RETHINKING THE TAIWAN QUESTION:
How Canada can update its rigid “One-China” policy for the 21st century

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September 2018
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# Table of contents

Executive Summary ........................................................................................................ 4
Sommaire .......................................................................................................................... 6
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 9
One-China Policy: Origins and Rationales ................................................................. 11
Canada’s Recognition of China ....................................................................................... 12
Post-Recognition .............................................................................................................. 14
United States ................................................................................................................... 20
France .............................................................................................................................. 22
Japan ................................................................................................................................. 23
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 25
Recommendations ............................................................................................................ 27
About the Author ............................................................................................................. 32
References ....................................................................................................................... 33
Endnotes............................................................................................................................. 39

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Executive Summary

Taiwan has faced a steadily deteriorating security situation, especially following the election of the more independence-oriented Tsai Ing-wen government in 2016. China has since renewed its efforts to curb Taiwan’s diplomatic presence abroad, resulting in four diplomatic allies – in the last two years alone – switching their recognition to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Beijing also undertook a number of provocative military exercises and self-described “Island Encirclement Patrols,” making it clear that China is positioning itself to unify Taiwan by force.

What exactly can Canada do in light of these developments, one may ask? The fact of the matter – quite a lot. But first Ottawa needs to be prepared to challenge some of the sacred shibboleths in how it has approached China and Taiwan.

Canada’s current approach to Taiwan remains heavily rooted in the past – a “one-China” policy designed in 1970, when the goal was to bring China out of isolation and sideline a Taiwanese dictatorship. The current situation is very different, with China an economic powerhouse under an increasingly authoritarian and belligerent leadership and Taiwan a vibrant democracy.

In today’s environment, Canada must be willing to reassess the wisdom of sticking to its rigid “one-China” policy and decades-long caution on all aspects of its very limited relationship with Taiwan. Indeed, the evidence is overwhelming that neither Canada’s nor anyone’s engagement effort is having any positive effect on China’s human rights or progress towards democracy.

Ottawa needs to be prepared to challenge some of the sacred shibboleths in how it has approached China and Taiwan.

The most common reason advanced for ignoring Taiwan’s security is that some unspecified element of our one-China policy prohibits this. There is little to support this assertion. The 1970 Sino-Canadian joint communiqué says nothing against security cooperation, and no scholar has unearthed anything prohibiting such cooperation. Despite the example of the US, France, and Japan, there is absolutely no Canadian contact or cooperation with Taiwan or with our allies on its security problems.
Based on a review of how our allies interact with the PRC and Taiwan on issues facing Canada, this paper offers two types of recommendations: those on security issues, and those on administrative non-security issues.

**Recommendations on security issues**

- Actions such as naval deployments to the Western Pacific should be continued and joining multinational exercises that could later include Taiwan encouraged, as they establish important links with the major security players in the region.
- Canada should join multinational efforts that include port calls in Taiwan.
- Canada should assist the US-sponsored effort to upgrade and replace Taiwan’s submarine fleet.
- Canada would be wise to join the US-supported intelligence effort in Taiwan or, if a more cautious route is desired, follow recent muted Taiwanese-Japanese initiatives to establish a more formal intelligence-sharing agreement.
- The Canadian Trade Office Taipei should have a full-time security liaison officer or military attaché, particularly as we have much to gain from Taiwan’s experience and expertise in handling daily cyber attacks.
- Canada’s military, intelligence services, and diplomats require greater numbers of Chinese-language speakers. This training is best conducted in Taiwan, where full immersion training can be done in a relatively safe environment at top grade schools and universities.
- Canada’s think tanks should consider closer contact and the potential for reciprocal researcher exchanges with Taiwan’s Prospect Foundation or the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy.
- Stop the artificial separation of security and economics: support Japan’s suggestion that Taiwan be included in the second round of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (now called the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership).

**Recommendations on non-security issues**

The following recommendations are made because of self-censoring done by Canadian officials in the absence of clarity and understanding of Canada’s one-China policy. Correcting this would involve the government re-issuing and updating its policies in these areas:

- Follow the EU model and declare that the only officials proscribed from visiting Taiwan, or their Taiwanese counterparts being received in Canada, are the prime minister, deputy prime minister, and the ministers of foreign affairs and defence.
- Make it clear that there are no restrictions on Canadian officials attending conferences in Taiwan or elsewhere when Taiwanese officials are present.
- Rename the Global Affairs Canada office dealing with Taiwan from “Greater China Division” to something more neutral along the lines of “China and Region Division.”
- The Canadian Trade Office Taipei should be renamed the Canadian Trade Office Taiwan, following the US and Japanese example. Consider removing the “Trade” element as the Canadian office does more.
• Canada should join with the US, Australia, France, Germany, the UK, and Japan to press for Taiwan’s membership in the World Health Assembly and World Health Organization.

• Canada should work with its allies to develop a prioritized action list of other international organizations that Taiwan should be a member of, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, INTERPOL, and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.

• Any one-way consultation practice with the PRC on Taiwan issues should stop.

Any one of these actions will undoubtedly produce the usual hyperbolic outrage from China. But, as Canada considers action on these suggestions, several things should be borne in mind. Almost all of the recommendations are based on actions some other Western-oriented nation has already taken. Further, many of the security-related recommendations were selected because they best offer Canada the option of joining a multinational effort in advancing them.

A growing number of states want to take concrete security steps to send a clearer signal to a China that has not responded to engagement and is taking increasingly risky action against Taiwan. It’s time for Canada to join them in these efforts.

**Sommaire**

Taiwan doit faire face à des conditions de sécurité qui se dégradent de façon continue, surtout depuis l’élection du gouvernement à visée indépendantiste de Tsai Ing-wen en 2016. La Chine a entrepris parallèlement de renouveler ses efforts pour réduire la présence diplomatique de Taiwan à l’étranger, ce qui lui a fait gagner quatre alliés diplomatiques – au cours des deux dernières années seulement – qui reconnaissent désormais la République populaire de Chine (RPC). Pékin s’est également livré à un certain nombre de manœuvres militaires provocatrices et, tel qu’il l’a décrit lui-même, a organisé des patrouilles d’encerclement de l’île, témoignant clairement de la volonté de la Chine d’unifier l’ensemble du territoire par la force.

On peut se demander ce que peut faire exactement le Canada à la lumière de ces développements. La réponse, c’est qu’en réalité il peut faire beaucoup. Mais d’abord, Ottawa doit être disposé à remettre en question certains des shibboleth sacrés lui ayant jadis ouvert les portes de la Chine et de Taiwan.

L’approche actuelle du Canada à l’égard de Taïwan demeure fortement enracinée dans le passé – dans la politique d’« Une seule Chine » adoptée en 1970, au moment où l’objectif était de briser l’isolement de la Chine et d’écarter la dictature taïwanaise. La situation actuelle est bien différente, la Chine étant devenue une puissance économique sous une direction de plus en plus autoritaire et belliqueuse, alors que Taiwan est maintenant une démocratie dynamique.

Dans l’environnement présent, le Canada doit être prêt à réévaluer le bien-fondé de sa politique rigide axée sur le principe d’« Une seule Chine » et de plusieurs décennies de réserve à l’égard de tous les aspects de sa relation très limitée avec Taiwan. En effet, incontestablement, aucun effort de mobilisation, ni du Canada ni d’ailleurs, n’a d’effet positif sur la situation des droits de la personne ou le progrès vers la démocratie en Chine.

Il convient de noter qu’en fait, plus tôt cette année, le Canada s’est avancé timidement dans la direction d’un assouplissement de sa politique fermement axée sur le principe d’une seule
Chine – lorsqu’il a exprimé son soutien envers la participation de Taïwan à l’Assemblée mondiale de la santé, soutien auquel se sont ralliés tout d’abord la Nouvelle-Zélande puis, l’Allemagne, le Japon, l’Australie, les États-Unis et d’autres pays. Plutôt que d’agir en fonction d’un incident isolé, le Canada ferait bien de prendre appui sur cette première mesure pour accroître ses contacts et coopérer plus étroitement avec Taïwan.

La coopération en matière de sécurité demeure un moyen particulièrement déprécié pour renforcer les relations entre le Canada et Taïwan. Les motifs les plus souvent invoqués pour passer sous silence la question de la sécurité taïwanaise relèvent de certains aspects flous, mais prohibitifs, de notre politique en faveur d’une seule Chine. Or, les preuves à l’appui de cette thèse sont rares. Le communiqué conjoint sino-canadien de 1970 ne contient aucun énoncé contre la coopération en matière de sécurité, et aucun universitaire n’a déterré quoi que ce soit interdisant cette coopération. Malgré l’exemple donné par les États-Unis, la France et le Japon, le Canada n’entretient absolument aucune relation ni ne coopère avec Taïwan ou nos alliés au sujet des problèmes de ce pays en matière de sécurité.

À la lumière d’un examen sur la façon dont nos alliés interagissent avec la République populaire de Chine et Taïwan concernant les enjeux auxquels fait face le Canada, ce document présente deux types de recommandations : les premières portent sur les questions de sécurité et les autres, sur les questions administratives indépendantes de la sécurité.

**Recommandations sur les questions de sécurité**

- Le Canada ferait bien de se joindre aux activités américaines de renseignement à Taïwan ou, s’il est souhaitable d’adopter une voie plus circonspecte, de s’inspirer des modestes initiatives lancées récemment par Taïwan et le Japon afin d’établir un cadre plus formel d’accord pour le partage de renseignements.

- Puisqu’elles engendrent des liens importants avec les principaux acteurs de la sécurité dans la région, les mesures telles que le déploiement de forces navales dans l’ouest du Pacifique devraient se poursuivre, tandis que leur intégration aux exercices multinationaux qui incluraient éventuellement Taïwan devrait être encouragée.

- Le Canada doit se joindre aux efforts multinationaux qui comprennent des ports d’escale à Taïwan.

- Le Canada doit contribuer aux efforts parrainés par les États-Unis pour mettre à niveau et remplacer la flotte taïwanaise de sous-marins.

- Le Bureau commercial du Canada à Taïpei devrait retenir les services à plein temps d’un agent de liaison et de sécurité ou d’un attaché militaire, d’autant plus que nous avons beaucoup à gagner de l’expérience et de l’expertise de Taïwan dans la gestion des cyberattaques quotidiennes.

- L’armée, les services de renseignement et les diplomates canadiens ont besoin d’un plus grand nombre de locuteurs de langue chinoise. Il est préférable que cette formation soit offerte à Taïwan, car une immersion complète y est possible par l’intermédiaire d’écoles et d’universités de haut niveau dans un environnement relativement sûr.

- Les groupes de réflexion canadiens devraient envisager des contacts plus étroits avec leurs homologues taïwanais – la Prospect Foundation ou la Taiwan Foundation for Democracy –, tout en songeant au potentiel des programmes d’échange réciproque de chercheurs.
• La séparation artificielle entre la sécurité et l’économie doit disparaître : il faut appuyer la proposition du Japon voulant que Taïwan participe à la seconde ronde de négociation menée dans le cadre de l’Accord de Partenariat transpacifique (maintenant appelé Partenariat transpacifique global et progressiste).

**Recommandations sur les questions non liées à la sécurité**

L’autocensure pratiquée par les représentants canadiens en l’absence de clarté et de compréhension de la politique en faveur d’une seule Chine motive les recommandations que voici. Rectifier la situation nécessitera que le gouvernement renouvelle et mette à jour ses politiques de la manière présentée ci-dessous :

• Adopter le modèle de l’Union européenne et déclarer que les seuls représentants soumis à l’interdiction de se rendre à Taïwan ou d’entrer au Canada sont le premier ministre, le vice-premier ministre et les ministres des Affaires étrangères et de la Défense.

• Confirmer qu’aucune restriction n’empêche les représentants canadiens de participer à des conférences à Taïwan ou ailleurs lorsque des représentants taiwanais sont présents.

• Renommer l’actuelle direction d’Affaires mondiales Canada qui traite avec Taïwan en utilisant un terme plus neutre, par exemple, « Chine et Région », en remplacement de la direction de la « Chine élargie ».

• À la suite de l’exemple donné par les États-Unis et le Japon, retenir l’appellation « Bureau commercial du Canada à Taïwan » par préférence à l’actuel « Bureau commercial du Canada à Taïpei ». Envisager également d’élimer le terme « commercial », puisque le bureau canadien s’occupe de questions bien plus étendues.

• Se ranger du côté des États-Unis, de l’Australie, de la France, de l’Allemagne, du Royaume-Uni et du Japon pour demander que Taïwan adhère à l’Assemblée mondiale de la santé et à l’Organisation mondiale de la santé.

• Collaborer avec nos alliés pour préparer une liste de mesures prioritaires concernant l’adhésion de Taïwan à d’autres organisations internationales, telles que l’Organisation de l’aviation civile internationale, INTERPOL et la Convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques.

• Cesser toutes les pratiques de consultation à sens unique avec la République populaire de Chine sur les questions touchant Taïwan.

Comme à l’habitude, la moindre de ces actions déclenchera sans doute l’ire de la Chine. Or, à mesure que le Canada envisagera d’agir relativement à ces propositions, plusieurs éléments devront être pris en compte. Presque toutes les recommandations sont basées sur des actions déjà prises par d’autres pays d’orientation occidentale. De plus, un grand nombre de recommandations liées à la sécurité ont été retenues parce qu’elles sont les plus aptes à offrir au Canada la possibilité de se joindre à un effort multinational propre à donner des résultats.

Un nombre croissant d’États souhaite prendre des mesures de sécurité concrètes pour envoyer un signal clair à une Chine qui n’a pas respecté son engagement et qui prend des mesures de plus en plus risquées contre Taïwan. Il est temps pour le Canada de se joindre à ces efforts.
Introduction

Taiwan has faced a steadily deteriorating security situation since 2016 and many trace this trend to the island’s election of the more independence-oriented Tsai Ing-wen government.¹ In addition to ending the cross-Strait dialogue in 2016, China renewed its efforts to curb Taiwan’s diplomatic presence abroad and undertook a number of provocative military exercises. In 2018, for example, China conducted live-fire exercises and a transit by its new aircraft carrier through the Taiwan Strait, while its missile-armed bombers conducted multiple “Island Encirclement Patrols” around Taiwan. A Chinese government spokesman indicated these manoeuvres were “a strong warning against the ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces,” concluding that “[t]here is no way out for ‘Taiwan independence’” (O’Connor 2018).

In partial response to these security trends, US President Donald Trump signed the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act, which allows US warships to conduct port visits to Taiwan. In response, a senior Chinese diplomat at its Washington embassy declared, “The day that a US Navy vessel arrives in Kaohsiung [Taiwan’s major port] is the day that our People’s Liberation Army unifies Taiwan with military force” (Blanchard and Yu 2017). The Defense Authorization Act was also decried as a violation of the one-China principle since Beijing considers Taiwan a province of China awaiting unification (Blanchard 2017).

Later, China’s President Xi Jinping, while outlining a general desire for the peaceful reunification of the island, went on to stress that “every inch of our great motherland’s territory cannot be separated from China,” a declaration widely recognized as a warning to Taiwan and the US (Berlinger and Hunt 2018). The commander of China’s ground forces also indicated that a peaceful unification option for the island, while desirable, was not open ended: “That doesn’t mean the problem could be postponed indefinitely. It should be solved as quickly as possible” (Berlinger and Hunt 2018).

A retired People’s Liberation Army (PLA) general had earlier suggested on the website of the government’s second largest newspaper that the optimum attack window would be 2020–2025 (Wade 2013).² A very experienced US intelligence analyst, James Fanell (2018), recently informed the US House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that the premier of China had indeed given the PLA a deadline of 2020 “to be ready to invade Taiwan” (4).³

Up until May of this year, the Canadian government had stuck closely to its own one-China policy and provided no comment on any aspect of Taiwan’s security situation, save for a 2005 statement indicating that Canada opposes any attempt to unilaterally alter Taiwan’s status.⁴
Some commentators have urged Ottawa to become more engaged, including David Bercuson (2018) at the University of Calgary and David Mulroney (2015, 245), former Canadian ambassador to Beijing. In 2015, Mulroney argued that “[s]heltering and supporting Taiwan will almost certainly be an increasing challenge, but it is a challenge worth facing.” He also added that the US would welcome Canadian support.

Yet there is no evidence these recommendations were being considered even before the arrival of the Trump presidency. This continues Canada’s decades-long caution on all aspects of its very limited relationship with Taiwan. Even when Taiwan suffered a major earthquake in 2018, the Canadian government’s condolences were issued by the Canadian Trade Office in Taipei via a Facebook entry. In contrast, Japan’s prime minister wrote a personal letter of condolence and posted himself doing so online (Huang, Kao, and Liu 2018).

Canadian caution is also apparent in other areas. After Air Canada was forced by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to amend its website to refer, incorrectly, to “Taipei, Taiwan, CN” instead of “Taipei, Taiwan,” the Canadian government did not respond other than to argue Air Canada was a private company that operated independently of the government (Canada, Parliament, Debates of the Senate, 42nd Parl, 1st Sess, Vol 150, No 208 (23 May 2018)). This was in direct contrast to protests by the Australian and US governments, the latter of which publicly referred to China’s airline demands as “Orwellian nonsense” (Cole 2018).

The Canadian government’s strict interpretation of its own one-China policy and its very limited responses to Taiwan issues have been consistent irrespective of the Canadian political party in power. Professor Paul Evans from the University of British Columbia, with some authority, argues that Canada has pursued its one-China policy with “a vengeance,” with the “chief casualty” being Taiwan (Evans 1991, 12).

My own recent research bears this out. Some officials have even argued that our one-China policy proscribes Canadian federal officials from attending international conferences anywhere if Taiwan also sends representatives. However, this May, the Trudeau government started providing the barest of hints that its Taiwan policy may be under modification. In fact, a very strong case can be made for a complete review of Canada’s one-China policy in view of the rapidly changing security situation. There is a need, therefore to examine why Canada adopted its one-China policy and whether it is in fact as harsh and rigid as it appears. We also need to look at how some of our major allies derived and then modified their own one-China policies with a particular focus on their response to security issues. Finally, it is critical we review today’s security challenges in the Taiwan Strait and see if and where Canada should modify its policy.

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A very strong case can be made for a complete review of Canada’s one-China policy.
One-China Policy: Origins and Rationales

The central element of most states’ one-China policy is that there is only one China and that is the People’s Republic of China. Moreover, the PRC version of one-China also claims that Taiwan is its province. The Chinese government’s justification is grounded in history and explained in detail in two white papers (PRC 1993; PRC 2000). These papers rely on three central assertions. The first argues that “Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times” (PRC 1993). There is no question that China’s Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) expelled the Dutch in 1662, and it and the follow-on Qing Dynasty (1644–1912) did much to establish the Chinese character of Taiwan by increasing the island’s population and economy. However, even at the height of the latter’s control over Taiwan, few credit the dynasty with controlling more than 45 percent of the island, the remainder held primarily by its Aboriginal people. In addition, China ceded Taiwan to Japan as part of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. The Japanese, in turn, held the island until their defeat in 1945.

That moment sets the stage for the second PRC assertion. This argues that the 1943 Cairo Declaration, the 1945 Potsdam Agreement, and the instruments of surrender for Japan directed that all the Chinese territory it had conquered, including Taiwan, be “restored” to the Republic of China (ROC) (Hsieh 2009, 61). With the flight of Chiang Kai-shek’s defeated ROC government and his Kuomintang (KMT) party to Taiwan in 1949, the PRC asserts it was the legitimate successor government of China and thus the legal holder of those returned territories – and not the ROC-KMT government that had fled. According to the Taiwanese government’s counter-argument, the PRC has not superseded it on Taiwan, where the ROC governed without interruption as a state separate from the mainland since 1949 (MOFA 2000).

The third assertion in support of the PRC’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan involves the claim that:

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, 157 countries have established diplomatic relations with China. All these countries recognize that there is only one China and that the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China and Taiwan is part of China. (PRC 1993, 2)

Pasha L. Hsieh (2009), writing for the Singapore Management University’s School of Law, points out that while most countries do indeed recognize the PRC as the legal government of China, “they almost uniformly disagree with the PRC’s territorial claim over Taiwan” (63). He then notes that individual states, including Canada, have added important qualifiers – they may “take note of,” “acknowledge,” or “understand and respect” the PRC’s position that Taiwan is part of China but they do not share that position.

While not an assertion, the PRC’s 2000 white paper also attempts to counter arguments that the people of Taiwan enjoy the right of self-determination, as guaranteed by the UN Charter. The PRC refutes such claims, stating that “The issue of national self-determination, therefore, does not exist” because this would put more weight on the views of the 23 million Taiwanese than the views of the much larger mainland population: “sovereignty over Taiwan belongs to all the Chinese people” (PRC 2000, Part IV). The white paper also rejects the use of a referendum to address the issue and additionally claims “China is under no obligation to commit itself to rule out the use of force” in achieving unification, although it states that peaceful means are preferred.
All these rationales seem at odds with the UN view that its Charter provides that “all peoples have the right, freely and without external interference, to determine their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (UNGA 1996). The PRC argument also ignores consistent Taiwanese polling that shows only a small minority on the island, some 15.5 percent, support unification with mainland China while 35.4 percent support full independence and 62.5 percent favour a continuation of the status quo.¹²

**Canada’s Recognition of China**

The historical and legal issues surrounding China’s claim to Taiwan are by no means straightforward. Jonathan Manthorpe (2002), in his history of Taiwan, assesses the PRC argument for sovereignty over the island as “frail” (xii). The government of Taiwan’s position, on the other hand, was not assisted by its long-standing and dubious claim to sovereignty over the mainland, noting that this claim ceased being supported in the 1990s. Unsurprisingly, the Canadian government in the 1950s felt such a question should be referred to the UN or an international conference for resolution; Canada, with most western states, initially followed what came to be known as a “two-China” or “one-China, one-Taiwan” policy that recognized two separate Chinese governments (Evans 1990, 81).

The latter two policies came under increasing attack from China in the 1960s. Buoyed, perhaps, by the increasing number of international states ready to recognize the PRC and ensure it received a UN seat, China began to link all these elements into its current one-China principle. This combination was used to argue that any move to grant the PRC diplomatic recognition and a UN seat must be accompanied by an acknowledgment that Taiwan was part of China, and that states recognizing China must cease diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. The PRC’s increasing economic leverage frequently buttressed its case and its position on Taiwan hardened steadily. (Wu 2000, 135).

The United Kingdom and France were able to grant China recognition without having to say anything about Taiwan’s existence in 1950 and 1964, respectively. Canada initially hoped to follow this trend and emphasized its one-China, one-Taiwan policy in public (Wu 2000, 407; 398). In campaigning for the leadership of the Liberal Party, Pierre Trudeau called for the diplomatic recognition of Communist China with the understanding that Canada would maintain relations with Taiwan (Thordarson 1972, 76). External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp repeated this intent prior to the beginning of negotiations in 1969, as did the counsellor of the Canadian embassy in Stockholm in charge of the negotiations. He stated “there can be no compromise” on the Taiwan issue, although he later claimed he was quoted out of context (Frolic 1991, 194; 201; and particularly footnote 24).

Certainly, Canadian support for Taiwan was not total. Many in Canada were concerned over the brutality of the dictatorial Chiang Kai-shek government.¹³ Commercial ties to the PRC
were also becoming increasingly important. From 1960 onward, Canadian wheat sales to China increased steadily and soon one bushel out of every seven grown in Canada went to China (Kostecki 1982, 223). As Der-yuan Wu (2000) argues in his doctoral dissertation at Carleton University, “The beginning of the wheat sales made the concern for Canadian trade relations with the mainland become of growing importance in the policy process” (98).

The actual Sino-Canadian negotiations on recognition began in 1969 in Stockholm and would last 20 months. Wheat was certainly a factor, as the Canadian Wheat Board went to Beijing for a “major negotiating session” during the Stockholm recognition talks, though the government insisted there would be no linkage (Frolic 1991, 196–197; 205). Nonetheless, the Wheat Board, joined with the Department of Industry Trade and Commerce, “strongly objected” in Cabinet against the one-China, one-Taiwan policy on the grounds that it could jeopardize future wheat sales to the mainland (Frolic 1991, 196; Wu 2000, 143).

The PRC would add significantly to this pressure. Soon after the start of recognition negotiations, China presented Canada with three demands – that a country recognizing China must:

- recognize the PRC as “the sole government of the Chinese people;”
- recognize that Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory and sever relations with the “Chiang Kai-shek gang;”
- support the PRC in taking its place in the UN while denying Taiwan any part in it (Wu 2000, 147–148).

Throughout the year-and-a-half negotiation process, it became clear to the Canadian negotiators that the PRC’s sole focus was on derecognizing Taiwan and ensuring it was treated as part of the mainland (Frolic 2011, 10; Wu 2000, 15). A Department of External Affairs (DEA) October 20, 1969 cable to our Stockholm embassy noted:

> The overriding Chinese interest seems to be to use negotiations with Canada as means of obtaining as forthright [a] statement as possible on Taiwan’s status . . . which) seems to be more important to Peking than establishment of diplomatic relations. (cited in Wu 2000, 158–159)

Steady PRC pressure on the Taiwan issue had its effect. Midway through the negotiations, Canada abruptly changed from a two-China to a one-China policy that would involve not recognizing and then breaking relations from Taiwan (Evans 1990, 85). This was questioned vigorously in Parliament where Mitchell Sharp responded with a brief statement of our new one-China policy (Frolic 1991, 207–208). Canada was, however, ultimately able to partially finesse the PRC’s insistent claim to Taiwan via a formula that called for Canada to “neither challenge nor endorse” the claim, but to “take note” of it. The 1970 Canada-China joint communique announcing recognition did accept the PRC as the sole government of China (but not the “Chinese people” as Beijing initially demanded) and agreed to support its entry into the United Nations (quoted in Wu 2000, 455). It did not publicly commit Canada to derecognizing Taiwan but this was certainly the two nations’ intent.

Yet Canada’s evolving one-China policy seemed to offer continued unofficial relations with Taiwan in the non-political areas of trade, science, and culture, with DEA informing its officials that “[t]echnical and commercial relationships (that serve Canadian interests) will be maintained but in each case the precise arrangements should be cleared with [the] dept beforehand” (Canada 1970c). Canada had also assured the United States, which remained concerned over Taiwan’s
increasing isolation, that Ottawa would maintain “good” relations with Taiwan in the commercial and non-political areas (Evans 1990, 85; Wu 2000, 144–146; 211; 266; Frolic 1991, 198).

When our recognition of China was announced in October 1970 it was considered a resounding success – “hugely popular, capturing the Canadian imagination,” according to Paul Evans (1990, 87). The Canadian media was also enthusiastic (Frolic 1990, 42). Others viewed recognition as “a substantial diplomatic coup” with many countries adopting a variation of the Canadian “take note” formula (Frolic 1991, 210). According to Bernie Frolic (1991) of York University, some Canadians saw it as “an act of emancipation from the suffocating embrace of bad American policy” given initial US opposition to recognition in the 1960s (212). Taiwan’s derecognition was not the Canadian public’s focus.

Many years later a senior Chinese foreign ministry official confirmed the Canadian negotiators’ initial observations, telling Frolic that “[e]stablishing diplomatic relations was all about Taiwan” (Frolic 2011, 5). Frolic, who had been a Canadian diplomat in Beijing, suggests we had lost control of the agenda to China’s insistence on addressing Taiwan and any attempt by Canada to deal with the practicalities of recognition (trade agreements, claim settlements, etc.) was put off until after recognition (10).

Frolic’s interview with that same PRC official suggests we may never have controlled the agenda at any time. That PRC official also claimed, “We were ready to wait 100 years or more to get agreement that there is only one China. Canada was flexible; we knew that the Americans were not” (5). Similarly, citing a 2010 internal PRC diplomatic study of their recognition negotiations, Paul Evans (2013) concludes that “Beijing chose Canada” over two other states to advance the opening up of its diplomacy (27).

The possibility that China picked Canada to advance its Taiwan case suggests a need to revise or at least qualify the popular view that the negotiations were a Canadian initiative (Head and Trudeau 1995, 224). It could have been a case of two compatible interests simply advancing in tandem by happenstance. To add to these doubts, Der-yuan Wu points out that while Canada came under intense PRC pressure to abandon Taiwan during the 1969–1970 negotiations, no comparable pressure appears to have been exerted on Turkey, Austria, Mexico, or Equatorial Guinea, all of whom recognized China in 1971 without having to mention Taiwan (Wu 2000, 245).

### Post-Recognition

In Canada there was no second-guessing of the country’s new policy towards Taiwan at the time. On October 12, 1970 the Taiwanese ambassador was informed that he and his staff had...
one month to clear out of their Ottawa facilities and their Vancouver Consulate and depart Canada. Thankfully, Canada had kept the Taiwanese government briefed on the progress of the negotiations so that this order was not a complete surprise. In addition, External Affairs also took steps to seize Taiwan’s Ottawa embassy premises for the potential new PRC occupants, only to find Taiwan had sold its properties to a US buyer and was now leasing them. Canada then set its sights on capturing the Taiwanese official vehicles (Canada 1970b, 2).18 The intent was to demonstrate that Canada’s break with Taiwan was to be, according to External Affairs, “as total and complete as possible within the bounds of normal good manners.” Despite the stated promise of maintaining informal relations with Taiwan, Paul Evans (1990) assessed “no provisions were made for informal or unofficial relations with Taiwan” (86).

If political relations with Taiwan were now impossible, economic relations began to develop. Taiwan soon became the world’s 12th largest trading nation, much of it focused on high-valued electronic goods. Trade between our two nations expanded dramatically – Taiwan was Canada’s 7th largest trading partner in 1989, with Taiwan enjoying a three-to-one trade surplus (88).

Paul Evans suggests the need to boost our exports to offset the rising Taiwanese surplus encouraged Canada to set up the Canadian Trade Office in Taipei (CTOT) in 1986, a move the DEA had been avoiding since 1970. This Canadian resistance was somewhat unique as other Western nations, like Japan and the United States, took steps to establish reciprocal quasi-embassies with Taiwan immediately after they had derecognized it. The initial problem with Canada doing so, despite Cabinet documents offering the option of exchanging unofficial trade offices as early as 1970, was the apparent desire of Canada’s team in Sweden to conclude negotiations with the PRC as “soon as possible” (Wu 2000, 414).19 This need for urgency seemed to have eliminated the option of exchanging offices with Taiwan, and the reason for the negotiators’ haste has not been explained.

Later, Canada’s rigid application of its new one-China policy coupled with PRC pressure on Canada not to accommodate Taiwan likely contributed to the following 16-year delay in setting up the CTOT. The allure of the Chinese market also played a large role. In responding to MPs calls in 1975 for greater Taiwanese representation in Canada, an External Affairs briefing note commented: “Canada’s essential current and long-term trading (and political) interests lie in the PRC, not Taiwan” (Memo for Min Dec. (DEA) 30/75), cited in Wu 2000, 319).20

Despite this intended focus on commercial ties with the PRC, Canadian trade with Taiwan continued to expand and was now assisted by a parallel Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (TECO) established in Ottawa in 1992. Beyond their trade functions, both the CTOT and the TECO played an important role in assisting the 60,000 Canadians in Taiwan and the 200,000 Taiwanese citizens in Canada as well as managing the expanding liaison between each states’ Indigenous peoples.
In addition, Canada’s National Research Council (NRC) established extensive links with Taiwan’s research centres with much of the work centered on advanced communications (Wu 2011, 79). Canada also established an MOU on Telecommunications with Taiwan and an Avoidance of Double Taxation Arrangement, although the latter brought warnings from the PRC over the need to “abide by the one-China principle and cautiously deal with the relative issues” (Vanderklippe 2018). These types of economic, cultural, and scientific links were the only areas of Canadian flexibility in its one-China policy during the early 1990s, and even these were conducted under a low key “peekaboo diplomacy” so as not to “offend” the PRC according to Paul Evans (1990, 89–90).

Political relations with Taiwan were a completely different matter. These were non-existent to begin with under the Canadian government’s plan of making the break with Taiwan “as total and complete as possible.” In 1970 the DEA issued a “Guidance for Canadian Officials Regarding Contacts with Taiwan” directing that “[w]henever possible Taiwan should not be explicitly identified as a country” in documents and publications, prohibiting the use of official stationery when dealing with it, restricting the use of Taiwanese diplomatic passports in Canada, and insisting on DEA prior consultation for any Canadian conference potentially involving Taiwan (Canada 1970a). Canadian official visits to Taiwan were to be conducted at the lowest possible level of official and with the lowest public profile while the Taiwanese were not authorized to visit Canada on official or diplomatic business. Officials dealing with Taiwan were not to mention that responsibility in government documents available to the public.

Not surprisingly, Paul Evans argued in 1990 that the provisions of Canada’s new one-China policy were “interpreted narrowly and enforced meticulously” (86). He also wrote that Canadian officials treated Taiwanese citizens at that time with “indifference, distrust, and occasional condescension” and Taiwan was “out of bounds, a pariah state” (86).

If Canada had a “meticulous” and “narrow” approach, the PRC had a very expansive interpretation of Canada’s one-China policy and it was oriented, unsurprisingly, against Taiwan. Most of the PRC efforts involved complaints of the Canadian government “tolerating the presence of ‘two-China’ activities” in Canada. This particular claim was issued by the PRC embassy over the Taiwanese Hai Chia acrobatic troupe flying the ROC flag and playing its national anthem during its visit to Canada (Frolic 1990, 49; Wu 2000, 267). The PRC ambassador complained over the presence of a ROC flag and title card on the Taiwanese stand at the 1974 Quebec Book Exhibition (Wu 2000, 267–268). The presence of one Taiwanese press officer in Ottawa’s National Press Gallery drove the Chinese Foreign Minister to complain that “[n]ationalist activities have reached staggering proportions” in Canada (Frolic 1990, 49).

Some Taiwanese activities had a wider impact. Prior to derecognition, Canada’s National Harbours Board had invited Taiwanese port authorities to the 7th International Association of Ports and Harbours Conference in Montreal to be held in June 1971 (Wu 2000, 265–266). Two Taiwanese port authorities had accepted but were denied visas by the Department of External Affairs after its attempt to have the National Harbours Board dis-invite them failed. The US State Department weighed in over concerns Canada’s action would set a negative precedent for the international community and contradicted Canada’s earlier promise to continue normal commercial and non-political relations with Taiwan (266). Canada’s DEA, on the other hand, felt that this and other incidents were actions of “deliberate sabotage” on the part of Taiwan against Canada’s one-China policy (Wu 2000, 263). As advancing relations with China was the Department of External Affairs’ overriding focus, Taiwan was soon seen as “a perennial obstacle to improved Sino-Canadian relations” (Evans 1990, 79).
One searches the historical literature for actual evidence of Taiwanese “sabotage,” but the only Taiwanese diplomatic fault seems to have involved a small number of cases where Canada had hoped for a discreet meeting with Taiwanese diplomats only to find the event publicized in the Taiwanese press (87). Similarly, in 1979, the DEA warned officials that “there have been several efforts in recent weeks by Taiwan to imbue slightest contacts with Canadians with [an] official tinge” without providing examples (Wu 2000, 303).

Contacts with Taiwanese officials were, therefore, avoided. Instead, Canada’s diplomats consulted frequently with China on resolving Taiwan issues, conversations which were unlikely to assist Taiwan’s case (Evans 1990, 89; 90). With no Taiwanese office in Canada until 1992 and no Canadian representatives in Taipei until 1986, countervailing advice was not available. At that time Canadian diplomats were also working on removing Taiwan from international organizations and the UN, as they pushed for the PRC’s entry (86). Taiwan’s situation was also not assisted by the PRC’s growing diplomatic and economic power, and Der-yuan Wu (2000) argued that this “strengthened its surveillance mechanism and increased its monitoring capacity with regard to other countries’ practice on [the] Taiwan issue” (406). As the result of its economic clout, he claims “[m]any countries, including Canada, had found it not affordable to neglect Beijing’s concerns when the Taiwan issue was invoked” (418).

There are a very few recorded examples of a Canadian push back to the regular PRC claims against Taiwanese activity in Canada. However, after the Chinese counsellor had presented a list of Taiwanese-related “offensive events,” one External Affairs official offered as personal advice that the counsellor “should consider seriously not wasting so much of his time and the time of others on it” (Canada, 1978, “BAPA Memo to NEAD” (DEA file A, 8775,29), September 22, as quoted in Wu 2000, 268). In 1988, Canada’s Department of External Affairs also sought the US State Department’s advice on dealing with this type of PRC complaint. The US offered that “USA spokespersons refuse to respond until Chinese develop [a] sound case to prove deviation from agmt” (Canada 1988).29

Pressure to change Canada’s one-sided one-China policy came primarily from the opposition and backbench MPs in Parliament. In 2001 the NDP pushed the Canadian government to support Taiwan’s entry into the World Health Organization (WHO) and World Health Assembly (WHA) but this was rebuffed; the foreign minister cited Canada’s one-China policy as the reason for its refusal (Hulme 2011, 56). However, the 2003 SARS virus crisis, and the PRC’s “secrecy and recalcitrance” in responding to it, suggested a readiness to “put politics dangerously ahead of international public health,” according to a Brookings Institution report (deLisle 2009, 5). This, in turn, generated considerable international support for Taiwan’s inclusion, and 163 Canadian MPs from all parties, with only 67 against, supported a resolution seeking Taiwan’s entry.
The government again rejected this call, indicating it needed to await the arrival of support from other states at the WHO (Hulme 2011, 58). Progress on Taiwan’s entry finally came in 2008 with the election of the KMT Ma Ying-jeou government in Taiwan. This led to the PRC itself supporting Taiwan’s entry as an observer at the annual World Health Assembly meetings the following year. According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, that was due to the Ma government’s readiness to accept that “there is only one China” (AFP 2018). When Ma was replaced with the more independence-inclined Tsai government in 2016, China quickly engineered Taiwan’s ouster from the WHA.

Backbench MPs’ efforts continued, and 2005 saw an attempt by approximately 150 MPs of all parties to create a Taiwan Affairs Act. Its similarity to the US Taiwan’s Relations Act was slim. The Canadian version did not provide for arms sales or contain the US version’s direction to its military to “maintain the capacity . . . to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion” against Taiwan (Taiwan Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. § 3301 (2012)).

Instead, the Canadian version made clear it would operate within the parameters of Canada’s existing one-China policy and focus on the mechanics of maintaining “commercial, cultural and other relations” (Bill C-357, An Act to provide for an improved framework for economic, trade, cultural and other initiatives between the people of Canada and the people of Taiwan). The bill also called for Canada to assist Taiwan’s entry into multilateral organizations focused on the “economic, trade, cultural, social and other” fields and remove travel restrictions on senior Taiwanese officials. During the bill’s debates the PRC embassy predicted the resulting destruction of Canada’s one-China policy (Fraser 2005).

In a similar vein, the Canadian foreign affairs officer sent to brief the committee declared the legislation “would empower Taipei to dictate an important part of Canada’s foreign policy agenda” and “could contribute to raising tensions” in the area (Canada 2005, 1115–1145). The potential damage would not end there, according to the official. He also predicted “our ability to engage with China would be severely limited” and it “would make it rather difficult for Canada to maintain our long-standing policy of multilateralism.” Despite very pointed requests from the Committee MPs, the official was unable to identify specifically what parts of the relatively anodyne draft legislation would cause such damage. The most problematic element of his testimony, however, involved the claim that the legislation would be “tantamount to unilaterally renegotiating the terms of our relations with China,” as it implied a need to negotiate mainland China’s agreement for any changes to Canada’s relations with Taiwan. Parliament was dissolved before any further progress was made on the Act.

Canada still operates under this highly constrained one-China policy. During my discussions with them, officials privately acknowledged that some of the rules may have been further tightened. Where the policy was understood to restrict only ministerial visits to Taiwan, today’s interpretation is frequently that no Canadian official at all should venture there. The 1970 aide-mémoire’s direction for government officials to not list “Taiwan” in their responsibilities
seems to have led to the Foreign Affairs office dealing with Taiwan being named the “Greater China Division,” a name even Beijing would have problems improving. Where Canadian conferences once had to get clearance for potential Taiwanese attendees, today, some officials would not go to a conference held anywhere if Taiwanese officials also attend. It is argued today that the policy’s long-standing narrow view coupled with some staffs’ ignorance of the actual policy details encourages self-censorship and a zero-risk approach to Taiwan.  

There were other factors that may have worked against Taiwan. While no hard evidence supports this claim, at the time of recognition the bureaucracy had to be mindful of the dangers of Canada being drawn into the regular PRC-Taiwan military conflicts with their continuing recognition of the ROC and the attendant possibility the US would call for our military support. Thus, supporting the PRC over Taiwan may have appeared the safer short term bet for avoiding Canadian diplomatic and, worse yet, military involvement.  

In addition, Arthur Andrew, Canada’s initial negotiator on PRC recognition, makes clear the External Affairs community was operating with no prior experience in switching recognition from one government to another and relied, it appears, inordinately on its legal advisers. Andrew (1991) himself admits the lawyers’ approach towards Taiwan was “draconian” at times (246–248). What was lacking, it seems, was a readiness to weigh the legal advice against the direction of Cabinet, the inclination of the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, and our promise to the US to explore methods of maintaining informal relations with Taiwan (Evans 1990, 85–86). Nothing was done to achieve this, all ties were cut, and Paul Evans (1990, 86) concluded “legalism prevailed over pragmatism.”  

Finally, Bernie Frolic argued the External Affairs’ staff was “under siege” (Frolic 1990, 44) from Pierre Trudeau and Ivan Head, his foreign policy advisor, who “sought to take firm control of the policy-making process and to reduce the influence of DEA in this process” (Frolic 1991, 211). As the government harboured broad doubts about the bureaucracy’s responsiveness, it would not have been wise for the staff to appear less than resolute in their actions with Taiwan. These factors, combined with a focus on wheat sales, high interest in future access to the PRC market, and regular complaints from Beijing ensured a rigid application of Canada’s one-China policy.

This was especially the case on the political-security front where there has not been the remotest suggestion of establishing any links or engaging in any military cooperation with Taiwan or its allies despite the regular security challenges to the island. The most serious of these was the 1995/96 Taiwan Strait crisis, which changed the outlook of many nations towards both China and Taiwan. The crisis had its origins in the first free elections of Taiwan’s president that took place in 1996. Jonathan Manthorpe (2002) argues that the PRC saw both candidates as “clear independists,” and, with no satisfactory outcome for the Mainland possible, “[i]t opted for a demonstration of rage” (221). The PRC then fired several unarmed missiles to impact just short of the island’s main ports and conducted a simulated invasion exercise.
The Taiwanese people, undeterred, concluded their successful election due in part to the support of the Clinton administration. The US had sent two carrier battle groups close to Taiwan and these deterred the PRC from any further action. In addition, France, alongside the United Kingdom, conducted contingency planning with the US military should the situation deteriorate (Shin and Segal 1991, 7; Segal, 1998, “Taiwan’s Strategic Context and the Strategy of Shsh-hh,” cited in Cabestan 2001, 12; Tucker 1998). The Japanese Foreign Minister informed his PRC counterpart that he did not approve of China’s war games and that Japan hoped the Taiwan issue could be settled through dialogue (Klintworth 1996, 22). Canada, however, offered no government support of any kind. There is a need, therefore, to examine how those states found they could support Taiwan politically or militarily despite having one-China policies not much different than Canada’s. The United States is the most straightforward in this regard.

United States

The United States’ one-China policy began early and developed slowly. In 1969 the US had begun secret negotiations with China on normalizing relations, with Henry Kissinger leading discussions in Beijing two years later. The US goals went beyond normalizing relations. Kissinger sought to enlist China’s aid in pushing an intransigent North Vietnam towards peace talks to end the Vietnam War and to link China, in Kissinger’s (1994) words, in “a tacit alliance to block Soviet expansionism in Asia” (728).

Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 successfully concluded these negotiations with the signing of the Sino-US 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. It stated that the US does not challenge the view that “all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.” The question of who would ultimately rule that one China, that is the PRC or the ROC, was left intentionally open. The Communiqué also made clear the US would not help Taiwan become independent or foster unification, but the US insisted that the final resolution be peaceful (Manthorpe 2002, 212). US observers have long complained that the PRC, on the other hand, incorrectly interprets the Communiqué to suggest it acknowledged the mainland’s right to Taiwan (Bosco 2018).

Actual US diplomatic recognition of China would have to wait until 1979 as the Nixon, Ford, and Carter presidencies all expected strong public and Congressional opposition. As a result, Manthorpe (2002) argues the deed of recognition “was done swiftly and in the dead of night” in early 1979 (215). As the prior 1972 agreement had also canceled the 1954 US mutual defence treaty with Taiwan, Congress began work on a replacement – the Taiwan Relations Act. Passed by 339 votes to 50 in the House of Representatives and by 85 to 4 in the Senate, the Act required the US to protect Taiwan’s independence, provide her arms to maintain sufficient self-defence capabilities, and maintain relations at what Manthorpe describes as “a high though superficially informal level” (218). In 1982, a second Shanghai Communiqué announced that the US would not exceed past levels of arms sales to Taiwan and that it would gradually reduce them.

From 1982 to 1992 US arms sales to Taiwan then steadily decreased in dollar value (Klintworth 1996, 9). However, the harsh suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrators significantly eroded the PRC’s standing in United States. This, and the PRC’s purchase of advanced Russian SU-27 fighters, was sufficient to allow the US to sell 150 F-16 fighter aircraft to Taiwan in 1992. The PRC missile firing during the 1995/96 Taiwan Straits crisis led to a further increase in US
arms sales and a greater readiness on the part of Congress to insert its usually positive viewpoint into the Taiwan arms sales process (Kan 2014, 26; 57). In addition, the US also chose to train Taiwan’s pilots and develop significant exchange programs to support their use of modern US equipment (Thim 2015).39

Simultaneously, China’s successful economic transformation had permitted a rapid increase in defence spending with double-digit annual increases that began in 1997 (Kan 2014, 33). This effectively doubled Chinese defence spending every five years in the Congressional Research Office’s estimation. A large part of that has gone into enhanced capabilities, including over 1000 short-range ballistic missiles that threaten Taiwan and the US ability to come to its defence.

China’s arms build up and the April 2001 intercept and forcing down of a US EP-3 intelligence aircraft in international airspace by the People’s Liberation Army Air Forces was followed that month by a new US arms sale package for Taiwan. President Bush also stated the US would do “whatever it took” to aid the defence of Taiwan including the committing of US forces (Manthorpe 2002, 232). In response to the overall decline in the region’s security, the Bush administration announced efforts to normalize military-to-military engagement with Taiwan, including expanding the US ability to host Taiwanese at its military schools, post US servicemen to Taiwan, and participate directly in Taiwanese exercises. High-level Taiwanese official visits were also allowed and this brought the Taiwanese Defence Minister in 2002 and its Chief of the General Staff to the US in 2005 (Kan 2014, 5). It was also understood that US arms sales would no longer automatically follow a persistent downward path.

President Bush approved the sale of eight diesel-electric submarines to Taiwan in 2001 to meet persistent shortcomings in the island’s anti-submarine warfare posture and enable Taiwan to counter a PRC blockade (Kan 2014, 8; 9; 11). Despite the reported interest in 2001 of two US firms, France’s DCN shipyards, Spain’s Navantia, the Netherlands’ RDM, and the German HDW consortium in assisting this program, it suffered a series of delays as Taiwan also considered its own ability to build them. (12; 13).

All of these arms sales were deemed “defensive” by the US and intended to ensure that Taiwan could delay any PRC offensive long enough for the US military to arrive. This policy was intentionally ambiguous and never open-ended. In 2003, for example, Taiwan’s President advocated referendums that would enrage China while providing little practical benefit to the island. President Bush then assured China “the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose” (27). However, the Assistant Secretary of Defense, in a follow-up, warned the PRC that its use of force to take Taiwan would “inevitably” involve the United States (28).

Surprisingly, the increased post-2016 mainland pressure on the Tsai government has not greatly increased US arms sales. The 2017 US arms sales reached $1.4 billion, but this was a reduction
of the previous year’s $1.8 billion. It did, however, include Mark 48 torpedoes for Taiwan’s existing and future submarines. This sale was accompanied with a US assurance to assist in their building, which was followed in 2018 by the State Department allowing US defence companies the marketing license to sell submarine technology to Taiwan.

The PRC’s post-2016 actions against Taiwan also led Congress to pass the 2018 *National Defense Authorization Act* that encouraged US naval visits to Taiwan and the *Taiwan Travel Act*. The latter, passed unanimously in 2018 after the Chinese embassy rashly warned Congress not to pass it, encouraged even higher level military and government official visits to Taiwan. The 2019 *National Defense Authorization Act* also strongly supported strengthening Taiwan’s armed forces, with provisions requiring a comprehensive assessment of Taiwan’s military assets, a plan to expand military-to-military engagement and joint training, and continued support for military sales, with a particular focus on helping Taiwan develop asymmetrical warfare capabilities.

**France**

France has also demonstrated significant flexibility within its own one-China policy. This began during the 1964 negotiations on establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing when French President Charles de Gaulle would not submit to a joint statement granting the PRC any right to Taiwan. However, France closed official relations with the island, although it allowed a low profile Taiwanese office to operate out of a “basement” in Paris (Cabestan 2001, 3). Ties with Taiwan were minimal until the 1970s.

Much like Canada, France responded to the increased trade brought about by the Taiwanese economic miracle by opening its own semi-official trade office in Taipei in 1978 while allowing a gradual increase in the Taiwanese presence in Paris. By 1989, the rapid pace of Taiwanese democratization, revulsion at the PRC’s handling of the Tiananmen Square protests, and, in one French observer’s view, “France’s weapon industry’s dramatic need for new clients” encouraged France to offer the sale of six of its new Lafayette-class frigates to Taiwan in 1991 (5). A massive three-nation bribery conspiracy, dubbed the “Dumas affair,” involving the French foreign minister, the Taiwan Navy, and, amazingly, private advisers to Deng Xiaoping, facilitated the deal (Manthorpe 2015). The bribes, and initial French assurances that the vessels would be delivered without weapons, combined with the limited PRC international diplomatic space post-Tiananmen, seemed to have significantly reduced China’s public opposition.

Soon after the French frigate sale, new French aviation orders were also viewed as critically needed as Dassault, France’s premier combat aircraft maker, had not won an order since 1986. An offer to Taiwan in 1992 to sell 60 of its advanced Mirage 2000 fighters was then executed as quickly as possible. It succeeded, although this time the PRC reaction was more violent. Beijing ordered the closure of France’s Canton consulate and froze some French firms from Chinese contracts. Similar pressure may have induced the German government to then decline further participation in the Taiwanese submarine purchase, and Berlin was apparently rewarded with the Guangzhou subway contract that France had sought (Cohen 1994).

By 1994, France was forced to come to an agreement with the PRC that appeared to promise a cessation of French arms sales to Taiwan, and, in a reversal of its 1964 position, publicly accept “the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China and
Taiwan as an integral part of the Chinese territory” (Cohen 1994). French firms were again allowed to bid on Chinese contracts.

Surprisingly, this did not end close Franco-Taiwanese relations, whether political or military. French ministers continued to visit Taiwan, often privately, and the French maintained high-level technical support in the country for its past arms sales. French exchange officers flew Taiwanese fighters, trained their pilots in France, and worked in Taiwanese ports supporting the frigates (Cabestan 2001, 14; 15). As has been noted, France also quietly worked with the US military in contingency planning during the 1995/96 Taiwan Strait crisis. Further, France reinterpreted its 1994 promise to cease arms sales to Taiwan to suggest as long as it showed “reserve” in so doing and avoided “offensive” systems the sales might continue. And they did (13).

In 1999, France also sold Taiwan a surveillance satellite that the PRC had correctly assessed had significant military capabilities and opposed (Mengin 2001, 3; Cabestan 2001, 14). This time, however, there appeared to be few repercussions for France from the mainland. In addition France continued to allow regular “working” ministerial visits from the Taiwanese government. France largely followed an evolving European Union policy that limited restricted entry to the Taiwanese president, vice president, premier, and the foreign and defence ministers, although at least four Taiwanese foreign ministers have made “secret” visits (Cabestan 2001, 13).

Japan

Japan has a much longer history with both China and Taiwan and that history continues to directly affect relations. The 1895–1945 Japanese occupation of Taiwan, while a dictatorship, was comparatively restrained and progressively brought significant benefits to the local people through economic development, universal education, and regulatory reform (Manthorpe 2002, 178–179). In part, this explains why Japan is the most widely respected country in Taiwan today, with 59 percent of Japanese listing Taiwan as their favorite country and 66 percent feeling “close” to Taiwan (Eldridge 2018). The brutal Japanese occupation of China (1931-1945) is, of course, viewed quite differently by the Chinese. Today, China insists Japan has not renounced its imperial past while Japan senses that China plans to hold it in “eternal guilt” over the issue (Munro 2005, 324). Nevertheless, Japan has invested heavily in China, where over 21,600 Japanese firms employ 9.2 million mainland Chinese (Hagström 2008, 228).

Interdependence has not reduced tensions between Japan and China and these stem from sovereignty disputes over the Senkaku Islands and concerns over China’s rising military power, reinforced by the views of a senior US naval intelligence officer who has argued that the PRC “was preparing for a short sharp war with Japan” (Gertz 2015). Not surprisingly, the question of Taiwan inserts itself directly into this fraught Sino-Japanese security calculus. This is in spite of the fact that Japan’s 1972 recognition of the PRC closely followed the Canadian approach by acknowledging the PRC claim to Taiwan (“Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of China”) without supporting it itself (Wu 2000, 247). Also like Canada, Japan was recognized for having “consistently adhered” to its one-China policy (Hagström 2008, 233).

Where Japan differs from Canada is in its recognition of the importance of Taiwan to its own security. This is longstanding, and in 1978 the head of Japan’s Defense Agency told his US counterpart that the defence of Taiwan was vital to the defence of Japan (Dreyer 2018). Japan is fully
aware that the loss of Taiwan to China would open up its southern flank and render Okinawa, let alone the Senkaku Islands, indefensible. There is also the widely held view that a failure to defend Taiwan could also lead to the loss of Korea and Japan.

Unsurprisingly, the 1995/96 Taiwan Strait crisis was of great concern to the Japanese government and it increased Japanese public support for a stronger US-Japan alliance significantly (Munro 2005, 324). In April 1996, the US and Japan then enlarged their security partnership beyond the original focus on the defence of Japan to include cooperation in areas near Japan including the East China Sea, and this necessarily included Taiwan (Klintworth 1996, 22).

In 2004 the PRC announced its intention to promulgate an anti-secession law for Taiwan and the law was passed the next year with a 2896 to 0 vote at the February National People’s Congress. The 2005 Anti-Secession Law endorsed “non-peaceful” intervention in the case of Taiwan’s “secession,” “major incidents entailing secession,” or the “exhaustion of possibilities for peaceful reunification.” Three months after the Chinese announcement of intent, the US and Japan (2005) issued a joint statement indicating that one of their common strategic objectives was to “encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue.” Linus Hagström (2008, 225) argues this could be interpreted such that the security of Taiwan was now within the US-Japanese alliance, while Jonathan Manthorpe (2002, 255) points out that the joint statement raises the possibility that Japan will join the US in defending Taiwan if it is attacked. China was reportedly “particularly outraged” over the joint statement given the obvious impediment this placed in the way of a forced unification (Jiang 2006, 334).

As the US Seventh Fleet is based in Japan together with over 39,000 US military personnel, Japan was going to be engaged in the defence of Taiwan under any scenario. Japan, however, is not relying entirely on its US military alliance and has revised elements of its restrictive constitution to allow wider military cooperation. It is working closely with India, and, while containing China is not the stated goal, the two states’ military cooperation has increased substantially (Crowley, Majumdar, and McDonough 2017, 5; 10-11). Japan has also significantly expanded its military ties with Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, and France, and has acquisition and cross-servicing agreements allowing the sharing of supplies, fuel, and ammunition with each (Kyodo 2018).

Of potentially even greater importance, Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary recently announced the possibility that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) could be opened to “various countries and areas, including Taiwan” (Scimia 2017). Taiwan has certainly made clear it is interested, and Japan has become the TPP standard bearer after the US withdrew. A Macdonald-Laurier Institute paper also recently argues such an expanded TPP offers an economic counterweight to China, a “burgeoning alliance” of like-minded, mostly democratic nations, and a needed counter to the PRC’s growing regional power (Crowley, Majumdar, and McDonough 2017, 5).
Conclusion

As each of these countries has interests, history, and proximity different from Canada’s, comparing their security posture with regard to Taiwan to our own has risks. One must guard against taking this too far, however. The US’s support to the island reflects, in part, a superpower’s broad military capabilities and responsibilities and a long history of assisting Taiwan. Offsetting this is the US requirement to carefully assess support for Taiwan against its larger worldwide responsibilities. It must also factor in the need to ensure ongoing cooperation with China on issues like North Korea. Japan’s close historical ties and proximity explain much of its support to Taiwan. It is, however, massively hamstrung by a rigidly pacifist constitution that embargoes military cooperation with others, save the US. France’s support for Taiwan has been linked to a persistent need to sell arms. Yet it must also factor in the competing need to penetrate the larger PRC market, European Union embargos – admittedly weak – notwithstanding. Moreover, all three states have one-China policies very similar to our own yet all were able to show more flexibility in security matters dealing with Taiwan.

The problem of rigidity in Canada’s one-China policy also goes beyond our inability to factor in the security environment. Changed circumstances and new evidence have had little effect on our one-China policy generally. For example, while PRC recognition was seen as an unvarnished diplomatic and economic triumph in 1970, by the late 1980s key observers of our Asian policies were having second thoughts. This paper has already noted that, despite popular views of our recognition being seen as an “act of independence” from bad US policy, it soon became clear that the Americans had, in fact, also begun efforts to normalize relations with the PRC in 1969 via secret negotiations, and were unlikely to oppose us.

Further, later-revealed Chinese research made clear Canada’s recognition of the PRC may have been as much a PRC initiative as it was a Canadian one. In 1991, Frolic also began questioning the Taiwan-related elements of Canada’s recognition of China, asking: “Should Canada have bowed to Chinese pressure and sacrificed Taiwan’s so swiftly? In retrospect, Canada abandoned its stated principles concerning the support of Taiwan abruptly and with little public discussion” (210–211). He also suggests a greater need for data on the influence of the parallel Wheat Board discussions with China that were underway as we negotiated recognition. In Taiwan, this is seen less equivocally. Writing in 1996, Ming Lee, of the National Chengchi University, argues one motive for Canada’s recognition effort was an “eagerness to gain access to mainland China’s large wheat market” (353). He suggests no other motive.

Certainly, large wheat sales to China immediately followed our recognition. The economic success of this policy was, however, increasingly doubtful. By 1989, as Frolic points out, we received no more of the assured long-term wheat contracts that immediately followed recognition, and, more worryingly, every bushel sent to China was subsidized by the Canadian taxpayer. As subsi-
dized wheat represented 70 percent of the value of our exports to China, the economic benefits of a relationship that initially appeared so alluring should have become suspect. This also forced Frolic (1990) to ask “should Canada continue to treat China preferentially on the promise that one day the PRC will not abuse human rights and will become a more open, democratic society” (60)?

None of these academic revelations sparked a rethinking of our one-China policy. Both Frolic and Evans provide a hint as to why our policy escaped review, and this is linked to the idea of Canada’s unique mission in China. Frolic (1991) describes a Pierre Trudeau-led process involving the “idealization of Canada’s special role” where “Canada had been given a mission to bring China out of isolation” (213). Evans (1990) then argues that our government’s investment in that relationship was “immense” (87) – “akin to the creation of the transcontinental railway a century earlier” (88).

Given that sense of mission and the fact that recognition of the PRC was immensely popular and seen as a “personal triumph” for Pierre Trudeau as well as his party and the diplomats involved, there was likely little internal interest in examining new evidence and costs (88). Instead, Canada advanced its one-China policy with, as Paul Evans states, a “vengeance” with the chief “victim” being Taiwan. Throughout, the PRC could be counted on to reinforce this by protesting even the slightest Canadian divergence from what it thought Canada’s one-China policy allowed.

The result, however, is that Canada is applying today a one-China policy designed in 1970 to bring China out of isolation and sideline a Taiwanese dictatorship. Conditions have changed dramatically. In particular, the evidence is overpowering that neither Canada’s nor anyone else’s engagement effort is having any positive effect on China’s human rights record or progress towards democracy. The Economist’s (2018) most recent assessment gloomily concluded that “the West’s 25-year bet on China has failed” as Xi Jinping “steered politics and economics towards repression, state control, and confrontation” (9). Moreover, China’s recent belligerency has gone beyond “Island Encirclement Patrols” to include building an elaborate mock up in inner Mongolia of the Taiwanese capital’s central government area to better practice a government decapitation attack (Lee 2015). China has also just posted an online video showing its forces exercising a take-over of a simulated Taiwanese city.

The only recent evidence of any Canadian policy change came as a result of the PRC’s successful 2017 effort to ensure Taiwan was not invited to the World Health Assembly. Beijing claimed the Tsai government would not ascribe to the one-China policy of its predecessor. In response, and for the “first time ever” according to one report, Canada, joined with New Zealand, publicly voiced support for Taiwan at the Assembly itself (Teng 2018). Germany then supported them on the first day and Japan, Australia, the US, and nine others joined on the second. While not able to overcome those hostile to Taiwan’s observer status, it was an important show of support for Taiwan, a rebuke of China, and a welcome break from Canada’s rigid application of its one-China policy.
There has been no comparable Canadian effort to insert needed flexibility in the security aspects of our one-China policy. Despite the example of the US, France, and Japan, there is absolutely no Canadian contact or cooperation with Taiwan or with our allies on its security problems. Paul Evans (2014) argues that our policy of focusing on the economic while ignoring the area’s security issues has resulted in Canada being seen as a “marginal, one-dimensional and declining influence in a region where economics and security are closely intertwined” (97).

In my discussions with serving and recently retired Canadian officials the most common reason advanced for ignoring Taiwan’s security is that some unspecified element of our one-China policy prohibits this. There is little to support this assertion. The 1970 Sino-Canadian joint communiqué says nothing against security cooperation, no scholar has unearthed anything prohibiting such cooperation, and nothing the author received through Access to Information or the National Archives sources addressed or forbade military cooperation or arms sales. One could make the extended argument that because Canada does not recognize Taiwan as a state, we cannot provide it with arms or cooperate with its military. No one has advanced this dubious argument and in 2017 Canada made plans to do both with the state-seeking Kurdish forces in Iraq.

Certainly China did not seem to be relying on the one-China principle when it protests US arms sales. Richard C. Bush, former head of the American Institute in Taiwan, argues that China’s consistent argument against US arms sales is that they lower Taiwan’s willingness to negotiate unification and that forces China to consider the use of force to achieve it (Bush 2014). In that the best offer the PRC provides is a variation of the Hong Kong model of “one country, two systems” there are problems. J. Michael Cole (2017), a Canadian security analyst in Taiwan, notes that “the erosion of freedoms and liberties that occurred after reunification” in Hong Kong has warned the Taiwanese they would lose their way of life and democracy in any similar arrangement with the PRC (102). Bush (2014) agrees and argues that the Taiwanese find the Hong Kong model “fundamentally flawed” and “incompatible” with their interests. He then argues, “[t]he better way for Beijing to achieve its political goals concerning Taiwan would be to make a more acceptable offer.”

**Recommendations**

Two separate lists of recommendations flow from this analysis. The first addresses needed changes to our security policy. The second covers potential changes to the non-security elements of Canada’s one-China policy and these are more administrative in nature.

**Security issues**

The recommended changes to our security policy have been framed with four ideas in mind. The first is that Canada has but modest deployable capabilities available in the Pacific region. This need not limit us significantly, as much can be done if we refocus on what we have and what we do today. We must, however, be cautious in not promising too much.

The second is more critical. Any effort to improve cooperation with Taiwan must be done with skill and a full understanding of the risks involved. In their dealings with each other, both the United States and Taiwan operate with the greatest of care to ensure that the benefits of cooperation are not outweighed by a potentially massive PRC counter-reaction. The US has also made it clear to Taiwan that US support is heavily qualified and a sudden, unilateral movement to
independence is unlikely to generate automatic support. In Taiwan, the current Tsai government, however much it is inclined to support future independence, operates with similar caution. Last year a Taiwanese Foreign Ministry official put it well by saying “our first priority is to not be the PRC’s first priority.”

Third, as Canada’s experience at the 2018 World Health Assembly revealed, at least five Western nations are ready to ally and confront China when its conduct is particularly egregious. Canada needs to support this group. Finally, the US military is central to Taiwan’s defence; this reality will not change anytime soon. However, the Trump administration’s erratic approach to alliances generally means Canada would be wise to watch and wait for up to year before taking overt action on some of the recommendations that follow. By then one hopes a more predictable US approach to its alliances will have emerged. During this time Ottawa should await opportunities:

• Canada, after a long pause, has started to redeploy regularly to the Western Pacific with naval ship patrols and a six-month submarine deployment to Japan in 2017. In addition, a CP-140 patrol aircraft is flying in support of North Korean sanctions monitoring and we have significantly raised our profile with the sending of a Lieutenant-General to the UN Command in Korea (Chase 2018). These initiatives should be sustained as they establish important links with the major security players in the region and allow us to assess, with others, any potential opening towards Taiwan. This will most likely occur with the US, Japan, Singapore, or India inviting Taiwanese forces to one of their multinational exercises. We should set a high priority on joining these exercises. Another option would involve Canada continuing its decades-long support to the Rim of the Pacific exercise if and when the US invites Taiwan.

• Much later, one may well see individual navies or groups starting to make port calls in Taiwan. This too would be best approached within a multinational framework. That framework is already forming, as recently seen at the WHA and also in the South China Sea, where Canada, the US, Australia, France, and Japan – joined next year with the United Kingdom – appear to have informally agreed to conduct regular naval transits to ensure freedom of navigation. These countries could expand their cooperation to include exercising with Taiwan. Should the security situation deteriorate to levels similar to those experienced in the 1995/96 Taiwan Straits crisis, it is likely, based on past performance, that a significant portion of that group would join in supporting a US action. By being engaged with them in the region’s security today, Canada will be better prepared to assist in an emergency. Canada’s influence with these framework nations will only be achieved with regular contributions of credible military forces to the Indo-Pacific region.

• Canada is also in a position to assist the US-sponsored effort to upgrade and eventually replace Taiwan’s submarine fleet. Currently two European firms, two US, one Indian, and one Japanese firm will bid their designs for the eventual Taiwanese-built replacement of these submarines (Gady 2018). Meanwhile, the Netherlands and the US are supporting the current Taiwanese effort to upgrade the existing 30-year-old Taiwanese submarines. Canada has extensive experience in this type of conventional submarine upgrading and has significant international success in selling and installing the key naval combat systems. It should join the upgrading effort.

• Taiwan is regularly tested by Chinese military probes, cyber attacks, and espionage. Canada would be wise to join the US intelligence effort there or, if a more cautious route is desired, follow recent muted Taiwanese-Japanese initiatives to establish a more formal intelligence-sharing agreement (Ihara 2018).
• The Canadian Trade Office Taipei should have a full-time security liaison officer or military attaché. Many of our allies do this, although the officer is not in uniform or so titled. A multi-tasked diplomat has neither the time nor the qualifications to deal with the range of cyber and espionage activities Taiwan’s authorities are forced to deal with on a daily basis. We can gain much from Taiwan as it is, by all accounts, responding particularly well to the cyber attacks.\textsuperscript{58}

• Canada’s military, intelligence services, and diplomats will require greater numbers of Chinese language speakers. This training is best conducted in Taiwan where full immersion training can be done in a relatively safe environment at top grade schools and universities.

• Canada’s think tanks, and especially those with a security component, should consider closer contact and the potential for reciprocal researcher exchanges with Taiwan’s Prospect Foundation or the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy.

• Security is tied to economics. Japan has suggested Taiwan should join the second round of the TPP (now called the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership). Canada should join with Australia and New Zealand and perhaps others to support this publicly. This could follow the combined effort those nations used when they joined to protest China’s exclusion of Taiwan from the World Health Assembly in 2018.

\textbf{Non-Security Issues}

Some of the following recommendations are provided in part because of the self-censoring that seems to have gripped some Canadian officials on matters concerning Taiwan. One serving and one former official argued that the lack of updated instructions and weak understanding within the bureaucracy of the policy in general leads them to the most severe, risk averse interpretation of what they think the policy is.\textsuperscript{59} It was also argued that too often it resulted in officials believing the Canadian one-China policy was the same as Beijing’s one-China principle. Correcting this would involve the government re-issuing and updating its policies in these areas:

• Declare that the only officials proscribed from visiting Taiwan, or their counterparts being received in Canada, are the prime minister, deputy prime minister, and the ministers of foreign affairs and defence. This follows the European Union model.

• Make clear that there are no restrictions on Canadian officials attending conferences in Taiwan or elsewhere. Whether the Taiwanese attend an international conference or not should not be a cause for concern.

• The Global Affairs Canada office dealing with Taiwan needs to be re-named from the “Greater China Division” to something more neutral along the lines of “China and Region Division.”

• The Canadian Trade Office Taipei should be renamed the Canadian Trade Office Taiwan. This follows the example of the US and Japan. Consideration should also be given to removing the “Trade” element as the Canadian office does more.

\textit{Canada, after a long pause, has started to redeploy regularly to the Western Pacific.}
• Canada should join with the US, Australia, France, Germany, the UK, and Japan to press for Taiwan’s membership in the World Health Assembly and World Health Organization. Taiwan cannot be represented by the PRC. China has failed to provide timely data on the SARS virus and exported, according to the Brookings Institution (deLisle 2009) “industrial chemical-tainted milk,” “fake or adulterated pharmaceuticals,” “lead laden toys,” “carcinogen-laced fish,” and “pork from ill pigs.” The PRC, at this moment, is also dealing with the suspect vaccines they have produced.

• Taiwan’s membership problems in international organizations do not end there. Despite the fact that its major airport has the world’s 11th largest passenger volume while hosting 74 airlines serving 135 global destinations, it has only participated in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) as a guest since 2013. Aviation Week notes this resulted in it getting late and incomplete flight data (Kao 2016). In 2016, China was successful in denying Taiwan observer status at its annual assembly and the flight data problem has likely worsened. There are at least 10 other arenas that deny Taiwan effective representation ranging from INTERPOL to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (Henderson 2017). Canada should work with its allies to develop a prioritized action list. Not surprisingly, this paper recommends Canada lead the ICAO file given its headquarters in Montreal.

• A Department of Foreign Affairs official attempted to convince parliamentarians working on the 2005 draft of the Canadian Taiwan Affairs Act that the act was “unilaterally renegotiating” our one-China policy, suggesting any changes must involve prior consultation with the PRC. This approach effectively hands control of our foreign policy to the PRC with absolutely no realistic expectation the PRC will consult with us on its decisions vis-à-vis Taiwan. For example, no one has suggested that Canada was consulted over the PRC’s intention to dis-invite Taiwan from the World Health Assembly or force Air Canada to relist “Taipei-Taiwan” to “Taipei-CN.” This one-way consultation practice with the PRC on Taiwan issues should stop.

One-way consultation with the PRC on Taiwan issues should stop.

This paper will not recommend the immediate preparation of a Canadian Taiwan Relations Act or similar instrument. In part, this recognizes the sad fate of Parliament’s 2005 Taiwan Affairs Act. Despite the reported support of the majority of MPs, the government opposed it, and the bill was allowed to die on the order table when Parliament dissolved (Hulme, 2001, 58-60). Support for a similar bill continues today but it is likely to face the same fate unless the government itself embraces it (Karalekas 2014). The unique success of the US Taiwan Relations Act, on the other hand, rests entirely on the US Congress’s independent right to initiate policy, a privilege Parliament does not enjoy. This recommendation also supports the view that Canadian action with regard to Taiwan should be incremental and taken at the same pace as our allies. This argues against packaging our response in some form of high visibility omnibus package.

Any one of these actions will undoubtedly produce the usual hyperbolic outrage from China. But, as Canada considers action on these suggestions, several things should be borne in mind.
Almost all of the recommendations are based on actions that some other Western-oriented nation has already taken. Further, many of the security-related recommendations were selected because they offer Canada the best option of joining a multinational effort in advancing them. This approach was chosen not to provide Canada cover, but because there is a growing number of states who want to take concrete security steps to send a clearer signal to a China that has not responded to engagement and is taking increasingly risky action against Taiwan.

In considering these recommendations the government of Canada must also return to its 2005 statement that it “is opposed to any unilateral action by any party aimed at changing Taiwan’s status” (Canada and China 2005). This analysis makes clear that this statement was not backed up by any Canadian military preparation at home or with allies. Doing nothing to defend a threatened democracy signals that Canada, a fellow middle power, is also ready to, however briefly, cease defending the rules-based international order that has protected it and allowed it to prosper these last seventy years. Ultimately our government would then have to consider the Economist’s (2015) warning that a state that does not stand up for those values “will inherit a world that is less to its liking.”
About the Author

Commodore Eric Lerhe was commissioned in 1972 and from 1973 until 1983 served in the HMCS Restigouche, Yukon, Fraser, and Annapolis. He then went on to command HMCS NIPIGON and SAGUENAY between 1987 and 1990. He then served as Director Maritime Force Development and Director NATO Policy in NDHQ. He earned his MA at Dalhousie in 1996 and was promoted to Commodore and appointed Commander Canadian Fleet Pacific in January 2001. In that role he was a Coalition Task Group Commander for the Southern Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz sector during the War on Terror in 2002. Commodore Lerhe retired from the CF in September 2003 and commenced his doctoral studies at Dalhousie. His PhD was awarded in 2012 and his thesis on the sovereignty implications of Canada-US interoperability was published by the Dalhousie University Center for Foreign Policy Studies. His current research interests are Asia-Pacific security, maritime strategy, and NATO.
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of-future-china-conflict/.


Endnotes

1 Disclaimer: In 2017 I participated in a visit to Taiwan as part of a group of 10 Canadian scholars organized and funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan. They had no role in the development of this paper other than answering my occasional question.

2 The 2020 date for retaking Taiwan was reinforced by China-based analyst Deng Yuwen in his January 4, 2018 article for the South China Morning Post, “Is China Planning to Take Taiwan by Force in 2020?”

3 He indicates the most likely attack window is 2020–2030. See also Kerry Gershaneck, 2018, “Taiwan’s Future Depends on Japan-American Security Alliance,” The National Interest.

4 A 2005 Sino-Canadian joint declaration marking Prime Minister Martin’s visit to China states that Canada “is opposed to any unilateral action by any party aimed at changing Taiwan’s status and escalating tensions.” Canada and China, 2005, “Joint Declaration By Canada And China.”

5 The prior Air Canada listings had also included “Taipei, TW,” and after the PRC’s demands, “Taipei, CN.”

6 Telephone discussion with Canadian government official, 1 December 2017. I had discussions with 10 serving or recently retired government officials in support of this paper.

7 A PRC corollary argues that a state recognizing it must also sever ties to Taiwan.

8 Jonathan Manthorpe (2002) credits the Qing Dynasty with controlling no more than 33 percent (18–19). In addition he argues, “Beijing denied having any responsibility for what happened in the islands aborigine territory in the mountainous eastern two-thirds of Taiwan.” Others have quoted the Qing Dynasty’s “Official Historical Record of Taiwan, Vol II, which states “Taiwan is a wilderness land and, from the beginning, never part of China” (cited in Charlie Smith, 2018, “Taiwanese Canadians Feel Betrayed by Corporate Kowtowing to Chinese Strongman Xi Jinping,” The Georgia Strait, June 17).

9 Note the elimination of the “Republic of . . .” in the PRC’s 1993 version, “The Taiwan Question,” 2.

10 The MOFA also points out the ROC has been an independent sovereign state since 1912.

11 Today, 178 states recognize the PRC, while Taiwan is recognized by 16.

12 J. Michael Cole argues these figures follow trend lines set over many years. See his 2017 Convergence or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait, 138–139. It can also be argued that those supporting the status quo are essentially supporting independence given that today Taiwan has all the practical attributes of an independent state (control over its own territory and borders, its own currency, national armed forces, and independent elections) and only lacks international recognition.

13 Writing many years later, Pierre Trudeau and his foreign policy adviser Ivan Head make that case in their 1995 The Canadian Way: Shaping Canada’s foreign policy, 1968–1984, 223 and 237.

14 The Board was instructed to make clear “its only mandate was wheat sales and nothing else.” One cannot be certain such issue isolation was possible especially given the Wheat Board’s above noted position on Taiwan in Cabinet.

See also Frolic, 2011, “Canada And China At 40,” 7.

He argues that beyond Taiwan, “The rest was shadow play.”


See also Evans, 1990, “Canada and Taiwan,” 81–82, where the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs’ proposal for maintaining unofficial links with Taiwan was never actioned.

What our long term political interests with China were was not explained.

The link with Taiwan was reportedly the NRC’s largest bilateral R&D exchange outside North America and given the advanced nature of Taiwan’s science and industries, this is not surprising.

In the 2000s, Canada was more likely to allow visits by high-level Taiwanese officials as long as they were not associated with the political, diplomatic, or defence ministries. See Wu, 2011, “Bridging ‘Forbidden,’” 74. The only recent Canadian ministerial visit to Taiwan was by Industry Minister Manley in 1998. See Jennifer Campbell, 2014, “Diplomatica: Taiwanese envoy urges ministerial visits,” *Ottawa Citizen*, October 1.


The ambassador was also offended that the Québec Minister of Culture opened the event.

See also Wu, 2000, “Institutional Development,” at 268 where the DEA “manoeuvred to prevent” a Taiwanese exhibition of Chinese painting and calligraphy at the National Archives in 1980 as a result of PRC pressure.


See also Wu, 2011, “Bridging ‘Forbidden,’” 89.

DEA did decline its Beijing embassy’s recommendation of formally recognizing the PRC’s sovereignty claim to Taiwan in 1976 (Wu 2000, 413).

The cable indicates the “Agmt” includes all three Sino-US communiqués. In the message the US added: “Thus far, Chinese have not/not proved adept or tenacious at such pursuit when the ball is in their court and issues are less than clear cut.”

See also Hulme 2011, 59.

As has been noted, the last Canadian ministerial visit was by John Manley, Minister for Industry, in 1998.

Discussions with Canadian government officials in 2017 and 2018.

See Evans, 1990, “Canada and Taiwan,” 82–83 for more on this topic.

This option would, in the author’s opinion, be of short term value only. As I hope I have made clear the potential for a PRC-Taiwan conflict remains high today.
35 See also Frolic 1991, 198.

36 Those working in large bureaucracies or corporations will be familiar with this pattern. Legal advice is normally followed. However, at times legal advice is developed narrowly or in a vacuum that ignores the institution’s larger interests. In this case a complicating factor was that the legal advice was being developed in an area where there were few precedents as Andrew makes clear. Hard or “draconian” legal interpretations should have been put under particular scrutiny in that case. At end of the day, the institution’s leaders must make a decision that reflects the institutions’ larger interests and demonstrate it is they who are responsible, not their advisers. There is no evidence of that oversight occurring in this event.

37 I was Commander Canadian Pacific Fleet from 2001 to 2003 and can attest to the lack of ties or cooperation.


39 See also Kan 2014, 23.

40 Jean-Pierre Cabestan was the Director of the French Center for Research on Contemporary China from 1998–2003.

41 See also Cabestan 2001, 6; 7. Ultimately France and the arms firm Thales were ordered to pay a fine of over 630 million on being found guilty of corruption. A Taiwanese naval officer was also found guilty of receiving bribes.

42 In 1993, the final vessel armament was delivered.

43 The speed of the sale likely had as much to do with not losing out to the developing US offer of F-16s as it did to evading a PRC effort to cancel it.

44 With thanks to Tom Donnelly and Vance Serchuk, 2005, “China’s Blunder: The Anti-Secession Law and Its Implications.”

45 See also Kan 2014, 49.

46 I have intentionally not converted TPP to CPTPP to avoid shifting back and forth.

47 A reviewer has unkindly noted the French conduct here is not unlike our support for China initially resting on our persistent desire to sell it our wheat.

48 Frolic (1991) notes that the US “appeared resigned to the inevitability of recognition and … would not place any obstacles in our path” (207; footnote 32). Wu (2000) provides, from US, WSHDC Tel to Ott Oct. 15/70: “In the end, the Canadian embassy gathered a general impression that the State Department and the Nixon Administration seemed to be privately pleased with the Canadian action” (195). This occurred as the Sino-Canadian communiqué was being prepared. The mild US reaction was also due to the fact that DEA had kept the US State Department fully informed on its progress with PRC recognition. This was part of a larger Canadian foreign policy practice of “engaged independence” vis the US. See Wu 2000, 185–187 and 191–193. I have not examined too closely the link between our unexplained need for haste in our negotiations and the US normalization negotiations. I am left to ponder if we were trying to steal a march.

49 The importance of such sales was significant with our earlier sales to China being seen by some as “the salvation of prairie agriculture” (Kyba 1991, 174).
50 For this thought I owe a debt to Gerrit van der Wees, 2018, “The Taiwan Travel Act in Context,” The Diplomat, March 19.


52 The images are convincing.

53 This video comes with a malware warning with the suggestion you watch it on a computer you do not highly value: http://hk.on.cc/cn/bkn/cnt/news/20180429/mobile/bkn-cn-20180429194537560-0429_05011_001.html?eventPath=tw_news&eventID=402883475929a1880159395c8fb80749. It shows PLA elements, likely from the 72nd Group Army, one of lead elements assigned for Taiwan invasion, practicing offensive operations on a mockup of a Taiwanese town. The town mockup reportedly includes a giant billboard that says “Chunghua Telecoms” (Taiwan’s national carrier). Nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare equipment was involved.

54 Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs briefing to Canadian scholars, December 4, 2017.

55 We have also sent a Naval Security Team to conduct mutual benefit training in Fiji every year. This deployment, in addition to demonstrating our commitment to the region, offers a low-key opportunity to cooperate with Taiwan in delivering training.

56 In 2015, the US House of Representatives attempted to amend the 2015 National Defence Authorization Act to force the administration to invite Taiwan to the 2016 RIMPAC exercise if it also invited China. See Thim 2015.

57 Singapore is another country well worth closer Canadian study. It skilfully balances close contacts with China with an independent mindset that permitted its very capable military to send up to 15,000 troops regularly to train and exercise in Taiwan. It does the latter quite openly but is reportedly under Chinese pressure to reduce numbers or stop outright.

58 I owe thanks to J. Michael Cole for many of these suggestions.

59 Discussion with government official, 1 December 2017. Email from former government official, 10 August 2018.
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In five short years, the Institute has established itself as a steady source of high-quality research and thoughtful policy analysis here in our nation’s capital. Inspired by Canada’s deep-rooted intellectual tradition of ordered liberty – as exemplified by Macdonald and Laurier – the Institute is making unique contributions to federal public policy and discourse. Please accept my best wishes for a memorable anniversary celebration and continued success.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE STEPHEN HARPER

The Macdonald-Laurier Institute is an important source of fact and opinion for so many, including me. Everything they tackle is accomplished in great depth and furthers the public policy debate in Canada. Happy Anniversary, this is but the beginning.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE PAUL MARTIN

In its mere five years of existence, the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, under the erudite Brian Lee Crowley’s vibrant leadership, has, through its various publications and public events, forged a reputation for brilliance and originality in areas of vital concern to Canadians: from all aspects of the economy to health care reform, aboriginal affairs, justice, and national security.

BARBARA KAY, NATIONAL POST COLUMNIST

Intelligent and informed debate contributes to a stronger, healthier and more competitive Canadian society. In five short years the Macdonald-Laurier Institute has emerged as a significant and respected voice in the shaping of public policy. On a wide range of issues important to our country’s future, Brian Lee Crowley and his team are making a difference.

JOHN MANLEY, CEO COUNCIL