Board of Directors

CHAIR
Rob Wildeboer
Executive Chairman, Martinrea International Inc., Vaughan

VICE CHAIR
Jacquelyn Thayer Scott
Past President and Professor, Cape Breton University, Sydney

MANAGING DIRECTOR
Brian Lee Crowley, Ottawa

SECRETARY
Lincoln Caylor
Partner, Bennett Jones LLP, Toronto

TREASURER
Martin MacKinnon
CFO, Black Bull Resources Inc., Halifax

DIRECTORS
Pierre Casgrain
Director and Corporate Secretary of Casgrain & Company Limited, Montreal

Erin Chutter
Executive Chair, Global Energy Metals Corporation, Vancouver

Laura Jones
Executive Vice-President of the Canadian Federation of Independent Business, Vancouver

Vaughn MacLellan
DLA Piper (Canada) LLP, Toronto

Research Advisory Board

Janet Ajzenstat,
Professor Emeritus of Politics, McMaster University

Brian Ferguson,
Professor, Health Care Economics, University of Guelph

Jack Granatstein,
Historian and former head of the Canadian War Museum

Patrick James,
Dornsife Dean’s Professor, University of Southern California

Rainer Knopff,
Professor Emeritus of Politics, University of Calgary

Larry Martin,
Prinicipal, Dr. Larry Martin and Associates and Partner, Agri-Food Management Excellence, Inc.

Christopher Sands,
Senior Research Professor, Johns Hopkins University

William Watson,
Associate Professor of Economics, McGill University

Advisory Council

John Beck
President and CEO, Aecon Enterprises Inc., Toronto

Navjeet (Bob) Dhillon
President and CEO, Mainstreet Equity Corp., Calgary

Jim Dinning
Former Treasurer of Alberta, Calgary

David Emerson
Corporate Director, Vancouver

Richard Fadden
Former National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, Ottawa

Brian Flemming
International lawyer, writer, and policy advisor, Halifax

Robert Fulford
Former Editor of Saturday Night magazine, columnist with the National Post, Ottawa

Wayne Gudbranson
CEO, Branham Group Inc., Ottawa

Calvin Helin
Aboriginal author and entrepreneur, Vancouver

Peter John Nicholson
Inaugural President, Council of Canadian Academies, Annapolis Royal

Hon. Jim Peterson
Former federal cabinet minister, Counsel at Fasken Martineau, Toronto

Maurice B. Tobin
The Tobin Foundation, Washington DC
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sommaire</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Diagnosis</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformational Change</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Institutional Culture of a Dysfunctional Workplace</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance: A Civilian Board of Management</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Diarchy: A Deputy Minister Co-equal With the Commissioner</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Civilian Commissioner?</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilization</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building a Leadership Culture</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Generation and Career Models</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Leadership Capacity</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unionizing a Semi-unionized Workplace</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix A</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix B</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix C</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix D</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About the Author</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The government has put out the call for a new Commissioner to lead an RCMP that is confronted with a number of major issues: the impending creation of an independent employee association, increased review from the newly established National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (and potentially a new arm’s-length bureaucratic review body proposed in Bill C-59), and a review of the RCMP’s mandate-contract. The last may even entail the transfer of some border duties to the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA). In addition, there are ongoing challenges such as allegations of pervasive harassment and bullying as well as a trial on violating the Canada Labour Code.

Outside observers are left with the impression of a dysfunctional organization. The symptoms manifest themselves publicly in class-action lawsuits, questions over leadership and equipment, recruitment shortfalls, complaints about compensation, and the Force generally being stretched too thin on too many fronts, particularly the requirement to meet contract policing requirements in much of the country. Governments have in the past responded by picking a new Commissioner and tasking him with an explicit mandate to “fix” the problems, alongside policy change, proposals for reform, and new legislation. This process essentially repeats about every five years, with little to show for it. Insanity, it is often said, is doing the same thing over and over, and expecting a different outcome.

The question is not just what kind of reform is necessary, but why changes have been so slow and difficult in coming – and what conditions are necessary to invigorate and sustain reform. The RCMP needs structural reform if we want to improve its performance and strengthen the professional aspects of policing while building the confidence that is required and expected of Canada’s federal police agency.

A Civilian Board of Management is widely touted as a panacea to challenge and validate the priorities the Force has identified, liaise with the Minister and senior bureaucracy in a more systematic way, and validate the RCMP’s budgetary “asks.” Such a board will need to be complemented by a seasoned civilian professional with long-standing expertise in the federal government to liaise with the Minister and senior federal bureaucracy: a Deputy Minister (DM) equal in rank to the RCMP Commissioner. Together, this “diarchy” arrangement would reinvigorate and modernize the RCMP’s governance, administration, and leadership.

The following set of recommendations need to be pursued:

1. Oversight by a Civilian Board of Management to forge a strategy that bolsters the RCMP’s leadership, professionalism, and competence. An independent oversight/management group forestalls the potential for abuse that would arise from greater direct political involvement in the RCMP.

2. Split operations and administration into a diarchy and install a DM equal to the Commissioner. Based on the Canadian Armed Forces/Department of National Defence precedent, that may require the RCMP to be split into two legal entities and to clarify the relationship between the RCMP and Public Safety Canada, and the RCMP’s DM and Public Safety Canada’s DM.

3. Demilitarize the RCMP by developing personnel, deployment, employment, and career models that transform the RCMP from a paramilitary vocation into a law enforcement profession. This will help professionalize functions, enable a shift from a command to a leadership culture, build an effective system to convert junior members into leaders, establish strategic leadership capacity, and innovate career models.

4. Bind the Commissioner to follow the direction/finding of the current and future review bodies in statutorily defined circumstances and establish sustained monitoring of reform implementation.
This could be done possibly through an external audit but preferably internally through a Minister’s Monitoring Committee.

5. If the RCMP fails to jettison contract policing altogether, then segregate federal and contract policing into two completely distinct organizations with separate requirements for entry, compensation, professional development, and leadership. Barring that, the RCMP should establish distinct competencies and remuneration specific to the needs of federal policing.

An independent employee association is necessary to ensure internal accountability and enhance the sort of collaboration and meaningful consultation with independent representatives of the workforce that is required to drive institutional reform. Hasty implementation risks undermining institutional reform; so, the way reforms are rolled out also needs to be carefully sequenced.

The RCMP’s size, complexity, and culture makes it difficult to reform, but not impossible. Possible models for the Force include the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the FBI, and most of its allied federal policing counterparts: ample control, but not quasi-military in nature. To this end, there are clear benefits with adopting a diarchy approach. A Civilian Board of Management and co-equal DM provides the best way to confront the structural challenges facing the RCMP. For Canada’s federal police force, failure is not an option.

**SOMMAIRE**

Le gouvernement entend désigner un nouveau commissaire pour diriger une GRC confrontée à un certain nombre d’enjeux importants : création prochaine d’une association indépendante d’employés, mise en examen plus étroite de la part du Comité des parlementaires sur la sécurité nationale et le renseignement nouvellement établi (et possiblement de la part d’un nouvel organisme gouvernemental indépendant d’examen, tel que proposé dans le projet de loi C 59) et revue du mandat contractuel. Cette dernière initiative pourrait même entrainer le transfert de certaines responsabilités relatives à la protection des frontières à l’Agence des services frontaliers du Canada (ASFC). Ajoutons à tout cela, les difficultés qui persistent, telles que les allégations de harcèlement et d’intimidation systématiques, tandis qu’une infraction présumée au *Code canadien du travail* doit donner lieu à un procès.

Les observateurs de l’extérieur ont l’impression qu’il s’agit d’une organisation dysfonctionnelle. Les symptômes se manifestent publiquement par le biais des recours collectifs, des difficultés en matière de leadership, d’équipement et de recrutement, des plaintes au sujet de la rémunération et, généralement au sein de la Gendarmerie, par une tendance à l’éparpillement sur trop de fronts à la fois, tout particulièrement à cause de l’obligation de satisfaire aux exigences des services de police contractuelle presque à la grandeur du pays. Les gouvernements ont réagi dans le passé en désignant un nouveau commissaire et en lui conférant le mandat explicite de « régler » les problèmes, de pair avec un changement de politique, des propositions de réforme et la mise en application de nouvelles lois. Ce processus s’est répété essentiellement tous les cinq ans environ, avec peu d’effets probants. Mais, la folie, dit-on souvent, consiste à faire la même chose encore et encore, tout en s’attendant à un résultat différent.

Il ne s’agit pas ici de déterminer uniquement le genre de réforme qui s’impose, mais la raison pour laquelle les changements ont été si lents et si difficiles à être opérés dans le passé – ainsi que les conditions propres à dynamiser et à soutenir la réforme. La structure de la GRC doit être réformée afin
d’améliorer son rendement et de renforcer les aspects professionnels de ses services policiers, et ce, tout en lui permettant d’inspirer la confiance qui est requise et attendue d’un organisme fédéral de police.

On considère généralement le Conseil de gestion civil comme la solution universelle pour contester et confirmer les priorités établies par la Gendarmerie, assurer qu’elle maintient des liens réguliers avec le ministre et les hauts fonctionnaires et valider ses « demandes » budgétaires. Or, un tel Conseil devra être suppléé par un professionnel civil chevronné doté d’une expertise de longue date au sein du gouvernement fédéral, et dont le mandat sera d’assurer la liaison avec le ministre et les hauts fonctionnaires fédéraux : un sous-ministre (SM) sur un pied d’égalité avec le commissaire de la GRC. Une « dyarchie » bureaucratique permettrait de revigorer et de moderniser la GRC en matière de gouvernance, d’administration et de leadership.

Il serait important de faire suite aux recommandations suivantes :

1. Un Conseil de gestion civil devrait superviser l’élaboration d’une stratégie qui renforcerait le leadership de la GRC, son professionnalisme et sa compétence. En outre, un organisme indépendant de surveillance et de gestion préviendrait les risques d’abus qui pourraient découler d’une influence politique directe accrue au sein de la GRC.

2. Il faudrait transformer les opérations et l’administration en dyarchie et désigner un SM égal au commissaire. En fonction du précédent établi par les Forces armées canadiennes/ ministère de la Défense nationale, cette mesure pourrait exiger de procéder à une scission de la GRC en deux entités juridiques distinctes et de clarifier la relation entre la GRC et Sécurité publique Canada, de même qu’entre leur sous-ministre respectif.

3. Aux fins de la démilitarisation de la GRC, il faudra perfectionner le personnel, procéder à des affectations et à des embauches et adopter des modèles de carrière qui transformeront la vocation paramilitaire de la GRC en une culture axée sur les professions liées à l’application de la loi. Cela contribuera à professionnaliser les fonctions, faciliter le passage d’une culture militaire vers une culture de leadership, bâtir un système efficace pour aider les membres inexpérimentés à devenir des meneurs, mettre au point la capacité de leadership stratégique et innover sur le plan des modèles de carrière.

4. Le commissaire aura l’obligation de respecter l’orientation et les résultats fixés par les organismes d’examen actuels et à venir dans les circonstances définies par la loi et de surveiller de façon soutenue la mise en œuvre de la réforme. Cela serait assuré de préférence à l’interne par le biais d’un comité de surveillance du ministre, mais pourrait éventuellement faire l’objet d’un audit externe.

5. Si la GRC ne parvient pas à se retirer complètement des services de police contractuels, il faudra scinder les services policiers fédéraux et contractuels en deux organisations distinctes en tout point, dotées toutes les deux de leurs propres critères en matière d’embauche, de rémunération, de perfectionnement professionnel et de modèle de leadership. À défaut, la GRC devra établir les compétences et les types de rémunérations propres aux besoins particuliers de la police fédérale.

6. Une association indépendante d’employés devra être créée pour garantir la responsabilisation interne et renforcer le type de collaboration et de consultation qui engage les représentants indépendants de l’effectif et est de nature à mener à une réforme institutionnelle. Une mise en œuvre hâtive risque de saper les réformes institutionnelles; par conséquent, la manière dont les réformes sont mises en place doit également être soigneusement séquencée.

En raison de sa taille, de sa complexité et de sa culture, la GRC est difficile à réformer, mais la tâche n’est pas impossible. Le Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité ainsi que le FBI et la plupart de ses homologues de la police fédérale peuvent service de modèle : un contrôle vaste, mais pas de nature quasi militaire. À cette fin, l’adoption d’une approche fondée sur une dyarchie serait avantageuse. Un Conseil de gestion civil et des sous-ministres égaux constituent la meilleure façon d’affronter les défis structurels de la GRC. Pour la police fédérale du Canada, l’échec n’est pas une option.
INTRODUCTION

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (also called the RCMP, the Force, or the Mounted Police), the oldest federal police force in the world, is unlike the law enforcement agency of any other democracy. No other police force has a greater span of tasks, from writing traffic tickets to investigating outlaw bikers, criminal hackers, fentanyl smugglers, and money launderers. In terms of the number of units and range of responsibilities, the RCMP is without parallel elsewhere in the Government of Canada and among democracies of comparable size: a federal police that has two-thirds of its regular members deployed on front-line contract policing duties. The RCMP Commissioner is constantly reminded that Divisional Commanders in the provinces and territories are responsible to the local minister in charge of public safety. As a result, a backbone of generalist cops crowds out specialization, and urgent operational matters seemingly trump those of strategic importance.

Today’s RCMP must contend with a number of new developments: the impending creation of an independent employee association; increased review from the newly established National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP and potentially a new arm’s-length bureaucratic review body proposed in Bill C-59); a review of the RCMP’s mandate-contract, which could result in a possible transfer of some border duties to the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA); in addition to ongoing challenges such as allegations of pervasive harassment and bullying as well as a trial on violating the Canada Labour Code. It does so at a time when the government is looking for a new Commissioner with an explicit mandate to “fix” the problems, alongside policy change, proposals for reform, and new legislation. A new sequel of this movie repeats with a similar plot about every five years.

The RCMP is confronting a paradox not of its own making. According to the 2017 Speech from the Throne, “Canada is, fundamentally, a safe and peaceful country.” On the other hand, the same Speech goes on to say “the Government will continue to work to keep all Canadians safe.” Translation: No need to invest more resources in national security, and policing in particular, but the world is a dangerous place so make do with what you have to confront a growing and increasingly complex array of threats. In recent years the RCMP has had to scale up rapidly along many difficult fronts, notably national security investigations, sensitive investigations, and extra-territorial prosecutions. Yet, expectations have outstripped the human, financial, and professional resources needed to confront a vast (albeit vague) array of increasingly complex, rapidly changing threats.

This is a study about what needs to be done, why, how, and the proper sequencing of reform. It charts a roadmap to realize effective and timely reform, and the way to ensure that reform is sustained. Its basic premise is that the RCMP and its challenges have been misunderstood; inchoate reforms are the consequence. The problems the RCMP faces are not all of its own making; so, it should not be left alone to confront them. Yet successive Canadian governments have been preoccupied with shielding the RCMP from the full rigours of democratic governance and accountability, while abrogating their responsibility on such measures under the guise of remaining at arm’s length from the police. On the one hand, issues are rooted in the RCMP’s (para)militarized institutional culture, marked by authoritarian and coercive public administration practices that confuse enforcement with leadership.
(Murphy and McKenna 2007). On the other hand, the RCMP faces significant resource constraints that are evident in lagging compensation, reduced professional development, hard choices about allocating overstretched resources to national security priorities, and the cannibalization of federal policing to meet contract policing obligations to eight provinces, three territories, and more than 200 communities.

The question is not just what kind of reform is necessary, but why change has been glacial in pace and difficult in coming – and, therefore, what conditions are necessary to invigorate and sustain reform. The idea of a Civilian Board of Management has been broached repeatedly over the years. It would allow the RCMP to challenge and validate the priorities the Force has identified, liaise with the Minister and senior bureaucracy in a more systematic way, and validate the RCMP’s budgetary “asks,” first and foremost among them a pressing overhaul of its byzantine information technology (IT) infrastructure. Absent a more robust and properly staffed Policy Unit that could work with the Department(s) and inform the Commissioner and Senior Command, the Board will need to be complemented by a seasoned civilian professional with long-standing expertise in the federal government to liaise with the Minister and senior federal bureaucracy on policy and budgetary matters: a Deputy Minister (DM) who is equal in rank to the RCMP Commissioner (in lieu of the current subordinate civilian Associate Deputy Minister). Together, this diarchy would reinforce and modernize the RCMP’s (1) governance, (2) administration, and (3) leadership, while holding out the promise of ancillary benefits.

This study launches by emphasizing the need to distinguish between the robust and largely well-intentioned membership of the RCMP, and the institution itself. The faults found in some of its sworn members are symptomatic of an organization that is suffering from significant, partly self-inflicted, malaise – by former Commissioner Paulson’s own account, the RCMP is (very) slow to change. The second section dwells on the RCMP’s stubborn resistance to independent review and oversight, of which it is in dire need. Drawing on the experiences of police reform elsewhere, this section stresses the importance of oversight, review, and external audit to ensure changes are implemented in a timely manner and are sustained. The third section drills down on the Force’s quasi-military structure and command culture. For some functions, especially contract policing, elements of the quasi-military structure may be necessary. However, that assumption does not hold up for the bulk of the RCMP’s functions.

The proposals for reform start in the fourth section, first and foremost among them a Civilian Board of Management. A Board is fundamentally a necessary condition to improve professional practices and performance. But, by itself, a Board is insufficient. The fifth section explains why a Board will need to be complemented by a DM and Commissioner who are co-equals. The sixth section explains why such a diarchy is preferable over the alternative: a truly civilian and effective Commissioner; the seventh section details the RCMP’s challenges with civilianization more generally. The eighth section discusses strengthening the professional aspects of the RCMP’s leadership culture. That, in turn, requires personnel, deployment, employment, and career models; why having none of those is a real problem for the RCMP is discussed in the ninth section. How to create a strategic leadership culture is the focus of the tenth section, along with the need for the RCMP’s organizational mindset to embrace policing as a profession. Section eleven highlights the way the RCMP’s quasi-unionized environment aggravates its malaise.

The study concludes by laying out the way forward along with a simple premise: failure is not an option. Given the uncertainties associated with a rapidly changing security environment, Canadians, through the Minister of Public Safety, must be able to count on the RCMP’s Federal Police Service to be up to the job.
THE DIAGNOSIS

The RCMP faces a host of structural issues that make it tempting to conflate members with the institution. This is precisely the nuance that Staff Sgt. Tim Chad, in his now famous email, pointed out to (now retired) Commissioner Paulson in 2012: “We are not all a bunch of screwups but it is evident that we are all being lumped into that category and we are not valued and trusted. The vast majority of the membership already lives by our core values and works hard every day to do the right thing” (CBC 2012). As in any organization, a minority of the membership is problematic. Yet the issues ultimately lie mostly with the institution, not the members per se; some of the RCMP’s more prominent recent episodes raised more questions about the institution than about the sworn members that were involved: the tasering and subsequent death of Robert Dziekaniski at Vancouver International Airport in 2007, the shooting of four sworn members in Mayerthorpe in 2005, and the deaths of three sworn members in a Moncton shooting in 2014 (MacNeil 2015).

To be sure, scandals have plagued the Mounted Police since the beginning: the disastrous moments of the initial “march west” from Manitoba to Alberta that almost ended the fledgling North-West Mounted Police before it really started (yet mythologized by the RCMP into a proud founding narrative); in the 19th century, at the behest of the government of the day, withholding food rations from Indigenous bands in western Canada to force them to accept treaties; spying on labour, ethnic, and political organizations from the First World War until the end of the Cold War; shooting and killing strikers and protesters in Winnipeg in 1919; illegally opening mail during the Cold War; committing a plethora of “dirty tricks” in Quebec and elsewhere, including breaking into the office of the Parti Québécois; botching the investigations of both the Air India bombing and the Airbus affair (and, some might contend, recent sensitive investigations into expenses by some Senators); the pepper spraying of peaceful demonstrators during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit at the University of British Columbia in 1997; and improperly supplying US authorities with intelligence that led to Mahar Arar being tortured in Syria (see, for comparison, Hewitt 2011).

How the organization deals with widespread allegations of misogyny and bullying is symptomatic of the malaise that afflicts the RCMP. Individual settlements such as the payout to former Sgt. Peter Merrifield for a finding of “egregious” harassment (Perkel 2017), which the RCMP is appealing (Crawford 2017c), class action lawsuits, and evidence collected by the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission (CRCC) (2013; 2017) indicate that harassment permeates the RCMP. Uncooperative decision-makers who silence those who endorse change and/or sanction those who support change are a long-standing issue in the RCMP (Agocs 1997), as are managers who abuse their authority to ostracize those who question or rebel. The intent is to deter members from acknowledging issues so they will think twice about the consequences of being disloyal (Paquet 2007).

In remote postings, that effect is amplified by geography: initiating a complaint leaves the victim with little support, few alternatives, and an extremely uncomfortable workplace. Such a work environment incurs higher health costs and medical expenses, higher rates of sick-related absenteeism, replacement costs (such as recruitment and training) due to premature attrition and lower morale, and
reduced productivity (RCMP Pay Council 2015) – all of which an organization that is short-staffed can ill afford (see appendix b). By Acting Commissioner Dan Dubeau’s own admission, the percentage of unfilled positions on the front lines is in the double digits (Crawford 2017a). As well, it has been reported that detachments are chronically understaffed, members discouraged from calling in sick, and supervisors are out on the road responding to calls instead of managing (Brown Report 2007; Derosa 2012). Defections from the RCMP to other police forces, especially in BC’s Lower Mainland, Ontario, and Alberta are case in point of an organization under chronic duress (Crawford 2017b). In places such as Delta and Burnaby, BC, merely crossing the street from an RCMP detachment to a municipal police service raises a sworn member’s salary by about $20,000 per annum.

Independent reports over two decades – by the CRCC (2013; 2017), the Task Force on Governance and Cultural Change in the RCMP (referred to in this paper as the Brown Report 2007) and Price-waterhouseCoopers (PwC) (1999) – have repeatedly found that transformation in the RCMP is impeded by a lack of accountability and a culture of fear. That lack of accountability was on full display when, confronted with yet three more independent reports, then-Commissioner Paulson insisted: “it’s the linkage between the harassment issue as it’s understood today for example and the whole-sale governance change of the force . . . I’m having trouble making that jump” (Crawford 2017d). The then-Commissioner claimed that the RCMP does not have a systemic problem, and he was able to shift the narrative from reform to the “primacy of operations.” Governments have repeatedly bought into the mantra, pretending the issue can be solved by tinkering at the margins.

TRANSFORMATIONAL CHANGE

If the RCMP’s malaise is rooted in its institutional culture, leadership, incentive structure, and lack of management expertise, then changes to the RCMP’s governance structure follow. One possible remedy is to provide clear, unequivocal guidance in the form of legislation, political direction by the executive, outside civilian review, or judicial or quasi-judicial review. Yet the RCMP has tended to react not as a self-governing profession, determined to preserve institutional autonomy through adaptation, but rather as a semi-unionized, paramilitary organization. Self-preservation is a principal objective; consequently, its DNA is highly resistant to change, which makes the organization prone to misconstruing constructive criticism as an attack.

A decade has passed since the Brown Report (2007): on most points little or no progress has been made. The same can be said of the CRCC’s 11 recommendations from its 2013 Public Interest Investigation Report into Workplace Harassment in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The litany of recommendations over recent decades, compiled in an annex published separately, stands in stark contrast to their glacial and haphazard implementation – if they are implemented at all. Low-key fixes have been tried for decades, to little effect. Police often deem oversight bodies such as the CRCC and External Review Committee (ERC) as overly focused on compliance, counterproductive, destabilizing, and neutering management by discouraging the organization from dealing with internal problems on its own. But instead of seeing the relationship as adversarial, police commanders should see review as an opportunity to innovate and work more closely with oversight bodies to identify individuals of concern proactively before their behaviour gives rise to complaints.

Owing to the work of commissions in the US, UK, and Australia, there is good comparative research on how to galvanize change – and pitfalls to avoid (see appendices A, C, and D). One of the key les-
sons learned is that independent oversight is insufficient: implementation of reforms has to be subject to rigorous, periodic, independent external strategic audit. This can drive reform by reporting “on success and failure, and . . . advise on measures to improve the reform process” (Wood 1997, 535). Police managers have to identify and articulate goals, and an integrated plan and strong leadership are required to “drive change throughout the organization” (Hay Group 2001, 252; 250). In other words, the government and the Commissioner must both fully commit to changing police culture over the long-term; otherwise, reform will merely be symbolic.

To catalyse genuine change, government will have to be more proactive. At least since Pierre Trudeau, governments have repeatedly argued for an arm’s length relationship to avoid the appearance of instrumentalizing the police to political ends. But the reticence to provide effective ministerial direction is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of police-government relations (Bayley and Stenning 2016; Roach 2007). Under the rule of law, police are impartial. However, this holds true only for investigations and laying of charges. Administration, finance, and human resources have nothing to do with impartiality. Responsibility ultimately rests with the political authority. An independent oversight/management group with ongoing reporting requirements to the Minister forestalls the potential for abuse that would arise from greater direct political involvement in RCMP operational decision making in matters of administration, finance, and human resources. Unlike the political direction received by the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) post-Somalia, which entailed sustained monitoring of implementation for several years, politicians have preferred to defer to the Commissioner to fix the problems in the RCMP without subsequent monitoring.

Does the following sound familiar? Progress on reform has been limited by: “(1) the police organization’s decision to pursue an [operational instead of a reform agenda]; (2) poor implementation of reform ideas; (3) a fragmented and uncoordinated approach to change; and (4) the . . . Commissioner’s view that the reform is near completion” (Hay Group 2000, i–ii). This assessment was reached by the initial audit of reforms in Australia’s New South Wales Police – but it may just as well have been written about the RCMP. The leadership was not committed to the reform agenda, and their “reform messages” were not effectively conveyed. Not having been consulted, the rank and file came to resent change and “equated reform with an unsettling state of continual change” (Hay Group 2002, 112). Eventually, the leadership team dropped “reform” from corporate objectives altogether. The report surmised this was unlikely to change absent “community pressure in the form of high-level stakeholders” (Hay Group 2002, iv). The audit concluded by insisting on continuous scrutiny of the police organization (Chan and Dixon 2007, 450–451).

Only organizational “shock” will galvanize the structural change necessary to counter the current institutional culture and promote accountability (Mahoney 2000). By definition, such change has to come from outside the organization, such as civil service leaders from another federal department or agency with more mature public administration practices. Paquet (2007) likens this method to a medical doctor’s approach to a life-threatening disease: confronted with such a disease, doctors may use harsh shock treatments as a last resort. For the RCMP, this therapy must “amount to nothing less than a change of identity.”

However, changing the culture of an organization, especially one where rank and stripes trump all
else, is very hard work. Lieutenant-Generals (ret’d) Andrew Leslie and Mike Jeffrey observed this in their 2013 testimony before the Senate committee, surmising the military could not have recovered from the Somalia ordeal without constant, external, independent oversight driven by the government and respected civilian appointees. Lessons learned from police forces across Canada and abroad show that the government and the RCMP have a variety of options at their disposal to confront generational, leadership, and institutional challenges constructively.

THE INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE OF A DYSFUNCTIONAL WORKPLACE

The RCMP was modelled on the paramilitary Royal Irish Constabulary that the British deployed to control Ireland. The RCMP’s founding myth, then, is based on 19th century British Army light cavalry, whence much of its ceremony and image still derive (Dawson 1998): red tunics, cavalry stripe on trousers, sabres, the Musical Ride, and more. Albeit mostly harmless, subtleties of the 19th century British Army also live on, including the inherent military ethos of a hierarchical institution headed by an omnipotent commissioner.

Analogous to Louis Hartz’s (1964) fragment thesis, colonies that grew into countries mirrored the parent at the time of separation. Peter Kasurak (2013) has argued that the same applies to institutions. In effect, the RCMP has some similarities with an early version of the Victorian Army: it stresses character rather than expertise for recruitment and promotion, and instead of a general staff (or strategic planning) it stresses field operations – the “primacy of operations” that Commissioners pride themselves on flaunting.

Criticism of the RCMP’s institutional culture dates back a century. A 1919 report to Parliament stresses allegedly desirable characteristics: “only men with a robust physique can carry on” (Reilly Schmidt 2013). The Mountie as a white, male, masculine authority figure is thus deeply ingrained in the institution. Whilst Canadian society shifted to expect the inclusion of women and other groups throughout the public and private spheres, favouritism towards robust Caucasian men persisted. In 1949, Constable Lois Beckett sued for the right to receive the same compensation as her male counterparts. Justice Fergusson ruled against her in 1968 (Reilly Schmidt 2013).

The 1968 Royal Commission on the Status of Women (RCSW) received 468 briefs, 890 witnesses, and countless letters. Its 1970 report made 167 recommendations, some of which addressed rampant inequality in the RCMP. The RCSW found a masculine culture dominated the organization; compared to other police forces it specifically noted that the RCMP was dominated by male members. To counter its gendered institutional identity, the RCSW recommended that the RCMP accept more women into its ranks, that women receive equal pay with the same responsibilities, and that the pension plan

---

The RCMP stresses character rather than expertise, and field operations over strategic planning.
available to men also be available to women (Reilly Schmidt 2013). Hitherto, if a male RCMP officer
died then the beneficiary would be that officer’s partner. If a female RCMP officer died, however, then
the pension would not be directed to her partner (RCSW 1970).

In 2007, the RCSW’s recommendations were reviewed by the Brown Report. It went beyond the
inclusion and treatment of women in observing that the RCMP’s institutional culture was at times
harmful and promoted a lack of accountability. The Brown Report proceeded to recommend that the
RCMP be monitored by an independent oversight commission; financial and human resource (HR)
practices should be external and somewhat independent; and the RCMP should be more independent
from the federal government. However, the RCMP was able to ignore that recommendation,
claiming that the proposed monitoring was unworkable and arguing that it already had two oversight
bodies. Meanwhile, the RCMP knew full well that neither the ERC nor the Commission for Public
Complaints Against the RCMP (predecessor to the CRCC) has oversight of management practices.
With no governance to force the recommendations to be implemented, the RCMP’s push-back tactics
– bullying for all intents and purposes – worked to perpetuate the status quo.

“Culture” should not be used as a place-holder for everything that ails the RCMP. Instead, we need
to examine the sources of the RCMP’s institutional culture. Organizations with a tightly coupled
institutional culture – a social system that prizes the team as a collective unit that is hierarchically
organized and whose team members are highly interdependent – commonly regard themselves as set
apart from society for a special purpose. Since their institutional culture is tight, it is slow to change.
Since their pace of change tends to be far slower than the pace at which societal and governmental
expectations evolve, the delta between the RCMP, its clients (in the form of Canadian society and
different levels of government), and the political authority (that is, government) widens apace. This
explains why the organization is unlikely to catch up on its own.

In fact, the RCMP had a major hand in drafting the Enhancing Royal Canadian Mounted Police Ac-
countability Act (initially known as Bill C-42), which came into force in 2014. Commissioner Paulson
himself made the case for the legislative changes he deemed necessary before the Standing Senate
Committee on National Security and Defence in February 2013 – remarks which were then posted
on the RCMP’s website (RCMP 2016). The government of the day effectively deferred to the RCMP on
the Act. Continuing to do so will only cause the attendant tensions between society/government and
the organization to grow.

To speed up the complaints, grievance, and disciplinary process, the Enhancing Royal Canadian
Mounted Police Accountability Act (2013) broadens the scope of discretion at the hands of RCMP
management. That further exacerbated the situation. It had long been recommended – in accordance
with Treasury Board policy and reiterated by the Senate (Lang and Dallaire 2013) – that leaders be
required to register a complaint if they witness intimidating behaviour or harassment. However, there
is little incentive to deal with harassment. As observed in the Deschamps Report (2015) on the CAF,
since commanding officers (CO) regularly rotate out of units, it is often easier for them to stall on
dealing with a harassment complaint until they transfer out; then it becomes someone else’s prob-
lem. The new CO, in turn, has little incentive to take ownership of the complaint. The same institu-
tional logic is at work in the RCMP: members can be suspended with pay for up to six years before
returning to work, with no finding of fault on their part, while two to three supervisors who would
rather not deal with the issue rotate in and out.

Supervisors have written up not only the accused, but also the alleged accuser to deter members from
reporting. This was to be expected. According to a study of BC’s “E” Division, “frequent tales of retal-
iation against those who bring forward harassment complaints can also leave victims and bystanders
feeling helpless” (Kinsella 2013). In such a discouraging atmosphere, ambiguity further depressed dis-
closure (Brown 2007). The ERC found a general trend towards less documentation in disciplinary cases
since 2007, which culminated in the 2014 legislative change. But implementation was still left up to the
The process for filing a harassment complaint can be onerously complicated. Sworn members who register a complaint can be intimidated by the convoluted process or are unsure of what happens to their complaint once it is registered. To register a complaint, members need to have access to the RCMP’s intranet, which may be difficult if they are off duty on sick leave (CRCC 2017). This is a potential problem for those who are off duty for mental health reasons (Auditor General of Canada 2017). Once their complaint is registered, the process that follows is tedious, and harassment investigators do not always adhere to timelines. If an allegation is substantiated, which is rare, harassment becomes an automatic Code of Conduct issue. RCMP policy states that a harassment complaint must be dealt with within one year, a timeline that (now) tends to be met. The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence had hitherto identified timeliness as necessary for trust in the Code of Conduct system (Kinsella 2013). The compound effect of these uncertainties can be daunting when members are reluctant to register a complaint in the first place.

In light of this track record, it should come as no surprise that the Enhancing Royal Canadian Mounted Police Accountability Act (2013) reinforces the RCMP’s institutional culture. The process is indicative of how primitive the RCMP’s labour relations regime is. Once a grievance is filed, it is assigned an investigator. However, grievance investigators are not allowed to confer with the Conduct Authority (CA) (the divisional CO who makes the decision to hold a Conduct Meeting). The CA alone is responsible for rendering a decision. Sworn members have no right to representation, and the CA does not issue a written decision. In the CAF, by contrast, equivalent infractions may be subject to a formal court martial with Judge Advocate General (JAG) representation.

**GOVERNANCE: A CIVILIAN BOARD OF MANAGEMENT**

Civilian police boards have proven a functional success for large municipal police services across the country. For the RCMP, such a shift would be a sharp departure from its roots as a bureaucratic paramilitary organization (Brief 2014). As per the Brown Report (2007), some members of the RCMP – albeit not all – perceive themselves to be above the law. The RCMP’s accountability framework is an anomaly: it does not report to official advisory boards (as the Contract Management Committee is not a board), despite being responsible for municipalities, territories, and provinces. Instead, the RCMP’s accountability is limited to the federal government (Auditor General of Canada 2005). While the NSICOP and the changes to review envisaged as part of Bill C-59 may alter things, in effect the NSICOP and the new review body will, ultimately, still be responsible to the political executive.
Among the most significant recommendations of the Brown Report (2007) – echoing the earlier PwC (1999) report that were subsequently reinforced by the Canadian Association of Police Governance (2013), former Commissioner Elliott, and now Fraser (2017) – was the suggestion to establish a Civilian Board of Management for the RCMP. The Board would be accountable for matters within its remit to the Minister and through him or her, to Parliament. The Commissioner would be accountable to the Minister for operational matters and would remain subject to written direction from the Minister with respect to these matters. The Commissioner would also be responsible to the Board for the organization and administration of the RCMP.

The Board would oversee – but not manage – the organization and administration of the RCMP as a whole. The power to appoint (and dismiss) the Commissioner should continue to be vested with Cabinet. But the Board’s views should be taken into account, and it should also perhaps control the Commissioner’s annual at-risk pay/bonus. Its remit would include: HR management; policies and practices; resource allocation; budgeting and financial management; strategic planning and oversight of implementation; risk identification and management; succession planning; internal and public communications; the establishment of objectives for senior management; and performance measures for those objectives.

Specifically, the Brown Report (2007) argues that the Board would benefit the RCMP as follows: (1) it would give more intensive and informed oversight of the Force than at present and a more rigorous and balanced accountability regime better suited to the nature of the organization; (2) there would be more meaningful oversight by the Minister, who can interact with the Board on organizational and administrative matters; (3) the Board would serve as a source of advice to the Commissioner on strategic issues; (4) it could provide constructive independent advice to senior RCMP management regarding administration of the Force; (5) there would be a more exacting performance management process for the Commissioner; (6) it would strengthen the Force’s ability to undertake strategic planning and to participate in policy issues at the federal and provincial levels; (7) there would be greater administrative flexibility in managing resources, both human and financial; and (8) the Board would provide encouragement to the Force to be on the forefront of developments in the policing environment.

Under Commissioner Paulson’s watch, the “primacy of operations” consistently trumped strategic priorities. As in any organization, following the money is a good way to ascertain what the real priorities are. During recent budgets cuts, BC’s “E” Division reduced by half funding for its Respectful Workplace Program, even though it is the RCMP’s largest division. This was possible because the RCMP’s budgeting process has yet to put in place fenced funding for such advisers. The RCMP would not be able to play such a shell game under a Civilian Board of Management because uniformed members would not be setting priorities and controlling the budget (MacCharles 2016) – which is precisely why the “old guard” does not want to “let these civilians run the show” (Silter, quoted in Freeze and Leblanc 2017).

Commissioners have been quick to claim a Civilian Board of Management risks politicizing the RCMP. However, that conception is based on a fundamental misunderstanding: it is accepted practice in common law jurisdictions that police enjoy only limited independence and are fully politically (and publicly) accountable for certain police functions, such as law enforcement activities and decisions
(Stenning 2011, 254). Notably, no Commissioner has yet been able to explain why exactly such a Board would be any more prone to politicization than the current office of the Commissioner. The real risk of politicization arises from the RCMP’s command, where the widely-touted “primacy of operations” is effectively subsumed by rampant careerism and concomitant risk aversion.

The Zaccardelli regime offers a case in point of a police officer playing politics, only to find himself in a terminal conflict about his political “independence” and accountability with the government. Commissioner Zaccardelli was forced to resign after admitting to providing misleading and contradictory information to a parliamentary committee. Ironically, Commissioner Zaccardelli’s office was in the L.H. Nicholson building – named after the late Commissioner who resigned over a police disagreement with the government of the day (Stenning 2000).22 As Philip Stenning (2011, 241) concludes, the historically unprecedented spate of resignations and dismissals of police commissioners in recent years reflects “some seismic shifts in attitudes towards the governance and accountability of police” in Canada, Australia, and England.

THE DIARCHY: A DEPUTY MINISTER CO-EQUAL WITH THE COMMISSIONER

The Department of National Defence (DND) model would complement a Civilian Board of Management in its division of labour between operational and non-operational responsibilities. DND’s leadership is effectively split into co-equals with responsibilities clearly laid out in legislation: responsibility for policy and control of the department is vested with the Minister of National Defence through the Director General, and operational responsibility is vested in the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) who manages the CAF.

The DM’s primary responsibilities are financial oversight, accountability, and policy. As the senior civilian civil servant advising the Minister, the DM is responsible for the day-to-day management of DND on behalf of the Minister (DND 2016a). Deputies also carry a general obligation of accountability to the Treasury Board Secretariat for the overall management capacity and performance of the department (DND 2016a). However, the DM is seen as being “political” by virtue of bringing non-operational considerations to bear on operational matters. By looking to the Privy Council Office (PCO) for bonuses and promotion, the deputy must necessarily bridge the political and the operational. A co-equal RCMP deputy as head of the Board of Management would face the same conundrum.

By contrast, the CAF is a legally distinct entity. The CDS commands, controls, and administers the CAF, and, like the DM, is appointed by the Governor-in-Council on the advice of the Prime Minister (DND 2016b). The Royal Canadian Navy, Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Air Force, and a variety of other commands report to the CDS (DND 2016b).23

Currently, no such division of labour exists within the RCMP – unlike DND and the CAF, the RCMP is not divided into separate legal entities. Still, the RCMP could readily emulate this division of labour as a way to raise the level of competence and confidence in the RCMP. Although the RCMP is governed by its own Act, it is subject to just about all the same requirements and legislation as DND and the CAF. Many of these are highly complex and require specialized knowledge and skills to interpret, implement, and administer. This is especially true in a security organization that, by virtue of its mandate, cannot operate as openly and transparently as most other government departments.
A CIVILIAN COMMISSIONER?

A n alternative to a co-equal DM to lead a Civilian Board of Management is to civilianize the position of the Commissioner. The political authority would then not interact with operational members directly, only with the civilian Commissioner. This would be analogous to the New York Police Department’s model outlined in appendix A: to minimize friction, the position is conventionally held by a former sworn peace officer. By way of analogy, the DM of Ontario’s Ministry of Community Safety is normally a retired police chief from an Ontario municipality. A civilian RCMP Commissioner would enhance the independence of the RCMP as a self-governing force by insulating the remaining uniformed operational leadership from interference by the political authority. Depending on the professional background, a civilian commissioner might also bring (different) skills that could benefit the RCMP. By way of example, that has tended to be the approach governments have taken in appointing directors of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), who tend to come from outside the organization, rather than having come up through the ranks of the Service.

The government experimented with this later model in 2007 in appointing a civilian as Commissioner – William J.S. Elliott, the first civilian in this role – with two deputies reporting to him on operational matters. Elliott, a seasoned lawyer and executive, had held senior positions as National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, Associate Deputy Minister of Public Safety, and Deputy Commissioner of the Canadian Coast Guard (RCMP 2014). Still, his tenure was marked by numerous complaints (CBC 2010a). Some officers accused Elliott of being verbally abusive, closed-minded, arrogant, and insulting (CBC 2010a). Tensions may have just been a matter of chemistry. However, without the right credentials, the sworn membership perceived Commissioner Elliott as a civilian – not the sworn peace officer that he was by virtue of holding the position – who lacked the knowledge and credibility that comes with a background in policing.

Part of the RCMP’s institutional culture is a strict quasi-paramilitary rank structure that extols the virtues of operational experience. As such, a civilian commissioner must enjoy the respect of the uniformed members, or else risks falling prey to a palace coup. In effect, that is what happened to Bill Elliott. The Afghanistan episode was emblematic to this effect: Commissioner Elliott wore the RCMP uniform and a sidearm (CBC 2010b). The rank and file quivered: the general feeling was that this was illegitimate, even though Commissioner Elliott was legally entitled to both by virtue of his appointment. By all accounts, Commissioner Paulson’s leadership style was no different from Bill Elliott’s (Quan 2017). Yet there were no letters to the Minister, and (almost) no press coverage of bullying. Those who disagreed with Commissioner Paulson’s style quietly retired or found employment outside the RCMP. The difference is a function of background: Commissioner Paulson was a Mountie; Bill Elliott was “just” a “civvy.”

In appointing Elliott, the idea was to break the RCMP’s cultural bias. Yet, far from being transformative, his tenure only exacerbated the tension between uniformed members and civilians. Indeed, “differences in standards and discipline have contributed to a divisive influence in the Force. It is clear the RCMP will need to continue to draw on the expertise of those trained outside the police tradition. For the RCMP to move forward, these two groups must come together in a constructive partnership” (Brown 2007). However, the government failed to grasp the RCMP’s tight institutional culture and underestimated just how important it was for the Commissioner to work well with the RCMP’s uniformed executive.
CIVILIANIZATION

This outcome was entirely predictable given the RCMP’s prior experience with civilianization. The thrust towards civilianizing positions between 1976 and the early 1990s meant positions that had previously been held by sworn members were now held by civilians with distinct training backgrounds. But, inside the organization, this period is pejoratively known as the “Teddy Bear Years.” Following PwC’s recommendations (1999), the RCMP again experimented with strengthening the professional aspects of some lines of business such as accounting and human resources through lateral hiring – bringing in a specialized skill set from another organization that is recognized as the leader in the field – and promptly reverted back to uniformed managers. Ergo, the struggle for and between civilian and regular members in the RCMP is significant and long-standing. One remedy is to change the status of civilian members to make them civil servants; there is already a move afoot to this end, but the sooner, the better.

To be fair, this situation is not all that different from the CAF. Reform started when the army, navy, and air force were merged under unification in 1968. After continuing push-back from the military to follow Cabinet direction and circumvent Treasury Board controls, Donald Macdonald instituted the Management Review Group (MRG) to force civilian direction on the despondent services (Kasurak 2013, 157–161). MRG reforms that placed civilians in much more authoritative positions in National Defence Headquarters were strongly resented by the military – and eventually mostly undone by General Rick Hillier when he was CDS from 2005–2008.

The RCMP is not alone among police services in its approach where character trumps expertise: the bio-sketches of uniformed officers on the RCMP’s executive committee are revelatory, and the absence of general (rather than professional or executive) post-secondary and especially tertiary education striking. It is more effective, efficient, and economical to have civilians in non-operational roles (Leuprecht 2014). RCMP officers often view positions in departments such as human resources as temporary, a chance to get promoted, or to work straight days and regular hours, among other reasons (Leuprecht 2014). Yet police are prone to perform poorly in these positions (Brown Report 2007). If the RCMP was to follow through on its mantra of “primacy of operations,” officers should be taken out of administrative positions to boost the short supply of sworn members out in the field, which would make RCMP administration more effective and efficient.

To be sure, there are limits to running field operations organizations on a model that purely seeks to maximize personnel efficiency. Operators get hurt and worn out. They need a place to recuperate and have some family stability. Some headquarter positions need to be encumbered for them even if they may not be all that qualified to serve in them. Making inadequate allowance for staffing administration with sworn members does come at the cost of morale and a high attrition rate of members choosing to resign (which the RCMP refers to as “separation from service”). Taken too far, however, it will have (demonstrably) deleterious effects on the organization’s ability to function.
BUILDING A LEADERSHIP CULTURE

Leaders are invested in the norms, values, and behaviour of an organization (Cain 2011). This responsibility is even more prominent in tight institutional cultures, common among military and police organizations. Tight institutional cultures have explicit standards of behaviour and extreme consequences for those who deviate from expectations. Such institutional cultures subordinate individual interest to the collective good. That explains why some supervisors fail to resolve harassment, dismiss issues, or look the other way. Others take punitive measures against those who report harassment.

Given its deferential hierarchical rank structure, the RCMP has effectively emasculated its own leadership: information about abuse of power or bullying does not reach the higher ranks. According to the Brown Report (2007), “senior management is not in a position to address developing problems because they are insulated by people who do not want to deliver bad news.” However, that assessment is far too charitable. No doubt a protective barrier is selectively applied; but systemic issues would be all too familiar to senior management who had to climb the ranks through the organization in the first place. As most members lack rank and positional power to make a difference, the common perception is that of a headquarters too “remote, disconnected and out-of-date with challenges faced on the front lines” (Brown Report 2007).

The RCMP has taken steps to encourage leaders to denounce harassment in the workplace. The Every Employee Engaged initiative, launched by Commissioner Paulson months after taking the helm in 2012, encourages a broad discussion about ethics, respect, and accountability. The RCMP has also imposed two mandatory town halls to discuss leadership expectations (RCMP 2013). Nonetheless, harassment and related issues prevail. The RCMP’s Assistant Commissioner, tasked with championing Gender and Diversity, likes to tout “cultural change” agents (Crawford 2017d); the problem is that the RCMP has an impoverished understanding of what constitutes cultural change agents, how to generate them, and what they need to be doing.

There is some analogy here to the CAF, where leadership recognized its own failure post-Somalia to position the institution for success: “The key change in the culture of the Canadian Armed Forces did not come through new regulations. It had to come from the leadership of the institution.” As Lieutenant-General Jeffery explains: “If the senior leadership do not believe reform is essential and are not invested in it, nothing will change” (Kinsella 2013). The now infamous yet widely misquoted phrase “decade of darkness” was actually coined by Lieutenant-General Al DeQuetteville, referring not to underfunding but rather to the inability of the CAF seniors to understand the agenda of the government. Consequently, they could not anticipate successive cuts, adapt their plans, and explain the impact to the Minister or Cabinet in language they could understand.28

FORCE GENERATION AND CAREER MODELS

Lack of personnel (aka “force generation”) or career models that are systematic in producing senior leaders the way the CAF does is a structural and procedural liability for the RCMP. The RCMP’s approach to training, career streaming, promotion, and education has long ensured that the wrong people often end up in the wrong job. COs have extensive authority yet often little formal education or training.30 The RCMP needs to create a single executive occupation with clear criteria for entrance and transition programs for different occupations. At present, RCMP mem-
bers are not screened for leadership and management skills, and there is no educational requirement for promotion – minimum qualification at entry suffices (a high school degree and no criminal record).\textsuperscript{31} Nor is there a formal career management and progression model akin to that of the CAF.\textsuperscript{32}

Professional organizations tend to lay out unambiguous requirements for management and leadership positions. Instead, the RCMP puts its faith in its members, perpetuating the myth that any RCMP member, regardless of educational or training background, has the ability to learn any trade or skill. This ensures that RCMP members who have spent years working in contract policing will eventually be able to migrate to federal policing. However, by the RCMP’s Acting Commissioner’s own admission, the skills required to be a successful contract policing officer – criminal policing, breaking up domestic disputes, writing tickets – differ from those required to investigate terrorism, white-collar crime, money laundering, and tax evasion (Freeze and Leblanc 2017). It thus follows that the entry points, qualifications, training, education, promotion, and compensation should differ for contract and federal policing.

Canada is an outlier. All of Canada’s federal democratic allies have different organizations to conduct federal as opposed to contract-like policing. Internally the RCMP is separated into Contract and Aboriginal Policing on the one hand, and Federal Policing on the other hand, each headed by a Deputy Commissioner. Yet, both organizations are staffed by the same members who are subject to the same hiring, compensation, and promotion processes, and can readily be moved from one organization to the other. It will continue to prove exceedingly difficult for the RCMP not to compromise its federal mandate when it spends the bulk of its time, effort, and resources trying to meet its contract policing obligations. The highly decentralized nature of contract policing – people, processes, infrastructure, technology – make it ever more difficult for federal policing to confront national and global issues, such as national security, transnational crime, and cybercrime.

If a stand-alone federal policing organization is a bridge too far (Freeze and Leblanc 2017), then at least federal policing needs to be reformed to optimize its ability to deliver on this core mandate. To this end, RCMP contract members should be able to compete for positions in federal policing; but these positions should also be open to any other qualified candidate who meets the legal conditions for employment.

However, the RCMP’s current recruitment process deters professionals such as lawyers, HR managers, and accountants from applying. Promotion in the RCMP is largely a function of experience in the Force.\textsuperscript{35} Professional applicants are treated like any other member and can end up spending years on contract duties before putting in for a transfer to federal policing. In contrast, Canada’s Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) hire professionals directly and/or laterally into positions where they can utilize their skills.\textsuperscript{34} Moreover, the RCMP discourages professional applicants because there is no mechanism to hire professionals laterally into positions that have been identified and earmarked for sworn members. While the government has now moved to competing the position of Commissioner externally, insofar as the positions of Deputy Commissioner remain restricted to internal applicants, the RCMP is an outlier among Canadian police forces which tend to compete both ranks – Chief and Deputy – externally. Similar to the CAF, the RCMP needs a number of different occupations within the Force. This could allow civilian members of the RCMP to be recruited and retained without them becoming sworn members.\textsuperscript{35}
Hiring professionals also raises the issue of compensation. The RCMP Pay Council (2015) has been making plenty of hay out of falling behind on remuneration: “As the pool of possible new members is shrinking, the competition between police services for qualified applicants is rising. Successful organizations must offer rates of pay comparable to their competitors in the labour market” (Leblanc 2015). Uncompetitive compensation hinders recruitment. However, that the RCMP compensates members based on seniority and rank rather than competency and skill set seems to be lost on the Pay Council. To attract professionals, compensation should be based on a combination of professional skills, competency, and experience. The Government of Canada already does this for other uniformed members: in the CAF, for instance, physicians, dentists, legal officers, and some specialist trades in high demand are compensated differently from other officers, and are commissioned at higher ranks (DND 2015). Akin to the Israel Defence Force, the RCMP could start everyone at the bottom but then stream those officer candidates who do not already have the requisite level of skill. The RCMP would also have to invest in graduate education and staff training for people proceeding to senior ranks. This would be expensive, but the cost could be estimated based on the CAF. Those costs could, however, be offset by savings generated by the integration of civilians into lower-level tasks.

One of the Canadian Army’s long-standing complaints since reunification has been that the CAF has mostly failed to decouple rank and expertise. This matter was almost solved in the early 1990s with a years-long study called Talent, Aptitude, Skills, and Knowledge (TASK). It proposed a pay grid that would have compensated as a function of both leadership and expertise. However, it was abandoned at Armed Forces Council when a new Army chief of staff viscerally disagreed with the pay inversions that would result, such as a skilled corporal being paid more than a “management” sergeant, or with making that corporal, without sufficient time-in-rank, a sergeant to begin with.36 This partially explains why the CAF maintains many artificial barriers to recognizing community college diplomas that would facilitate lateral entry. This suggests that clear political direction would be needed for the RCMP to change its ways.

**STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP CAPACITY**

The RCMP’s institutional culture still holds that a member who meets the minimum qualifications at entry – a high school degree and no criminal record – can learn any trade or acquire any capability. Contract policing members are expected to enforce provincial laws yet respond to national security threats; transfers from contract to federal policing are common. Many federal policing jobs are not all that different from criminal policing: surveillance, door knocking, interviewing, and so forth. Investigating criminal extremism, human trafficking, conducting municipal patrols, and investigating sexual assaults may offer some cross-cutting synergies but require very different competencies. The trajectory of federal policing requires increasingly specialized expertise: the massive surge in human resources that cannibalized just about all other facets of federal policing in the wake of the 2014 shootings on Parliament Hill is an exemple par excellence where the RCMP tried to compensate for a lack in necessary specialized skill sets with a costly and inefficient influx of human resources (Freeze and Leblanc 2017).

Although the RCMP is supposedly the federal government’s police force, it spends over two-thirds of its personnel, resources, and time delivering contract policing. Contract policing maintains the RCMP presence across Canada, provides security at major events, and represents the federal government
in remote areas. Most detachments outside of Ontario and Quebec still have contract and federal
members, which allows the RCMP to draw from the pool of contract policing members as required
(Auditor General of Canada 2005). Yet, the organization’s preoccupation with contract policing has
been cannibalizing federal policing. The RCMP must meet its contract obligations but does not have
enough members to do so (Auditor General of Canada 2005).

In some communities, the RCMP’s effective per capita complement is about half that of a municipal
police service for a town of comparable size. Still, eight out of 10 provinces (and municipalities who
contracted before 1991) continue to contract with the RCMP because they benefit from a fed-
eral cost-share that effectively sees the federal government subsidize their policing costs. This
unwieldy Hydra is best tamed by completely splitting it into discrete law enforcement agen-
cies, with different entry points, training, education, promotion, and compensation – although
contract policing and federal policing could still remain under the mandate of the RCMP.

Contract policing members are expected to enforce provincial laws yet respond to national
security threats; transfers from contract to federal policing are common.

One option is a common base of training and experience (commonly known as a “beat cop”).
After four to five years, members would be able to choose among different branches: contract
vs. federal policing; non-commissioned member vs. officer. For specialist occupations, there could be an accelerated program that consists of, say, two years of field work in a large urban centre rather than a remote location.

Alternatively, movement between the two policing mandates could cease and the two could be-
come watertight and separate, except for those members who can meet the requirements of the
revamped Federal Policing Services. This is akin to the creation of CSIS. On the recommendation of
the McDonald Commission, security intelligence was taken out of the RCMP. However, when CSIS
was created, it also inherited the legacy of the “dirty tricks” scandal of the 1970s, which resulted
in CSIS being subject to scrutiny by the Security Intelligence Review Committee. Isolating the two
forms of policing would allow for more specific qualification expectations for federal policing. Af-
ter all, recruitment, employment, promotion, remuneration, and the entire institutional culture at
CSIS are quite different from the RCMP. For one thing, an undergraduate degree is usually the min-
imum qualification at entry for CSIS, in stark contrast to the RCMP’s standard of a high school di-
ploma. The RCMP’s closest equivalent in the federal civil service – the Military Police – has required
a college certification in police sciences as a minimum since 1996, although many applicants have
at least an undergraduate degree.

Therein lies the rub. Initially CSIS was largely staffed by RCMP members who transferred over when
CSIS was created. A discrete Federal Policing Service would carry a similar risk: those who staff fed-
eral policing now would stay, and others would just transfer over, thereby stalling any cultural shift.
Imagine an “old” staff sergeant with only a high school diploma suddenly tasked with supervising
new recruits with graduate degrees. For that reason, professional management in the form of civilian-
ization may have to precede a split between contract and federal policing.

Higher levels of education also have ancillary benefits. First, higher levels of education have been
shown to professionalize policing as an occupation (Chan and Dixon 2007, 455). Second, in Austra-
lia’s New South Wales, the shift from vocation to profession caused an unprecedented surge in unso-
licted applications. Third, the increase in demand for police education will alter the demographics,
skills, and experience of new recruits, including the number of female recruits. Fourth, these new members will have the educational qualifications to understand how to interact with government, which is lacking in the current RCMP membership and senior leadership.

Instead of prioritizing skill and expertise in assigning roles, the RCMP routinely promotes using any number of inappropriate considerations, such as seniority, instead of competence and experience. This can be daunting to highly skilled candidates who are not prepared to “pay their dues” by putting in years of contract policing. As a result, these candidates regularly opt to join other police forces, such as the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) where the vast majority have a university degree and promotion is increasingly based on expertise. The RCMP has a hard time competing with these other police forces (Brown Report 2007).

If the government were to opt for a distinct, stand-alone Federal Policing Service, it might also consider transferring the RCMP’s border functions to Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA). The RCMP’s border legacy dates back to a 1932 Order in Council and would no longer fit well with the new Federal Policing Services’ mandate. The reality is that the RCMP accepts the role but is insufficiently resourced to perform it effectively. Handing the RCMP’s duty to CBSA would also resolve the long-standing collective action problem of having two different organizations in charge of different parts of the border: CBSA at ports of entry and the RCMP between them. This would give rise to three separate organizations: one in charge of federal policing, one in charge of the border, and one in charge of contract policing. This will optimize functional specialization, and allow each organization to focus on its operational imperatives. At the same time, it makes harassment and related issues more manageable by parsing them out across three separate organizations.

**UNIONIZING A SEMI-UNIONIZED WORKPLACE**

Precedent from other large police forces in Canada suggests a proper collective bargaining regime could eventually have a positive impact on the RCMP’s institutional culture. At present, absent an independent employee association and concomitant grievance process, harassment, abuse, and intimidation in the RCMP are reinforced internally. However, sustainable change in the RCMP is improbable without significant structural change. Instituting a union prior to a systematic structural overhaul of the RCMP would surely thwart such an endeavour, in part because, by all accounts, certification of a collective bargaining agent will prove painful. Meanwhile, unionization risks making the working relationship between the executive and the union more adversarial rather than mutually beneficial.

Unlike other Canadian police forces, the RCMP does not have a union. The debate on whether RCMP members should have a union has persisted since its founding (MacKay and Perez-Leclerc 2016).
From 1918 to 1974, an Order in Council forbade any union-related activity by RCMP members. According to MacKay and Perez-Leclerc (2016), this was thought to be necessary in order for RCMP members to avoid a conflict of interest between their allegiance to their fellow workers and their obedience to orders from superiors.

As an alternative, the RCMP established a non-unionized labour regime in 1974. At the core of the new labour regime was the Staff Relations Representative Program (SRRP) (MacKay and Perez-Leclerc 2016). The SRRP was to ensure that in each level of hierarchy (divisional, regional, and national), members’ representatives and management consulted on HR initiatives and policies. Management, however, had the final say on human resources – sort of. Owing to the quasi-unionized environment, SRRP people could undermine anything with which they did not agree. The SRRP was dissolved following the Supreme Court’s decision in Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada (2015). Yet the ability to undermine whatever people disagree with persists and is a major impediment to strategic leadership.

In Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada struck down provisions that specifically forbade RCMP members from unionizing. The Court reinforced collective bargaining as protected under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom. In response, the Liberal Party proposed Bill C-7 in June 2016, which would amend the Public Service Labour Relations Act (PSLRA) to allow RCMP members and reservists to choose whether to be represented by a bargaining agent and would introduce an independent, binding arbitration process in the event of an impasse, with no right to strike (Government of Canada 2016).

Bill C-7 would impose constraints on prospective unions: should members choose to certify a bargaining agent, there must be a single, country-wide bargaining unit for RCMP members; the RCMP bargaining agent must have as its primary mandate the representation of RCMP members; and officers shall be excluded from representation. It also restricts the remit of a collective agreement (MacKay and Perez-Leclerc 2016) from any term or condition that related to law enforcement techniques, transfers, appraisals, probation, discharges or demotions, conduct, including harassment, and more (Government of Canada 2016). After much debate, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence amended the bill to remove the restrictions on the content of a collective agreement (MacKay and Perez-Leclerc 2016).

The SRRP provided a mechanism for employees to voice concerns, but ultimately deferred to management on matters of HR (MacKay and Perez-Leclerc 2016). Under Bill C-7, an independent arbitrator would examine both the union’s and management’s concerns and provide binding dispute resolution, rather than defer to management on the final decision. Bill C-7 could also potentially help improve harassment issues within the RCMP in two ways. First, senior management would be more aware of the prevalence and causes of harassment because the union would be dealing directly with senior management. Second, independent arbitration would ensure that both the employees’ and management’s thoughts on solving harassment are considered. However, unionization cannot alone solve the RCMP’s issues with harassment, bullying, and intimidation (CRCC 2017). It needs to be accompanied by a mentoring program that is established, maintained, documented, and part of performance evaluation.
CONCLUSION

The RCMP’s size, complexity, and entrenched police culture makes it difficult – but not impossible – to reform. In terms of institutional culture, CSIS offers a possible model to which to aspire. So too does the FBI and most of the RCMP’s allied federal policing counterparts: ample control, but not quasi-military in nature. To this end, the benefits of a Civilian Board of Management and co-equal DM would provide stewardship in performance management of commissioners, advice to the Commissioner on strategic issues, including ensuring the RCMP continually adapts to achieve the objectives of Government and senior management, greater administrative flexibility in managing resources, and more meaningful oversight by the Minister.

The diarchy approach of a Civilian Board of Management with a co-equal DM is the best way to confront the structural challenges of the RCMP. First, the pilot with Commissioner Elliott effectively poisoned the well with regard to a civilian Commissioner. Second, in the absence of direction at the political level, the RCMP is left to deal with the frictions inherent in contract policing, where cities and provinces that contract with the RCMP want policing to be conducted differently than the federal government. A Civilian Board of Management and a co-equal DM could sort out the compromises, leaving the uniforms to deal with the “primacy of operations.” Third, a retired police officer will not bring the expertise of a DM from the public service. A Commissioner-DM duo would allow the Commissioner to focus on core functions while learning from an experienced public servant who has mastered the “black arts,” in the words of one former DM, of working at the Deputy Minister level.

The RCMP is a classic example of a “weak” profession. It does have a generalized sense that policing is (or should be) a profession and the requisite history, narrative, customs, traditions, distinctive symbols, and so on. Yet, the RCMP is missing many other aspects of how professions regulate and control both professional practice and conduct. The net result is major gaps in articulating key elements of the profession, such as jurisdiction (contract versus federal policing); identity (beyond the Red Serge); responsibility (which and to whom); expertise (what to know, how to acquire it), and ethos (the inculcated values, beliefs, and expectations that guide moral decision-making in complex or ambiguous settings).

It follows that the RCMP needs to articulate and update the professional body of knowledge, strengthen professional socialization, systematically develop professionals through formal education, effective on-job mentoring, and assessments, clear “step changes” in professional responsibilities, a formally laid out system to move from novice to mastery, clear career structures, and finally a cadre of senior leaders (commissioned and NCO) who would be responsible for professional functioning as their core job. All of this requires supporting formal research capability that goes beyond routine employee attitudinal surveys but actually commissioning and assessing work.

The RCMP’s semi-unionization is yet another reason for a Board and co-equal DM. In theory, management has the final say, but in reality – due to activist SRRB “representatives” and weak leadership at the detachment level – the quasi-union controlled matters. Yet, by not being formally unionized, representatives could meddle in various issues and undermine any initiative. The genesis of Bill C-7
exemplifies how the Commissioner tried to retain control over aspects of professional functions, but lacked the framework or vocabulary to present his concerns or objectives properly.

Exacerbating this situation is the lack of leadership culture. Members are not told that they are expected to become leaders, while the RCMP’s current model confuses leadership development and courses with genuine management and administration. The ability to demonstrate technical skills in conducting routine police work should only be the minimum baseline criterion for promotion. In what other professional organization is the simple ability to do the job one was hired to do sufficient to get promoted? Worse yet, the 13 divisional oligarchies reinforce stovepipes and fiefdoms with no connection to headquarters in Ottawa, a problem exacerbated by the recent decision to decentralize operational responsibilities for national operations.

In principle, the RCMP’s current emphasis on “character” could include the qualities of leadership essential to policing. In practice, without a systematic large-scale longitudinal study of what characteristics at entry make for a great leader, the organization will actively have to hone the leadership qualities it needs. That explains why developing a leadership culture is an organic process across the CAF. Non-commissioned members are systematically trained to become junior management after six to eight years of service and senior leaders for Sergeants around the 15-year mark. Officer leadership courses are embedded in an officer’s career up to the rank of lieutenant-colonel. Members who do not meet the mark do not get promoted.

By contrast, the RCMP lacks an effective system to convert junior members into leaders. Specialized civilianization and changing the process for promotion hold out the promise of changing the necessary incentive structure. The RCMP lacks not only an effective mid-career/commissioning leader development system but also the associated rites of passage where the individual (and everybody else) is validated as having made it through the fire and proven oneself worthy. It should be expected that a meaningful percentage of those who go through officer commissioning will be unsuccessful. This is a necessary hallmark of a profession. Even then, the RCMP still needs a second-tier senior officer development system, given its woeful preparation to work with political masters or senior public servants.

In turn, the RCMP needs to develop effective career models to deal with the challenges of contract versus federal policing. Currently all sworn members in the RCMP operate as a single occupation, known as a “regular member,” who can be employed fluidly to meet any requirement. Instead, the RCMP needs to establish functional areas – border security/patrol/integrity, cybercrime, white-collar crime, national security, organized crime, and criminal intelligence – to develop specialized expertise. The point at which prosecutors become involved in a major investigation illustrates the need for specialized functional expertise. The RCMP used to work a file for many years, then hand it to the prosecution. Not only did this process prove unworkable, it also resulted in serious delays of justice. Instead major case managers now have to bring prosecutors into the investigation early on or at the onset. Similarly, if the RCMP is to continue to be responsible between ports of entry (rather than transferring that task to CBSA altogether), it needs a cadre of members who spend their careers specializing in the border, rather than changing functional areas on a regular basis as is currently the case. The RCMP may have to retain the common, single-entry model. But the RCMP should limit the entry-phase period to four to five years, at which point members get assigned to a unique sub-occupation.
The model has to accommodate the pressures of contract policing while facilitating accelerated programs for specialization. Finally, the RCMP will have to create a single executive occupation, similar to the general officers/flag officers (GO/FOs) in the CAF, which would have clear criteria for entrance and transition programs for different occupations. As with the CAF, not all occupations would lead to Commissioner. The RCMP could thus retain the primacy of (real) police operations, but with several paths to Commissioner, instead of just one.

The RCMP needs structural reform to devise and implement a comprehensive strategy to improve performance, set behavioural expectations, specialize skill sets (and compensate accordingly), and incorporate best practices of public management. Such a strategy would inevitably strengthen the professional aspects of policing while building the confidence that is required and expected of Canada’s federal police agency. Ultimately, that entails a shift from vocation to profession and a paradigmatic shift in institutional culture.

Recommendations in Order of Sequence:

1. Oversight by a Civilian Board of Management to forge a strategy that bolsters the fundamentals of public management, such as leadership, professionalism, and competence, performs a challenge function to scrutinize the priorities the RCMP sets for itself, and validates the organization’s “ask,” such as a pressing overhaul of IT, and the financial infusion necessary to implement the structural changes recommended in this report, such as the reorganization of headquarters. An independent oversight/management group with ongoing reporting requirements to the Minister forestalls the potential for abuse that would arise from greater direct political involvement in RCMP operational decision making in matters of administration, finance, and human resources.

2. Split operations and administration into a diarchy and install a DM equal to the Commissioner. Based on the CAF/DND precedent, that may require the RCMP to be split into two legal entities and to clarify the relationship between the RCMP and Public Safety Canada, and the RCMP’s DM and Public Safety Canada’s DM.

3. Demilitarize the RCMP by developing personnel, deployment, employment, and career models that transform the RCMP from a paramilitary vocation into a law enforcement profession. This will help professionalize functions, enable a shift from a command to a leadership culture, build an effective system to convert junior members into leaders, establish strategic leadership capacity, and innovate career models.

4. Bind the Commissioner to follow the direction/finding of the current and future review bodies in statutorily defined circumstances and establish sustained monitoring of reform implementation. This could be done possibly through an external audit but preferably internally through a Minister’s Monitoring Committee, for which a deputy of the RCMP and the DM from Public Safety Canada should be jointly responsible. A core team would ensure every recommendation is achieved and a biannual report card on progress signed off by the Commissioner, DM, and Deputy Commissioner (DCom). Divisional commanders should be held accountable and sign off at their level as well. The Force should be evaluated every 24 months through a Staff Assistance Visit (SAV) to ensure compliance and continuity.

5. If the RCMP fails to jettison contract policing altogether, then segregate – not just separate – federal and contract policing into two completely distinct organizations with separate requirements at entry, compensation, professional development, and leadership paradigms. Barring that, the RCMP should establish distinct competencies and remuneration specific to the needs of federal policing along with more civilian investigators with requisite professional skills such as account-
ing, law, and computer science. Currently many positions that require such skills are held by sworn members without the requisite educational background.

6. An independent employee association is necessary to ensure internal accountability and enhance the sort of collaboration and meaningful consultation with independent representatives of the workforce that is required to drive institutional reform. Employees need to have input and be consulted on the design and implementation of reforms. Hasty implementation risks undermining institutional reform; so, the way reforms are rolled out needs to be carefully sequenced. The government’s current approach of waiting for a bargaining agent to be certified before adjusting remuneration is ill-advised: unionization needs to follow – not lead – implementation of these recommendations.

APPENDIX A: NYPD AND COMPSTAT – DEVOLVED DECISION-MAKING

The Brown Report (2007) found the administrative organization of the RCMP at the level of contract policing unconducive to communication or efficiency. In this model, support staff report to a Deputy Commissioner (DCom). This individual is expected to support and connect different regional offices. However, instead of connecting offices, the study found that Commanders were actually disconnected from COs and other authorities. If a DCom is not present in the region, more confusion arises as regional detachments need clarity on what to do when the DCom is absent. This model turned out to be confusing for management while giving rise to extensive overhead costs. The abysmal failure of the Regional Deputy Commissioner model exemplifies why the RCMP cannot be left to fix its own problems.

By contrast, the CompStat management model, short for “computer statistics,” is a data-driven management tool for police services that was first applied at the New York Police Department (NYPD) in 1994 (Henry 2006). Although CompStat has been adapted in different ways to police departments all over North America, two components generally follow its application: the identification of crime trends through data collection and analysis, and decentralizing the management structure. The RCMP could look to the CompStat model to increase accountability for middle management and introduce a more data-driven management and accountability strategy.

CompStat was introduced in the NYPD alongside changes in the management structure that sought to identify and empower strong middle management in an organization with more members and Divisions than the RCMP (Henry 2006). In the RCMP’s DCom model, neither power nor authority are really devolved to subordinates. Decision-making is discouraged: instead, they wait on the DCom, because the “wrong” decision in the absence of a DCom can end a subordinate’s career. Meetings are not encouraged and when they do occur, notes/minutes are rare. By contrast, the NYPD’s new management structure focused on bringing the city’s precinct commanders and top departmental management closer together, enhancing and devolving power, authority, and accountability throughout the organization (Henry 2006). The core of the NYPD process was the Compstat meetings that were introduced in 2004. The Compstat meetings evolved into management accountability sessions as new technology, including new crime mapping technology and new forms of statistical analysis, were introduced (Henry 2006). The quality of accountability achieved at the weekly Compstat meetings permitted executives to identify which managers were performing poorly (Henry 2006). It also
identified high performers to promote and give additional responsibility based on how effectively they managed their personnel and other resources (Henry 2006). The downside can be too much of a focus on outputs and not enough on outcomes, and the strategy for attaining them. That was the experience with a variation on the Compstat process used by the New South Wales Police known as the Operations and Crime Review (Chan and Dixon 2007, 450).

The NYPD’s decentralization was accompanied by a redistribution of responsibility across the agency. The NYPD’s executives gathered experts from across the agency as well as outside to develop a series of crime control and quality-of-life strategies (Henry 2006). The strategies, specifically crafted to be flexible and adaptable to the local community’s particular needs and conditions, addressed specific types of crime and were applied throughout the department (Henry 2006). Every precinct commander was directed to adapt and implement them, and Compstat meetings help ensure that they have been implemented effectively (Henry 2006). The goals may not be perfect, but having some goals and measuring performance against them is better than having none.

The CompStat precedent could be beneficial if applied to the RCMP. The Brown Report (2007) heard consistently both in detachments and in other operational units that those in charge had insufficient authority to make normal course decisions. As a result, valuable time was spent seeking authority up the chain of command often all the way to the Headquarters. The frustration and delays seriously compromise the ability to deliver effective policing services. Instead, operational decision-making should be lodged at the point closest to where the action is, where effective decision making is possible. In other words, as much decentralization as possible, but as much centralization as necessary for best performance.

By devolving authority, the RCMP could become more agile in responding to issues and holding leaders accountable.

**APPENDIX B: HARDSHIP POSTINGS AND WORK-LIFE BALANCE**

Creating and maintaining a supportive and healthy work environment to enable employees to balance work and personal responsibilities is one of the RCMP’s foremost retention obstacles. The Brown Report (2007) found “impossible demands being placed on members and Employees.” Seven years later, the RCMP’s 2013/14 FY Exit Questionnaire revealed that work-life balance was still one of the main reasons employees and members were leaving the Force (RCMP Pay Council 2015). In effect, those with marketable skill sets are more prone to move on, leaving behind those unable to exercise the exit option due to a lack of skills. This hardly makes for a healthy work environment; so, better-skilled recruits may be more prone to attrite, but they will also improve the workplace environment overall.

The RCMP’s ability to fulfill its mandate and respond to the government’s priorities depends on its members. However, a wave of retirements and a shortfall of applicants have left the RCMP critically understaffed, especially in remote and rural areas (Brown Report 2007). Personnel must take on a heavier workload to compensate for the lack of staff (and skills), which can be demoralizing, frustrating, and conducive to harassment.
Even if the RCMP were able to attract enough new recruits to fill existing vacancies, the organization would still have difficulty filling posts in remote or rural areas. RCMP regular members can be posted anywhere in Canada. However, there has been a decline in interest in being posted to remote and rural areas (RCMP Pay Council 2015). Factors that contribute to a lack of interest include the cost and quality of housing, lack of spousal employment opportunities, and quality schooling and medical services (RCMP Pay Council 2015). The increase in age and marital status of recruits and first-year constables creates implications for family life and spousal employment needs (RCMP Pay Council 2015). Not only does mobility affect careers (for instance, larger workload and higher burnout rates in remote locations), it also affects RCMP members’ personal lives (RCMP Pay Council 2015).

Members who are relocated have a choice of leaving their family behind or uprooting their family to a place that might not have adequate amenities (RCMP Pay Council 2015). The lack of readily accessible quality medical services can negatively affect the member’s health and the health of their family (RCMP Pay Council 2015). Depending on the location, a dearth of quality educational services may have long-term effects on the member’s children. Aside from familial implications, there are also financial implications. Opportunities for spousal employment are scarce in some remote areas policed by the RCMP (RCMP Pay Council 2015). Two-income families face the prospect of loss of income, which is compounded by the spouse’s inability to build seniority and pension savings (RCMP Pay Council 2015).

Work-life balance in rural and remote locations is worsened by higher workload owing to a high volume of work and fewer resources to do the work, which results in a loss of time off and higher rates of burnout (RCMP Pay Council 2015). In an analysis of Criminal Code offenses, the RCMP Pay Council (2015) found that the police workload is higher in the three territories where many of the RCMP’s isolated posts are located.

Benefits that both the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) and Sûreté du Québec (SQ) provide to their personnel in remote and rural areas shed light on how to mitigate this problem and create ownership. In remote areas, most people figure they are just there to put in their time, save some money, but eventually apply for a promotion and leave. The challenge is to create incentives for the community as a whole to take ownership as a way of generating results over the long term. For all intents and purposes, that does not seem to happen at remote RCMP postings because there is no incentive to do so.

Sûreté du Québec (SQ)

The SQ offers a generous compensation program to attract and retain members in isolated and remote posts. Their incentives include financial allowances, as well as free housing, free food, and other free items/services necessary for working and living in these locations (RCMP Pay Council 2015). To illustrate this, the RCMP Pay Council (2015) compared one of the most isolated locations policed by the SQ in Northern Quebec (Kujujuaq, QC) to an isolated post serviced by the RCMP (Arviat, NU). The comparison shows that, although the two communities are similar in remoteness and size, RCMP members work under more difficult conditions than their SQ counterparts when it comes to the resources available for providing policing services to these communities. The RCMP only has three members policing a population of 2315 people, or about 772 residents per officer, while the SQ has seven members policing a population of 2350 people, or about 336 residents per officer.

The potentially higher workload notwithstanding, the RCMP members are not compensated as well as the SQ members for these difficult working conditions. In fact, an RCMP member working in Arviat receives an annual allowance of $14,524 (or $24,206 if with a dependent), whereas the SQ member working in Kuujjuaq receives $21,502 per year, regardless of dependent status, in addition to an allowance equivalent to 66 percent of the value of expenses to offset the taxes on the free incentives that s/he is provided.
Ontario Provincial Police

In 2000, the OPP and OPP Association signed a Memorandum of Understanding marking the creation of Northern Incentive Compensation Enhancement (NICE) program. The program is designed to attract and retain qualified personnel at remote locations designated as duration postings. Unlike the RCMP, duration posting is staffed on a volunteer basis. The Pay Council (2015) again compared two remote communities policed by the RCMP and the OPP to demonstrate that RCMP members work under more difficult conditions than their OPP counterparts when it comes to the resources available for providing policing services in remote and rural communities.

The RCMP only has three members policing a population of 550 people in Wabowden, MB, which is about 183 residents per officer. The OPP has 12 members policing a population of 420 people or 35 residents per officer in Pickle Lake, ON. Despite higher workloads, the RCMP members are not compensated as well: an RCMP member working in Wabowden receives no additional compensation for the hardships s/he is subjected to, whereas an OPP member working in Pickle Lake may receive up to $32,000 above and beyond his/her base salary. In addition, RCMP members have more to lose financially as their spouses are less likely to find employment in Wabowden compared to the spouses of OPP members in Pickle Lake, as demonstrated by Statistics Canada: in 2015 the unemployment rate in the Census Division to which Wabowden belongs was 15.8 percent whereas the unemployment rate in Pickle Lake was 10.4 percent (RCMP Pay Council 2015).

Management could improve work-life balance by phasing out the process of uncompensated overtime. The concept of uncompensated overtime (UOT) in a policing environment is unique to the RCMP. Officers in other Canadian police services occasionally perform UOT for exceptional occasions or special events, but not to the degree performed in the RCMP. In 2015, constables reported performing an average of 19 hours of UOT per month. The RCMP Pay Council’s (2015) survey on UOT found that the UOT members’ engage in is generally the result of their day to day workloads. Frequently performing UOT can lead to burnout and attrition. This is where a union may prove useful.

Management might also offer added compensation for rural and remote postings. The added compensation will help recoup losses RCMP members may endure for lack of spousal employment opportunities in rural and remote postings and allow them to seek private services for other unmet needs. Special compensation for remote area deployments should be supported by management when the first collective agreement is negotiated, which will be appreciated by frontline officers and increase morale. Allowing constables to do administrative work at home would also help provide some flexibility to members with families.

APPENDIX C: COMPARATIVE LESSONS LEARNED FROM POLICE REFORM IN NORTHERN IRELAND

Unequal treatment of citizens belonging to different sectarian groups remained a significant problem in Northern Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement was signed in 1999. This behaviour was not limited to individuals within the force. Instead, this attitude was reinforced by a paramilitary model of policing based on a counterinsurgency mentality. This model, when not closely monitored, can result in abrasive and threatening behaviour. This behaviour was usually concentrated at the operational level (Engel and Burruss 2004).
The model for professionalizing the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) was to teach police officers to overcome a divided society. Changes made in training requirements shifted policing initiatives to a democratic policing model. This model forces human rights to the forefront of training. There are two benefits to this model: police interact with the population in an honest, respectful, and helpful way and police internalize this behaviour and naturally use these lessons in everyday interactions. The PSNI found the holistic method for teaching this model to be most effective (Engel and Burruss 2004).

Northern Ireland achieved this shift through fairly innocuous changes, starting with the symbolic change in the name of the agency. Some changes were more apparent and targeted. Northern Ireland’s police force had an institutional culture that was not inclusive of all members of society. To foster a new culture that supported human rights and inclusivity, the police force retired many senior officers who supported the previous, exclusive culture. These officers were then replaced by new recruits who were trained to support an inclusive culture. This effort was intentional, and training was monitored closely to ensure that elements of the old culture did not seep back into the training regimen. These new officers became a critical element for transformational change (Engel and Burruss 2004).

McGarry and O’Leary (1999) recommended to downsize the police from 11,412 officers to 5000, and then recruit 3000 new officers. This approach served two purposes. First, it ushered in change without needing to wait for a generation of officers to retire. Second, the police force could integrate a good deal of Catholics (who were underrepresented in the force); so, the force quickly became much more representative of the population. If the RCMP could improve its recruitment system and enable lateral entry, it could stand to benefit from emulating the way personnel change was forced upon police in Northern Ireland.

This is part of the logic in segregating federal policing from contract policing. The RCMP could remove officers who perpetuate the current institutional culture or are complicit in it. The CAF has been doing it effectively for years by issuing a “Notice of Intent to Release.” All CAF members know the consequences: those who rebuke the system and become a burden are administratively released. By way of example, the CAF now issues a Notice of Intent to Release to all members who are charged with breaching the code of conduct on appropriate sexual behavior: a member who is found guilty after having been afforded due process is then released. This removes from the organization those members who benefit from or are complicit in intimidation and harassment, which means they are no longer present to perpetuate that culture. Instead, they can be replaced by new recruits who have been socialized differently. Hiring new members is also an opportunity to recruit underrepresented groups. However, the RCMP already faces a hiring challenge and is understaffed. Were the RCMP to retire culprit officers, then it needs a strategy and commitment to replace them by recruiting new members.

Initially Northern Ireland’s approach to human rights was legalistic. In this model, police officers are expected to learn regulations. However, the police force found that the holistic approach was a better method of training. It requires members to internalize what they learn about human rights in their behaviour. Not only must police understand human rights law, but they must learn how to respect human rights through their behaviour. This is a good example of how to generate competent behaviour.

The training process takes two and a half years. Recruits spend 20 weeks at an intensive training facility where foundational skills are established. After students graduate from this training, they are then allowed to practice their police skills. After these 20 weeks, pass students receive a certificate in police studies from the University of Ulster. This new curriculum explores nine themes, including diversity, human rights, problem solving, and community-oriented policing practices. Students are taught legislation, but are also expected to understand how they might practice law in their duties.
Students act out scenarios with others and identify how they respect human rights. This method proved to be effective: when students later practiced routine traffic stops, they took human rights and respect into consideration without being advised to do so.

In one scenario observed, the student stops a car that fits the description of a stolen car. The student asks the individual to step out of the car, and questions the suspect, leading to an eventual arrest. Following the scenario, a trainer conducts an extensive debriefing session with the students involved in the session to identify strengths and weaknesses. In this case, the trainer asked the student why he asked the suspect to walk around to the other side of the car to question him. The student responded that he wanted to ensure the health and safety of the suspect as well as his human rights because he might be seen by his friends, family, or co-workers being questioned by a police officer on the side of the road. This response, at a later stage of training, illustrates the way in which it is possible for students to develop a holistic approach to human rights into their behavior. (Engel and Burruss, 2004)

Police now applied their human rights training in routine duties. The recruit is then expected to complete four stages of training: firearms training, tutorship, 44 weeks of serving under a more mature officer, followed by a 44-week assessment process. Instead of the largely enforcement-focused training cadets currently receive at Depot, the RCMP might consider adopting a more formalized education and professionalization process that aligns human rights training with behavioural expectations, followed by on-the-job training (OJT) – rather than the RCMP's current model of on-the-job indoctrination once recruits deploy to detachments where much of the progress that has been made at Depot in recent years is cast aside – for members who subscribe to the prevailing undesirable standard of policing and behaviour. Formalized education ensures that all recruits have the same educational background, and establishes a standard foundation.

The challenges compare to those experienced by the CAF: “Those who are aware of the transformation the Canadian Armed Forces has undergone over the past 20 years recognize that the current situation at the RCMP was the stuff of catastrophe in terms of leadership and recognition, not to mention the respect Canadians had for and the confidence they had in the Canadian Forces during the 1990s” (Kinsella 2013). According to Davis (2016), “similar to other military and para-military organizations, new recruits to the CAF undergo a process of organizational socialization to institutional values and norms.” And like the RCMP, this formal training and socialization covers HR policies, but there is also informal processing.

Davis goes on to observe: “even as recruits are undergoing formal training on Canadian and espoused ethos and military values, and organizational rules, they are also exposed to less visible cultural practices . . . experiences with sexual harassment and sexual assault begin as early as basic training, where inappropriate language used by trainers appears to go unpunished”. In the CAF, “the re-professionalization process included creating and publishing a new code of professional conduct, reforming the professional development system, tightening the academic criteria, updating the Code of Service Discipline, improving basic training as well as leadership development and selection training” (Kinsella 2013). Mandated education has the benefit of helping recruits to understand the complexities of the societies they police. Understanding how poverty, oppression, accessibility, and enforcement are connected can help officers connect with civilians and to be more compassionate of circumstances. This mandated education provides knowledge of society that otherwise has to be acquired through the experience of trial and error. Education is thus a way to shortcut and compensate for inexperience.

The RCMP can also benefit from Northern Ireland’s experience with holistic training. RCMP recruits already learn about legislation at Depot (from an officer who reads from a PowerPoint deck). However, recruits could also benefit from a curriculum that provides examples about how the spirit of this legislation can be enacted in everyday policing. Students should understand the legislation, how
they might live up to it in their policing duties, and how to incorporate this behaviour into everyday situations. When supervisors educate recruits this way, and positively reinforce recruits who exhibit inclusive behaviour, then recruits will be more likely to continue to practice inclusive and respectful behaviour. The Toronto Police Service, for instance, is intentionally building up competencies based on forward-facing values. It would seem that the RCMP, too, could benefit from competencies based on more forward-looking values.

APPENDIX D: COMPARATIVE LESSONS LEARNED FROM POLICE REFORM IN AUSTRALIA

Australia recognized that educating a police force is necessary to reform the organization and institutional culture. However, this approach was not the result of a natural evolution. Instead, the police organization had to reform in reaction to a crisis. Public confidence in the police had declined, and investigations revealed a corrupt organization. Management was not held accountable, the organization was isolated from society, and members were quite defensive of the culture.

The investigative report recommended higher education for police officers so they would be better prepared to serve a complex society. Many of the recruits entering the service were too young to have acquired the necessary experience and thus needed this knowledge to serve the population adequately. The previous paramilitary training model was over-reliant on discipline, a limited worldview, and rote learning.

The relationship between better policing practices and higher education is controversial. Nonetheless, more higher education for police is a recurrent theme. So, the question is whether such education should be mandatory, how much education should be required, when it should be undertaken, and what form it should take. In response to a specific recommendation of the so-called the Fitzgerald Report (1989), Griffith University in Queensland created a degree in criminology and criminal justice for police. The degree is a one-year program that is offered in collaboration with the police academy. The result was an Advanced Certificate in Policing. For the first time in Australia, all police recruits were required to complete university courses. The program incorporated social and behavioural sciences, communications, ethics, and law. After this one-year program recruits graduated to a probationary year during which they were supervised by more senior officers. However, senior officers found that their new recruits understood social complexities associated with policing, but were young and lacked “street sense.” Indeed, the Public Sector Management Commission reviewed the certificate program and found that it had favoured theory over practice (Wimshurst and Ransley 2007).

For the purpose of the RCMP, the Australian case stresses the importance of mandatory post-secondary education to restore public faith in police organizations and to educate the force about societal complexities that they may not have been exposed to before. However, the Australian case adds an important caveat for mandating education in police forces: that courses not be too theoretical. The experience in Northern Ireland suggests that education and training should incorporate essential elements of inclusion, cooperation, compassion, and human rights in a way that is applicable for policing practices. For instance, the RCMP might adopt the Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) certification that is common in the United States yet readily adaptable to different contexts and join the US Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA). While far from perfect
or ideal in the Canadian context, at least these standards provide a baseline against which to measure the performance of the RCMP and its members.

RCMP recruits can be young, with a limited worldview and education. RCMP recruits should receive some level of standardized education so they are able to understand the complexities of the communities with which they engage: one and usually two years is the minimum standard across much of Western Europe, for instance (Frevel and Kuschewski 2009). Australia and Germany have adopted this expectation. Recruits not only receive mandatory training, but they are expected to achieve a policing certification as well. Mandatory education provides officers with basic knowledge in psychology, sociology and the behavioural sciences. To ensure that those who are traditionally at the margins of society are nonetheless represented under such a rule, it could be accompanied by a strategy that offers scholarships as a way of encouraging diversity. Officers are more prepared to engage thoughtfully with communities and to be more understanding of different circumstances. However, if the RCMP intends to implement a mandatory education/certification, it should be wary of an overly theoretical focus.

The RCMP is responsible for establishing the minimum standard of policing required for the communities it polices. Clients can also request a certain number of peace officers. However, the RCMP rarely evaluates the minimum standard of policing (Brown Report 2007). An internal audit of the RCMP’s method found that there was no process to determine the minimum standard of policing. This gives the RCMP more flexibility, but with little transparency for contract clients. Contract clients may help set priorities, but they receive few progress updates; so, they should be more aggressive about goals and performance measurements. The RCMP is responsible for allocating the appropriate resources to meet its clients’ expectations and then report back with the results. This process should naturally result in an abundance of consultation meetings to update clients. The RCMP does communicate with clients on a regular basis; however, few updates contain information about how well the RCMP is delivering services or whether priorities are being met.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Christian Leuprecht is Matthew Flinders Fellow in the Centre for Crime Policy and Research at the Flinders University of South Australia, on leave from the Royal Military College of Canada where he is a Professor of Political Science. He is Munk Senior Fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and cross-appointed to the Department of Political Studies and the School of Policy Studies at Queen’s University where he is also a fellow of the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations and the Queen’s Centre for International and Defence Policy.

In 2016, he was elected a member of the New College of the Royal Society of Canada; he is also a recipient of RMCC’s Research Excellence Award. He holds a Governor-in-Council appointment to the governing Council of the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, is president of the International Sociological Association’s Research Committee 01: Armed Forces and Conflict Resolution, and a United Nations Security Structure Expert.

An expert on security and defence, political demography, and comparative federalism and multilevel governance, he is regularly called as an expert witness to testify before committees of Parliament.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study would not have been possible without the support of numerous people who took time – often with repeated follow-ups – to contribute to its completion. Special thanks to research assistants Hayley Mcnorton and Alex Green, as well as the many experts and reviewers who provided constructive feedback along the way.

I would also like to thank the people who brought the initial manuscript to its final product: Rachael Fajardo, who diligently copy-edited the manuscript; Monica Thomas for turning the paper into such a professional looking publication; and MLI’s managing editor and communications director David Watson and deputy editor David McDonough for their persistence and patience in the editorial and publication process for this study.
REFERENCES


ENDNOTES

1 Of course, there are older police forces, but among the classic federations – the United States, Switzerland, Canada, and Australia – Canada has the oldest police force. In fact, Switzerland did not even have a federal police service until quite recently.

2 As of late, the RCMP has been too stretched to send sworn members on the National Security Programme offered by the Canadian Forces College.

3 This study shall use federal policing as a shorthand for Federal Policing Services (FPS) and National Policing Services (NPS), including national security criminal investigations, serious and organized crime, financial crime, sensitive investigations, protective policing, criminal intelligence, protective policing, border integrity, critical infrastructure protection, marine security, air carrier protection, critical incident management, and a host of related support services.

4 As of late, instead of relying simply on the Criminal Intelligence Service of Canada, the RCMP has been collating a variety of federal and provincial threat assessments along with those of partner countries to compile its priorities, but it does not currently have an effective governance mechanism to validate the result.

5 The RCMP has ignored the transformative effects of disruptive technology on its business. Its main record management systems – the Police Records Information Management Environment (PRIME) in British Columbia and Police Record and Reporting System (PROS) in the rest of the country – were, as the names suggest, a way for patrol officers to record occurrences. They do not lend themselves to conducting criminal assessments, such as those provided by the CBSA, which is obviously a major strategic impediment for the RCMP.

6 The term “sworn members” refers to collectively to the three components of the RCMP’s rank structure: the vast majority of members (about 12,000) are Constables, which is known as the “working rank,” followed by about 6000 Non-Commissioned Officers (Corporals, Sergeants, Staff Sergeants, Staff Sergeant Majors, Sergeant Majors, Corps Sergeant Major), and a small number (about 600) of actual Officers – Inspectors, Superintendents, Chief Superintendents, Assistant Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners, and the Commissioner. See RCMP, 2017, “Organizational Structure,” at http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/about-ausujet/organis-eng.htm.

7 The overhaul of the complaints, grievance, and conduct process in the form of the Enhancing Royal Canadian Mounted Police Accountability Act (2013) was driven as much by concerns over harassment per se as by the exorbitant length of time it was taking to bring resolution and closure to allegations. The Enhancing RCMP Accountability Act also bestowed upon the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission a systemic review mandate is separate and distinct from the complaints function. Pursuant to paragraph 45.3(1) of the RCMP Act, the Commission may now undertake reviews of specified activities. Those reviews can be initiated by the Chairperson or at the request of the Minister of Public Safety or the Minister responsible for policing in a contract province. The purpose of such reviews is not to evaluate the conduct of individual members; rather it is to identify potential systemic issues within the RCMP and make recommendations that will contribute to public confidence in the Force.

8 Several cases inform this study; they are included as appendices A, C, and D. Not included is the DND/CAF because it informs the analysis throughout. In a democracy, one certainly wants to be careful about the lessons one imports to other government entities from the military. But I think the attentive reader should readily recognize that some of the experience of the CAF/DND is quite instructive in illuminating the challenges the RCMP faces and charting the way forward.
To prevent further civil suits, Fraser (2017) proposes that the RCMP become more informed about events that prompt an employee to launch a civil suit and to avail itself of that knowledge to ensure that its investigations and internal redress mechanisms are effective.

The CRCC (2017) noted that abuse of authority is not just a problem in and of itself, but also jeopardizes the integrity of investigations and the efficiency and effectiveness of the operations of the RCMP as a whole.

The RCMP’s systematic institutional disincentives contrast with the process the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) uses to deal with complaints: once it has been determined that an investigation is warranted, either the complainant or the respondent are usually moved to a different detachment while the investigation is carried out.

These problems are exacerbated by inadequate human and financial resources the RCMP allocates for mental health support. The Auditor General of Canada (2017) found that one in six members did not receive timely access to mental health support, members’ supervisors and health services staff did not fulfill their roles in supporting members who were returning to work from mental health sick leave, new mental health programs to support early detection and intervention were only partially implemented, and that the RCMP did not allocate budgets to support them.

Quoting from RCMP Pay Council (2015, 16): “Primacy of Operations is the Commissioner’s desire for the RCMP to focus on success in its core business of policing (i.e., emphasis on law enforcement, detection and prevention of crime, etc.) through strong leadership that inspires strong results and success in operations. This would be achieved through leaders striving for excellence, maintaining respect, stimulating collaboration, developing efficient strategies, and maximizing information sharing.”

This has also been an issue with harassment, which has become a “catch-all phrase” through which RCMP members and employees express a broad array of concerns (CRCC 2017).

The CRCC (2017) found that fears of being targeted for raising workplace concerns are still held by some members.

Fraser (2017) identified several additional issues with the existing harassment investigation and decision-making process, including lack of input from interviewers on cases, use of resources to discredit the complainant by seeking information regarding their past relationships, and lack of objectivity by decision-makers.

Fraser (2017) expressed concerns about the time it takes the RCMP to resolve complaints, arguing that the longer the process takes, the greater the inadvertent effect on working relationships and the ability to re-establish a healthy workplace.

One can also question whether greater domain awareness by the executive actually translates into greater accountability.

Although Fraser (2017) did not explicitly call for a civilian board of management, she did call for a board of management with “external expertise.”

The CRCC (2017) also noted that given the uniqueness of the RCMP’s mandate, the Board would need to be mindful of and responsive to the RCMP’s contract partners while fulfilling its mandate.

This particular recommendation is fraught with difficulty, which the authors of the Brown Report may not have entirely appreciated, by virtue of the need to ensure the RCMP’s political independence. After all, our system of democracy and government relies on the fact that office bearers, such as the Commissioner of the RCMP, exercise their best judgment, independent of political processes. However, the conventional doctrine of the separation
of powers is not actually the pedigree of “police independence”; rather, it is rooted in a less extensive recognition that law enforcement and criminal justice require a certain degree of independence from the executive to which they are accountable to carry out their administrative functions (Stenning 2011, 248–250). As a result, both the concept of “police independence” and its expanse are controversial. The two fundamental disagreements are over: “(1) the activities/decision of the police to which the concept applies; and (2) whether the concept gives the police immunity from political control or influence and from political accountability, or only from political control or influence but not from political accountability with respect to these activities/decisions” (Stenning 2011, 252).

That Commissioner Nicholson is still revered as a hero is yet another testament to the institutional culture of the RCMP. Although five Commissioners have resigned over the course of the history of the RCMP, Nicholson was the first to resign since 1873, and there is no question that the Minister of Justice of the day, Davie Fulton, second-guessed the commissioner in his responsibility and expertise to manage the RCMP (Roach 2007, 29–32).

DND recently reverted to its pre-1970 organization with a distinct CAF headquarters (although the legislation has not been amended). Provided the CDS and DM get along, this reorganization, with CAF and DM “departmental” HQs – which has been redone at least once because General Hillier’s reforms as CDS came at a huge expense – seems to work reasonably well.

That organizational structure was subsequently abandoned: it created considerable duplication in management responsibilities with divisional COs and thus proved ineffective.

With Staff Sgt. Chad as the sole exception among the senior ranks (CBC 2012).

However, that is actually not all that different from the CAF where combat experience seems to trump education these days. Bentley and Horn (2015) document the CAF backsliding on educational requirements for promotion to senior rank.

Both Fraser (2017) and the CRCC (2017) propose that civilianization could make the way the RCMP processes harassment allegations more effective. Fraser (2017) recommends that the RCMP should set up a distinct unit to deal with harassment and workplace issues. The unit would be operated by staff with expertise in the subject matter and would report to the management board. Similarly, the CRCC (2017) recommends that the RCMP should retain skilled administrative investigators who are independent of the chain of command to conduct harassment investigations. The CAF and the OPP offer two distinct examples of how to operationalize these recommendations.

While improving the CAF’s institutional effectiveness has not been easy, reform may not be permanent: some now believe the investment in knowledge by the officer corps has been abandoned to give preferential treatment to operational experience in Afghanistan (Horn and Bentley 2015, 116–133).

Inadequate training in the RCMP has contributed to abuse of authority by managers and supervisors (CRCC 2017) and the ineptitude of supervisors to identify and respond to employees’ mental health concerns (Auditor General of Canada 2017).

To better equip COs, the CRCC (2017) recommends that the RCMP ensure that divisional COs receive ongoing, classroom-based training on decision-making, specifically in relation to the assessment of workplace harassment complaints.

The CRCC (2017) recommends that the RCMP should recognize management skills when considering promotions and institute more rigorous, mandatory leadership development programs for existing and future supervisors, managers, and executive officers. New management development programs could include mandatory in-person harassment training as recommended by the CRCC (2017).
The RCMP is not alone in this regard. The report on transformation of the Toronto Police Service (2017) recently bemoaned the lack of a “comprehensive people-management and (human resources) strategy” (34).

Members implicitly presume that they have the ability to exercise authority because they occupy a particular rank, not because they have received specialized training that qualifies them for said responsibilities (CRCC 2017).

The RCMP is now examining the possibility of civilianizing more investigative positions in federal policing, both to professionalize and expand capacities and to counteract its ongoing shortfall in attracting recruits with such competencies as sworn members (Freeze and Leblanc 2017).

The CAF also pays for different costs of living for “hardship” postings (see appendix B for a comparison between the RCMP and the OPP and SQ).

Ironically, this is currently the case in the RCMP. Senior members would now make more than a Chief Superintendent were it not for some (very) creative temporary workarounds, such as granting some senior officers administrative leave which they then cash out.

Creating a Civilian Board of Management and a co-equal DM would also fulfill the CRCC’s (2017) recommendation to introduce civilian governance and/or oversight.

As premised on the CAF’s manual *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (Canadian Forces Leadership Institute 2003).

The Brown Report (2007) found that in every detachment there were unacceptable vacancy rates (often in the order of the magnitude of 25–30 percent).

By way of example, while CBSA’s lawyers are actively involved in professional development activities throughout the organization and country, nothing analogous exists in the RCMP (possibly because lawyers tend to be civilians and thus do not meet the requisite characteristics of rank and hierarchy to instruct more junior sworn members).
Critically Acclaimed, Award-Winning Institute

The Macdonald-Laurier Institute fills a gap in Canada’s democratic infrastructure by focusing our work on the full range of issues that fall under Ottawa’s jurisdiction.

- One of the top five think tanks in Canada and No. 1 in Ottawa according to the University of Pennsylvania.
- Cited by five present and former Canadian Prime Ministers, as well as by David Cameron, the British Prime Minister.
- *Hill Times* says Brian Lee Crowley is one of the 100 most influential people in Ottawa.
- The *Wall Street Journal*, the *Economist*, the *Globe and Mail*, the *National Post* and many other leading national and international publications have quoted the Institute’s work.

“'The study by Brian Lee Crowley and Ken Coates is a 'home run'. The analysis by Douglas Bland will make many uncomfortable but it is a wake up call that must be read.'
FORMER CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER PAUL MARTIN ON MLI’S PROJECT ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLE AND THE NATURAL RESOURCE ECONOMY.

Ideas Change the World

Independent and non-partisan, the Macdonald-Laurier Institute is increasingly recognized as the thought leader on national issues in Canada, prodding governments, opinion leaders and the general public to accept nothing but the very best public policy solutions for the challenges Canada faces.
What Do We Do?

When you change how people think, you change what they want and how they act. That is why thought leadership is essential in every field. At MLI, we strip away the complexity that makes policy issues unintelligible and present them in a way that leads to action, to better quality policy decisions, to more effective government, and to a more focused pursuit of the national interest of all Canadians. MLI is the only non-partisan, independent national public policy think tank based in Ottawa that focuses on the full range of issues that fall under the jurisdiction of the federal government.

What Is in a Name?

The Macdonald-Laurier Institute exists not merely to burnish the splendid legacy of two towering figures in Canadian history – Sir John A. Macdonald and Sir Wilfrid Laurier – but to renew that legacy. A Tory and a Grit, an English speaker and a French speaker – these two men represent the very best of Canada’s fine political tradition. As prime minister, each championed the values that led to Canada assuming her place as one of the world’s leading democracies. We will continue to vigorously uphold these values, the cornerstones of our nation.

Working for a Better Canada

Good policy doesn’t just happen; it requires good ideas, hard work, and being in the right place at the right time. In other words, it requires MLI. We pride ourselves on independence, and accept no funding from the government for our research. If you value our work and if you believe in the possibility of a better Canada, consider making a tax-deductible donation. The Macdonald-Laurier Institute is a registered charity.

Our Issues

The Institute undertakes an impressive program of thought leadership on public policy. Some of the issues we have tackled recently include:

- Aboriginal people and the management of our natural resources;
- Making Canada’s justice system more fair and efficient;
- Defending Canada’s innovators and creators;
- Controlling government debt at all levels;
- Advancing Canada’s interests abroad;
- Ottawa’s regulation of foreign investment; and
- How to fix Canadian health care.
What people are saying about the Macdonald-Laurier Institute

In five short years, the institute has established itself as a steady source of high-quality research and thoughtful policy analysis here in our nation’s capital. Inspired by Canada’s deep-rooted intellectual tradition of ordered liberty – as exemplified by Macdonald and Laurier – the institute is making unique contributions to federal public policy and discourse. Please accept my best wishes for a memorable anniversary celebration and continued success.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE STEPHEN HARPER

The Macdonald-Laurier Institute is an important source of fact and opinion for so many, including me. Everything they tackle is accomplished in great depth and further the public policy debate in Canada. Happy Anniversary, this is but the beginning.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE PAUL MARTIN

In its mere five years of existence, the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, under the erudite Brian Lee Crowley’s vibrant leadership, has, through its various publications and public events, forged a reputation for brilliance and originality in areas of vital concern to Canadians: from all aspects of the economy to health care reform, aboriginal affairs, justice, and national security.

BARBARA KAY, NATIONAL POST COLUMNIST

Intelligent and informed debate contributes to a stronger, healthier and more competitive Canadian society. In five short years the Macdonald-Laurier Institute has emerged as a significant and respected voice in the shaping of public policy. On a wide range of issues important to our country’s future, Brian Lee Crowley and his team are making a difference.

JOHN MANLEY, CEO COUNCIL