The Legacy of
LOUIS ST-LAURENT
When governments got things done

Also INSIDE:
An Israel-Iran peace deal?  Canada’s lacklustre COVID response  Crisis in academic freedom  Solving the Maritime fishery dispute
In the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Trudeau government has been quick to spend money and to offer vague rhetoric to “build back better.” But there is little in the way of bold vision for Canada in 2021. Simply put, we seem to have forgotten how to get things done – from pipelines to vaccine production.

Yet, as detailed in our cover feature, the current government can usefully look back at its post-war Liberal predecessor for lessons on how to not only spend money but actually govern. As detailed by Patrice Dutil, the St-Laurent government was able to offer a vision for a nation in need of rapid transformation and improvements.

Also, as part of the cover feature, Ken Coates looks back at St-Laurent’s efforts to revitalize the rural parts of Canada and his successful push to complete large infrastructure projects, Gregory Marchildon turns to St-Laurent’s record with securing universal hospital coverage, and David MacKenzie explores St-Laurent’s pivotal role in bringing Newfoundland into Confederation.

Environmentalists and “eco-colonialists” have been a particular obstacle when it comes to pipeline projects, as noted by Chris Sankey. Yet, as pointed out by Mike Priaro, there has been some good news of late, such as the Kitimat and Saguenay LNG projects. He also outlines the benefits in a national energy corridor transmitting Quebec and Labrador hydropower to western Canada.

According to Brian Ferguson, the federal government approach to the COVID-19 pandemic can also be rightly criticized. And Tarun Katapally discusses the risk in failing to tap big data in fighting the pandemic.

Meanwhile, Coates also documents the recent challenges facing our East Coast fishery, Melissa Mbarki shows how First Nations and their reserves have dealt with the COVID crisis, and Eric Kaufmann looks at the crisis in academic freedom in Canada.

This issue concludes with articles by Andrew Pickford and Jeff Collins on the need to work with our allies in confronting China, and by Mariam Memarsadeghi and Shuvaloy Majumdar on the aspirations for an Israel-Iran peace deal.
Indigenous leaders step-up, but where is the applause from environmentalists?

We need to change the way Canadians understand Indigenous aspirations for the environment and economic development.

Chris Sankey

Not enough has been said about the recent Memorandum of Understanding between the First Nations Climate Initiative table and the First Nations Major Projects Coalition, collectively representing 70 First Nations from across Canada. In December 2020, the two parties signed an agreement to advance an Indigenous-led, net-zero carbon-emissions policy framework, including nature-based solutions for carbon capture. This is a major step forward in responsible resource development in Canada.

Indigenous leaders and our communities have been pushing in this direction for the last decade. This agreement is just another example of what First Nations can achieve when we work together without outside influence. And it raises a new question: why have environmentalists been silent about one of the most significant developments in several decades?

This initiative answers many, if not all, of the concerns presented by the agenda-driven activists and environmental groups that have spent the last 20 years trying to tell us what to do. Our communities worked with the brightest minds in academia and industry to develop a First Nations-centred solution that accommodates both climate change realities and appropriate resource development, which will bring much needed opportunities to our people.

What have the boisterous, assertive, and agenda-driven activists accomplished? I will tell you what they accomplished.

Families have been torn apart. The country has forfeited billions of dollars in lost opportunities and tens of thousands of jobs. Our communities have been gripped with grief, anger, and resentment. Money has been taken out of the hands of our people, undermining the ability of communities to be independent. Immense divisions now divide our communities across the country.

The consequences are real and serious. By ignoring Indigenous requests – and by listening to only those community members who share their preservationist worldview – the environmentalist agenda has stripped away our capacity to pay for necessary infrastructure such as housing, roads and commercial buildings. They stole opportunities for us to fund the advancement of our arts, culture, and language. Far too many communities remain welfare dependent, relying on the government to pay for our basic needs.

This is both unnecessary and destructive to Indigenous communities. The environmentalists love to use our ceremonies, symbolism, even our spirituality, when it suits their purposes. But when the legal and political battles are over, they leave our communities and do nothing to address the deep intergenerational poverty that they are now helping to entrench.

First Nations are fighting to get away from their dependence on government and to determine their own futures.

So, do the actions of environmental groups advance the cause of Indigenous sovereignty and self-reliance? The answer is simple: they do not. Their actions keep many of our communities impoverished. The result is eco-colonialism, just another incarnation of the colonial systems we are trying to escape. Paternalism, it seems, dies a hard and slow death.

Environmental non-governmental organizations receive millions of dollars in donations from outside interest groups, allowing them to pay key organizers and hire activists to protest in our communities or to declare (typically without our 

Why have environmentalists been silent about one of the most significant developments in several decades?

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Rising tensions in the Maritime fishery demonstrate the fundamental difficulty of creating effective and popular public policy. The situation is simple. Supreme Court judgments in the 1999 fishing case of Donald Marshall Jr. included the provision that First Nations people were entitled to a “moderate livelihood” from harvesting. Yet the concept was not defined and was put to the side.

Now, over two decades later, the fishing dispute has become one of the country’s most perplexing and difficult political challenges. Non-Indigenous fishers worry about their future in the industry. First Nations fishers feel that their constitutionally protected treaty rights are being ignored. Most Eastern Canadians want the issue resolved, preferably without incremental cost or discord. Conservationists worry about the ability to manage the fishery. And politicians wish the issue would fade into the background.

The Maritime fishery revolves around a series of certainties, each of which must be respected. First Nations have treaty rights recognized by the Supreme Court. The government must ensure the conservation of the fishery. Non-Indigenous fishers must not be hung out to dry by any resolution of the disagreement. And police and fisheries officers have to enforce Canadian regulations while protecting all those involved in the increasingly contentious dispute.

Parties to this complicated dispute have so far not been able to reach a satisfactory agreement. In the interim, First Nations capitalized on their Marshall rights and became a major presence in the industry, with several groups purchasing Clearwater Seafood, the East Coast’s industry leader, in 2020. For most of the past two decades, the transition went smoothly as the Maritimes adjusted to the reality of a formidable Indigenous presence.

Two other major things happened in the intervening years. Lengthy negotiations over the meaning and nature of the First Nations’ moderate livelihood rights produced many proposals but no lasting resolution. Indigenous frustration mounted for the simple reason that being locked out of their full fishing rights costs individuals and communities millions of dollars in lost revenue.

At the same time, the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet population grew dramatically. The growing number of young people, raised in the glow of the Marshall decision, pressed ever harder for an expanded role in the fishery. The activists were right, of course. The Supreme Court had left the country a political quagmire. Their support for enhanced Indigenous involvement in the fishery, as a treaty right, was imprecise but unequivocal. As the Indigenous fishery improved over time, it became increasingly clear that substantial revenues and opportunities remained on the table.

The federal government accommodated some of those demands and continued the expansion of government support for the Indigenous fishery, though larger issues left over from the Marshall decision remained unresolved.

Bernadette Jordan, Minister of Fisheries, Oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard, pressed for a resolution and came up with a strategy that secured the support of the major commercial fishers’ association and met the conservation goals. Yet Jordan’s pro-
posal does not, to date, have the endorse-
ment of key Indigenous leaders.

As a result, the fishery became, yet
again, a political hotspot and a potentially
volatile situation. The burning of
Indigenous buildings, violent outbursts,
and a flood of angry words have poisoned
the political air in the Maritimes. People
remain on edge, with no obvious path
forward. Anyone looking for an easy and
painless resolution, however, is almost
sure to be disappointed. The First Nations’
demand for an inshore lobster fishery
outside the standard commercial season
appears to be a game-stopper.

Several elements are clear. If a reso-
lation is not reached soon, First Nations
could return to the courts and force
another Supreme Court decision on the
issue. The all-or-nothing resolutions that
often emerge from the court system could
make the situation dramatically worse for
Indigenous communities, non-Indigenous
fishers and the federal government. The
broader commercial fishery, whose inter-
est have long been accommodated in the
Indigenous-government negotiations, are
clearly nervous about the prospects for
unwanted and dramatic change.

There is an urgent need for clarity, with
a firm requirement that conservation rules
will be followed, disruptions in the fish-
ery will not impact any of the commercial
fishers, and Mi’kmaq and Maliseet treaty
rights will be honoured. The Government
of Canada will undoubtedly continue their
efforts, but they could improve discus-
sions by making it clear that any income,
rights and opportunities due to the First
Nations would either be provided through
an expanded Indigenous fishery or some
other acceptable compensation.

In retrospect, Ottawa should have
resolved the “moderate livelihood” shortly after
the initial Marshall decision. They tried, but without achieving a final
resolution. First Nations, for their part,
were adjusting rapidly to the new authority
achieved under Marshall. Letting this
legal and political sore fester for over two
decades has made the matter difficult and
potentially more intractable.

It should be clear to all concerned
that Indigenous peoples in the Maritimes
are not going to retreat from their hard-
won rights. They have waited generations
to secure recognition and they should not
be expected to back down soon. Creating
public policy is difficult business, as the
Maritime fishery dispute demonstrates.

The path forward is far from precise,
but several key elements stand out.

The federal government must continue
to reaffirm its commitment to honouring
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision
on the Marshall case. Many non-Indigenous
peoples wish that this decision had never
been rendered but that is immaterial. The
court judgment stands and, because it
speaks directly to Indigenous treaty rights,
has constitutional protection.

Secondly, Ottawa must reassure soci-
ety at large that the country will conser-
ve and protect the East Coast fishery and rec-
ognize the personal and corporate rights of
the commercial fishery. The industry works
under and respects the strict controls on
commercial fishing. Beginning in 1999, the
long-established fishing communities wor-
rried that the Marshall ruling would under-
mine their access to the fishery and, thereby,
to a vibrant and sustainable economy. The
fishers and the associated businesses should
not pay, individually or collectively, for the
consequences of the court ruling.

First Nations have every right to push
for a resolution of the “moderate liveli-
hood” provisions of the Marshall decision,
but their efforts to do so are strengthened
by respect for other aspects of Canadian
law. This applies to the conservation mea-
sures established by the Department of
Fisheries, Oceans and the Canadian Coast
Guard and to the government’s manage-
ment of the fisheries overall. Drawing
attention to the government’s inability
to resolve the Marshall impasse is under-
mind by any extra-legal assertions of
authority in other aspects of the East Coast
fishery.

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the initial Marshall decision.

If the government and First Nations
want a legal resolution, they could individ-
ually or collectively apply to the courts for
a legal judgment on the practical meaning
of the “moderate livelihood” concept. This
approach would be risky for both parties,
for the court ruling could impose regula-
tions that one side or both find unpalat-
able. This approach is likely, however, if
the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet opt to return to
the courts, as is their right.

The most appropriate resolution, it
seems, is to ensure that the eventual settle-
ment does not weigh heavily on the East
Coast fishers while addressing Indigenous
legal rights. Other ways of accommodating
Indigenous rights under Marshall include a
sizeable one-time payment to First Nations
governments, revenue-sharing arrange-
ments with the federal government, prefer-
eental access to other economic activities
(lotteries, cannabis, etc.), or other mutu-
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The real-life consequences of COVID-19 among First Nations

The unwillingness to address fundamental challenges made the pandemic much worse than it had to be for First Nations across Canada.

Melissa Mbarki

As the Macdonald-Laurier Institute’s COVID Misery Index has revealed, Canada ranks near the bottom among the 15 countries surveyed when it comes to misery arising from the pandemic. Specifically, Canada ranked 11th out of 15 countries on the scale – based on 16 measures that range from the direct impact of the virus (disease misery) to the efficiency of the government’s mitigation efforts (response misery) to the economic consequences of the virus and the government’s response to it (economic misery).

While Canada did not suffer as much disease misery as many of the other countries reviewed, its handling of the pandemic has proven far more costly – from a mitigation perspective (testing, vaccines, etc.) and in terms of economic consequences (debt, job losses, etc.).

Yet this only tells part of the story. Some groups in Canada faced additional challenges that only increased the misery in their communities. A more in-depth look at First Nations’ reserves and their experience with COVID reveals the real-life consequences of this terrible epidemic.

The first wave of COVID-19 had only a limited impact on First Nations, with no more than 500 cases from June to mid-September 2020. Yet this changed with the second wave. From September 2020 to February 2021, First Nations experienced a drastic increase to 22,000 cases. The current third wave is hitting remote Indigenous communities particularly hard.

Socioeconomic inequities make First Nations more vulnerable to infectious diseases than any other community in Canada. This is due to limited access to health care, higher rates of underlying medical conditions such as diabetes and heart disease, economic barriers, isolation, poor housing, seriously overcrowded homes (often in poor repair), and no access to clean water. Other factors that contribute to the rise in numbers include no access to isolation housing, limited health care services (including workers in communities) and access to vaccinations.

Housing, or rather the lack of adequate housing on reserves, has created a cauldron of disease. Social distancing is not an option in multi-family homes. If one family member tests positive, the rest of the household are not able to isolate. In the case of the Eabametoong First Nation, temporary tents and shacks set up for COVID-19 isolation were converted into homes.

Another huge issue is having clean water for drinking and proper sanitization. How can First Nations comply with the basic public health guidelines when proper hand washing is not even possible? Poor water supplies alone makes many communities vulnerable to infectious diseases.

The list of fundamental challenges goes on: lack of food security and poor nutrition, women not having the ability to leave abusive relationships, and profound inequalities in education were exacerbated during the pandemic. Most Canadians take for granted reliable, stable Internet and their ability to use a laptop/tablet for school or work. Indeed, many First Nations communities struggle to provide families with the basic home school set up for their children; and numerous students have now fallen as much as two years behind in their studies during the pandemic.

Even before the pandemic, First Nation communities have been dealing with mental health issues, addictions and family violence. A high-profile police presence in my community was common on the weekends.
The short-hand question of “How bad?” really means, “How bad were they beaten or hurt?” or “Will they make it?”

Nearby towns and cities have shelters for women and their families at risk. On the reserve, where shelters are often not an option, a family member’s home is the most likely safe place. The movement of women and children, of course, leads to overcrowding and accounts for some of the multi-family situations evident on reserves.

Ceremonies like sweats, feasts or round dances and powwows have been cancelled. These gatherings are integral to our traditions and ceremonies and are far more common, outside the pandemic, than many non-Indigenous people recognize. Losing that interaction has challenged all of us. We have had interactive powwows, but it’s not the same as sitting in an arbor watching the dancers in person.

Many communities decided to isolate members by closing reserve borders to almost all travel. This meant limited access to family members. Personally, I have only seen my family twice last year, though I would normally visit them on holidays and during the summer.

Closing our borders also limited the flow of drugs coming into the reserves. An elder said this may have been the only good thing that came from the pandemic. It is forcing our leaders to look closely at what we need to address this issue in the long-term.

Another benefit of closing the border was that it gave the community back some autonomy to make decisions. They decided when restrictions could be eased or enforced. Our governments distributed food, water, firewood and other supplies to community members. We have been hearing stories of some First Nations abusing this control and not allowing people to leave. We have to remember these enforcements are in place to keep our communities safe and not to control people unduly.

Not all First Nations people respect the authorities.

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There is also the isolation imposed by the pandemic and the mental distress generated by it. Many First Nations were challenged by the loss of support systems and threats to family cohesion. Communities could not hold a traditional burial for those who have passed on, nor could people be there to support those who were grieving.

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Our elders are worried about the borders opening. Our communities believe that when the floodgates open, we are going to see more drug use and more deaths by overdose. Such fear is well-founded. After all, Statistics Canada released a report that showed an increase in the number of non-COVID-19 deaths because of increased substance use.

We will likely never know the actual number of suicides, drug overdoses or heart attack (health-related) deaths that occurred on reserves during the pandemic. There is no way to track these numbers adequately, particularly when off-reserve populations are taken into account. As a First Nations person, I am always skeptical when the government asks for this data without telling me the reasons why they need it. The long history of under-reporting Indigenous realities continues.

It is critical that we address infrastructure and mental health issues on reserves. Many of these issues were pre-existing prior to and amplified during the pandemic. Government has been complacent for too long and provided bandaid fixes rather than long-term sustainable solutions. First Nations, including my own home community, have suffered a great deal over the past year during this pandemic. It will take years to fully recover.

MLI’s COVID Misery Index shined a much-needed spotlight on the misery generated by the pandemic – including on areas (such as response or economic consequences) that are frequently overlooked. Yet, as this review shows, some communities fared much worse than others in terms of misery. As we look back on 2020-21, we need to realize that the unwillingness to address fundamental challenges made the pandemic much worse than it had to be for First Nations across Canada.

Melissa Mbarki is the Policy Analyst and Outreach Coordinator at MLI. She is from the Muskowekwan First Nation.
As a teenager growing up in the 1970s, I often felt as though much of the pop culture of the time was obsessed with the 1950s. No doubt the boomers in their 30s (and their parents) were already feeling nostalgic for a humbler time when Rock ‘n Roll was a little simpler and when people could easily tell what was left from right. It was hardly a period when hardships were erased (polio and tuberculosis still ravaged certain populations and racism was rampant) but the general zeitgeist was one where people believed that those who worked towards progress were rewarded.

The 1950s soon became a distant memory, however. Forty years later, and in the midst of a pandemic, perhaps it’s time to rediscover them again, particularly in terms of governance – the key ingredient to realizing advancement. The government of Louis St-Laurent has a lot to teach us in this regard about getting things done.

Patrice Dutil

Cover Feature

LOUIS ST-LAURENT

Getting the job done

At a time when Canada has lost the ability to “get things done,” Louis St-Laurent’s record as prime minister and as a politician is worth remembering.
As part of his campaign for reelection in 1957, Louis St-Laurent made a campaign swing through the Niagara region and stopped in Wainfleet in early June. Campaigns in those days were not driven by opportunities to win national television coverage, but rather involved good old glad-handling with folk in the small towns and opportunities to talk about what was working and what was going wrong with the country. Wainfleet sits a few kilometres from Lake Erie and St-Laurent was sure to talk up the dramatic improvements his government had brought to the St. Lawrence Seaway.

When he arrived, St-Laurent was greeted by Lehman Laurier “Ray” Davis, the Clerk of Wainfleet Township. Davis was a public servant, but that did not stop him from being active in the local Liberal organization and he was excited to welcome the prime minister. (Davis was given his middle name in honour of the Liberal prime minister who had just won the 1900 election a few days before he was born.) The Liberals were still favoured to win, but polls were indicating that John Diefenbaker’s message was resonating with voters. Davis’s youngest daughter, Janice, missed school that day to meet St-Laurent. “I remember being there and shaking his hand. It was a big deal because nobody came to Wainfleet back then,” she remembered. “‘Uncle Louie’ was revered by the Davis family who were staunch Liberals at that time. But we had statesmen then, not politicians.”

Janice Davis Muirhead’s memory probably speaks more eloquently than most pundits as to what is wrong about politics and governance today. There is widespread discussion as to whether Canada has lost the ability to “get things done.” Some think it’s a question of simply having a stronger political class of “statesmen,” and I think there’s merit to this view. But how can the class of politicians be changed? The country is waiting for a new type of politics, much as it did in 1896, 1921, 1949, 1958 and 1968. Surely, the pandemic has made it so, but only in the sense that it has aggravated a worsening condition. In considering a response, I think that Louis St-Laurent’s record as prime minister and as a politician is worth remembering.

St-Laurent was the right man at the right time when he became prime minister in November 1948. Nobody really expected much from him, but he knew Canadians better than they did themselves. He proved to be a highly effective political operative, an uncontested leader in cabinet, a self-starter, an insatiable appetite in Western Europe as countries rebuilt. The national debt was enormous, but Canadians were open to people of vision.

Louis St-Laurent was the best of them and among the many things his government tackled, the task of “getting things done” was key. Within a hundred days of assuming office, St-Laurent made key decisions Mackenzie King simply could not do. He approved Canada’s participation in NATO, eventually forward deploying air and ground forces to Europe, and recognized the state of Israel. In time, he also oversaw the growing operational coordination between Canadian and American air forces.
on air defence, the latter eventually paving the way for the standing up of the North American Air Defence Command under his Progressive Conservative successor.

St-Laurent also met with President Harry Truman to discuss the possibility of retooling the St. Lawrence river in order to allow for bigger ships and for power generation. It had long been planned but was kept on hold because of fussy American objections. Truman pleaded that he was handcuffed by Congress, but St-Laurent persisted with the planning and gave a clear signal that Canada was to proceed with its part of the necessary works, with or without US participation. It took four years, and the Eisenhower administration, but the Americans finally agreed. By 1958, most of the works had been accomplished.

The same could be said about the Trans-Canada Highway (1949), multiple radar lines for air defence (Pinetree Line extension, Mid-Canada Line, Distant Early Warning Line), the Canso Causeway in Nova Scotia and, not least, the transcontinental gas pipeline from Alberta to central Canada. St-Laurent’s gravest decision was to go to war over Korea. This triggered a massive, multi-billion-dollar rearmament program that entailed a significant expansion of the Canadian army, navy, and air force, including new fighter squadrons, new naval ships, such as the commissioning of an aircraft carrier (HMCS Bonaventure, Canada’s last), and a launch into aerospace engineering with the Avro Arrow.

Today, the federal government has made commitments to rebuild the military but seems fundamentally unable to deliver on anything substantive. This ability to decide has now become unimaginable.

What has changed? Politics today is very different. The glare of the media (not least social media) magnifies every little bit of opposition to the point where it paralyzes government. Politicians are afraid to plant firm stakes on important issues and instead endlessly send mixed messages for fear of alienating some small segment of the population. There are hard structural issues also. Much of the tax dollar goes to health care funding now and precious little money is left to invest in infrastructure. Not least, the world is inexhaustibly interlinked and in many ways that has left Canada vulnerable to the wishes being championed in foreign capitals. Should Canada have its own capacity to produce vaccines? Why can’t firm decisions be made on military procurement?

But are these unsolvable problems? Canada’s health care system is mired in forty-year-old rules that guarantee inertia and inefficiency, which at the same time hamstring the government’s ability to do...
things. And yet no leading politician is willing to tackle the issue. On construction of key infrastructure like pipelines, the responsibility to consult (Indigenous people yes, but not only them) seems to discourage any timely action. Instead, we get dithering.

It does start with leadership. Louis St-Laurent and the ministers who surrounded him had a bold vision for the country and were not afraid to build it. They welcomed capital and knew how to work with it because they had worked in it (something few federal ministers today can include on their CVs). They unanimously applauded efforts to “build government” and to build infrastructure. The prime minister also knew how to delegate to his ministers. He could not resist the entrepreneurial flair of C.D. Howe, his minister of everything, but Howe was only one of many get-it-done ministers. St-Laurent was willing to see the federal government involved in university funding, hospital funding, social security, and aid to developing countries. He was also quite happy to see the federal government assume its responsibilities (and those of the provinces, if that was necessary) to deliver on those goals. The elaboration of equalization payments demonstrated that thoughts could translate into action.

The can-do attitude of the federal government was demonstrated in other areas. It responded vigorously to help Hungarian refugees find a place following the revolt of 1956. It also showed flash in helping the Inuit community cope with terrible hardships. St-Laurent recognized that the old approaches were not a match to the emergencies of starvation and disease. His vision was to involve the Inuit as much as possible in the development and administration of the vast northern areas. He framed the initiative by saying that it was something “the Canadian people would want to have their government” do, so as to provide the Inuit “with opportunities for developing their talents and making themselves real citizens of the Canadian nation.” He appointed an energetic young fellow to lead the charge, one Jean Lesage (who became a transformative Premier of Quebec six years later).

Lesage was distressed by reports of illness and starvation and seized by his mission. A committee on Inuit issues (of course it was called Eskimo Affairs in those days) quickly narrowed the policy options, with speed being the key criterion. This was not a simple matter: concerns were expressed about how the Inuit way of life might be affected. The language was modern and inclusive compared to the paternalism and racism expressed in the past. The St-Laurent government felt responsible to provide the essentials of survival and created a Northern Health Services Division in the Department of National Health and Welfare. By 1955, over 800 Inuit were receiving treatment in southern sanatoria.

The government knew well that the intervention could create severe dislocations in the northern communities. But it was worth doing, simply because the alternative was to allow these Canadians to die. The same logic was applied to the relocation of small and remote Inuit communities who were facing death by starvation. Today, the merits of the High Arctic relocations are being debated in nicely air-conditioned seminar rooms, but the St-Laurent government had no such luxury. It just acted. The apology expressed by the Harper government in 2010 over relocations and by the Trudeau government in 2018 over the tuberculosis interventions are the work of politicians.

The policy of Northern Development and assistance to the Inuit was a microcosm of the St-Laurent government’s stance. There was a moral imperative and fantastic administrative undertakings. Necessarily, mistakes were made. But it set an example of trying to find ways to work with the local population and set Canada on a path of partnership with its northern population. In less than two generations, the Inuit would have their own government. Canada received phenomenal benefits; so too did the Indigenous population. That is the work of statesmen, not politicians. 

Patrice Dutil is professor of politics and public administration at Ryerson University and a senior fellow at MLI.
Scanning the landscape of political reputations, the journalist Bruce Hutchison wrote that “no finer human being ever governed Canada and none has been so thoroughly misunderstood as Louis St-Laurent.” This was in 1964, seven years after the old Liberal leader had retired from politics. That judgment still stands.

St-Laurent was born in Compton in 1882, studied law at Laval University and plunged into his profession, rising to become a leading barrister in Canada. Mackenzie King approached him to join the cabinet in November 1941; he said yes the day after Japan bombed Pearl Harbour. He was almost 60 years old (which in those days was old – the life expectancy for a man born at the same time was 40).

But he was young in spirit. Within seven years, in November 1948, he reached the top of Disraeli’s proverbial “greasy pole” with the driest hands possible. In the spring of 1949, at age 67, he led the Liberals to their greatest victory ever. In 1957, most thought Canada’s best-known great-grandfather would win a third time and lead Liberals to a third consecutive decade in power. The Liberals won the popular vote but lost the election. John Diefenbaker formed a minority government. Louis St-Laurent was now 75 years old (and would live to the ripe old age of 91).

Louis St-Laurent’s time as prime minister left a number of leadership lessons. Some have been retained, others not.

1. **Age and experience matter.**

St-Laurent came to electoral politics late in life and became prime minister at an age far older than any other person, before or since. Age gave him an asset: he had nothing to prove. He had earned the respect of his peers and of the population.

2. **Know yourself.**

St-Laurent believed in what he knew and he said what he believed. He was, like many people who rose to power in the West in the 1940s and 1950s (Adenauer, Attlee, Ben-Gurion, De Gaulle, Eisenhower, Marshall, Masaryk, Truman), a man who had seen too much grief and wanted a better world.

3. **Attract and unleash the best cabinet members.**

The key about St-Laurent was that he was not afraid to have top talent around him: Lester Pearson, C.D. Howe, Paul Martin Sr., Jean Lesage, Jack Pickersgill, to name but the best known. The occasional threats to resign coming from ministers were met with a stony silence and the assurance that government could operate quite well without them.
4. Seek the best leadership of the public service.

St-Laurent knew how to manage competency. Good, dedicated people mattered to him and he mattered to them. As simple as it sounds, this can be most difficult to accomplish. John Diefenbaker inherited the same team of mandarins, and simply could not run his government effectively.

5. Be idealistic.

St-Laurent was quite happy to challenge conventions. He openly talked about “values” in guiding Canada’s foreign policy. He was anti-communist, for sure, but he was also a humanist and an ardent believer in peace. St-Laurent reimagined the Commonwealth of Nations, actively promoted international aid by joining the Columbo Plan, and promoted Canada as a voice – and an enabler – of peace long before the Suez crisis in 1956.

6. Walk the talk.

Canada joined NATO a few months after he became prime minister because, for him, internationalism means shouldering responsibility. St-Laurent believed that Canada should have a strong military and showed that he meant it in expanding it rapidly during the 1950s. St-Laurent had an aircraft carrier built, the HMCS Bonaventure, and became the father of the Canadian aerospace industry when his government invested in the developing the Avro Arrow, a supersonic jet fighter. It was during his time in government that Canada dotted its northern landscape with three necklaces of distant early warning (DEW) stations.


St-Laurent oversaw a massive spending increase, taking on large infrastructure projects such as the St. Lawrence Seaway, the Trans-Canada Highway, the Canso Causeway in Nova Scotia and, not least, the transcontinental gas pipeline from Alberta to central Canada.

8. Build up provinces and regions.

St-Laurent was willing to see the federal government involved in areas of provincial jurisdiction to help the regions. He innovated in university funding and hospital funding. Not least, he introduced equalization payments to ensure that all Canadians, no matter where they live, receive adequate and comparable government support.

9. Help the poor.

The St-Laurent government introduced a variety of poverty reduction programs for the elderly, the disabled and the long-term unemployed. He helped the Inuit battle tuberculosis in the North. The St-Laurent government introduced universal pensions for people over 70 years of age and older, and 65 for people in demonstrable need. To help people save for retirement, he spearheaded the creation of the RRSP. He also introduced hospitalization insurance and equalization payments.


St-Laurent’s government oversaw a massive inflow of immigrants. He believed that culture mattered and was willing to invest considerable political capital to crusade for a variety of new national symbols. He Canadianized the Governor General and created the Canada Council, to give but two quick examples.

St-Laurent brought something new to government: an almost perfect mix of idealism and realism. On almost every issue it touched, his government modernized the idea of Canada, either in its support of new programs or in its international relations. It was, against all expectations, St-Laurent who proved to be a key agent of modernity in this country. Many of the things he did while in office continue to shape Canadian politics today – pipelines, defence, the place of Canadian culture, the impact of immigration, the nature of equalization payments, the imperatives of dealing with the North, to name but a few – are still with us and Canadians today live with the ambitions that St-Laurent first crafted. Yet no one would call themselves a “St-Laurent kind of politician,” or a “St-Laurent Liberal.” That is too bad: Canadians believed him and supported his priorities. His leadership lessons should resonate to this day.

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Pipelines and national prosperity under the St-Laurent government

Ken Coates

The regional pipeline debates of the 2010s – Northern Gateway, Keystone XL, Trans Mountain, Energy East, Line 3 (Enbridge), and Coastal GasLink, among others – have shaped Canadian national political affairs in complex ways. The people of Alberta and Saskatchewan remain angry and disappointed with Ottawa’s approach. For its part, Justin Trudeau’s government sought, without success, to purchase social licence for pipelines through its expansive climate change agenda and its highly reluctant purchase of Kinder Morgan’s Trans Mountain project. The result has been a nation bitterly divided and with a substantial portion of the national economy at stake.

Highly contentious pipeline debates are not new in Canada. In the 1950s, the government of Louis St-Laurent threw its support behind the proposed TransCanada Pipeline. Under the guidance of the influential cabinet minister, C.D. Howe, the government helped assemble a group of Canadian and American partners to build an all-Canadian pipeline to ensure the supply of natural gas from Western Canada to Eastern Canada. A parliamentary clash unfolded in 1956, when the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) and the Progressive Conservatives attacked the Liberals for trying to force through the contentious legislation. The St-Laurent government went into the 1957 election with the burden of the pipeline approval process symbolizing their alleged arrogance.

Canada got its pipeline, which opened in 1958, but the Liberals fell from power the previous year. In 1958, John Diefenbaker and the Progressive Conservatives secured one of the largest electoral majorities in Canadian history. The Liberals lost their hold on government because, in the eyes of many in the country, they had succumbed to the arrogance of power. By forcing through the legislation that enabled the development of the TransCanada pipeline, the Liberals irritated the parliamentary opposition and angered electors who demanded a more responsive government.

Before the 1956 pipeline debate, the confidence and decisiveness of the federal Liberal government had served the country well. They were able to push through major projects that transformed the country dramatically. But the line between assertive and arrogant government is a thin one, particularly when issues related to major infrastructure, natural resource development, and Canada-US relations were at play. The legacy of post-war expansion proved to be profound, sparking an equally bold plan by the Diefenbaker government to promote major developments in the middle and far North.

In the 1950s, Canadian governments got things done. The opposition to the Liberals’ plan was more about how the Liberal government proceeded than over the idea of the pipeline. The CCF fought for public ownership of the pipeline; the Tories worried about American influence over a key piece of Canadian infrastructure. In the post-war period, pipelines were but one part of a major expansion in national infrastructure that included major highways, airfields, hydro-electric plants, and the St. Lawrence...
Seaway. In short order, with pipelines figuring prominently in the evolving landscape, the country launched a major expansion of resource development in the middle North, the development of key national roads and other facilities, and a rapid improvement in the country’s standard of living.

There are important similarities in the situation facing Canada’s post-war government and the government today. Just as the Second World War liberated Ottawa to spend public funds freely, the 2020-2021 pandemic freed the Trudeau government from almost all budgetary constraints. The government of Louis St-Laurent enjoyed widespread support in Canada, with a mandate to rebuild after the war and avoid a widely feared return to the Great Depression. The plans were grandiose, especially in the context of the late 1940s and 1950s, and included public housing initiatives, major urban developments, and the infrastructure needed to sustain the modern industrial state. Contemporary Canada reveals the long-term benefits and consequences of the major public investments and the combined government and private sector commitment to modernizing the country.

Following the Second World War, and much like Canada in 2021, federalism had tipped to the national government. While the post-war era would eventually see the empowerment of Quebec, Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia, it took some time for the provinces to gain comparable authority to the federal government. In the interim, as in 2021, the fiscal power rested with the Government of Canada, and Louis St-Laurent capitalized on this fiscal authority and the convening power of the national government to press for rapid economic development.

Canadians also forget that, in the late 1940s and the decade that followed, Canada lagged well behind the United States in wealth and opportunity and lacked a great deal of basic infrastructure. St-Laurent, more pragmatist than poet, did not paint a grand portrait of the nation he envisioned, and he avoided simple statements or characterizations of the country’s challenges. He sought to mobilize private investment more than make open-ended commitments of government funding. He was, ultimately, both cautious and effective in his promotion of the business of building a stronger and more economically robust country.

There is no such bold vision in Trudeau’s Canada in 2021, save for vague rhetoric such as “build back better” that underlie the nation’s uncertain plans for future development. The government is willing to spend vast sums of money but has difficulty finding projects to support that can be rolled out expeditiously. Yet there is no shortage of real and urgent needs, ranging from rural and northern Internet, much-needed road and rail systems in northern Canada, urban transit systems to match those of the world’s greatest cities, renewable energy projects, experimental investments in the resource and energy sectors, low-cost housing systems, and appropriate commitments to the facilities required to support a 21st century innovation economy.

Obviously, however, the 1950s and the 2020s are different worlds. After the Second World War, the western world rallied behind a peacetime recovery that ushered in the greatest economic expansion in world history. Canada, as a provider of raw minerals to a rapidly industrializing world, was a primary beneficiary of America’s growth and the rebuilding of Europe and East Asia. This growth happened without the intervention of environmentalists, who had not yet articulated a critique of industrialization. Indigenous peoples were not consulted, nor were they included in the massive development plans. Approval plans were, by the standards of the 2020s, rudimentary and superficial. Ultimately, however, much of the contemporary infrastructure that underpins Canada today was developed in the first decades after the war.

Supporters of 21st century infrastructure projects look back on the St-Laurent era with considerable wistfulness. Contemporary political and approval processes are cumbersome, expensive and unpredictable.

Companies venture into the development of a major project with considerable nervousness, knowing the fate of projects like the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline or Enbridge’s Northern Gateway, but aware, too, of the dozens of major mines, hydro-electric projects and other significant infrastructure investments that have proceeded through to completion. Furthermore, Indigenous communities – almost completely ignored in the immediate post-war period – find themselves in prominent, court-supported positions in the approval and development of infrastructure projects.

The current realities facing developers in Canada are more time-consuming, costly, complex and beneficial than those that shaped decision-making, investments and government actions in the post-war era. But the idea that the country does not get anything done is wrong, just as is the often-made suggestion that the empowerment of Indigenous peoples would lock...
down natural resource development. In the complex realities of the 21st century, we confront a new world marked by the economic uncertainties of the pandemic and post-pandemic world, the transformative effects of rapid technological changes, and the rise of a new authoritarian superpower, which has not been shy in flexing its newfound economic and military muscle, including through Chinese-funded infrastructure under construction in many parts of the world. In such an environment, the bold, confident national leadership exemplified by Prime Minister Louis St-Laurent is urgently required.

As Canadians contemplate the challenges facing the Canadian government in 2021 and beyond, we should reflect on the circumstances under which the St-Laurent government operated. The world was recovering from a devastating global war while struggling to come to terms with the Cold War. The spectre of a massive worldwide depression remained both a vivid memory and a real danger, with the fear of economic uncertainty worrying many people and governments. This, too, was an era of massive technological change, exemplified by jet and space travel, a revolution in consumer electronics, new and expanding communications technologies (particularly television), the advent of the nuclear era (with all its attendant existential dangers), and the early years of major societal transformations.

Canadians sought — and got — stability, with a practical and effective government that was free of nationalistic rhetoric. The nation benefitted from surging international demand for Canadian natural resources, which in turn spurred economic expansion in the middle North. The government, too, built from its central Canadian base, using major government investments to improve the infrastructure and economic prosperity of southern Ontario and southern Quebec.

Louis St-Laurent understood well the concerns of a nation that was proud of its many contributions to the Allied war effort, recognized the industrial system transitioning from wartime to peacetime operations, and understood the gathering power of the resource-rich western provinces. St-Laurent had a vision for a nation in need of rapid transformation and improvements, able and ready to capitalize on the potential of the post-war era. Yet the same cannot be said of the Trudeau government today, which has struggled to effectively govern throughout its tenure in power.

St-Laurent had a vision for a nation in need of rapid transformation and improvements, able and ready to capitalize on the potential of the post-war era.

While displaying a strong willingness to spend without much constraint, especially in the midst of a pandemic, the Trudeau government has proven far less adroit at using this financial largesse to actually get things done expeditiously — from infrastructure and energy projects to domestic vaccine production. It has also proven unwilling to work closely with the private sector to fill many of the urgent needs facing the country in the 21st century. It would behoove the current government to look back at St-Laurent’s legacy, and to remember that vague rhetoric like “build back better” are no substitute for doing the hard work that governing requires.

Prime Minister Louis St-Laurent has largely faded from the Canadian imagination. He was a manager more than a charismatic leader, but he guided the country through a time of remarkable and intense transition, and he did so with a calmness and grace that has largely disappeared from the Canadian political landscape. He was Prime Minister during a period of multi-faceted pressures for change, ranging from rapid industrialization and the Cold War to the dramatic growth of cities and a sharp increase in the national standard of living. St-Laurent’s tenure was a time when Canadians grabbed onto bold visions, particularly in terms of infrastructure and when government focused on getting the fundamentals of the Canadian economy right. Much of the prosperity that Canadians now take for granted was rooted in the St-Laurent years.

In the early decades of the 21st century, Canadians have become used to the idea that major projects are extremely difficult, if not impossible. Early infrastructure developments, including the TransCanada Pipeline project, attracted considerable response, even protests, but governments in the day pushed forward and got the work done. Canada has lost, as nation, the “can-do” spirit that exemplified the St-Laurent years and has become extremely cautious, even nervous, about tackling nation-building enterprises, draining the country’s sense of urgency, possibility and optimism. Remembering the work of St-Laurent’s government reminds us of the fundamental and multi-generational importance of national investments in infrastructure and the contributions that these bold decisions make to Canada’s long-term prosperity.

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What constitutes effective political leadership in a decentralized federation? This is a question to which I have returned time and time again in my career as a senior public servant and a policy scholar.

I recently confronted this issue again while addressing Prime Minister Louis St-Laurent’s role in the establishment of universal hospital coverage in Canada. Usually overlooked because of the much greater attention paid to the introduction of universal medical care coverage a decade later, the introduction of hospitalization in the late 1950s was the major foundation of what would become known as Medicare in Canada. It was a policy that established the principles and architecture of universal health coverage that we take for granted today.

This initiation and implementation of hospitalization required leadership at both the federal and provincial levels of government and among both first ministers and cabinet ministers. Although Canada is generally perceived to be a more centralized federation in the 1950s, due to the expansion of federal powers during the Second World War, it was still a relatively decentralized federation when compared to other federal countries in the world. This institutional dynamic requires more subtle forms of federal leadership, especially in areas of shared or provincial jurisdiction.

When it comes to hospitalization, this was most certainly the case. The establishment, maintenance, and management of hospitals had been placed under the exclusive jurisdiction of the provinces, as defined under Section 92(7) of the original British North America Act, 1867, now incorporated into the Constitution Act, 1982. In 1955, the issue of whether the federal government should encourage provinces to establish universal hospital coverage by providing shared-cost financing was raised at a first ministers’ conference. Premier Maurice Duplessis of Quebec argued that the federal government had no business interfering in provincial jurisdiction.

Prime Minister Louis St-Laurent, though opposed to Duplessis on many fronts, was generally sympathetic to his argument in this case. He preferred the federal government to focus in areas where it had obvious jurisdiction. One example was equalization. In my mind, this was the signature policy of the St-Laurent government, a landmark policy that earned St-Laurent’s Liberals no political points but has done more to deliver national unity and regional equity in social programming than any other policy in the post-war era.

To the prime minister, however, hospitalization was another kettle of fish. Aside from the problem of provincial jurisdiction, St-Laurent had concerns about the policy, including major misgivings about expanding the welfare state in such a major way. Proponents of hospitalization tended to prefer the design based on the Saskatchewan model, operating since 1947, with the government as the sole payer of all hospital bills.
Like many in his cabinet, St-Laurent was more drawn to a less expensive (in terms of public budgets) and more targeted approach, in which governments limited themselves to subsidizing the cost of the very poor purchasing private hospital care — an approach that Saskatchewan Premier Tommy Douglas derided as “tin cup medicare.” Then there was the enormous amount of time, energy, and political capital that would have to be expended to get a federal-provincial agreement on the principles and the intergovernmental financing of such a program.

Given all this, why did St-Laurent finally agree to exercise federal leadership in negotiating the deal through 1955, 1956 and the first months of 1957, and the passage of legislation shortly thereafter that would establish hospitalization? The answer is twofold. The first and obvious reason is that it was in his partisan political interests to do so. St-Laurent’s government had been around for almost a decade (and the Liberals in power since 1935) and was looking tired. With an election due in 1957, St-Laurent felt that something new like hospitalization might just win over new voters, particularly those who might otherwise vote for his main left-wing rival, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF).

The second more inspiring reason is that St-Laurent was willing to listen to his ministers, including Paul Martin Sr., Minister of National Health and Welfare. Contrary to St-Laurent, Martin was keen on the Saskatchewan design. In his mind, only a single-payer financing spout paying the bills for a single-tier of hospitals (most of which were private but non-profit) would ensure full access to hospital care by all Canadians on “uniform terms and conditions.” St-Laurent may not have accepted this logic, but he deferred to his minister’s longstanding experience and policy knowledge. Whatever the ideological merits and demerits from St-Laurent’s perspective, the Saskatchewan hospital program worked extremely well in practice and its design could therefore be defended on pragmatic grounds.

St-Laurent accepted Martin’s judgment that a majority of provinces would eventually accept federal insistence on a few high-level national standards and requirements including portability, all of which were placed in the Hospital Insurance and Diagnostic Services Act. However, he also insisted that no federal money would be forthcoming unless a majority of provinces, with a majority of the country’s population, would accept the federal plan — a requirement that Martin and some pro-Medicare premiers realized could kill the plan. We will never know whether this was St-Laurent’s actual intention, but this obstacle was soon removed by St-Laurent’s successor after the Liberal’s electoral defeat to John Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservatives in 1957.

Compare this to the games that have been played by the current Trudeau government on the health file over the past six years. In the election of 2015, Justin Trudeau promised national pharmacare. Instead of initiating a First Ministers’ Conference and providing a detailed federal proposal, the Trudeau government went silent after winning the election. Although a Parliamentary Committee dominated by Liberal members ultimately recommended that prescription drugs be made part of universal health coverage for all Canadians in 2018, the federal government insisted on yet another study. Led by Eric Hoskins, the former Ontario health minister, the Advisory Council on the Implementation of National Pharmacare conducted detailed studies and extensive consultations.

In its final report in 2019, the Advisory Council recommended that a single-payer design with national standards similar to Medicare be applied to prescription drug coverage. This should have been enough to spur the Trudeau government into initiating a program through internal work on legislation and external negotiations with the provinces. Neither has occurred. Nor has the government explicitly rejected the Hoskins Report. In February 2021, Liberal MPs helped defeat a private member’s bill on pharmacare that would implement the recommendations of the Hoskins report. While arguing that his government remained committed to universal pharmacare, Trudeau argued that the bill infringed on provincial jurisdiction despite the fact that this is an area of shared jurisdiction where the federal government has a strong constitutional foothold. Finally, since 2015, Trudeau has never deferred to his successive health ministers on the policy itself, and instead drives the issue entirely based on short-term political calculations.

Every democratically-elected government has to balance short-term political interests with longer-term policy ambitions. A tradeoff the St-Laurent government was well familiar with. However, unlike the current government, St-Laurent exercised leadership in continuing to drive forward a longer-term policy agenda that improved the country and the quality of life of its citizens. The contrast in leadership could not be sharper.}

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The day Louis St-Laurent was sworn in as prime minister on November 15, 1948, he was already deeply involved in the negotiations that would bring Newfoundland into the Canadian Confederation. It was an event he would later recall as the “most important achievement of my years in public life.” St-Laurent knew the file well and approached the issue with his usual even temperament, integrity, and sound judgment.

“The key to Mr. St. Laurent’s character,” wrote the influential journalist Bruce Hutchison in a 1949 article in the Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, “is his ability to sort out the essentials from the trivial, to see great affairs in simple terms.” Hutchison added that St-Laurent was “instinctively aware of public opinion, the limitation of government power, [and] the possible thing in a practical politics.” During his efforts to bring Newfoundland into Canada, he utilized all of these characteristics.

St-Laurent’s approach to union with Newfoundland was both pragmatic and shrewd. He weighed the pros and cons and concluded that Confederation was a good idea for both countries. The strategic value of Newfoundland was demonstrated during the Second World War and that importance would continue long into the Cold War. The island was an important trading partner, its airspace was increasingly valuable, and, in a more general way, union would strengthen Canada and put an end to a process begun in the 1860s. St-Laurent’s support for Confederation did not mean that political considerations or tactics were irrelevant, but once decided he believed that the government should move ahead on the matter without delay.
At the end of the war, the British government authorized the establishment of a National Convention in Newfoundland to debate various forms of government that would then be placed before the country in a referendum. It was the first step in the restoration of democratic government in Newfoundland, but in advance of that vote it was agreed to send a fact-finding mission to Ottawa to explore the possibility of union. Ottawa established a cabinet committee to oversee the process and St-Laurent, as secretary of state for external affairs, was appointed chair. From that moment, he assumed the direction on the Canadian side of the whole process leading to Confederation.

Over the next two years St-Laurent was deeply involved in the unfolding drama, balancing, on one side, the demands of the Newfoundlanders for better terms and, on the other, the financial resources available to the government and the domestic political ramifications if the government was seen to be making a too-generous offer to the new province. Added to the mix was an increasingly nervous Prime Minister Mackenzie King who saw political risks around every corner and advocated caution. St-Laurent, conversely, became more determined. He believed that the two countries were moving towards union and that it would have been irrational to turn back at this stage. The only question was the cost, but for St-Laurent, as for many Canadians, it was a price worth paying.

The Newfoundlanders voted in favour of Confederation in the second of two referendums in the summer of 1948, and Ottawa established a cabinet committee to undertake the final negotiations. By this time St-Laurent had become prime minister, further enhancing his prestige and authority in the proceedings. For the most part the talks were cordial and reasonable, and there was willingness to compromise on both sides.

St-Laurent usually spoke for the Canadians, although on occasion C.D. Howe, the minister of trade and commerce, chaired the sessions. Elmer Driedger, a Justice Department official who sat in on many of the meetings, later recalled the differences in style and temperament between St-Laurent and Howe, with the latter arriving at meetings only to declare: “Well, what’s on the agenda today?” The Newfoundlanders would bring up a problem or suggestion and Howe would respond bluntly “No we can’t do that, what’s the next item?” St-Laurent was much more the diplomat, Driedger remembered, and far more courteous. Things moved along more smoothly when he presided.

Throughout the process St-Laurent chaired most of the joint meetings, steered the debate in cabinet, and spoke for the government in Parliament (and he ultimately oversaw the establishment of the new provincial government in St. John’s). Near the end, as the negotiations faltered and nearly collapsed on the financial issues, he intervened decisively in cabinet and endorsed the inclusion of a clause in the Terms of Union calling for the establishment of a royal commission, within eight years of union, to examine Newfoundland’s financial situation and determine whether additional assistance was necessary. That term broke the impasse over subsidies for the new province and enabled the negotiations to proceed. Without it, Confederation might never have happened.

Newfoundland officially joined Canada on March 31, 1949 and in Ottawa the moment was marked with a ceremony at the base of the Peace Tower, with speeches from St-Laurent and Gordon Bradley, a prominent Newfoundlander and the newest member of the Canadian cabinet. The two politicians carved the first strokes of the Newfoundland coat of arms on the blank tenth shield in the arch of the tower – left empty for just such an occasion after the rebuilding of the House of Commons after the 1916 fire. It was right that St-Laurent should be asked to oversee the ceremonies, not only because he was prime minister but also because he was the leading Canadian behind the achievement of union with Newfoundland. He provided the leadership and a steady hand, responding to problems with flexibility but always with the ultimate goal firmly in view.

It was an extraordinary achievement and must rank as one of the most remarkable moments in Canadian history: the union of two countries, achieved with little protest, without a single shot fired in anger, and with no one killed before, during, or after its implementation. St-Laurent never wavered from his position of support for Confederation and was willing to make what he believed to be a generous offer to the Newfoundlanders. As he said in the House of Commons on June 19, 1948, “I think we would have been remiss in our duty to future generations of Canadians not to have done so.” It was a demonstration of prime ministerial leadership not often seen in Canadian politics.

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Before the Second World War, rural Canada was trapped in a long and disastrous depression, particularly in the prairie west. The war ended the immediate economic crisis, replacing it with a military conflagration that engulfed the country for six years. At the end of the conflict, the people of Canada stared into the unknown, uncertain if the Great Depression would return or if the country could make a constructive transition to a peacetime economy.

For rural Canada, with memories of the dust bowl still strong, the end of the war and the post-war rebuilding held fear of a return to the pre-1939 economic troubles. However, through the tenure of Prime Minister Louis St-Laurent, much of rural Canada instead experienced a decade of widespread opportunity.

Throughout war the natural resource economy and Canadian agriculture generally stayed strong, but the percentage of the population living in rural areas fell almost 10 percent between 1941 and 1951. The relative decline continued through the 1950s, reflecting the rapid growth of the country’s largest cities. But in post-war Canada, unlike the country in the 2020s, rural constituencies still played an influential role in federal and provincial politics and had significant influence over national affairs.

In the 1940s and 1950s, all political parties worked hard to cultivate rural voters and to respond to their needs. In his first election as Liberal Party leader, Louis St-Laurent swept to a resounding victory, securing 191 seats and a large majority. His showing in the prairie west – 5 in Alberta, 14 in Saskatchewan and 11 in Manitoba – provided evidence of strong rural support. There was discontent, shown by the
10 Social Credit members elected from Alberta, but Liberals had strong rural constituencies across the country.

The St-Laurent governments played a major role in the improvement of the quality of life in rural Canada through the late 1940s and the 1950s. And more broadly, the transitions in rural Canada from the 1930s to the 1990s have been profound, including a dramatic rebound from the Great Depression, rural electrification, the improvement of country roads, expanded educational and health services, advanced mechanization of agriculture, and a general improvement in the quality of life across the country.

**Canada’s current approach to rural regions lacks a St-Laurent-like commitment to rural revitalization.**

This same time period saw both the rapid expansion in rural production (agricultural, forestry and mining) and sharp transitions in rural living. Communities that developed along railways and near grain elevators in the 19th and early 20th centuries declined dramatically toward the end of the 20th century, largely as a result of improved transportation systems.

The post-war boost to rural Canada owed a great deal to the infrastructure investments of the St-Laurent government. These investments sought, in turn, to enhance national unity by binding the country together, in the spirit of the Canadian Pacific and the Canadian Northern/National Railways. Nation-building had become an obsession under William Lyon Mackenzie King, who like many of his predecessors worried about national unity. The advent of universal social programs, led by the Mother’s Allowance in 1945, was matched by a bevy of post-war initiatives, including urban housing, that saw the federal government take increasingly bold steps into the realm of social programming.

As Prime Minister, Louis St-Laurent focused more on the country’s physical infrastructure than on the expansion of the social welfare system, although he continued many of his predecessor’s initiatives. During the war, Canada had developed a robust industrial system that had sustained the Allied military effort and provided a strong foundation for the shift to a peacetime economy driven by domestic consumption, particularly of cars, suburban homes, household appliances, and consumer electronics. But the country was far from complete. Private travel between major southern cities was poor and unfinished. The middle North, to say nothing of the Far North, was not well-connected to the rest of the country, leaving much of the nation’s resource potential unrealized.

In a measure of fundamental practical and symbolic importance, the Liberal government announced the Trans-Canada Highway Act in 1949. This project, which led to the opening of the highway in 1962, made private automobile travel easier and more dependable from the Atlantic to the Pacific, replacing the uneven quality of existing connectors and providing tangible proof of national unity. For many parts of rural Canada, from the Maritimes through to British Columbia, the Trans-Canada Highway represented a crucial development. Towns and small cities found themselves with ready access to larger centres and the enhanced economic opportunities attached to improved transportation systems. This major and unifying effort was matched by a commitment to the St. Lawrence Seaway, which had a comparable impact on the social and economic development of the Great Lakes when it opened in 1959.

As Canada addresses the current challenges of rebounding from the COVID-19 pandemic, it is useful to reflect on the lessons learned in the St-Laurent years. In contrast to the 1950s, rural Canada’s political stature is significantly lower in the 2020s. The empowered rural ridings of the 1950s factored prominently in national politics; the minority Liberal government of 2021, rooted largely in the major cities, has no such engagement with rural Canada.

Canada’s current approach to rural regions lacks a St-Laurent-like commitment to rural revitalization. A small effort to expand rural Internet service and continuing commitments to address First Nations’ water crises compare poorly to multi-billion-dollar investments in urban transit systems and major industrial support programs directed at the cities. The patchwork of federal economic programs targeted at rural areas lack the focus and long-term foundation for rural empowerment that were the hallmarks of Liberal plans in the 1950s.

The post-war years are not the 2020s and it’s wrong to expect that the Trudeau government would adopt the strategies that worked after the Second World War. But it is important to remember that a government like that under Louis St-Laurent, with solid support from across the country, with strength in both cities and rural areas, stands in sharp contrast to current realities, with party alliances separated by rural/urban divides along with ideological and partisan differences.

Perhaps this is the core lesson from the St-Laurent government: We need a new kind of politics that can bring together urban and rural Canada, and create a new commitment to the future of Canadians who have been left behind by today’s leaders.
A year into the COVID-19 crisis, what have we learned? Well, we’ve learned that pretty much the only thing the federal government is good at is spending money. Actually, not even that, since to be good at spending money carries with it the implication of spending money the right way in the right places. Better, perhaps, to say that it’s good at signing cheques. Lots and lots of large cheques for lots of things, which may or may not be directly pandemic-related.

The feds, although perhaps not to the same degree as their American counterparts, seem to have decided that any spending they feel like doing can be lumped under the heading of “pandemic recovery.” They also seem to have decided that pumping up federal spending will have no lasting impact either on inflation or on the rate of interest. Better, perhaps, to say that it’s good at signing cheques. Lots and lots of large cheques for lots of things, which may or may not be directly pandemic-related.

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When you’re actually on the front line, platitudes wear thin pretty quickly. Anyone who seriously thinks that we need a federal government-run single pharmacare plan (as opposed, perhaps, to a variant of a Swiss-style system) might give some thought to Ottawa’s management of our stocks of personal protective equipment (PPE) before, and early on in, the COVID crisis.

There are other policy lessons that come out of the pandemic, less dramatic but in the long-run more important. Perhaps the first of them must be that some really important stuff is really boring, and some really boring stuff is really important. Like, for example, pandemic monitoring and modelling. Neither is sexy but both are critical and, Imperial College London or IHME out in Washington State notwithstanding, both are the sort of thing that the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) should be mandated to treat as ongoing priorities.

These projects need to be done somewhere like the PHAC partly because

One year on: What have we learned from the COVID-19 crisis?
they’re not the sort of thing that academic institutions (even those that are currently doing them) can be expected to do in the long-run. That’s partly because, as academic research funded sources find themselves having to slice the meat more and more thinly, these are projects that grant review committees (made up of academics from outside the research funding agencies) are likely to rate as worthwhile but not top priority. And more importantly, doing that kind of research long-term is a risky way to acquire the journal publications necessary to build an academic career (and again, apologies to anyone who’s managed to do just that – keep it up as long as you can).

This kind of work needs to be done at a very high level, ideally by people who are prepared to build a career of it. There are federal agencies where that sort of career was once possible, although in recent years the mark of a successful career in Ottawa seems to involve jumping divisions and departments so often that there’s no time to acquire any kind of deep understanding of a single department’s responsibilities. And why Ottawa and not the provincial departments of health? Here the fact that the provinces are in the front line is a drawback: long-term analysis is easily set aside when bushfires need to be fought. There are provinces that have excellent modelling units, but the feds have, at least in theory, the luxury of having more resources and fewer distractions.

Other health care areas need some serious re-thinking in light of the pandemic experience. The tendency of both federal and provincial politicians to regard health care purely as a cost centre is one. We’ve been told, repeatedly, through the past year that our efforts must be directed towards protecting the health care system (in this case primarily hospitals) from being overloaded. Flatten the curve – the idea wasn’t to eliminate COVID, it was to stretch the pandemic out over a long enough period that intensive care units would be able to cope.

To that end, all sorts of other health care needs had to be postponed until COVID was under control, set aside whether the most dire of those predictions came to pass. Yet why were we in that situation in the first place? Could it have had anything to do with the fact that our hospitals have dangerously high occupancy rates, in many cases regularly operating at or above 100 percent occupancy? That’s not something that only happens in an emergency; for many of our major acute care hospitals, it’s the norm.

We’ve been told for years that we can, with our single payer government-run system, keep the cost of health care low. But the policies that have aimed at doing that have tended to be cut-the-fat policies. We’ve been cutting the fat for at least 40 years – have we perhaps been cutting into muscle and bone?

Think about a firm which produces a physical commodity. It can produce for immediate sale, but it can also produce for inventory, and it can draw on inventory when faced with an upsurge in demand, whether anticipated or unexpected. How does a hospital tackle that upsurge? It can do well. The key lesson of this pandemic is that in the interim before the next one (and remember that the next one will be completely different from this one) we need to stop and think about that very carefully.

Brian Ferguson is professor of economics at the Department of Economics and Finance at the University of Guelph, and a faculty associate of the Canadian Centre for Health Economics.

We need to better recognize the risks and trade-offs inherent in our public health measures against COVID.
The perils of a failure to innovate in confronting pandemics

We need to reimagine our approach to big data to address communicable and non-communicable diseases.

Tarun Katapally

The COVID-19 pandemic has left us catching our breath, literally as a society suffering from debilitating effects of the virus, as well as figuratively as health systems are barely able to cope with the exacerbation of existing public health problems. Our health systems weren’t ready for the impact of this pandemic, just as they weren’t innovating to address longstanding endemics like mental illness, and resurgent epidemics such as obesity. The stark reality is that this pandemic has heightened the negative impact of existing endemics and re-emerging epidemics.

In the understandable clamor of countries eager for vaccines, the inescapable politics of mask mandates, and the rightful focus on the depleted global economy, we aren’t asking ourselves a basic question – why weren’t we better prepared for this pandemic?

Living in a globalized world, global health is a local issue. Even if this self-evident fact escapes public policy and national security calculations, what should disappoint us is the inability of our advanced western health systems to respond rapidly to an existential threat, which could have been far worse. Perhaps that is not entirely fair as our 21st century health systems are restricted by 20th century public policy.

It is not difficult to imagine a pandemic scenario where the R₀ of the virus from its inception is far higher. The fast-emerging virus variants that are more readily transmissible provide evidence for this eventuality. Looking back over 100 years to the 1918 influenza pandemic, it is also not difficult to fathom a reality where the mortality rate is much higher in general. Perhaps more scarier, what would be the effect on our society if the mortality rate were similar across all age cohorts, including children and the workforce? Without minimizing the devastating impact this pandemic has had on our way of life and the millions of preventable deaths globally, one could be forgiven to think that we might have escaped a truly global catastrophe this time round.

This pandemic has heightened the negative impact of existing endemics and re-emerging epidemics.

Hypothesizing that we got lucky, have we learned any lessons that would help us prepare not only for a potentially world-altering pandemic, but also the endemics and epidemics that we have learnt to live with? The disparate pandemic responses across the world make it evident that we are, at the moment, unable to effectively coordinate our strategies, policies, and activities – an undeniable truth that lays bare our human deficiencies despite the technological and scientific advances in the past decades.

This inability to coordinate is worsened by the silos of our health systems, which are designed to internalize errors, rather than that communicate and coordinate across jurisdictional boundaries – a losing formula especially with a highly transmissible virus that knows no boundaries. Nevertheless, there is a larger systemic issue at play that health systems need to come to terms with, if they intend to retain their current role; it is the fact that we live in a digital world, where we communicate with each other using sophisticated digital tools, and exchange big data constantly.

Coordination of public health response in a health crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic – from triaging of potential cases within their homes and testing individuals at risk to addressing misinformation in real-time and tracking vaccine response – could be made highly efficient if health systems created digital pathways to directly engage citizens. Similarly, monitoring for illness, whether communicable or non-communicable, can be enabled by developing ethical engagement policies that emphasize citizen data sovereignty. Perhaps most importantly, in preparation for future crises, precision medicine tools using artificial intelligence can be used to not only prevent illness by

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The crisis of academic freedom in Canada and how to address it

Eric Kaufmann

Academic freedom for political minorities is in crisis in Canada and the wider Anglosphere. Despite a sharp rise in no-platforming and attempts to silence academics in the US, Britain and Canada since 2015, comparatively few incidents have been reported. Instead, the biggest problem is a chilling effect experienced by political minorities, notably conservatives and so-called “gender-critical feminists” who believe in the biological basis of womanhood. Many centrists, alongside some leftists who study Israel and the Middle East, also face restrictions. This intolerance comes both from threats of disciplinary action and via political discrimination from peers. The loss of intellectual freedom affects thousands of academics and students and is the core of the problem.

My new report for the Center for the Study of Partisanship and Ideology shows that campus-based threats to academics’ freedom to research and teach are considerable. Based on eight surveys of academics and graduate students across Canada, the US and Britain, it represents the largest survey-based study ever conducted into academic opinion about dismissal campaigns, political discrimination, chilling effects and self-censorship. It reveals the nature and extent of the problems of censorship and bias in academia from the perspectives of both perpetrators and victims.

There is good news: few academics support cancel culture. Less than 10 percent of Canadian academics backed each of five hypothetical campaigns to fire scholars who report controversial findings touching on race and gender. However, a large group of around 30 to 60 percent do not actively oppose cancellation in each scenario. This mirrors American and British findings and shows that there is considerable academic tolerance for cancel culture. After all, many academics support the progressive aims of the activists even if they have qualms about the authoritarianism of their methods.

The structure of public opinion among Canadian social sciences and humanities (SSH) academics reveals this cross-pressure. On the one hand, Canadian academics prioritize freedom of speech over social justice by a 53-34 margin, similar to the US. Yet Canadian SSH academics support mandatory race and gender quotas for reading lists more than they oppose them, by a margin of 48-29, broadly echoing American findings. This impinges on the freedom of academics to set their own reading lists and thereby violates academic freedom.

While favouring illiberal progressive initiatives like mandatory ‘decolonization’ of reading lists, academics do not want
threatened with discipline. In the US (as I don’t have Canadian data), one in three conservative academics and PhD students report being disciplined or threatened with disciplinary action for the content of their research, teaching or public commentary. The problem is not fading away, but it is likely to get worse if nothing is done. Why? Because Millennials are a less tolerant generation than Xers or Boomers. Younger academics are no more left-wing than their elders but are twice as likely as those over 50 to support dismissing controversial professors, with 41 percent of Canadian SSH academics under age 40 supporting at least one of four hypothetical dismissal campaigns. Canadian PhD students, 44 percent of whom back at least one dismissal campaign, are even more intolerant; this is similar to findings in the US and Britain. As a more authoritarian cohort enters the ranks of academia, the threat to the freedom of political minorities is likely to intensify.

There is also a longstanding problem of political discrimination, which has grown worse as the faculty has tilted increasingly to the left. A large minority of Canadian academics discriminate against conservatives in hiring, promotion, grants and publications. Forty-five percent of Canadian academics would not hire a known Trump supporter, which is also true of four in 10 American academics, while one in three British academics would discriminate against a Brexit supporter. This is not because academics are more biased than non-academics or the left discriminates more than right. In fact, my work shows there is a similar level of political bias in all these groups. That said, when the left outnumbers the right 14-1, as is true in my survey of Canadian SSH academics, and people’s views are apparent in their work, discrimination falls heavily against the right.

Discrimination also occurs in collegiate interactions. Just 27 percent Canadian academics would be comfortable having lunch with a gender-critical scholar who opposes the idea of trans women accessing women’s shelters. This is very similar to results from the US and Britain and is lower even than the 37 percent of Canadian academics who would be comfortable sitting down with a known Trump supporter. This also suggests that gender-critical feminists face the most severe discrimination of any political minority. In Britain, they are the group that is most likely to be no-platformed.

The combination of punishment and discrimination against dissenters means that political minorities are careful about what they say and write. Among conservative academics in the social sciences and humanities, 56 percent of Canadian conservatives, 70 percent of their American counterparts and 50 percent of British conservatives self-censor in teaching and research. This compares to 10 to 25 percent among left-wing faculty. Lack of freedom in casual conversation is even greater than in research and teaching; just 15 percent of Canadian academics say a Trump-supporting academic would feel comfortable expressing their beliefs to a colleague, about the same as in the US. Just 18 percent of Brexit-supporting SSH academics in Britain say they would openly express support for Brexit.

The result is a chilling effect. Around six in 10 conservative Canadian academics in the social sciences and humanities say there is a hostile climate for their beliefs in their department. This compares to just 9 percent among left-wing faculty in Canada. In the US and Britain, 75 percent of conservative academics in the SSH fields report a hostile climate.

This feeds into the graduate student recruitment pipeline: 53 percent of conservative SSH graduate students in a combined Canadian, British and American sample say that their political beliefs would make a difficult fit with an academic career compared to under 7 percent of leftists and centrists. My surveys show that conservative MA students self-select away from academia at significantly higher rates. In the UK, I also find that conservative academics retire earlier than their leftist counterparts.

This reproduces a political monoculture. Seventy-three percent of Canadian SSH academics sampled from the 40 top-ranked universities in the country identify as left-wing, with just 4 percent identifying as right-wing, a 73-4 ratio. In the US, across the top 100 universities, the numbers are almost identical, at 73-5. In Britain, across all universities, the ratio is 62-7. Seven percent of Canadian
We are now in a spiral, in which punishment and discrimination create chilling effects which keep dissidents out.

This chills the intellectual climate still further, in a feedback loop.

Will the problem of progressive authoritarianism fix itself? Or will it fade away like McCarthyism did in the 1950s? On both counts, the answer is no.

The problem of progressive illiberalism on campus was noticed in the late 1960s. It has been embedded in university policy since the late 1980s (via speech codes), persisting for close to four decades. Intolerance is an inherent component of a cultural-left ideology that sacralizes historically disadvantaged race, gender and sexual identity categories and therefore does not permit such groups to be offended. Universities are at the forefront of this secular creed and have been captured by a self-fulfilling dynamic, which means they cannot reform themselves. Only external intervention can break the spiral.

Statements of principles, such as those modelled on the Chicago Principles adopted by universities in Alberta and Ontario, are a start. But on their own, they will have little effect. Ninety percent of American universities maintain speech codes that violate the First Amendment. Universities pay lip service to academic freedom, but when this collides with the demands of activists who leverage loosely worded policies on harassment, diversity or university reputation, academic freedom is often sacrificed.

Mutual aid associations like the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE) in the US and Free Speech Union (UK, now in US) are vital, and are needed in Canada. Yet, even here, the onus is on the accused to fight back while activists against political discrimination and safeguarding public commentary. The white paper explicitly mentions that "emotional safety" as a rationale will not be accepted as a reason to limit speech. The Academic Freedom Champion and their staff will have the power to levy fines on non-compliant institutions. This could involve receiving reports from whistleblowers and plaintiffs, combined with rapid intervention. It should incentivize universities to reject frivolous complaints and ensure that the disciplinary apparatus is used very sparingly, and only for speech likely to infringe the law. The latter is crucial for nipping authoritarianism in the bud.

A Canadian equivalent should involve the creation of similar offices at the provincial level to proactively ensure that universities in receipt of public funds are adhering to the law on freedom of expression and not engaging in discrimination against political minorities.

Some have complained that this represents a violation of the academic freedom in universities and student unions. However, when institutions are violating individual rights, only the government can protect fundamental freedoms. When southern US universities discriminated against black students in the early 1960s, the federal government had to temporarily override their autonomy. When some British public schools were captured by Islamists, the government had to take over the schools. Individual autonomy trumps institutional autonomy, especially where institutions are publicly funded.

Likewise, today, there is no alternative to proactive, principled and persistent government intervention to restore academic freedom and tackle the pervasive chilling effects being felt so keenly by political minorities in the professoriate and student body.

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while Norway has embarked on an ambitious program of electrification of its oil and gas facilities, the “Tesla of LNG plants” is not Norway’s Hammerfest LNG plant with its electric motor-driven refrigeration compressors. The Equinor-operated Hammerfest LNG plant, on an island 300 miles north of the Arctic Circle, has processed natural gas from the Snøhvit field in the Barents Sea since 2007.

Natural gas is conveyed in a 160-kilometre pipeline to the facility where the greenhouse gas (GHG) carbon dioxide (CO2) is separated from the natural gas and returned to the Snøhvit field where it is injected in a separate formation under the reservoirs. The liquefied natural gas (LNG) is exported in custom-built ships.

Hammerfest’s three refrigeration compressor trains are equipped with the world’s largest, high-voltage, high-speed 65-megawatt (MW) Siemens synchronous, variable-speed, electric motors that provide high efficiency levels and high availability compared to natural gas-driven refrigeration compressors. Siemens also provides real-time digitized monitoring, analysis and optimization of the compressor trains.

But no, Norway’s Hammerfest is not the “Tesla of LNG Plants” because the electric power used to drive Hammerfest’s refrigeration compressors, despite much-touted local hydro, wind, and tidal power, is generated onsite by five natural gas-burning turbines. It is to be noted that one of the turbines caused a serious fire at the plant in September 2020 resulting in all plant operations being shut down until October 2021.

The “Tesla of LNG Plants” would be Canada’s proposed Kitimat and Saguenay LNG projects which would use low-carbon hydropower to power the LNG plants.

A lot of hydropower is required to run green LNG plants.

For example, the hydropower needed for the Kitimat LNG plant would be two-thirds of the power that would be produced by BC’s under-construction Site C dam. While Site C’s nameplate capacity is 1100 MW, it will have an average generating capacity of about 650 MW. Each of Kitimat LNG’s two process trains would require 200 MW. If the Pacific Trail Pipeline that would supply the natural gas for liquefaction was also electrified, the electricity demand for the entire project would consume all the power BC’s Site C dam will produce.

Kitimat LNG would be the greenest, lowest GHG-emitting LNG plant on Earth, as would GNL Quebec’s proposed Énergie Saguenay LNG Project at Port Saguenay. Énergie Saguenay has some support from the Quebec government but, incomprehensibly, has not obtained Alberta government and industry support even though it would exclusively use Alberta natural gas.

Natural gas liquefied into LNG using hydropower will cut global GHG emissions in half, and eliminate almost all the air pollution, wherever it is exported as LNG that displaces coal-fired power. In the worst example, China, almost 70 percent of electricity is still generated by burning coal.

Kitimat LNG and Énergie Saguenay will be environmental and sustainable energy global leaders that deserve all the support industry and the British Columbia, Alberta, Quebec, and Canadian federal governments can muster.

It is a national shame that Quebec and...
Andrew Pickford
Jeffrey Collins

US President Joe Biden recently joined his Japanese, Indian, and Australian counterparts at the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad) summit. This informal grouping remains the most powerful collection of countries focused on confronting the security, economic, and geostrategic challenges posed by China. Canada may not have been there but there is finally a growing realization across political parties and wider society that China’s actions necessitate that we stand up and stand together.

Under Xi Jinping, China has global superpower ambitions that involve undermining the international order founded by the US, Canada and other allies after the Second World War. International institutions like the World Health Organization are to be co-opted, while international laws and norms governing the law of the sea in places like the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea are to be ignored. Moreover, any foreign government that gets in the way of China’s interests quickly becomes roadkill under Beijing’s economic and (increasingly) military might.

Canada has already gotten a taste of Xi’s medicine with the kidnapping of citizens Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig in December 2018 following the detention on a US extradition request of Meng Wanzhou, deputy chair and CFO of Chinese telecom giant Huawei, days earlier. The years since have seen import bans on canola, restrictions on Maritime lobster, and the clandestine seizure of at least 100 tons of personal protective equipment in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, to name a few.

Any attempt to create a coherent strategy against Beijing’s bullying has been undermined by the quixotic belief that a unique mix of Trudeau familial history, international star power, and Laurentian business connections would lead to a blossoming in relations between Canada and China. Unfortunately, this proved to be a flimsy foundation for engagement with a China that was more authoritarian, protectionist and aggressive than the last time the Liberals were in power in the early 2000s.

It’s up to civil society to push against this visionless approach from Ottawa. In a recent study published by the Macdonald-Laurier Institute last October, we argued...

The threat of China’s retaliation should not be used as an excuse for Canada to continue its weak-kneed approach to China.

When will Canada finally join its allies in standing up to China?
that Canada should follow the example of its Commonwealth cousin and Quad member, Australia, and take a stand against China’s bullying and human rights violations. This contribution is one of many such calls for Canada to move off the sidelines.

These efforts, combined with a growing awareness of China’s belligerence in the wake of the Kovrig and Spavor kidnappings, have led to a shift in public opinion. In June, four-out-of-five Canadians expressed a belief that Ottawa must speak up about China’s human rights abuses. A similar number believe we should be even more bullish, specifically on issues that concern our national values. Only 7 percent have an even moderately positive view of the PRC regime.

Acting on this groundswell, the House of Commons voted unanimously (notwithstanding abstentions and the conspicuous absence of virtually all of cabinet) to support a non-binding motion labelling Beijing’s mistreatment of its Uyghur and other ethnic Turkic Muslims as genocide. This multiparty support was a significant change and an important juncture. Even former Prime Minister Stephen Harper, whose government in its later years in power oversaw the introduction of a foreign investment agreement with China, has warned that Beijing is now a “competitive rival” against Western interests.

Yet, despite the emergence of such a strong consensus, Ottawa continues to deal with China indecisively. Welcomed ad-hoc efforts like the recent Canada-led coalition of countries opposed to arbitrary detention are offset by actions like the split between the Liberal caucus and cabinet over the Uyghur motion, or ambassador Dominic Barton’s bizarre push in 2020 for more trade ties at a time when, a world away, ambassador to the UN Bob Rae called for an investigation into China’s treatment of the Uyghurs.

With the international community acting and the political and public spheres in Canada in political unison, Ottawa should finally transition this broad support for a coherent strategy on China into concrete action. China, after all, does not respect weakness.

This starts with revitalizing a Canadian vision of its role in the Indo-Pacific, identifying those areas in which Canada can be a meaningful partner for other countries in the region, like Australia, that are more assertive in their approach to China. Canada is unlikely to be taken seriously today as a potential member of an expanded Quad, but it can move toward greater integration, perhaps as an observer.

Andrew Pickford works between North America and Australia in the areas of strategy, economic analysis, and energy with a range of organizations, both private and public. Jeffrey F. Collins is a fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute.
Israel-Iran peace deal: Why it’s needed, what it could look like

If Abraham serves as inspiration for a new Arab-Israeli peace, then Cyrus serves as aspiration for an Israeli-Iranian one.

Mariam Memarsadeghi
Shuvaloy Majumdar

If Abraham serves as inspiration for a new Arab-Israeli peace, then Cyrus serves as aspiration for an Israeli-Iranian one. Where the United Arab Emirates succeeded at placing a satellite in orbit over Mars, the Iranian regime obsesses over developing a ballistic missile capable of delivering a nuclear payload. It is an obsession that has led to destruction.

Since the 1979 revolution, the Islamist theocracy ruling Iran has demonized the State of Israel, terrorized the Jewish state, and pursued its annihilation. It cultivates hatred for Israel as a nation and for Jews as a people, but in the four decades since the radical Islamists’ violent takeover, it has only managed to destroy Iran.

Israel has thrived. As a free nation it has prospered, now taking its legitimate place as a respected partner defining a regional peace that champions modernity over its medieval rivals.

Not only have Iran’s tyrants failed in their objective of eliminating Israel, their ideological hatreds have principally failed Iranians themselves. Today, respect and curiosity for the Israeli state on the Iranian street is common, especially among those who most despise Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s regime. Iranians yearn for restoring an open, modern and thriving nation, in great part imbued by pride for an ancient heritage and a pre-revolutionary, 20th-century modernism that celebrated cosmopolitan difference, religious freedom and friendship with Jews and Israel.

That this ideological propaganda would fail to be convincing is nothing new. As with subjects under Communist and fascist regimes, Iranians have long resisted the Orwellian control exercised by ruling clerics, seen on state media, and read in school textbooks. To them, the regime’s opposition to Israel’s existence affirms precisely the opposite sentiment; a seduction also reflected in the Iranian people’s esteem for the “Great Satan,” for equality between sexes, the liberty to sing and dance, and the right to live free from fear, and to earn an honest living.

Iranians yearning for freedom at home and for peace with their neighbours have a special appreciation for Israel’s investments in countering their tyrants. Iranians rejoiced in private and under the security of pseudonymous social media accounts on the occasion of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh’s assassination, upon the avalanche of information released from a hair-raising heist of a clandestine nuclear archive, the Stuxnet attack on Iran’s nuclear program, and the sabotage of regime infrastructure. They welcomed representations by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the United Nations General Assembly and the US Congress about the regime’s nefarious activities, as well as his personal outreach to the Iranian people.

Iranians are keen to engage with Israel’s pro-freedom public diplomacy, not least because of the large numbers of Jews of Iranian descent who consecrate Iran’s noble history; a history that provided the world its first universal declaration of human rights, carved upon a clay cylinder, and exalted by Jews because it corroborates the events in the Old Testament: the liberation of Jews from Babylon by King Cyrus, and their safe return to Jerusalem to rebuild their Temple. Some 2600 years ago, ancient Persian leadership cultivated a most modern sense of pluralism and peaceful co-existence, grounded in the universality of human rights.

Iran is also the burial place of Esther and Mordechai, and is still, despite the designs of regime fanatics, home to the largest community of Jews in the Middle East after the State of Israel. All of this makes peace and friendship between the peoples of Iran and Israel grounded in common history and most natural. It also underscores the
sad irony of the Iranian people being left outside the triumphant peace agreements the Abraham Accords afford.

Victoria Coates and Len Khodorkovsky have the hopeful idea of investing in the “Cyrus Accords,” a promise to revive an ancient bond between Iran and Israel. For Iranians to reach this destiny with Israel, changing a regime obsessed with war holds primacy over all else. With an American turn from maximum pressure to “Appeasement 2.0,” Israel and her allies could undertake a historic effort at strengthening the democratic resilience of the people of Iran.

Naysayers will be abundant, but support for the struggle of disidents, labour organizers, women’s-rights activists, student leaders and ordinary Iranians against one of the world’s most brutal tyrannies is not for the faint-hearted.

Israel and its like-minded partners can commit to:
1. supporting robust Persian-language broadcasting focused on Iran’s democracy movement, its tolerant past, and the opportunities of Israel’s flourishing democratic society;
2. a transparency initiative to expose the anatomy of how Khamenei’s cohorts raid the people’s treasury in exporting terrorism and war;
3. an international awareness campaign about the regime’s human rights atrocities, its antisemitism, and its Holocaust-denial;
4. providing sustained and emergency access for Iranians to organize online, particularly during regime shutdowns, and
5. establishing a Cyrus Trust for civic institutions that span the academy, arts, history and civil society, bridging Iranian, Israeli and Arab peoples.

The most disruptive investment that can be made against the regime’s four-decade-old war machine are in the very ideas that animate human life. The irreducible concept of the rights, dignity and liberty of every person holds a longevity from three millennia into our past, capable of surviving a temporary installation of medieval tyrants. In this, the promise of Abraham and of Cyrus can serve as a guide for the basis of unity between the peoples of the region. 😊

Mariam Memarsadeghi is a leading proponent for a democratic Iran. Shuvaloy Majumdar is a Munk senior fellow for foreign policy at MLI. This article first appeared in the Jerusalem Post.

Environmentalist applause (Sankey)
Continued from page 4

Let me be frank: First Nations do not need environmentalists or any other outsider groups to shape our future. We can fight our own battles, on our own terms, based on our own rights and interests. The eco-colonialists need to stop telling us what to do. It is not up to governments or activists to develop policies and force Indigenous people to live by them.

Canadians should be incensed that these agenda-driven activists still try to dictate how we should manage our traditional territories. This is completely unacceptable. It needs to stop, and it needs to stop now. Their actions are literally tearing families apart.

These interventions by outside environmental activists must be addressed. We will have these debates inside and between our communities, thank you very much. As Ottawa has a responsibility toward the well-being of Indigenous peoples, those at the highest level of authority must step up and start holding these groups accountable for their destructive acts against our communities. First Nations can no longer allow unknown activists to destroy our people and communities.

The agreement reached by the First Nations Climate Initiative table and the First Nations Major Projects Coalition should change the way Canadians understand Indigenous aspirations for the environment and economic development. First Nations care about our future, our people, our environment, and our country.

We have been waiting for environmentalists to applaud this impressive achievement. But we do not need their approval, just like we do not need their lectures and interventions. First Nations, as economic developers and as defenders of the environment, have their future well in hand. 😊

Chris Sankey is a senior fellow at MLI and a former elected Councillor for the Lax Kw’alaams Band.

East Coast fisheries (Coates)
Continued from page 6

ally acceptable form of compensation. In other words, there are alternate paths to a “moderate livelihood” that may be acceptable to the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet.

While these discussions continue, it is vital that governments, industry representatives and Indigenous leaders avoid provocative statements or proposals. The sense of unease on the East Coast is severe and volatile. Indigenous peoples feel, with justice, that their rights are not being honoured. Commercial fishers believe, without legal foundation but with strong political resonance, that their fishing rights and privileges are at risk. It would not take much for the comparatively mild confrontations in the region to erupt into more serious conflicts.

The Marshall decision has long stood out as one of the most commercially effective court decisions, drawing many Indigenous peoples into the fishing economy and
producing millions of dollars in incremental income for First Nations people, communities and governments. Yet court rulings must be respected by governments and the country at large. They are not to be avoided, obfuscated or otherwise pushed to the political margins.

Canada’s legal system is one of our country’s foundational strengths. But if significant court rulings, like the Marshall decision’s “moderate livelihood” provisions, can be left unresolved for over two decades, it brings Canadian law into disrepute. Conversely, a just and fair resolution can show all Canadians, including Mi’kmaq and Maliseet people, that the law can be effective and consequential.

Ken Coates is a Munk senior fellow at MLI.

National health systems (Katapally)
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taking each individual’s needs into consideration, but also respond rapidly to mitigate potential exacerbation of outbreaks.

Digital innovation in public health is lacking, which explains the dearth of application of big data to address population health crises. This reality has particular implications for health systems, which in general are rigid to using data that exist outside traditional health care settings. This reticence is perhaps warranted due to ethical issues related to data ownership and patient privacy. However, if innovations to leverage big data are not made a priority, health systems across the globe risk irrelevancy as big technology companies become more aggressive in cornering the health market.

There is a need to reimagine our approach to big data to address communicable and non-communicable diseases. This approach can decentralize technology and revolutionize health systems and healthy public policy.

Big data, if thoughtfully processed, can offer solutions that are far more efficient and sustainable than human-designed policy, which at the moment is inadequate. Big data can also help prevent, mitigate, and manage health crises, and the consequences of not embracing this approach are far worse than the risks of innovating. If Amazon, Google or Facebook can predict our behaviours and purchasing or voting patterns, why can’t health systems predict our risks and address them in real-time?

Here is one prediction I hope doesn’t come true – Big Tech, which is already investing heavily in the health sector, will continue to innovate and develop artificial intelligence. This will continue to minimize the role of the public health sector, and if we do not take this challenge seriously, we will face with the reality of choosing between health care services that are provided by Big Tech and our own health systems. This scenario will test the mandate of universal health care.

Tarun Katapally is an associate professor in the Johnson Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of Regina.

Tesla of LNG Plants (Priaro)
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Labrador hydropower are not transmitted across the country to sustainably drive production of natural gas and gas liquids from shales in Alberta and BC, to power LNG production in BC, and to reduce GHG emissions from the oil sands. In Alberta, three billion cubic feet of GHG-emitting natural gas are burned each day for oil sands mining, in-situ extraction, bitumen processing and upgrading, and for cogeneration of electricity.

It is a stated objective of Hydro-Quebec to increase its exports beyond its borders and support the decarbonization of north-eastern North America.

Lower energy demand brought on by the pandemic resulted in average export prices of only 4.4¢/kilowatthour (kWh) (from 4.9¢/kWh in 2019) in the first six months of 2020. This dropped to 4.3 ¢/kWh in the third quarter of 2020. Net electricity export amounts were also down in 2020 compared to 2019 by 1.7 terawatthours (TWh) for the first half of 2020 and by 3.2 TWh for the third quarter of 2020.

Construction of the 1550 MW Romaine hydroelectric project is expected to be complete in 2021 – continuing Quebec’s update and expansion of its transmission infrastructure to support its export plans.

Perhaps a national energy corridor transmitting Quebec and Labrador hydropower to western Canada could be negotiated in return for oil and natural gas pipelines to Central Canada and Eastern Canada, and to the East Coast through Quebec. Conversion of an existing, unused TC Energy gas pipeline would provide a secure, all-Canadian route to supply refineries in Sarnia, Nanticoke, Montreal, Levis and St. John with Canadian crude, and eliminate all foreign oil imports and oil tanker traffic in the St. Lawrence River and Gulf of St. Lawrence.

It is not widely known that an oil pipeline can easily batch dilbit, partially upgraded bitumen, conventional heavy oils, syncrude, conventional oil, light shale oil, intermediate refinery products, and finished refined products such as ultra low sulphur diesel and gasoline. The existing Trans Mountain pipeline to Vancouver has done just that for decades.

Such a national energy corridor would require industry and federal and provincial government leadership, vision, courage and cooperation of the highest order.

If Sir John A. Macdonald was alive today, I have no doubt he would be building a ‘Canadian Pacific Energy Corridor’ from the Atlantic to the Pacific. And he would do it for exactly the same reasons he built the Canadian Pacific Railway – to unite the country from coast to coast and to protect it from American interests.

Mike Priaro, a Lifetime Member of the Association of Professional Engineers and Geoscientists of Alberta, worked in the Alberta oil patch for 25 years and is an independent analyst.
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