.

Malfeasance

More civilians in policing raises concerns about the potential for corruption and moonlighting. Although sworn members do take on second jobs (Lippert and Walby 2013), moonlighting is discouraged. By contrast, contracted personnel are less restricted from taking on other work. This contrast raises questions of impartiality and transparency, as a contractor's outside connections and their roles within the police service may increase the prospect of wrongdoing: "success in the careers of sworn officers is more critically tied to absence of wrongdoing than is the case with privately hired employees [...] Although corruption is certainly not unknown to sworn officers in many police departments, most citizens would probably prefer police officers over contract employees for regulating activities that affect public safety and order" (Forst 2000, 5). However, appropriate legislative and oversight mechanisms can mitigate such risks.

Legislation

Legislation on ASD and special constables varies, and is more comprehensive in some provinces than in others. Many provinces licence private investigators, security agents, or security companies. Newfoundland and Labrador, Quebec, and Alberta have the most stringent licensing requirements (see Appendix 1). They license armed guards, alarm responders, patrol guards, and burglar alarm agents along with defining and outlining the duties of a person once licensed. The duration of these licences varies by province.

Training requirements also differ across provinces. Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and PEI do not regulate training. These provinces issue licences nonetheless, without any training standards. However, many provinces set parameters such as hours spent training and a minimum grade a trainee must attain to pass provincial exams (Kiedrwoski 2015).

Training also varies in content. Appendix 1 outlines the various regulations across provinces. Note the training elements that do not require certification. Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, and New Brunswick do not have any specifications for training armed guards. This means that these provinces do not regulate training specifications for the use of coercive force, which could jeopardize the public's trust in private security. While other provinces may stipulate a minimum standard for firearms training, Nova Scotia is the only province to mandate testing on the same basis as police: annually (see Appendix 1). Inconsistencies in coercive force training and annual testing make it difficult to ensure that private security contractors are providing consistency in the quality of service and performance. Alberta, for instance, excludes essential skills from the security licence, such as armoured vehicle services. Lack of consistency can prove difficult for police departments that now have to navigate complex provincial legislation and determine the proficiencies required from contractors.

Oversight

In the absence of oversight legislation, there are few opportunities for provinces, the police, or the general public to monitor the performance of private security agents. For example, one officer cited an incident where a landlord hired a private security agency to monitor an

apartment building. Dissatisfied with a security guard's behaviour, the landlord called police. The proper course of action for the landlord to report dissatisfaction with a private security supplier was unclear, which ended up creating more work for police (Kiedrowski et al. 2016).

Yet, sworn members cited in a study by Kiedrowski, Ruddell, and Petrunik (2019) favoured police working more closely with private security agencies, and allowing departments to monitor and oversee their own private security partners. This relationship is currently missing from legislation, but it can be implemented with an MOU or contract. The practice of allowing police departments to oversee private security partners could potentially work well, as police departments have established accountability and reporting mechanisms. However, this relationship would require a detailed and clear MOU and the department's capacity to manage additional people. The capability of police departments to oversee and manage the accountability of private security partners requires further study, and complaint and special investigation processes outlined in police services acts apply only to regular police, not special constables.

However, the contracting process does provide oversight. First, in competing for the contract, a private company must not only offer value for money in fulfilling NCP roles, but must also adhere to expectations. When the private company wins the contract, the civilians it selects are now under the scrutiny and oversight of both the private organization and the police department. Both are able to detect problems and report them to management. By opting for a contract with a limited duration, police have the benefit of holding the private contractor to account: a contractor that underperforms and fails to meet the standards is unlikely to be rehired, and the reputational damage will make the contractor less competitive.

The need for comprehensive and clear regulations in Ontario

The role of special constables in Ontario is particularly ambiguous. It is in constant flux and legislation has yet to address methods to oversee training, accountability mechanisms, or the use of force. These gaps have consequences for quality assurance, as police departments are left to handle training and concerns over use of force.

The province's legislation has largely overlooked special constables. Ontario's *Police Services Act* mentions them in passing: they can serve for an "undefined purpose and/or period of time" (Mann and Johnstone 2010). Ontario's *Police Services Act* also mentions that the special constable must not be hired to perform responsibilities that police are expected to perform. Their governance is at the discretion of the local police service board (Mann and Johnstone 2010); they are not governed by a body or authority. While special constables may be hired and fired by the police services board, the complaint and investigation process does not apply to them. Special constables *could* fall under the *Criminal Code* definition of a "Peace Officer," which is described as a "Constable, or other person employed for the preservation and maintenance of the public peace" (Mann and Johnstone 2010).

These ambiguities have legal and capacity-related ramifications. The city of Ottawa grappled with the legal complexity of hiring a civilian who may not be subject to oversight or accountability mechanisms. Ultimately, its police services board opted to suspend any further appointments of special constables until legislation reduced the prospects of civil liability. The city of Toronto later took a similar position.

The Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police (OACP) acknowledged the lack of legislation surrounding special constables at its general meeting in 2007. It asked Ontario's minister of com-

munity safety and correctional services to review the legislation surrounding special constables. Specifically, the minister was asked to evaluate training standards, accountability and complaint oversight, and the uniform or identification used by special constables (Mann and Johnstone 2010). This sentiment has been echoed by police services boards across the province. A 2017 paper by the Association of Police Services Boards showed that a majority of the 107 police governing agencies across Ontario agreed that there should be an accountability mechanism for special constables similar to that for police. The same survey also noted that a "provincially standardized memorandum of understanding (MOU) between a special constable employer and police board is required" (APSB 2017).

Conclusions

The traditional policing model has been coming under pressure on grounds of efficiency, effectiveness, quality of service, and cost. Challenges are being exacerbated by fiscal constraints, demographic changes, and changing public and political perceptions and expectations – all in an environment that is becoming increasingly complex. Responding to more calls for service that are growing in complexity with mounting accountability requirements is stretching the resources available to uniformed police. These demands have encouraged police services to do business differently, including considering greater civilianization and contracting.

Canadian police departments are gradually shifting to an operational model that does not necessarily have expensive, highly skilled, highly trained members respond to calls where public safety is not in jeopardy. At the same time, the departments are realizing that civilians can compensate for some of the gaps in specialized skills among uniformed members, and that civilians are actually more effective and efficient in carrying out certain tasks than uniformed members. ASD offers a way for police forces to civilianize, contract, and possibly even privatize. ASD enables police forces to optimize the allocation of sworn members while adding specialized services and skills. More efficient and effective use of resources stand to generate savings that can be invested in more human resources.

Positions previously occupied by sworn members who do not require police training to do their jobs effectively may be filled by trained, civilian experts. Some critics argue that removing sworn members from positions will jeopardize quality. However, studies show that contracted civilians perform to high levels. These people are often experts who are already trained, have extensive experience, are up to date with recent trends in their field, and can be employed at a lower cost than sworn members. Furthermore, police departments are encouraged to award contracts to private security providers that hire disproportionately among former military or police. Not only are these personnel more sensitive to the institutional culture of a police department, but they also usually have advanced education and broader skills. Furthermore, police departments benefit from the confidence they have in employing a veteran. So, quality is assured (and is perhaps even improved) at a lower cost.

Contracting also ensures that police focus on operations rather than on the management, accounting, and training associated with maintaining civilian employees. By contracting these positions to a private organization, police departments avoid the costs and efforts associated with those responsibilities. While critics suggest that contracting these positions might be

more expensive than civilianization and could jeopardize quality, the contracting process may well prove more efficient and effective. Contracting involves a competitive bidding process: companies must compete to provide the highest quality service at the best value for money. Manuals on best practices in contracting for private security services include those from the Confederation of European Security Services (n.d.), the UK government (Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, 2013), and the Lincolnshire constabulary (Rhodes 2012). Furthermore, the competitive bidding process is also a way of upholding quality and standards of service. Successful bidders know that if they underperform, they bear the reputational risk if the contract is not renewed.

Table 3 summarizes examples of civilianization in Calgary, Winnipeg, Vancouver. They and the Northern Alberta and Nova Scotia Commissionaires demonstrate that NCP is not only viable, but can provide quality service delivery at a lower cost – offering gains in effectiveness and efficiency.

TABLE 3: CIVILIANIZED TASKS ACROSS POLICE SERVICES IN CALGARY, VANCOUVER, AND WINNIPEG

CASE STUDY	MEDICAL EMERGENCIES	VANDALISM	ASSAULTS	COMPLIANCE	MENTAL HEALTH	FINANCE	IT	DIRECT TRAFFIC	FORENSICS
Calgary	✔	✔	✔	✔					
Vancouver	✔	✔	✔	✔		✔	✔		✔
Winnipeg				✔				✔	

Thus far, however, the proportion of civilians to uniformed members shows that over the years, the trend towards civilianization has been lagging. The same is true for privatization, although the Ipsos (2017) survey provides some clues as to where and how forces should proceed. The survey shows that Canadians are comfortable with private-sector involvement in policing activities in which one already sees some private presence, such as security at major events (79 percent), traffic management (70 percent), enforcing municipal by-laws and parking tickets (59 percent), and administrative tasks at the police station, such as forensic identification and facility management (58 percent). By contrast, Canadians are less supportive of private involvement in *Criminal Code* offences: civilians assisting victims (42 percent), taking statements (40-45 percent), detention services and transportation of detainees (40 percent), and securing crime scenes (37 percent).

Contracting is the next frontier in ASD for NCP duties. However, before that can be done, it will be necessary to modernize relevant provincial legislation to reduce ambiguities and ensure greater consistency within and across provinces.

Contracting holds out the prospect of better service, greater efficiency, and better value for money, specifically:

1. Contracting has the potential to generate efficiencies. The competitive bidding process ensures that the government hires the company best able to deliver the needed ser-

vices efficiently and effectively. By contracting the management, hiring, and vetting of new employees, the public sector saves money and time; police can focus on the core duties of law enforcement when HR or administrative tasks that can be completed by civilian employees are removed.

2. The government retains oversight. By keeping the contracts short-term, companies have the incentive to perform the non-core tasks for which they were hired to the best of their ability. If a company's standard drops, it can be replaced. Periodic auditing ensures that contracted companies are fulfilling their obligations.

3. Policing remains a public good. By not privatizing policing completely, and only contracting out certain tasks, policing remains a government responsibility. This means that the public can still hold the government accountable for the way the service is delivered, which ensures security remains a common good for all of society to share. By only contracting certain tasks, the government also avoids being held hostage by the private security industry and can act in the public interest. In short, by contracting out only certain non-core tasks, the government would promote efficiency, transparency, and accountability in service delivery.

Throughout this study, NCP refers to contracting, *not* privatization or civilianization. Possible confusion arises since all three are methods of ASD, and the nuances among privatization, civilianization, and contracting are subtle, but important insofar as each process has its own accountability considerations and cost-saving benefits. The contracting system can encourage the honesty and integrity of contract workers by vetting the qualifications of prospective employees against metrics and qualifications that are different than those of prospective sworn members, by providing greater transparency over often opaque and cumbersome bureaucratic processes, and by ensuring merit. The contract system can do all this, yet avoid making a government beholden to the private sector.

About the Author

Christian Leuprecht is Class of 1965 Professor in Leadership, Department of Political Science and Economics, Royal Military College and Eisenhower Fellow at the NATO Defence College in Rome. He is cross-appointed, Department of Political Studies and the School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, where he is affiliated with both, the Queen's Centre for International and Defence Policy and the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, and Adjunct Research Professor, Australian Graduate School of Policing and Security, Charles Sturt University as well as the Centre for Crime Policy and Research, Flinders University.

A recipient of RMC's Cowan Prize for Excellence in Research and an elected member of the College of New Scholars of the Royal Society of Canada, he is also Munk Senior Fellow in Security and Defence at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. An expert in security and defence, political demography, and comparative federalism and multilevel governance, he has held visiting positions in North America, Europe, and Australia, and is regularly called as an expert witness to testify before committees of Parliament. He holds appointments to the board of two new research institutes funded by the German government, including the German Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies.

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Appendix 1

| PEI	NS	NB	NL	QC	ON	MB	SK	AB	BC	NWT
Min. age 18 or 19	Min. age 18 or 19	Min. age 18 or 19	Min. age 18 or 19	Five year licences; Min. age 18 or 19	Min. age 18 or 19	Min. age 18 or 19	Min. age 18 or 19	Two year licences (three years for organizations)	Min. age 18 or 19	Min. age 18 or 19
Does not regulate training	Does not regulate training	Does not regulate training	Provincial basic security training standards	Five years experience in the agency	Agency licensee must provide the registrar with information about workers (at time of application)	Agency licensee must provide the registrar with information about workers (monthly updates)	Agency licensee must provide the registrar with information about workers (at the time of application)	Agencies report hires and terminations in 30 days	Agency licensee must provide the registrar with information about workers	
Mandated training for guards transporting valuables/ armed guards	Mandated training for guards transporting valuables/ armed guards		Proof of completion of a security related college program	Provincial basic security training standards	Provincial basic security training standards	Provincial basic security training standards	Provincial basic security training standards	Provincial basic security training standards	Provincial basic security training standards	
	Firearms proficiency test every year			135 hours of coursework within 5 years of the application	50 hours of training		40 hours training	60 hours training mandatory	Private investigators must work and train for 2,000 hours with supervision	
				Mandated training for guards transporting valuables/ armed guards				Fluent in English specified	Mandated training for guards transporting valuables/armed guards Fluent in English specified Disclosure of mental health conditions if treatment was received	

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When you change how people think, you change what they want and how they act. That is why thought leadership is essential in every field. At MLI, we strip away the complexity that makes policy issues unintelligible and present them in a way that leads to action, to better quality policy decisions, to more effective government, and to a more focused pursuit of the national interest of all Canadians. MLI is the only non-partisan, independent national public policy think tank based in Ottawa that focuses on the full range of issues that fall under the jurisdiction of the federal government.

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SIR JOHN A. MACDONALD

SIR WILFRID LAURIER

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Good policy doesn't just happen; it requires good ideas, hard work, and being in the right place at the right time. In other words, it requires MLI. We pride ourselves on independence, and accept no funding from the government for our research. If you value our work and if you believe in the possibility of a better Canada, consider making a tax-deductible donation. The Macdonald-Laurier Institute is a registered charity.

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Visit our website www.MacdonaldLaurier.ca and sign up for our newsletter.

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

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The Indispensable
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CONTACT US: Macdonald-Laurier Institute
323 Chapel Street, Suite #300
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
K1N 7Z2

TELEPHONE: (613) 482-8327

WEBSITE: www.MacdonaldLaurier.ca

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In five short years, the institute has established itself as a steady source of high-quality research and thoughtful policy analysis here in our nation's capital. Inspired by Canada's deep-rooted intellectual tradition of ordered liberty – as exemplified by Macdonald and Laurier – the institute is making unique contributions to federal public policy and discourse. Please accept my best wishes for a memorable anniversary celebration and continued success.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE STEPHEN HARPER

The Macdonald-Laurier Institute is an important source of fact and opinion for so many, including me. Everything they tackle is accomplished in great depth and furthers the public policy debate in Canada. Happy Anniversary, this is but the beginning.

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In its mere five years of existence, the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, under the erudite Brian Lee Crowley's vibrant leadership, has, through its various publications and public events, forged a reputation for brilliance and originality in areas of vital concern to Canadians: from all aspects of the economy to health care reform, aboriginal affairs, justice, and national security.

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